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Abstract 
 
Today, the rapid growth of aged populations is a pressing issue across the globe. In 
China, longevity risk is also associated with complex social issues consequent on birth 
control policies in the 1980s, raising the demand for elder care services in recent years. 
However, the relatively high cost of elder care services creates financial burdens not 
only for elderly people themselves, but also for their children. While increasing 
retirement incomes, the Chinese Government has also promoted new forms of social 
elder care, introducing market mechanisms into public nursing institutions, to increase 
financial resources for elder care provision. This thesis analyses these new funding 
models for elder care, examining supply and demand side factors that shape their 
effectiveness within a theoretical framework of New Public Management (NPM) and 
social investment. First, case studies are used to compare funding policies in four types 
of nursing institutions in and around Wuhan, Hubei Province, to evaluate different 
Public and Private Partnership (PPP) funding arrangements and their consequent 
influence on the performance of the nursing institutions. Second, Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) is employed to calculate and compare the elder care services index in 
urban and rural areas. The outcomes provide insightful and useful guidance to identify 
probable problems within the elder care funding system. The results reveal that 
investment is more efficient when dedicated to financing the incomes of the elderly 
rather than to the construction of elder care institutions. The conclusions propose the 
feasibility of public long-term care insurance (LTCI) in China, as an appropriate 
approach to improve elderly people’s retirement income and thus their ability to 
purchase long-term care (LTC) in the future.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Research Background 
An increasingly aged population is globally a pressing issue, and China’s ageing 
problem is more severe than other countries due to the birth control policy in the early 
1980s. In 2000, the proportion of Chinese over 60 years and over 65 years was 13.26% 
and 8.87% respectively (Ministry of Civil Affairs, 2016d), an indicator that China was 
becoming an ageing society
1
. Since then, China’s population has been ageing fast. 
According to National Statistical Bureau (2017a), people over 60 years exceeded 230 
million by 2016, 16.7% of the total population. Among the elderly population, the 
population of people over 80 years was 23 million in 2015, and the growth rate was 
4.5% annually (Di, Chen and Li, 2016). It is estimated that elderly people will increase 
by approximately 1 million annually from 2016 (ibid). In addition, the longevity risk is 
also associated with disability and chronic illness. In 2015, the total semi-disabled and 
disabled elderly reached 40.36 million (National Ageing Work Committee Office, 
2016), accounting for 18.8% of the elderly population. Moreover, the dependency ratio 
keeps growing too. It is estimated that dependency ratio for elderly people in China will 
be 30% in 2023 (Powell and Cook, 2010). Thus multiple social issues consequent on 
growing numbers of elderly have created great challenges to and pressures on elder care 
provision in China.  
For centuries, it has been a Chinese tradition for elderly people to be cared for by their 
offspring (especially sons), which is called ‘bringing up sons to support parents in their 
old age’ (‘yang’er fanglao’ in Chinese). The traditional family-supported and 
inter-generational elder care pattern is still the most popular in China due to the low 
                                               
1
 By international definitions, an ageing society is defined as such if the proportion of the population 
aged 60 years and above accounts for 10% of the total population; or if the proportion of those aged 65 
years and above constitutes 7% of the total population (United Nations, 1956). 
2 
 
level of overall social security and undeveloped infrastructure for elderly people, 
especially in the vast rural area where the majority of elderly people still live below the 
poverty line without access to general elder care and relevant healthcare assistance. 
Meanwhile, the tradition of ‘fallen leaves return to the roots – return to one’s hometown 
when old’ (‘luoye guigen’ in Chinese) demonstrates that people prefer living with their 
children when they are old and need the financial support and physical care provided by 
their children until they pass away. However, recent demographic shifts and social 
structural transitions have made it increasingly unsustainable for family members to 
fulfill these traditional duties. In urban China, due to the one-child policy, the ‘4-2-1’ 
family structure
2
 is quite common. At present, the proportion of ‘empty-nest’ families3 
(‘kongchao jiating’ in Chinese) is over 50% in the cities, while the situation in rural 
China is much more severe, mainly due to the rapidity of rural-urban migration and the 
unprecedented development of urbanisation. In 2015, the population of rural 
‘left-behind’ elderly people4 (‘liushou laoren’ in Chinese) accounted for 23.3% of the 
total rural elderly people (National Health and Family Planning Commission, 2015). 
The pressures posed by longevity risk and deteriorating family capability for elder care 
has stimulated demand for government and market to provide more elder care services 
in China.  
In 2011, the Chinese State Council (2011b) issued a report – ‘Construction and 
Planning of Social Elder Care System (2011-2015)’. In order to respond to growing 
demands for elder care services and associated care provision, elder care services can be 
subdivided into three categories – home-based, community-supplied and 
institution-supported elder care services (ibid).  
                                               
2
 ‘4-2-1’ family structure is a common family structure in China, which consists of four grandparents, 
two parents and one child, so a young couple has to raise their only child and take care of four old 
parents. 
3
 ‘Empty-nest’ family refers to a family pattern that develops when elderly people, or a couple, live alone 
because their children move out to work or start their own family. Due to the ‘one child’ policy in the 
early 1980s, the only child in the majority of ‘empty-nest’ families moves elsewhere to live and work, and 
seldom returns to care for their parents and grandparents.  
4
 ‘Left-behind’ elderly people are those whose children live in other places for the long-term (usually 
more than half a year), and their parents stay in the family home. These elderly people’s lives are usually 
very simple and difficult, and they might need to raise their grandchildren. 
3 
 
The home-based elder care services mainly provide door-to-door services offered by the 
local communities. To those who are over 80 or disabled and stay at home alone, the 
local community would offer some free or market-based services, such as sending 
volunteers to help with shopping, cooking and housework, or social workers to impart 
healthcare knowledge and simple treatments, installing safety facilities for the elderly, 
offering emergency help or legal assistance, etc (Wang, 2015). In some wealthy 
developed regions, the communities subsidise some paid services, and local government 
encourages the construction of facilities for rehabilitation and medical assistance, so as 
to improve their quality of life and independence (Yang, Mao and Zhang, 2014). 
Community-supplied services are an important support for home-based elder care. They 
cover day care and home-based care as well as other elder care facilities, aiming to 
provide services to elderly people in the community who need daily assistance. In cities, 
every community is required to establish a home-based service point, which acts as a 
contacting and monitoring centre. This station usually apportions existing communal 
resources, including the community infrastructure and neighbourhood direction of 
entertainment, healthcare and rehabilitation facilities for elderly people. It advocates and 
guides various forms of volunteering activities and mutual assistance, convening people 
from all walks of life to participate in community elder care services. While in the rural 
areas, with the development of urbanisation and the introduction of the socialistic new 
rural construction movement
5
, some rural nursing institutions have been transformed 
into regional elder care service centres, which offer day-time or short-term care to 
‘left-behind’ elderly people. Relying on self-governance and collective economy, 
regional elder care service centres are exploring a new model of mutual assistance 
among the elderly (Chinese State Council, 2011b). 
Institution-supported elder care services have three basic functions: (1) daily care – 
satisfying elderly people’s requirements for dressing, eating, bathing, going to the toilet 
and outdoor activities, and so on; (2) rehabilitation nursing – helping elderly people 
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 The reform of ‘socialistic new rural construction’ was proposed in October 2005, with an aim to 
support overall development in the rural areas of China, including economy, politics, culture and society 
(The Fifth Plenary Session of the Sixteenth Central Committee, 2005). 
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recover physical functions or reduce rates of physical deterioration; (3) emergency 
assistance – providing elderly people in crisis with efficient help (Chinese State Council, 
2011b). China’s nursing is divided into two sectors: public and private nursing 
institutions. The public nursing institution is called Social Welfare House (‘shehui 
fuliyuan’ in Chinese) in China, and every city or town has at least one. The urban social 
welfare institutes only perform basic functions and duties, providing ‘Three-Nos’ 
elderly people
6
 (‘sanwu laoren’ in Chinese) with free elder care services. If these 
elderly people are not willing to come to the nursing institutions, the government gives 
them a basic monthly allowance. While in the rural areas, the local Social Welfare 
House offers free beds and care to ‘Five-Guarantees’ elderly people7 (‘wubao laoren’ 
in Chinese). In some cases, surplus beds in social welfare institutes can be provided to 
private elderly people (‘shehui laoren’ in Chinese8), who pay a reduced fee. However, 
the limited resources of Social Welfare Houses have already led to an inadequate supply 
of elder care services, so the Chinese Government plans to introduce market-based 
mechanisms into the public provision of elder care services to foster the establishment 
of private nursing institutions. 
Above all, the Chinese Government has initiated the establishment of an elder care 
system. However, this system is only free to a limited number of beneficiaries 
(‘Three-Nos’ and ‘Five-Guarantee’ elderly people). As to the rest, no matter how much 
they save for retirement, they are also stimulating a rising demand for long-term social 
care. However, the relatively high cost of elder care services creates burdens not only on 
elderly people themselves, but also on their children, or even grandchildren. As we see 
from the experiences in Western developed countries, economic growth preceded the 
genesis of an ageing society while in China, the current generation of elderly are 
‘getting old before becoming rich’ (‘weifu xianlao’ in Chinese) (Li, 2013). In other 
                                               
6
 ‘Three-Nos’ elderly people (sanwu laoren) are defined to be those who are over 60 years and have no 
labour ability, no financial source and no legal dependants.  
7
 ‘Five-Guarantees’ elderly people (wubao laoren) are those over 60 years living in towns and rural areas, 
without labour ability, income source and legal dependants, and thus, government will guarantee their rest 
of life in five aspects: eating, dressing, healthcare, living and funeral. 
8
 Private elderly people (translating as social elderly people,‘shehui laoren’ in Chinese) differ to the 
‘Three-Nos’ and ‘Five-Guarantees’ elderly people who are supported by the governments, so the 
privateelderly people need to purchase elder care by themselves or their children.  
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words, the majority of Chinese elderly people are relatively poor in their old age. 
China’s GDP per capita is only 22% of the average amount of that of the Organisations 
of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, while the proportion of 
Chinese elderly people over 60 years is equivalent to the average world level (Zheng, 
2011). Although China’s social security system almost covers all elderly people, the 
standard is relatively low, especially in the rural areas. During the last two decades, the 
Chinese Government has issued relevant policies concerning the increase in people’s 
retirement income, advocating several forms of social elder care patterns, and 
introducing market-oriented mechanism in public nursing institutions, in order to 
increase finance and expand social provision for the elderly
9
. In this sense, provision 
and funding for old age are not just a responsibility for elderly people themselves or 
their family members, but pose multiple social problems for both governments and 
markets. 
The debate over the evolution of elderly welfare policy in China over the last three 
decades has been quite controversial (Tsai, 1987; Leung and Nann, 1995; Zheng, 2011; 
Wang, 2012). Since the late 1990s, many new thoughts and strategies of social policy 
have been formulated and proposed that transform the state’s function in funding elder 
care provision. Social policy tends to be ‘people-oriented’ (‘yiren weiben’ in Chinese), 
indicating that the government pays greater attention to people’s living standards by 
fostering both public and private interventions in the provision of elder care services. In 
2000, the Chinese Government explored social welfare reform in elder care and 
emphasised the importance of ‘Socialisation of Social Welfare’ (General Office of 
Chinese State Council, 2000). This meant that the Chinese Government introduced 
more diversified investment channels and different providers, including individuals, 
families, society, the market, non-government organisations (NGOs), non-profit 
organisations (NPOs) and charitable organisations, in order to generate more investment 
in the elder care system. Subsequently, a number of government documents specifying 
the provision and finance of elder care in China emphasised the diminishing role of 
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government and the integration of public and market-based financial resources. Various 
financial policies to expand elder care services and increase elderly people’s retirement 
income have been introduced in different localities. In the latest 19
th
 National 
Communist Party of China (CPC) Congress, the president Xi Jinping (2017)
10
 points 
out that China’s current major social contradiction lies in the increasing demand for a 
better living standard and in a context of unbalanced development. This provides a 
political guide for the further improvement of China’s social policy for elder care in the 
Thirteen ‘Five-Years’ Period (2016~2020). In other words the Chinese Government 
should strengthen the social security system and integrate social and market resources 
on elder care, in order to enhance the elderly’s social welfare, as well as narrow the gap 
of elder care funding between the urban and rural areas and between different regions. 
The above outline of China’s elder care describes the general background of elder care 
provision and funding in China. Over the past 10 years, positive outcomes have been 
produced in the reform of elder care funding, both on the supply and demand side, but 
this also triggers new problems and challenges which are either generated from policy 
weakness or flaws in the system itself. This research focuses on the funding models of 
China’s social elder care services, and systematically analyses the main problems 
existing in current elder care service funding in China. Public expenditure on elder care 
services has expanded continuously year on year, and the participation rate of private 
sectors keeps increasing too. However, problems such as inadequate funds and lack of 
elderly facilities are still the main driving forces that restrict the development of elder 
care services. At present, current funding models for elder care services in China mainly 
operate on the supply side. New approaches include various mixed funding methods (i.e. 
public-private partnerships) to fund the construction and operation of elder care services. 
However, elder care funding on the demand side is not really developed in China. 
Although China’s current social welfare system covers nearly all aspects of elderly 
people’s life, it still remains quite low level and cannot cover long-term care (LTC) for 
all. In this respect, a research perspective on the issue of how to fund elder care services 
                                               
10
 In the report ‘Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects 
and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era’. 
7 
 
in China is unusual, as this dimension is too frequently ignored. Thus, this research has 
both theoretical and empirical significance that is described below. 
 
1.2 Significance of the Research 
From a theoretical perspective, the significance of the research lies in the application of 
several theories related to neo-liberalism, new public management and social 
investment. The care system plays a very important part in elderly welfare, and it should 
target all elderly people who need daily and medical care in their old age. Thus, it is 
necessary to explore the theoretical foundations that underpin the funding system of 
elder care and the coverage and level of elder care services. At present in China, the 
funding of elder care is conducted in two different paths, which are studied in this 
research – supply and demand side – and can be explained by different but related 
theories.  
On the supply side, a market-based mechanism has been introduced and applied in the 
process of reforming public nursing institutions and the expansion of new facilities. 
Neo-liberal ideas have affected the traditional administration within public nursing 
institutions. New market-based approaches in public management are considered more 
motivating and efficient than simple public provision. As to the latter form, the evidence 
of this research demonstrates how multiple arrangements – with care providers and 
financial institutions – have long been found in the provision of elder care/long term 
care. Indeed, we might conclude that this has always been the case and that the creation 
of a model of ‘public-private partnership’ is a construct that simply applies a new label 
to well-established systems. 
Added to the market-based dimension, there is an increasing recognition that social 
policy for some purposes or in some forms can contribute to both economic growth and 
social development. Thus social policy should be conceptualised as ‘investment’ rather 
than ‘public expenditure’. The term ‘social investment’ has been used to describe 
various attempts that aim to prevent social risk and personal misfortune by investing in 
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people’s talents and capacities rather than merely offering economic compensation 
through fiscal subsidies. The idea of ‘social investment’ is to integrate the economic and 
social dimensions of policy and achieve the aims of both economic growth and social 
stability (Perkins, Nelms and Smyth, 2004: 2-3). Thus, ‘social investment polices’ 
include various attempts that offer services (mainly through education and training) to 
enable all to develop human capital and enhance personal capacity and to contribute to 
the creation of wealth (Giddens, 1998: 117). In a social investment state, social policies 
can be gradually turning its focus away from employment and towards social services, 
in order to increase labour market participation rates and help more people avoid 
welfare dependency (Esping-Andersen, 1994). Elder care or LTC is difficult to 
accommodate under this perspective. This research will explore how entrepreneurship 
and state funds combine to increase resources to expand social provision for the elderly 
in the empirical cases found in and around Wuhan, Hubei Province. 
On the demand side, funding for elder care services is commonly conducted as part of a 
social insurance model, with the participation from the government, enterprise and 
individuals. At present in China, elder care is provided under a single social assistance 
system, but might revert to a moderate universal social insurance system (e.g., in the 
form of public long-term care insurance). This would mean that the coverage of 
beneficiaries will turn from low income people alone to all elderly people enrolled in 
the public medical insurance scheme. Elderly people can obtain a certain proportion of 
cash benefits or a form of elder care services from a mixed funding pool. In addition, 
this research further explores investment outcomes by using statistical analysis to 
discover which investment strategy is more efficient, and whether returns from 
investment can contribute to the improvement of the living standards of the elderly 
people as well as the quality of the elder care service as a whole.  
On the empirical level, the provision and funding for elder care/LTC is currently a 
global issue, which is given priority in all developed and developing countries. In China 
in particular, with the very swift development of urbanisation and industrialisation, 
different consequences (e.g., smaller family structure, etc.) resulting from demographic 
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shifts have already put great pressure on traditional informal elder care provision. The 
change of policy to involve more market-based mechanism demonstrates the 
multiplicity of arrangements that can emerge in response to local conditions, all of 
which involve the private sector. However, it is hard to conceive of private provision of 
elder care services that does not involve the state. How far this involvement of 
commercial institutions compromises welfare objectives that seek to prioritise human 
need over financial profit is a recurring theme in this research.  
Currently, there are mainly two challenges in the development of an elder care provision 
and funding system in China. On the one hand, the coverage rate of social elder care is 
low, and the quality and level of elder care services is also poor. The provision of elder 
care is inadequate for both urban and rural elderly people, and a fragmented social 
welfare system and the widespread differences in invested funds in different regions 
have led to growing inequalities in the provision of social welfare. On the other hand, in 
the process of expansion of elder care provision, the Chinese government encourages 
the private sector in local areas to explore diversified funding models for the 
construction and operation of nursing institutions or other relevant facilities. Whether 
these funding models can produce expected results is important to judge the efficiency 
of the investment. Therefore, the research offers a comprehensive perspective on a work 
in progress, as the Chinese Government has introduced new initiatives in this area 
consistently over recent years – and the results will take time to show through. 
 
1.3 Research Questions 
Much of the research into the field of elder care/long term care, in China as elsewhere, 
has focused on the professionalization of elder care, the needs of the elderly people, 
strategies for coping with an aged population and so on. Far less has addressed the 
problems of funding. Accordingly, this thesis addresses the following specific 
questions: 
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RQ1. What are the achievements and problems of current funding arrangements for 
elder care/LTC on the supply side in China? 
RQ2. Can LTCI work as a social insurance to benefit the Chinese elderly people on the 
demand side? How can China learn from international lessons in this area? 
RQ3. Does the analytical framework offered by PPP funding arrangements help us 
analyse current trends in funding elder care/LTC in China? 
RQ4. What is the investment efficiency in the elder care funding in China? Which 
investment orientation is more efficient in terms of extending care for the elderly?  
RQ5. What kinds of elder care funding seem to be working most effectively at present 
that might serve to direct future policy? 
 
1.4 Research Contributions 
This thesis offers critical insights and useful guidance to policies shaping elder care 
funding in China, and the situation will be analysed from the following three aspects: 
1.4.1 Contribution on Theoretical Exploration 
Chinese politicians and academic scholars constantly seek to find a solution to establish 
an elder care funding system using perspectives developed by relevant Western scholars. 
There are plenty of studies of neo-liberalism and New Public Management (NPM) on 
the management and delivery of welfare systems (Perkins et al., 2004; Lee and Mcbride, 
2007), while few explain these principles and their application to China’s current elder 
care funding system. In addition, current research on social investment theory aims to 
foster the development of human capital and enhancement of people’s capabilities, 
through investments in education and training. However, investment in elder care is 
unlikely to be an area that yields positive and productive returns. Thus, this research 
will offer an insight to extend the theoretical connotation and applied range of the social 
investment theory.  
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Additionally, studies on the structural arrangements of social welfare institutions 
usually consist of two different views: residual welfare and universal welfare (Titmuss, 
1976). In the field of elder care funding, residual welfare refers to means-test safety-net 
models that aim to provide social relief to the very poor elderly people, while universal 
welfare systems involve cooperative participation from market, society and government. 
This research will explain how elder care funding is currently being transformed from 
residual relief to more universal provision in China from the perspective of an 
institutional transition. Therefore, this thesis offers a theoretical foundation for ‘welfare 
triangulation’ as a funding model that includes market, society and government, which 
offers a new perspective to improve China’s elder care funding system. 
1.4.2 Contribution on Empirical Guidance 
The research focuses on elder care funding as the main theme and explores the various 
funding arrangements from the perspectives of supply and demand. On the supply side, 
China’s elder care funding is mainly guided by government. The main source of funds 
for the construction of elder care industry comes from direct funding, public funds 
(mainly from central and local tax revenues), mixed funds (from the private investors 
and government) and purely private funds (market-based operations). A series of 
preferential policies (e.g., preferential tax, land leasing, credit funding) is adopted by the 
government as a form of indirect investment. The result implies that the construction of 
China’s elder care industry is promoted and conducted by the mixed funding models. 
The forms of funding arrangement of elder care services are decided by the degree of 
participation by the private sector and government. This usually results in varied mixed 
forms of financing arrangements operating under a partnership between government and 
market agencies. At present, various forms of elder care funding on the supply side have 
been generated in China, such as, ‘Public Construction and Private Operation’, ‘Private 
Build and Public Subsidy’, ‘Public and Private Partnerships’, etc11. The research 
explores the performance of these models using four typical cases of PPP projects that 
deliver institutional care in and around Wuhan, Hubei Province.  
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 These funding models will be examined in section 5.3. 
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This research also summarises the financial resources that elderly people have available 
to access elder care from the perspective of the demand side. Lessons can be drawn 
from the international experiences and lessons from Western countries, such as, 
Germany and Japan, which have implemented LTCI for more than two decades. In 
China, free elder care services are only provided as social assistance on a mean-tested 
basis for the vulnerable (‘Three-Nos’ and ‘Five-Guarantees’ elderly people). Public 
LTCI in China is quite new and may prove an important funding model for all private 
elderly people to access services in the future.  
1.4.3 Contribution on Research Methods 
The quantitative method employed in this research is unique, and offers a useful 
analytical insight to determine the efficiency of public financial inputs for elder care 
services in China. This compares the differences in the regions and between the urban 
and rural areas. It establishes an elder care service index system, and uses a Data 
Envelopment Analysis method and multiple linear analysis to evaluate the efficiency of 
public financial input in the elder care industry. 
Additionally, the decision to observe how funding issues are addressed from a local 
perspective influenced part of the research design adopted in this research. However, 
closer examination of local situations revealed how private nursing institutions within a 
major city combined very varied systems of generating funds and this more specific 
perspective was adopted to shape the analysis documented in Chapter 7
12
. 
 
1.5 Thesis Structure 
This thesis contains ten chapters:  
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 The research methods will be explored in more detail in section 3.2. 
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Chapter one (Introduction – above) has offered some background information, 
established the significance of the research, and identified the research questions, 
research contributions and the structure of this thesis. 
Chapter two (Theoretical Perspectives) examines some relevant theories and explores a 
theoretical framework in funding for the elder care services in China as a whole.  
Chapter three (Literature Review and Research Methodology) offers a critical 
assessment of the research methods and research design.  
Chapter four (Historical Development and Rationales leading to the Construction of 
Elder Care System in China) reviews historical changes in the policy orientation on 
elder care funding in China over the last few decades, and illustrates how and why 
public policies related to elder care funding are being transformed from 
government-dominated provision to public-private partnerships.  
Chapter five (Funding Models for Elder Care in China) provides comprehensive 
summary of the overall structure of funding for elder care in China and discusses the 
relative problematic issues within the various funding models employed.  
Chapter six (Financial Resources: The Ability of Elderly People to Pay for Elder Care 
Services) examines the overall structure of financial resources provided for Chinese 
elderly people by addressing social insurance benefits and alterative old-age assistance. 
It also discusses the differences in financial conditions between urban and rural elderly 
populations, and analyses the reasons behind the low purchasing power of the majority 
of elderly people. 
Chapter seven (Funding for Institutional Care in Wuhan, Hubei Province: Case Studies) 
presents four typical institutional cases in a major city in central China (Wuhan, Hubei 
Province), to demonstrate how each reveals different funding arrangements and assesses 
comparative performance achieved by the variety of partnerships between government 
and the private sector.  
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Chapter eight (Empirical Analysis of the Financing Efficiency of the Elder Care: Based 
on the Perspective of Public Expenditure) establishes an elder care service index and 
analyses the efficiency of public expenditure on elder care in China.  
Chapter nine (Elderly Welfare Policy: A Feasibility Analysis for Establishing Public 
Long-term care Insurance) offers a statistical estimation on the elder care supply and 
demand scale found in China and proposes a pathway for the elder care funding system 
in the future.  
Chapter ten (Conclusion) concludes with findings and explains some limitations of this 
study, as well as including suggestions for further research. 
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Chapter 2 Theoretical Perspectives 
 
 
In the context of neo-liberal economy and later new public management theories, 
governments in most western countries have made great efforts to adopt 
market-oriented approaches to reform traditional bureaucratic systems at all levels 
radically and thoroughly. At the same time, many new ideas about welfare policy 
concerning the transformation of the role and function of the state in the provision of 
social services have been proposed, including bringing business ideas into public 
administration, applying technological information in managing public routines, setting 
up performance criteria and targets for the delivery of public goods and services, etc. 
Additionally, the public sector is encouraged to cooperate with the private sector, 
generating ‘joined-up’ partnership models to be applied in funding and providing social 
services. Central to these empirical changes, neo-liberal initiatives, in turn, have 
provoked efforts by most western countries to transform from a welfare state to a social 
investment state which claims to combine extensive social protection with support for 
economic growth.  
With the rise of demographic ageing and growing demand of social services for the 
elderly, elder care has become one of the major public services both in the developed 
and developing world. Apart from outright privatisation, a variety of cooperative 
mechanisms have been proposed and adopted in public service provision. Rethinking 
and re-emphasising the development of market-based elder care from a social 
investment perspective is central to this research. Thus, this chapter mainly focuses on 
theoretical perspectives underpinning social investment. The first part reviews the 
background of neo-liberalism, elaborating on how and why neo-liberal theories affect 
welfare states and the relationships between states and markets. Second, it presents the 
alternative delivery mechanisms of public social services by discussing the performance 
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of public management reform and analysing the transformation in the role of those 
services which introduce a market-based approach in cooperation with private agencies. 
The third part describes the theoretical arguments underpinning the transition from 
welfare state to social investment state, and explains its criticisms and problematical 
issues on implementation of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). The last part explores 
this theoretical framework and its practical consequences for elder care services in 
China.  
 
2.1 Rise of Neo-liberalism: Against Welfare States and In Favour of 
Markets 
Esping-Andersen (1990) once described the post-war development of the welfare state 
as ‘politics against markets’. It is evident that state intervention has been a dominant 
economic approach that has achieved well-recognised economic growth success around 
the world. However, the political, economic and social changes that appeared in the 
final decades of twentieth century undermined confidence in statist economic policies, 
as well as placed increasing pressure on social welfare provision. Moreover, 
ever-growing flows of goods and capital both nationally and internationally have shrunk 
governments’ capacity to guarantee consistent and stable welfare entitlements and job 
security. In this respect, politicians attempted to find out a way to transfer the role of 
government in delivering public services, and some adopted neo-liberal reforms to their 
welfare systems. The most well-known are those introduced by Margaret Thatcher in 
the United Kingdom and Ronald Reagan in the United States in the late 1970s and early 
1980s (Jones, Parker and Bos, 2005). To be specific, neo-liberal reform was generated 
in a particular context: 
Firstly, since the end of the 1970s, the occurrence of oil crisis witnessed the demise of 
the ‘welfare golden age’ of the 1940s to the 1970s. Most welfare states could not 
maintain a managed market economy to further sustain and develop welfare (Schmidt, 
1983). The economic recession exposed the limits of a Keynesian approach. That had 
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addressed strong job protection, high minimum wages and overly generous 
unemployment support, which led to a simultaneous rise in unemployment and inflation 
(Esping-Andersen, 1994). Unlike the Keynesian demand-side approach which 
emphasises ‘passive’ social policies and government intervention via fiscal policies, the 
supply-side approach supported by neo-liberals views social expenditures as an 
impediment to economic growth and social stability and argues that economic growth 
can be effectively generated by lowering the threshold for market access and capital 
investment, so that the consumers can benefit from a greater supply of goods and 
service at lower prices (Goodwin, Harris, Nelson, Roach and Torras, 2015).  
Secondly, economic globalisation is the external factor driving welfare state reform. 
Due to the end of cold war, competition between the states largely comes from the 
economic field rather than political ideology. In the process of economic globalisation, 
the mobility of products, technology, information and labour are much more frequent 
than ever before. Due to high welfare expenditure in welfare states, together with cheap 
migrant labour and the development of multinational corporations, a rising 
unemployment rate made the country less competitive in the context of global 
competition (Armingeon, Beyeler and Binnema, 2001). Thus, globalisation and in-depth 
economic integration expose national economies to competitive pressures, stimulating 
them to reduce social expenditure and create a more flexible labour force with lower 
marginal taxation and less regulation (Cox, 2012: 18).  
Thirdly, the comprehensive systems found in Keynesian welfare states gradually 
increase the disadvantages consequent on rising welfare dependency as people realise 
that the opportunity cost of returning to work is greater than being unemployed and 
relying on social insurance benefits. This situation is regarded as the ‘welfare trap’ 
which reduces individuals’ work incentives and constrains their financial accumulation 
(Kaasch, Starke and Breme, 2010). Giddens (1998) points out that the resulting high 
unemployment would aggravate the government’s fiscal burden and make welfare 
expenditure unsustainable. Additionally, welfare states also face many other social risks: 
changing employment patterns and family structures, along with the increasing aged 
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population and growing participation of women into the workforce, have triggered more 
negative effects on the development and sustainability of welfare states.  
Above all, the integrative forces of economic globalisation, fiscal burdens and welfare 
dependency have strengthened neo-liberal arguments, which directly led to the 
gradually shrinking government, the introduction of market mechanisms and 
retrenchment in state welfare provision from the late 1970s. Since the first ‘Washington 
Consensuses’13 was promoted in 1989, neo-liberal approaches and practices have 
dominated the relationship between states and markets in both the developed and 
developing countries (Lee and Mcbride, 2007). Policies promoted by economic 
neo-liberals are found in many areas: privatisation, deregulation, free trade, fiscal 
austerity, and reductions in social expenditure are designed to stabilise the domestic 
macroeconomic environment and enhance the role of the private sector in the economy.  
 
2.2 Restructuring Delivery Mechanisms: Alternative Governance 
The debate over the institutional character of the state and role of government in the last 
two decades of the twentieth century was increasingly intensified thanks to neo-liberal 
policy. This debate became most focused in the 1990s when a new approach, defined as 
New Public Management (NPM), addressed the capacity of public administration to 
secure the efficient and effective provision of public services under a minimal state 
(Hughes, 1997; McLaughlin, Osborne and Ferlie, 2006: 7). With in-depth processes of 
reform within the public sector, many countries have focused on a series of cooperative 
arrangements to deliver social services. With the collaborative involvement of 
governments, non-government organisations, profit or non-profit sectors, public-private 
partnerships fit into the new public governance regime as they allow governments to 
cooperate with a number of private sectors in often contractually sophisticated and 
                                               
13
 ‘Washington Consensus’ is a ‘standard’ reform package which contains 10 economic policies 
promoted by Washington, D. C. for economic transitional countries in 1989. The prescriptions covered 
the areas including fiscal policy discipline, tax reform, trade liberalisation, privatisation of state 
enterprises, deregulation, and legal security for property right, etc.  
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complex relationships, to jointly develop products and services, as well as share rewards, 
risks, costs and resources (Van Ham and Koppenjan, 2001: 598).  
2.2.1 New Reforms in Public Management 
In the last decade of twentieth century, new market-based management within public 
sectors has been intended to replace the traditional bureaucracies featured by hierarchy, 
direct planning and control, centralisation and self-sufficiency (Stewart and Walsh, 
1992). This NPM is regarded as the solution for improving performance in various 
organizational contexts, and it also can affect political decision making in social welfare 
reform. Under the NPM system, public managers have an incentive-based motivation 
and discretion, and concentrate on the business-like professional management ideas and 
approaches proposed by the private agencies, which more rely on customer satisfaction, 
market mechanisms, information technology and entrepreneurial spirit to raise standards 
and secure efficiency (Farazmand and Pinkowski, 2006).  
It is argued that the practice of NPM first emerged in the United Kingdom under the 
leadership of Conservative government. The Prime Minister – Margaret Thatcher – 
launched radical changes in public management policy in the areas of civil services, 
labour relations, expenditure planning, state-owned companies, financial management, 
etc., with an aim to defeat inflation, curb the power of trade unions, liberalize markets 
and restrict the extension of state intervention (Wolf, 2014: xix). The Conservative 
government’s agenda of public management reform involved the privatisation and 
marketization of public services, so enhancing the ability and responsibility of public 
authority to guarantee an economic, efficient and effective delivery of these services 
(Hughes, 1997). Subsequently, the impact of NPM spread. Since the start of the new 
century, the central function of NPM has been away from a narrow focus on 
marketization of public services, and towards a concentration on coordinated 
partnership relationships. The government is no longer defined solely as a planner or 
provider for public services. On the contrary, it seems that the planning, management 
and provision of public services are negotiated between a number of participants, 
including the government, communities, voluntary organisations and the private 
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commercial sector. In this model, the primary mission for government is to deal with 
these complex networks of public service provision (Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan, 
1997; Clarke and Stewart, 1998). In this respect, the development of NPM is an 
evolving phenomenon rather than a static process.  
For a long time, there has been a general idea that public service has a quasi-charitable 
nature and the state is always seen as an effective redistributor of sources or as a 
producer of last resort, in order to ensure equity and fairness, and avoid market failure 
and the decline of social value (Walsh, 1995: 4-6). However, there is also another 
general argument against state provision of public services, stating that it is ineffective 
and inefficient to operate on bureaucratic and rational planning principles, due to the 
waste of public resources and lack of incentives to control costs, and the inability of 
politicians to make informed decisions and monitor performance. This debate leads to 
the paradoxical conclusion that purely privatisation or total government intervention is 
not possible, state activities need to be operated and managed through the introduction 
of market mechanisms. Thus, the NPM has been seen as a transitory stage in the 
evolution from traditional public administration, and it is denoted as an implementation 
regime within the overall field of public policy implementation and public service 
delivery.  
The spread of NPM, from the beginning of 1990s onwards, has asserted the superiority 
of private-sector managerial techniques over those of traditional public administration, 
with the assumption that the application of such techniques to public policy 
implementation and public services delivery would lead to improvements in the 
efficiency and effectiveness of these services (Thatcher, 1995, as cited in Osborne, 
2006). Thus, there are several key elements of NPM in the field of public service 
provision which can be summarised as follows. First, NPM focuses on professional 
entrepreneurial management which is the advantage of private sector performance: to 
establish short-term labour contracts, and design corporate plans, performance 
agreements and mission statements which are focused on the targets that public agencies 
are trying to reach. Second, NPM promotes competition in the public sector which 
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could in turn lower costs and service prices, avoid restriction and achieve a higher 
quality of work through term contracts. Third, NPM emphasis on input and output 
control and performance assessment within public service organisations can be 
empirically measured by explicitly quantitative performance indicators. Fourth, NPM 
emphasises a decentralised system in which public managers have some flexibility to 
provide various possibilities from which customers can choose, and are not limited to 
agency restrictions (Kaboolian, 1998). Therefore, NPM promotes clarification of 
intentions, goals, targets, and indicators for progression and guarantees the application 
of markets, competition and contracts for resource allocation and service delivery within 
public services organisations. 
2.2.2 Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs): Seeking Pathways to Social Investment 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) have emerged as quasi-market organisational and 
institutional forms in public governance regimes. These grow out of the privatisation era 
but are something more than just marketization (Bovaird, 2006; Greve and Hodge, 2010: 
150). They refer to the combination of social resources via the cooperation between 
governments and private agents (businesses or NPOs) to deliver public products and 
services so as to secure societal purposes (Skelcher, 2007: 348). Generally speaking, the 
major purported advantages of PPPs are briefly summarised as follows: first, they 
increase the efficiency of delivery of public products and service: the key to the increase 
of efficiency lies in the transformation of responsibility for the production and provision 
of public services and products from public sectors to private agencies (Savas, 1987). 
PPPs offer a useful incentive for public sector cooperation with private partners, to 
adopt their advanced expertise and technology in order to meet the clients’ demands 
(Allen, 1999). Second, they provide qualified products and services to the public at low 
costs: cost saving can be achieved mainly through increase in efficient and flexible 
managerial skills and reduction in human resources (Skelcher, 2007: 350). Thirdly, they 
allow public services to access private capital: apart from specialised expertise and 
proprietary technology introduced from the private sectors, partnership provides great 
opportunity for government to get private capital to guarantee adequate public 
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expenditure and reduce fiscal risks so as to better serve the public interest (Seader, 
2002). Besides, the forms characterised by capital allocation allow governments and 
private agencies to relate to each other through contracting, and the purchase of services 
(Walsh, 1995: xviii). Fourth, they solve political and social issues for governments: 
PPPs can be a great approach to achieve politicians’ objectives and avoid serious 
controversies on the issues of labour participation, border relationships, regionalisation 
implementation of difficult policies, and coordination of political entities (ibid). Thus, 
PPPs can effectively minimise the extent of government and market failure by 
providing quality public products and services at low cost, and would strengthen the 
government’s leading position in the allocation of investment while maintaining its 
controls over the economy.  
According to European Commission (2003), PPP arrangements were driven by 
limitations in public funds to cover investment needs, to allocate and integrate social 
capital to the largest extent possible by implementing various cooperative models that 
identify the borders and functions of public and private sectors. Their contents cover the 
processes of design, financing, construction and operation for the public utilities. 
Previous reports published by the world’s renowned organisations, including World 
Bank (1997), European Commission (2003) and United Unions (2008), have explored 
overall performance of PPPs from the perspective of ownership, the rights of 
management, the extent of risk sharing and investment returns. Contemporarily, the 
forms of PPPs have extended from the early contractual model to encompass long-term 
strategies based on more professional and relational forms, such as, the contracting-out 
of services, the franchising of public utilities, and the establishment of hybrid 
organisations for reward-gaining, risk-sharing and co-production between public and 
private agents (Skelcher, 2007).  
Through reviewing the literatures concerning PPPs, it appears that there are mainly 
three general models of PPPs across the world: (1) Outsourcing model: it involves 
contracting-out, by which it means that the governments usually define the criteria of 
public services, and then contract out the provision to a private or NPO. This kind of 
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component contracting-out suits areas in which public providers fail to offer the best 
solution, and calls for more market-based approaches, for example, competitively 
tendering municipal services (Domberger and Hall, 1996). The outsourcing model also 
includes entirety outsourcing, such as Design-Build (DB) model, 
Design-Build-Finance-Maintenance (DBFM) model, Design-Build-Operate (DBO) 
model, etc. In these models, the private sector designs and builds, or even finances an 
asset or maintenance services under a long-term agreement (European Commission, 
2003: 5); (2) Franchising model: this partnering model is different from the former one 
in that the government auctions a license to a private organisation to deliver a public 
service over a fixed period of time, while its reimbursement comes from the consumers 
(Savas, 2000: 80). Common forms under this model include Build-Operate-Transfer 
(BOT) model, Design-Build-Finance-Operate (DBFO) model, 
Design-Build-Transfer-Operate (DBTO) model, etc. These models occur when the 
governments first propose the intention of a project and then designate two or more 
independent agencies to engage in a collaborative venture in terms of its scope and the 
commitment of partners’ resources (Schaeffer and Loveridge, 2002); (3) Divestiture 
model: this includes complete divestiture and partial divestiture. A complete divestiture 
is much like a franchising model which gives the private sector full responsibility for 
investment, operations and maintenance, but the difference lies in the ownership of the 
assets is transferred to the private sector, so the nature of the public-private relation is 
slightly different (World Bank, 1997: 7-8). Thus, the government’s responsibility under 
a divestiture model is to make regulations to prevent price-fixing and poor quality of 
products and services. 
Therefore, these inter-related hybrid agencies operate according to quasi-market 
principles, and the public services are gradually becoming a more integrated network 
with private agencies through contracting, franchising and the purchase of services. 
These new forms of organisation are neither market- nor hierarchically oriented, but lie 
between the two extremes to combine the advantages of market competition and 
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government capacity at the same time. Their performance is monitored and controlled 
by performance standards and predicted targets.  
 
2.3 From Welfare State to Social Investment State: A New Trend in 
Social Service Expenditure 
The welfare state at the beginning of the twenty-first century appears to be undergoing a 
transformation. NPM movements offer a great opportunity to re-emphasise the potential 
advantages of market-based mechanisms in the provision of social care. Today, there is 
increasing recognition that social policy for some purposes or in some forms can 
contribute to both economic growth and social development, and this social policy 
should be conceptualised as an ‘investment’ rather than an ‘expenditure’ (Morel, Palier 
and Palme, 2011). Increasing labour force participation in the late 1990s, regarded by 
some as an extension in the ‘commodification’ of labour, became the central function of 
the ‘social investment state’, a concept first pointed out by Giddens (1998) in his 
famous book: The Third Way, which has been regarded as a solution to the neo-liberal 
critique of the traditional welfare state (Jenson and Saint-Martin, 2003; Sipila, 2012). 
2.3.1 Origins and Nature of the Social Investment State 
Since the end of Second World War, many western countries chose to establish a 
universal and comprehensive welfare system to revive their floundering economies 
while resisting the aggression of socialism. These western countries were later referred 
to as welfare states by many scholars. At that time, any welfare arrangement seemed to 
be a powerful weapon for politicians to win the next election battle and sustain social 
stability. Mishra (1990) points out that the full-employment policies, common public 
interests, and measures for poverty prevention, are three basic principles in welfare 
states. During that time, many welfare states were devoted to expanding welfare, to 
form a comprehensive and universal welfare system, including pension, healthcare, 
unemployment, and so on (Esping-Andersen, 1994). Since the end of the 1970s, two 
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separate political trajectories – social democracy and neo liberalism – began to design 
the future of the welfare state. However, the ideational orientations of these two groups 
are quite different. The philosophy of wealth creation in classical social democracy is 
based on economic security and equitable redistribution; while, neo-liberals attach great 
importance to market competitiveness and the generation of wealth much more than the 
former. With an in-depth process of reform in privatisation and deregulation during the 
era of neo-liberalism, the shortcomings of a neo-liberal approach became apparent by 
the late 1990s. It no longer responds to social issues, such as growing social polarisation, 
social exclusion and rising poverty rates. Such criticisms are in line with the growing 
awareness that the traditional welfare state cannot adapt to the demographic 
transformation of families and society, which will produce more, new social risks.  
In this respect, the politicians and academics alike attempt to find a way which could 
solve the ‘either this or that’ dichotomy between ‘welfare state’ and ‘market state’, or – 
more specifically – between the political pursuit of ‘social democracy’ and 
‘neo-liberalism’, between the operational approaches of ‘state intervention’ and ‘market 
regulation’, between the social preferences of ‘welfare privilege’ and ‘social 
responsibility’. Giddens (1998) proposes ‘a third way’ to end such dilemmas, and 
argues that states play an essential role in fostering the development of human capital 
by offering the necessary infrastructure to avoid human capital depletion. The ‘social 
investment state’ promoted by Giddens gives a clear developmental direction to the 
western countries undergoing rapid political and economic transformation. In politics, 
the New Labour prime minister of the UK, Blair (1996), accepted this argument and 
stated that investments in people, infrastructure and industry should be government’s 
strategic responsibility, and all states need to promote the cooperation between public 
and private sectors, applying market-based approaches to serve public needs and 
interests in a context of global economic competition.  
A social investment perspective largely accepts the neoliberal belief that a free market 
system is the most efficient organising principle under all circumstances; while, it also 
acknowledges the existing phenomenon of market failure and the necessity for 
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government involvement in and the appropriate application of market forces in order to 
improve both economic and social outcomes (Perkins et al., 2004: 2-3). Thus, the chief 
concern of a real social investment state is to recognise and integrate the economic and 
social dimensions of policy in order to achieve the aims of both economic growth and 
social stability. The term ‘social investment policy’ can be understood as the various 
attempts that aim to move beyond redistributive and consumption-based social welfare 
systems to secure the prevention of social risk and personal misfortune by fostering the 
development of human capital and the enhancement of people’s capabilities, through 
investments in education and training, rather than merely direct fiscal subsidies for 
economic compensation (Giddens, 1998: 117; De Deken, 2012). Therefore, social 
investment policies yield positive and productive returns not only at present, but also in 
the future (Morel et al., 2012: 6).  
Moreover, traditional forms of social intervention and poverty relief found in post-war 
welfare states cannot satisfy the needs of the current economy, to facilitate its transition 
to a ‘knowledge economy’ which attaches great importance to the value of human 
capital (Morel et al., 2012). A knowledge economy fosters the miniaturisation and 
decentralisation of job markets and social organisations, so the power of trade unions is 
seriously impaired. It is argued that in this ‘knowledge economy’, there is a pressing 
demand for an educated and skilled workforce, who can quickly adapt to a constantly 
changing society (De Deken, 2012). Without the necessary investments to foster human 
capital development, inadequate skills and education are also expected to restrain future 
economic growth and employment creation (Perkins et al., 2004: 3; European 
Commission, 2009). Thus, a social investment state provides economic incentives for 
better quality jobs and minimises the risk of an intergenerational transfer of poverty. 
With the improvement of the healthcare and medical technology and continuously rising 
living standards, people tend to live much longer than before. The growth of an aging 
population leads to great pressure on pension payment costs and on the provision of 
social care services. Giddens (1998: 120-121) suggests that statutory retirement should 
be abolished, and the elderly people should remain in the workforce to work with 
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younger generations. The variations of family structures, including increasing family 
breakdown and growing female labour force participation (including low-skilled 
women), have called for more welfare services (De Deken, 2012). These changes have 
resulted in new forms of need: to balance paid work and family responsibilities 
(especially for women who need to take care of younger children and frail elderly 
parents) and to obtain the training required for a secure job. 
Esping-Andersen (1994) addresses the importance of social services in maximising 
participation in the labour force. Thus, the concept of social investment in the field of 
elder care services can also secure social purposes: increasing the labour market 
participation of the population of any age and improving productivity of those 
participating in the elder care industry. As is summarised by Bouget, Frazer, Marlier, 
Sabato and Vanhercke (2015: 31), ‘the more extended is elder care, the more 
middle-aged women work’. Although the gradual increase in pension levels has largely 
improved the financial status and social autonomy of the retired, these elderly people 
tend to feel lonely and live passively due to smaller family size. Moreover, Palme (2006: 
160, as cited in Sipila, 2012: 82) stresses the primary purpose of a social investment 
state is to deal with work, ageing and the new ‘gender balance’. Growing numbers of 
females working in the labour market have reduced the possibility to take care of their 
elderly parents. At present, local services have become limited to the greatest elder care 
demands, especially to the most handicapped elderly people, which weakens preventive 
policy and also threatens women’s participation in the workforce. What is worse, many 
countries lack eligible and accessible assessment of the social consequences of fiscal 
consolidation, which leads to gradual downsizing in the supply of public elder care 
services.  
To sum up, a social investment state can adopt productive approaches that are essential 
to economic stability, employment growth and social cohesion in the long term. With 
the aim of ‘preparing’ rather that ‘repairing’, the underlying policy logic in social 
investment seeks to sustain a competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy and 
to promote a flexible, professional and skilled labour force. With investment in elder 
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care, not only would the elderly’s disabilities be prevented and better access to more 
efficient and sustainable elder care services be secured, but also the previous care staffs’ 
qualifications and skills would be promoted to enable them to positively participate in 
the labour market.  
2.3.2 Returns from Social Investment: A Perspective on Social Care Provision 
Elder care provision has often been seen as an expenditure rather than as part of 
community social capital. In fact, it comes as a significant recessive cost to the 
households who prefer family care: firstly, the carers have no alternative employment 
income and have to work for a long time in caring for their old relatives; secondly, it 
might reduce the accrual of social protection entitlements available from waged work 
(European Commission, 2013). At present, from a global perspective, reducing the 
public costs of elder care provision is likely to increase the social investment via 
providing private elder care. A determined social investment strategy can achieve both 
economic and social returns in reducing disability in old age, enhancing labour force 
participation, improving the productivity of care delivery, etc. Returns from the social 
investment in elder care needs to take account of all costs and benefits, which are not 
just in a monetary form, but also need to cover the benefits to the wide variety of people 
who get involved in it (Ellis, 2017). Specifically, it can be argued that providing and 
improving elder care might produce significant economic and social returns, as it is 
demonstrated below:  
From a macro-economic perspective, social investment in elder care protects family 
carers from heavy care responsibilities, enabling them to go back to the labour market, 
so making contribution to the government tax revenues, social welfare contributions, 
and even the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). It also avoids any depreciation 
of human capital among the care workers. Additionally, more private institutions 
become involved in providing and funding elder care, so relieving public financial 
burdens. It also encourages public authorities and stakeholders to understand and 
implement policy options on social care services. What is more, social investment in 
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elder care enhances social protection expenditure and reduces the risk of poverty and 
health inequality among elderly people.  
From a meso-social perspective, the current care delivery still remains highly 
labour-intensive, so it provides professional social care services and enhances the 
supply of caring and administrative jobs, especially stimulating the labour participation 
among late middle-aged women. Besides, it provides higher productivity of care 
provision by training and recruiting professional care workers, so contributing to an 
improved allocation of labour resources. Moreover, it facilitates the development of 
other industries, such as pension markets, insurance markets (including LTCI and the 
development of reverse mortgage loans), etc.  
From a micro-individual perspective, social investment in elder care encourages people 
to recognise life’s risks and prepare to confront them at an early age rather than simply 
accept public help to solve the consequences in late age. It affects and determines 
people’s current and future capacities, in terms of employment income and prospects. 
Moreover, it enhances the material wellbeing and health status of care-givers by 
reducing the physical and mental stress from work and family responsibilities, 
improving their social inclusion and cohesion through participation in work. It also 
facilitates the integration of people outside the labour market into paid employment.  
However, returns from investment in elder care cannot be easily measured or quantified, 
so this research will focus as much on the social returns from social investment in elder 
care provision. In addition, there is an absence of consideration of the negative 
outcomes from social investment in much of the literature. So, this research also takes 
these unintended outcomes into account.  
2.3.3 Criticisms and Problems of the Transition: Issues of Co-ordination in Elder 
Care 
Over the last several decades, as the global population is ageing fast, social change 
associated with transformed demographic structures, intergenerational relationships and 
the redistribution of roles and transfers within the family have challenged the traditional 
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way of caring for the elderly people. Confronted by the tension between elder care 
needs and insufficient informal care services, most industrialised nations have attempted 
to improve the structure for their elder care system with the goal of allocating social 
resources at all levels to meet the expanding demand for care. The phenomenon of an 
ageing society leads to the dependency not only in physical but also in financial terms. 
In the practical situation, however, the fiscal cost of increased elder care provision is 
higher than that of increased pension provision (Casey, 2003: 67). High social demand 
for elder care services, coupled with constrained financial resources in the public sector, 
calls for the necessity of co-ordinated arrangements which open broader conversations 
about how to establish and maintain a sustainable elder care system. With restricted 
budgets, governments are promoting cooperative models and exploring new capital and 
operational structures to reduce costs and improve positive outcomes, thereby 
guaranteeing greater efficiency in the financing and delivery of elder care.  
While there is a wide consensus on social investment policy and co-operative models 
between government and the private sector, this approach has also attracted criticisms 
from different academics. Some of these criticisms are related to the implementation 
and negative consequences of the approach, but some of them might come from the 
approach itself.  
First and foremost, there is no appropriate balance for public and private resources in 
financing, managing and delivering elder care services. The controversies always arise 
when it comes to the issues of who pays, who can pay and who should pay for elder 
care. On the issue of informal elder care, there is near absence of direct public and 
private expenditure, even on medical aids and assistive devices. Costs of informal care 
tend to be a significant burden for families, especially when it includes the working time 
of the carers, alternative employment income foregone and reduced accrual of social 
protection entitlements. Within the formal care area, it generates conflicts between 
different branches of public sectors and different private agencies as to the issues of 
who pays for what and when payment should be made (Casey, 2003: 86). Also, policy 
makers face the challenge of securing affordable quality care while offering decent pay 
31 
 
to the employed carers. Thus, the supply and quality of care may fall short of needs and 
expectations. Besides, when NGOs or a social insurance institution pays with care 
allowances, the separation between financing and care-providing bodies would make 
quality control more complicated, and many preventive measures, such as day-care 
facilities and rehabilitation, may not be covered (European Commission, 2013: 13-15).  
The second criticism stems from foreseen drawbacks of public-private partnerships in 
empirical situations. For instance, PPP projects usually cover benefits from several 
interested parties, so governments need to examine partnering projects strictly due to 
complicated procedures and it might lead to delay in procedural examination and 
approval before moving to contract on a partnering project. Besides, academics also 
doubt whether PPPs can really eliminate inefficiency in the provision of elder care in a 
competitive market. Because in a practical situation, PPPs might have high transaction 
costs, and limits of applicable range, the contract agreements are long-term, complicated 
and comparatively inflexible because of the impossibility to envisage and evaluate all 
particular events that could arise in the future (Katz, 2006). Also, private agencies may 
lack adequate experience to cope with problems in providing social services, compared 
with traditional public provision. Additionally, PPPs confront risks in the process of 
construction and operation, such as cost overrun, government default, environment 
destruction, market demand alteration, inadequate business income, inflation, and other 
uncontrollable risks (Van Herpen, 2002).  
The third criticism lies in the unequal power relations between government and 
contractor in the provision of services, as government is always the dominant authority 
on the project. Unlike the legal contract between two private entities which gives both 
rights and responsibilities, the contract between public and private sector is more 
flexible and unstable, due to this imbalance of power. There is significant scope for 
government to improve its approach to contracting for public services, and the 
government has the right commercial and financial skills to manage contracts and it 
may use the full range of powers in different stages of coordination (House of 
Commons, 2014). While, on the other hand, government has a tendency to make 
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managing contractors’ performance overly complicated and uncontrollable, and the 
coordination may not achieve partnership objectives, especially when the interests of the 
private sector conflicts with the interests of the public, which might create a net loss to 
society as a whole (Bo, 2006).  
 
2.4 Creating the Social Investment State in China: Social Services for 
the Elderly People 
The above review of relevant theoretical and empirical perspectives found in European 
countries can shed much light on the issue of funding and delivery of elder care services 
in China. European countries have demonstrated that population ageing is the key 
common challenge in the field of elder care provision and the number of very elderly 
people (people aged over 80 years) will triple over the next five decades, so there are 
strong arguments for a social investment approach to the delivery of elder care service. 
According to the ‘Social Investment Package’ (European Commission, 2013), a 
long-term strategy of social investment can combine the policies of prevention, health 
promotion and rehabilitation, to improve systematic productivity in informal and formal 
care delivery and provide measures that raise the capacity of frail older people to 
manage self-care and independent living. Given that member states are at very different 
stages in their efforts to address the need for elder care services, this policy receives 
more attention than any other field of social protection.  
In China, the population aged over 60 years has reached 230 million by the end of 2016, 
approximately 16.7% of the total population; the percentage increased by 6.5% points 
compared with figures in the sixth national census conducted in 2010 (National 
Statistics Bureau, 2011). However, China’s ageing problem is far more serious than 
other countries due to the one-child policy that lasted over three decades as well as 
unsustainable social security. Besides, the transition to a market oriented economy and 
everlasting economic growth have transformed family patterns as well as existing 
traditions involving the elderly in China. An ageing society with increasing mobility of 
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labour force and smaller family size has severely impacted the traditional family care 
model, and the increasingly growing demand for elder care services calls desperately for 
an alternative approach for care provision. By 2025, the population aged over 60 is 
expected to reach 300 million in China, so elder care is a pressing issue (Yang, 2015). 
To address this issue, China has introduced an increasing number of regulations and 
guidelines to encourage private investment in what is emerging as an elder care service 
industry. This aims to increase the supply of healthcare facilities as well as to improve 
the quality of healthcare.  
In June 2006, the General Office of the Chinese State Council (2006) issued 
‘Suggestions on Accelerating the Elder Care Service Industry’. Elder care was first 
defined as a service industry in this official document. It also proposed the policy 
measures to develop social welfare for the elderly, improving social service institutions 
and home-based elder care services and launching pre-employment training for service 
staff. Besides, local government was required to promote market consumption of 
services by the elderly and to induce private sector provision of social care services, 
including: daily care, housework, psychological consultation, rehabilitation and 
emergency relief, etc., for the elderly people who stay at home. In 2011, the Chinese 
State Council (2011a and 2011b) issued two further plans in relation to the elder care 
system: ‘Twelfth ‘Five-Year’ Plan of China’s Aging Development (2011-2015)’ and 
‘Construction and Planning of Social Elder Care System (2011-2015)’. Both of these 
documents present the background of current aging society in China and arrange the 
to-do list on different aspects of social elder care services during the period of 2011 to 
2015. The latter document emphasises the dominant role of government in guiding other 
social organisations to participate in an elder care service industry, including institutions, 
planning, finance and management. It also addresses the market-based approaches to the 
process of resource allocation and provision, such as, ‘Public Construction and Private 
Operation’ (‘gongjian minying’ in Chinese), ‘Private Construction and Public Subsidy’ 
(‘minban gongzhu’ in Chinese), government purchase of healthcare services and various 
subsidies. Local governments are required to use a portion of social welfare lottery fund 
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in the construction of their elder care system. In 2012, the Ministry of Civil Affairs 
(2012a) issued ‘Implementation Suggestions on Encouraging and Guiding Private 
Capital to Enter the Field of Elder Care’. It was the first official document that focused 
on the funding of elder care provision, for the purpose of realising the diversification of 
investors to relieve the imbalance between supply and demand of elder care. Private 
capital is encouraged to participate in family and community-based elder care, building 
nursing institutions and service facilities, offering basic elder care services and 
developing the elder care industry. In 2013, ‘Several Suggestions on Accelerating the 
Development of Social Services Industry for Elderly People’ was released by the 
Chinese State Council (2013), which first proposed a list of detailed implementation 
policies, including financing and investment, land supply, preferential tax, subsidies, 
employment and training, non-government organisations and charity, to pour into the 
construction and development of the elder care industry in China. Late in 2014, the 
Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of Civil Affairs (2014) jointly issued the ‘Circular 
on Various Issues on Foreign Investment in For-profit Senior Care Facilities’, 
providing detailed guidelines for foreign investment in elder care businesses in China. 
Foreign investors are encouraged to scale up investment, develop franchises and 
cultivate the elder care market. They are also allowed to participate in the privatization 
and restructuring of public elder care facilities. In February 2015, the Chinese 
Government introduced further regulations on the framework for private investment in 
the elder care industry
14
. The regulations aim to encourage private investors actively to 
participate in this area and reflect the on-going efforts China is making to ease market 
access barriers for private investment. This document added some new insights, such as, 
proposing a list of permitted business models including shareholding co-operative 
systems and Public-Private Partnerships, collaborating nursing institutions with medical 
                                               
14
 ‘The Implementation Suggestions on Encouraging Private Capital in the Development of Elder Care 
Industry’ was issued by the Ministry of Civil Affairs (2015a), National Development and Reform 
Commission, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Human Resources and Social 
Security, Ministry of Land and Resources, Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development, National 
Commission of Health and Family Planning, China Banking Regulatory Commission and China 
Insurance Regulatory Commission.  
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treatment organisations, promoting various incentives ranging from funding measures
15
 
to tax exemptions, as well as discretion on service fees
16
. Given the official statements 
of previous years, the current Chinese elder care system is gradually moving away from 
state provision and towards market provision (albeit in a carefully constructed market), 
allowing private investors to consult on the implementation of the framework and 
incentives provided by the Chinese Government.  
On the way to explore the diversification of suppliers of elder care and promote the 
PPPs in the elder care industry, the Chinese Government has advocated pilot models in 
the construction and operation of elder care services, including ‘Public Construction and 
Private Operation’ and ‘Private Construction and Public Subsidy’ – all will be discussed 
in more detail in chapter 5. These models had already been used in several public 
infrastructure construction projects in China, such as highways, underground, 
water-supply and urban village reconstruction, etc. As to the construction and operation 
of elder care, the participants for PPPs include: public sector, private sector, PPP project 
companies as well as other organisations, such as financial institutions, insurance 
companies, consulting companies, design companies, suppliers of materials, etc.  
However, there exist several criticisms on the current situation of provision and funding 
for the elder care services in China. First, the operation and management of private 
nursing institutions is not efficient, funding shortages are endemic and banks or other 
financial organisations doubt their solvency and will not offer them loans (Shi, 2012). 
Second, there are doubts as to whether China has realised the marketisation of the elder 
care industry, as more and more nursing institutions have mixed ownership structures, 
involving both public shareholders and private investors, which exposes them to more 
government intervention (Yang, 2015). The boundary between the public and private 
ownership becomes a reflection of the contradiction between resource allocation 
                                               
15
 The new regulations for funding issue are: 50% of the welfare fund collected through the sale of 
lotteries should be used in the local elder care industry, and this proportion must increase with the growth 
of old population; that allocated for the promotion of private investment must not be less than 30%. 
16
 The operators of elder care businesses could decide a range of reasonable service fee levels, but the 
government authorities retain the right to supervise their operation, fee items and frequency of fee 
changes. 
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mechanisms and the search for profit, which leads to unbalanced resource allocations 
between different departments and regions, industry barriers, unequal competitive 
environments, etc. (Wang and Yang, 2014). Third, there is still a lack of laws and 
regulations that focus on the operation and management of PPP projects in China. It is 
difficult to define who is the person in charge, how to reach maximum profits, how to 
distinguish the responsibilities and rights of public and private sectors respectively, how 
to cope with the risks of compensation if losses occur (Ren and Yang, 2012). Fourth, 
the construction of a new nursing institution requires pre-period financial inputs and 
professional talents, but has to wait for a long period for investment returns. The limited 
consumption capacity of elderly peoplecan set limits on the development of an elder 
care industry. In practice, preferential policies for the participants, financial channels 
and partnership modes are not advanced, so the various participants, including nursing 
institutions, insurance companies, foreign investors, are not confident of a profitable 
future (Wang, 2014).  
From the empirical perspective, however, the social care system in China is still at a 
low-level stage of development and confronted with several issues. First, the remaining 
publically funded nursing institutions usually offer only limited beds, while large 
high-end or small private nursing institutions have high rate of empty beds and run at a 
loss. Second, community-based elder cares centres lack money, land and working staff, 
and can only provide limited services (Zhao, 2016). For example, according to Hubei 
Provincial Government (Yin, 2016), the future new missions on Hubei’s elder care 
system include: reforming public nursing institutions (Social Welfare Houses) and 
expanding their scale by more than 120,000 beds; introducing market mechanism 
through purchasing services, and public-private partnerships, etc., to increase the supply 
of elder care services; exploring LTCI; promoting the combination of medical treatment 
and elder care and introducing medical institutions into community-based elder care; 
establishing a comprehensive information network for the elderly people. All these 
efforts need time to bed down, but the rate of elderly demand is rising faster than the 
capacity of these new initiatives to meet it.  
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In summary, this research will apply a social investment perspective to examine the 
provision of China’s elder care system, analysing how social investment, especially 
PPPs, has affected the roles of state, market and society in providing and funding elder 
care services, examining how different types of PPPs fit into the construction and 
development of elder care services, while analysing their advantages or disadvantages. 
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Chapter 3 Literature Review and Research Methodology 
 
 
This chapter will begin with an overall literature review of current funding trends in 
elder care/long-term care (LTC) in the Western countries as well as in China, followed 
by a presentation of the research methods employed.  
 
3.1 Literature Review: Current Trend of Funding for Elder 
Care/Long-term Care (LTC) 
During the past three decades, an increasing volume of published studies has emerged 
on the provision of LTC for frail elderly people, its definition, types of services, pricing 
and costs, and assessment from both national and international perspectives. With 
population ageing and a shrinking pool of potential family carers, increasing demand for 
social elder care is pushing up the cost of formal LTC across the world. So, this raises 
questions in policy discussion about who should pay more. So far, current research that 
has systematically reviewed LTC funding mainly aims at comprehensively summarising 
and analysing the available evidence on policy development in the LTC funding system, 
comparing the funding frameworks of LTC in different countries over recent years. This 
section offers an overview of elder care/LTC funding by reviewing the categories of 
funding arrangements and problems of LTC in Western countries. It then examines the 
current studies of elder care/LTC funding in China, and ends by identifying the gaps 
between the existing literature and the research done for this study, to justify the aims of 
this thesis.  
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3.1.1 Categories of Funding Arrangements for LTC in the Western Countries 
Although the sources of funding in LTC are heterogeneous due to the complex mix of 
schemes, services, and benefits, it is still possible to distinguish clusters of countries 
with similar approaches from the underlying evidence on cost-incentives. For instance, 
family provision of informal care is prevalent in Southern and Eastern European 
countries. In Scandinavian countries, public expenditure on LTC is the main source of 
funding. While, in Spain, Germany and Switzerland, where market intervention is more 
common, both for- or not-for-profit providers offer LTC services. Means-tested 
programmes are the primary source of public funding in the United States and the 
United Kingdom (Costa-Font and Courbage, 2012). In general, the LTC systems mainly 
fit into two broad funding arrangements which include: public funding through social 
insurance schemes or supported by tax revenues to deliver universal benefits; and 
private spending coming from individuals or private insurance plans (Gold, 2013).  
3.1.1.1 Public LTC Funding  
Colombo and Llena-Nozal, Mercier and Tjadens (2011) use two criteria to distinguish 
different types of public long-term funding by identifying the scope of entitlement to 
LTC benefits: whether it is a universal or a mean-tested entitlement, and whether 
coverage is through a single system or multiple benefits, services and programmes. 
Three broad types of LTC funding across Western countries can be identified using 
these two criteria: universal coverage within a single programme, mixed systems and 
mean-tested safety-net schemes.  
Universal coverage within a single programme 
Under this type, publicly-funded LTC is provided through a single universal system to 
all individuals assessed as eligible due to their care-dependency levels. The forms of 
this funding model reflect the relationship between LTC and health care, as long term 
care may be separate from health system or be part of health coverage (ibid). Three 
main sub-models can be summarised as following: 
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(1) Tax-based models. These are typically found in Nordic countries, including Sweden, 
Norway, Finland and Denmark. The state organises universal and tax-funded LTC and 
healthcare services provision for the elderly and disabled (Karlsoon and Iversen, 2010). 
These comprehensive and broad public services absorb a relatively large share of GDP 
spending on LTC, ranging from 2% in Denmark to 3.6% in Sweden (Colombo et al., 
2011).  
(2) Public long-termcare insurance (LTCI) models. A number of countries, including 
Germany, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, typically finance LTC via a 
social-insurance arrangement. This model usually involves mandatory 
employment-based contributions and a separate funding system to health insurance 
(Fernandez and Forder, 2012; Zuchandke, Reddemann and Krummaker, 2012). It is 
similar to the previous model in that coverage is also generally comprehensive and 
covers the entire population (Glennerster, 2009). As a share of GDP, LTC spending is 
around the OECD average of 1.5% for this group of countries, apart from two extreme 
cases of Korea (0.3%) and the Netherlands (3.5%) (Colombo et al., 2011).  
(3) Personal care via the health system. Belgium typifies this model, which is based on 
the coverage of LTC costs under the health system. In this model, LTC is viewed as a 
health risk, and care services, including daily care, such as dressing, washing and eating, 
are primarily delivered by skilled nursing providers, financed under the universal public 
health system. LTC spending as a share of GDP accounts for 2% in Belgium (ibid).  
Mean-tested safety-net scheme 
The United States and England belong to this model. Under this scheme, income and/or 
asset tests are used to set thresholds for eligible recipients to receive publicly funded 
social care, which is designed as a means-tested scheme to assist those who are unable 
to pay for the medical and LTC expenses themselves (Colombo et al., 2011; Costa-Font 
and Courbage, 2012). For instance, Medicaid – the public programme in the US – pays 
for 40% of total LTC costs and LTC spending accounted for around 0.8% of GDP in 
41 
 
2010 (Glennerster, 2009; Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, 2010). In 
England, LTC spending as a share of GDP was 1.2% in 2014 (OECD, 2017).  
Mixed systems 
Most countries do not have a universal single programme for LTC services, but 
combine different universal programmes, depending on target groups and specific 
long-term cost. Three main sub-models can be identified as follows: 
(1) Parallel universal schemes.This model combines different coexisting schemes, each 
providing universal coverage for different types of care. Typically, universal nursing 
care is financed through the health system, while universal personal care is under a 
separate scheme. Scotland, Italy and Czech Republic typify this approach. 
(2) Income-related universal benefits or subsidies. Typical countries under this model 
are Australia, Austria, Ireland and France. In these countries, the recipient is required to 
complement public long-term funding with a personal contribution, which is adjusted to 
their income level, as a condition for receiving the cash allowance or in-kind LTC 
services.  
(3) Mix of universal and means-tested benefits. The universal entitlements under this 
model generally consist of the following services: health-related and skilled nursing 
care (Switzerland), and nursing and personal care in home-care settings (New Zealand 
and Canada). In countries with limited formal services delivery, universal benefits may 
apply only to certain services, for example to institutional care, or to cash benefits 
(Colombo et al., 2011).  
3.1.1.2 Private LTC Funding 
Private LTC funding approaches seem to play a potential role in the delivery of LTC, 
although the market for private LTCI is not well developed in Western countries. A 
wide range of private LTC coverage arrangements can be found in these countries, 
differing in eligibility rules, benefit triggers and reimbursement levels. At present, there 
are mainly three main private LTC funding models which can be identified as follows: 
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Private long-term care insurance (LTCI) 
Private LTCI insurance aims to offer complementary coverage for the LTC costs which 
may not be covered under public social insurance programmes. Currently, there are two 
main products emerging over time: the first is a reimbursement model, designed in line 
with private health insurance arrangements (e.g., US). It usually has a maximum 
amount of benefit payment to cover nursing home or outpatient care expenses. The 
second is an indemnity model, designed in line with an annuity contract (e.g., France). 
Once the insured meet criteria set out in the policy determining dependency level and 
waiting period, they can receive a fixed level of monthly benefits for life (Colombo et 
al., 2011). The main advantages of private LTCI are the simplicity and flexibility it 
offers subscribers with fixed cash benefits according to their preferences. It also 
facilitates the management of the financial risk associated with dependency for 
providers (Cremer and Pestieau, 2009). 
Combining LTCI with life insurance 
An integration of LTCI and life insurance into a single product has been developed to 
cover the risk of dependency. Combining life insurance with long-term coverage has 
several advantages: firstly, it could avoid adverse selection in the life insurance market, 
because dependent people may not live long enough to qualify for long-term annuities; 
secondly, the risk is minimised because it crowds out the individuals who can 
immediately benefit from insurance payments (Costa-Font and Courbage, 2012); thirdly, 
it may reduce the cost of both products as well as make them more attractive and 
accessible to potential buyers (Murtaugh, Spillman and Warshawsky, 2001). 
Self-funded care using house property 
As Glennerster (2013) puts it, if the elderly people were single and owned a house 
property, they could sell the house and use the proceeds to pay for care costs. In some 
other cases, a reverse mortgage scheme can be used by those who are deemed 
housing-rich and cash-poor (Casey, 2003; Costa-Font, Mascarilla-Miro and Elvira, 
2009). A reverse mortgage is a commercial loan which allows the elderly to access the 
43 
 
house equity secured on the value of a property. In some cases, reverse mortgages 
would link to LTCI rather than LTC spending. The insured would receive an annuity 
depending on the value of the house and the level of dependency (Chen, 2001). Thus, 
the house would be used as finance of last resort. However, the market for reverse 
mortgages is not prevalent due to the uncertainty of housing prices and in some 
instances, elderly people are reluctant to pay for this scheme because they prefer to 
bequest the house to their children (Costa-Font, Gil and Mascrillia-Miro, 2010).  
3.1.2 Problems of LTC Funding in the Western Countries 
As it illustrated above, financial plans for LTC include subscription to a public or 
private LTC coverage product, which could offer more options regarding the care that 
the elderly people receive, as well as protect their income and assets against the risk of 
future needs for LTC. However, there are still some problems within these schemes. 
The current literature focuses on the problems encountered under LTC funding and can 
be summarised as follows:  
3.1.2.1 Funding Pressure on Public LTC System 
Both Colombo et al. (2011) and Glennerster (2013) argue that funding levels for LTC in 
Western countries are inadequate, so that the standard of any category of care may not 
be well developed. The public LTC funding system generally costs a larger proportion 
of national fiscal revenue than the OECD average level, typically from 1.5% to 3.6% of 
GDP. It also features potentially high care costs and relatively higher reimbursement 
rates compared with other systems (Colombo et al., 2011). Wittenberg (2011) points out 
that life expectancy is rising at a faster rate than official estimates assume, thereby 
creating greater pressure to raise the funding levels. Casey (2003), Glennerster (2009) 
and Dilnot, Warner and Williams (2011) also point to rising costs of care as a factor that 
is set to exacerbate the problems of inadequate support for the care of elderly people. 
The current availability of financial support for elderly people is very limited, and the 
situation may get worse if care expenses continue to rise in the future. Fernandez and 
Forder (2012) compare the cost and disadvantages of LTC funding arrangements in the 
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Western countries, and point out the main disadvantage of a universal system is the 
higher cost to the public in the form of higher contribution through general taxation or 
mandatory contribution for LTC. They also claim that in both Germany and Japan, the 
significant increase in demand in the low-level needs population has led to the 
over-consumption of the insurance system.  
3.1.2.2 Complexity of Funding Systems 
Dilnot et al. (2011) examine the funding system for LTC in the United Kingdom and 
argue that the current LTC system is confusing, unfair and unsustainable: first, 
assessment processes for eligibility are usually complex, opaque and not portable; 
second, there are significant uncertainties as well in its duration and intensity; thirdly, 
provision of information and advice is poor, so that individuals may not be unable to 
plan ahead properly to meet their future care needs, or the wider care and support 
system may fail to join up. Colombo et al. (2011) argue that unlike the universal 
programmes, a mixed system is viewed as desirable for reasons of efficiency rather than 
equity, so it may generate fragmentation, according to different sorts of services and 
benefits, and it can be more difficult to quantify the overall entitlements received by a 
user relative to the cost incurred. Fernandez, Forder, Trukeschitz, Rokasova and 
McDaid (2009) use a means-tested model as an example to conclude that it is difficult 
to set a fair threshold and may result in unmet demands, because it may leave elderly 
and disabled people much poorer in order to qualify for care and means the families 
above the income thresholds tend to pay more for the LTC. However, the means 
assessment is administratively expensive and this system can be unfair if it leaves frail 
elderly people to be poor to become eligible for LTC and also may lead to confusion 
over eligibility for public funding and reduce transparency due to no uniform criteria for 
eligibility.  
3.1.2.3 Unpopularity of Private LTCI 
Potential demand for private LTCI is inadequate and the market of private LTC 
coverage is generally small in OECD countries (OECD, 2004). According to the 
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research from Colombo et al. (2011), the United States and Japan offer the most 
developed examples, where the share of private LTCI financing accounts for 7% and 
5% of total LTC expenditures in 2010, while in other countries, such as Germany, New 
Zealand, Portugal and France, etc., private arrangement for LTC accounts for less than 
2% of total LTC spending. 
To address this issue, some research has explored the reasons behind this situation: 
Costa-Font and Courbage (2012) reveal two reasons to the unpopularity of private LTCI. 
The first one reflects inter-generational factors within most countries that reduces the 
demand for LTCI, as elderly people are more likely to receive care from their children 
and may be reluctant to purchase insurance. Another explanation for the limited 
development of the private LTCI market is asymmetric information, the individuals are 
inadequately informed about the products available. Tumlinson, Aguiar and Watts 
(2009) argue that the potential consumers do not calculate future returns of private LTC 
associated with their investment, nor do they know about the detailed arrangements and 
the evolution of supply due to the complexity of the LTCI contracts and unpredictable 
costs. Costa-Font et al. (2009) believe that the interaction of public insurance 
programmes arguably crowds out private insurance. Moreover, Colombo et al. (2011) 
point out that the phenomena of moral hazard (over-consumption of care encouraged by 
insurance) and adverse selection (over-representation of bad risks in the insured 
population) lead insurers to protect themselves by limiting access to the private cover. 
Merlis (2003) and Courbage and Roudaut (2008) claim that low demand for private 
LTC arrangements reflects people’s neglect to plan for the financial risk associated with 
longevity risk in their youth. They also demonstrate people’s awareness of the high 
proportion of private LTCI in terms of their disposable income which might lead to 
financial crisis within the family, as well as people’s preference of living with their 
families which might affects their willingness to buy private LTCI. 
3.1.3.4 Boundaries of Responsibility in Funding for LTC 
The majority of people recognise the importance of LTC as well as the requirement to 
make some contributions to the costs of care in later life, but they need a fairer way of 
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sharing costs and responsibility between the state and individuals in order to relieve 
uncertainty. Glennerster (2013) claims that the cost of elder care has always been shared 
between families and the state, but this boundary line has caused some difficulties in 
policy making in most countries. 
Glennerster (2009) identifies some dilemmas in funding LTC in advanced economies: 
who should pay for the growing costs of an aged population? Who should shoulder 
most responsibility? Will the state be able to do more and if so how much more? Should 
the state be confined to funding or extend to the provision of services? Should the 
funding be national or local? What role can private insurance play? However, there is 
still no entirely satisfactory solution to this problem in Western countries.  
3.1.3 Research on Funding for Elder Care/LTC in China 
In China, where the whole society upholds traditional values, an emphasis on filial piety 
requires the younger generation to take care of their older parents or other old relatives, 
and thus many Chinese elderly prefer to live at home rather than in a nursing home. In 
this situation, family care still dominates care patterns in China, and community care is 
viewed as a supplementary model for elder care provision while institutional care is 
used as a last resort (Lin, 2014). Currently, there is a mass of Chinese literature on elder 
care/LTC systems. Most of these publications mainly focus on the current situations of 
provisional models, on international comparisons and on the construction of an elder 
care industry. However, an ageing society with growing mobility of labour has greatly 
impacted on the provision of LTC, and the current structure of care provision for the 
elderly is no longer consistent with changing family size and life styles of younger 
generations (Feng, Liu, Guan and Mor, 2013). Seen from the existing studies on China’s 
elder care/LTC funding, current research mainly focuses on the following five 
perspectives: (1) international comparisons: examining the different funding models for 
LTC in Western countries; (2) funding structure of LTC according to the participation 
of different investment agencies; (3) financial resources of the elder care/LTC funding 
system: public and commercial LTCI and reverse mortgage markets; (4) current 
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situations and problems of China’s LTC funding; (5) future expectations and 
recommendations on the construction of elder care/LTC funding in China. 
3.1.3.1 International Comparison of Different Funding Models of LTC 
The first research orientation offers overviews of the LTC funding system in Western 
countries and analyses the current situation of elder care funding models in China. For 
instance, Lin and Liang (2016) and Fang (2016) identify different funding models for 
LTC in OECD countries. Fang (2016) discusses the current situation of LTC funding 
models in China from three aspects: subsidies to the providers, subsidies to the elderly 
people and reimbursements for the portion of medical care. The author later evaluates 
the problems of LTC funding policy in practice: provision for LTC is unavailable to 
elderly people on low income; government does not fund informal family care. Lin and 
Liang (2016) conclude two main funding models exist for social elder care in developed 
countries: the tax-based expenditure model (e.g., the United Kingdom) and the social 
insurance model (e.g., Japan). They then conclude that current funding policy for elder 
care in China mainly depends on the government. Government should increase the 
investment of public welfare lottery funds and fiscal payment in the provision of elder 
care, and explore other effective methods to subsidise provision.  
The research from Yin (2011), Chen (2014) and Zhang (2015) also reviews the funding 
models for LTC in OECD countries, and discusses experiences and lessons for China. 
Yin (2011) compares the developmental process of LTC systems in Western countries 
(e.g., France, Germany, Japan, the United States and the United Kingdom) and 
discusses features relating to finance, contents and forms of services, targeted objects 
and fee burdens, human resources and quality control, etc. Ma, Yuan, Zhang and Sa 
(2016) compare the different funding models of LTC in Western countries and later 
suggest that China needs to establish a professional assessment panel to define the 
elderly’s disability level and the subsidy standard, and to integrate the resources from 
the hospitals and nursing institutions. Chen (2014) argues that a sustainable funding 
system for LTC requires a comprehensive consideration of economic conditions; the 
existing social security system; cultural and demographic situations and the elderly’s 
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health condition. Reviewing the experiences from Western countries and practical 
situations in China, these authors conclude that public LTCI should be the main funding 
method for the elder care in China. Due to the different economic and fiscal conditions 
to be found in different regions in China, however, the funding models also require 
diversification. So they propose local government should issue pilot arrangements for 
public LTCI and then set a unified national policy for the future.  
Above all, all these studies just examine the specific funding models of LTC in the 
Western countries, but they do not actually review the overall situation of elder care 
funding systems in the Western countries, nor do they completely summarise the 
funding models of the elder care in China. 
3.1.3.2 Discussion of Funding Structure fromDifferent Investment Agencies 
Quite a lot of studies focus on the funding for the elderly through the participation from 
different investment agencies. For instance, He and Chen (2006) believe that 
government, company and non-profit organisations should take the responsibility for 
funding LTC.  
Zhu, Huang and Guo (2011), Chen and Fan (2014) and Zhang (2015) discuss LTC 
funding mechanisms from the perspectives of three financing entities – individuals, 
employers and the government. There are four LTC funding mechanisms – personal 
retirement savings/pension; commercial LTCI; compulsory long-term insurance; 
taxation. Their functions are duplicated between the three financing entities. Personal 
retirement savings is the most popular funding mechanism, because it has high 
transparency and low administrative cost, but all risks have to be taken by individuals 
and outcomes might be affected according to their actual economic level. Also, 
individuals can participate in commercial LTCI, but it only applies to those who have 
the capacity to pay or work in a company which offers this welfare benefit to their 
employees. 
Han and Liang (2012), Zheng (2012), Xiao and Wang (2013) argue that the private 
companies are already under great pressure derived from social insurance contributions, 
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so they suggest that these companies temporarily do not need to contribute to a LTCI 
scheme, and the contribution to LTC can be proportionately deducted from pension and 
medical care insurance. 
Xiao and Wang (2013) argue that the government plays an important role in the 
provision and funding for the elderly, especially to the elderly on low incomes. If the 
elderly people have enough pension, they can purchase commercial LTCI on a 
voluntary basis.  
3.1.3.3 Financial Sources of the Funding for Elder Care/LTC 
Public LTCI  
Zhu et al. (2011), Dai (2011), and Chen and Fan (2014) propose the establishment of a 
separate compulsory LTCI scheme in China. Li and Hou (2009) point out the necessity 
to establish different LTCI schemes for elder care for different groups of people. Urban 
employees who have enrolled in the medical care insurance should contribute to a 
compulsory LTCI scheme; urban residents can enrol in a LTCI scheme voluntarily; 
rural residents can choose any one of the three models, one is the same as for urban 
employees (only for rural-urban migrants), the second is a kind of accumulative LTCI 
scheme, and the third is a government subsidy model (for very poor rural residents). 
Commercial LTCI and Reverse Mortgage Funding 
Some scholars support commercial LTCI or other relevant commercial insurance 
schemes as the main funding models for LTC. For instance, Li and Zhang (2004), Dai 
(2007), Zhou (2008), Dai (2011), Shi (2012), and Deng and Deng (2016), compare 
different LTCI schemes in several Western countries: Germany, Netherlands, Japan and 
the United States, etc., including their legislation and regulation, principles of insurance, 
financing, management and benefit payments. Other scholars, such as Li and Hou 
(2009), Dong (2011), Geng and Liu (2014), Wang (2015), and Tang and Feng (2015), 
analyse the necessity and feasibility to establish LTCI in China.  
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As to reverse mortgages, Guo (2013) argues that the reverse mortgage goes against the 
traditional Chinese idea of rearing children to help look after their parents in old age 
who then bequest the property to the children in return. At the same time, the appraisal 
of house values and the function of government are also of central concern. Chen (2014) 
believes that the current relevant insurance designs, whether LTCI or reverse mortgage, 
are only just starting and develop very slowly. All these studies actually understand 
LTCI as equivalent to the funding for elder care, however, LTCI is currently only one 
part of the elder care funding system.  
3.1.3.4 Current Situations and Problems of China’s Elder Care/LTC Funding System 
According to the relevant research, the problematic issues of China’s elder care/LTC 
funding can be summarised from the following five perspectives: 
From a perspective of macro-economic environment, as Zhang (2013) puts it, the total 
population of elderly people in China is approximately equal to the total population of 
elderly people in all OECD countries, while China’s GDP per capita is only 22% of 
OECD countries. Due to the progress in technologies of medical treatment and longer 
life expectancy, the period of LTC will rise and the burden coefficient of providing for 
the elderly will increase, and thus, it is difficult to guarantee the sustainability of LTC 
financial resources.  
Li (2013) claims that elder care funding is largely reliant on government’s subsidies and 
tax preferences, and this increases the government’s fiscal burden in absolute terms. 
Due to the different economic conditions among different regions, well-developed 
regions have more resources to fund the construction and operation of elder care, while 
less developed regions do not have adequate funding sources. At the same time, 
economic investment is usually indeterminate and frequently changes, tax preference 
policy is not implemented very well and these factors seriously constrain the 
development of elder care at the local level.  
Additionally, Zhang (2015) points out that from the perspective of family and individual, 
elder care is mainly viewed as a family responsibility, so government and society will 
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fiscally intervene into social elder care only if family care does not work well. This is 
the reason why the Chinese Government mainly supports the socially dependent urban 
‘Three-Nos’ and rural ‘Five-Guarantees’ elderly people, while the majority of elderly 
people have to rely on their own pension or medical care insurance, which largely 
depends on their income level and years in work.  
Li (2012) states that private nursing institutions do not perform very well in the delivery 
of LTC. The financial resources for them come from government subsidies (50%), 
membership fees and service fees (35%), donations (10%), and others (5%). Although 
these private institutions mainly rely on government subsidies, in practical terms, they 
might not easily get these subsidies, and so this significantly constrains their 
development and reduces the efficiency of elder care/LTC provision. Due to less 
funding and business revenue, these nursing institutions cannot provide their 
administrative and service staffs with adequate income and benefits, which leads to high 
labour turnover  
Some researchers concentrate on analysing the funding models of the specific elder care 
services in China. Zhang (2013) points out the shortcomings of existing funding models 
of home-based elder care in China. First, the provision of social security for the elderly 
mainly creates inadequate pension and medical care insurance; second, the development 
of private insurance for the elderly is immature; third, elder care funding relies heavily 
on government subsidies as private capital is inadequate.  
3.1.3.5 The Construction of the Elder Care/LTC Funding System in China 
In order to solve the problems mentioned above, Chinese scholars have proposed 
recommendations on LTC. First and foremost, China currently does not have enough 
specialist LTC institutions, so a number of scholars suggest legislation to give the LTC 
system funds to provide care homes and service staff as soon as possible (Zhuang, 2009; 
Zhang, 2013; Wang (2005, as cited in Cao and Wang, 2013). 
Some scholars propose a specific feasible financing model for China after reviewing 
different models in Western countries. Yin, Tian and Li (2006) propose a social 
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insurance system that should cover LTC, and LTCI should be viewed as a special 
insurance amalgamated with pension or medical care insurance. Li (2016) states that 
establishing an elder care funding system needs first to consider the disabled elderly’s 
practical care needs, and suggests a combination of elder care subsidy and medical care 
insurance to ensure the diversification of financial resources.  
Zhang (2015) points out that there is a distinct difference in LTC between urban and 
rural areas in China, so it is difficult to establish a unified LTC system. Long-term 
funding mechanisms should take different groups into consideration: establishing LTCI 
coverage to those who are covered by basic pension and healthcare insurance; offering 
LTC subsidies to those who do not have a formal job, such as rural-urban migrants, the 
unemployed, temporary workers, etc.  
Shi (2012) claims that in the long run, China needs to establish a LTC funding system 
which is based on public LTCI and supplemented by social assistance and commercial 
LTCI. However, China’s current economic condition is not well developed and the 
relevant social security systems are not mature, so progress involves several stages. 
First, the launch of a pilot LTCI scheme in some well-developed cities. Later, the 
establishment of a unified national-based LTCI system, supplemented with social 
assistance and commercial LTCI. 
Yang et al. (2014) propose the idea of the ‘Monetisation of Adult Child Supporting 
Responsibilities’ to solve the fund shortage problem for medium and low-income 
families. This idea involves the government collecting a service fee from those working 
children who cannot give informal care to their parents, and then establishing a special 
fund by charging the children with a proportion of the care fee, which aims to pay for 
elderly people’s care service fee in the future. Based on an empirical study inviting 
future participants to compare three feasible funding management models – mutual 
cooperation model, personal account model and tax pooling model – this research finds 
that more people (the proportion of the interviewees: 43.68% of the elderly and 40.06% 
of the elderly’s children) support personal accounts and the income level does not 
significantly affect the interviewees’ preferences.  
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Yang, He, Fang and Mossialos (2016) focus on the financing of institutional LTC by 
examining three emerging models in pertinent urban settings: Social Health Insurance in 
Shanghai, LTC Nursing Insurance in Qingdao and a means-tested model in Nanjing. 
Results show that the Qingdao model is by far the most desirable policy option. The 
experiences are summarised and used to draw up proposals for LTC financing for 
Chinese policy makers: first, a national-based financing mechanism needs to be 
established for prepayment and pooling specific to LTC costs (although it surely takes a 
long time to achieve this goal); second, assessment mechanisms to determine eligibility 
rules and the extent of cost-sharing needs to be set; third, care providers need to move 
away from fee-for-service payment arrangements, because these might lead to price 
hikes and overuse of services.  
3.1.4 Summary 
To sum up, we can learn from the established literature that the majority of studies 
concerning elder care/LTC funding in China mainly focus on the introduction of LTC 
funding models found in Western countries, especially on LTCI systems. Currently, 
there is an abundance of research materials on the elder care/LTC systems found in 
China and Western countries: their characteristics, operating models, current problems 
and measurements. However, there is far less research examining and explaining the 
elder care funding system in China from both a theoretical and empirical perspective. 
Also, currently there is no study on efficiency of elder care/LTC funding based on a 
comprehensive quantitative analysis.  
 
3.2 Research Methodology 
One conclusion from previous studies in the field of elder care/LTC funding is that the 
Chinese government has long been aware of the imbalance of the increasing care 
demand from the elderly and the difficulties in public provision and funding for elder 
care. More market-oriented approaches to provide and fund care of the elderly in China 
are urgently required at both policy-making and implementation levels. This research 
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aims to identify current funding models of elder care services on both the supply and the 
demand side, and to analyse the problems within these models. This section will outline 
and discuss the methodological framework and approaches employed. 
The section is in three parts. In the first part, the research strategy and case selection are 
described and justified. This is followed by an explanation of each of the qualitative 
research methods employed – documentary analysis supplemented by semi-structured 
interviews – and a description of the analytical strategies used. Subsequently, the 
quantitative methods and their analytical framework are examined, and finally there is a 
brief presentation of ethical considerations pertinent to this research.  
3.2.1 Research Strategy: Qualitative Case Studies 
Methodologies can employ a variety of research strategies, and the case study design is 
suitable for most ontological and epistemological approaches (Creswell, 2014). The 
term ‘case study’ covers the detailed study of a case or cases, which can be an analysis 
of particular persons, events, decisions, periods, projects, policies, institutions and other 
systems using one or more research methods (Thomas, 2011). The case study method is 
grounded in in-depth investigation and can be descriptive or explanatory, quantitative or 
qualitative, based on multiple lines of enquiry or sources of evidence (Yin, 2014). 
Bryman and Bell (2007) state that interviews, questionnaires, documents, audio-visual 
materials and reports can be applied. With a wide range of information, case studies can 
illuminate and explain the occurrence of an object, and the findings of research in case 
studies can be especially persuasive.  
However, case study research has often been criticised for using informal designs with 
too many variables and too few cases, resulting in unsystematic research (Gerring, 
2007). Yin (2014) also argues that case studies provide very little basis for 
generalisation because they focus on small numbers of subjects that are not necessarily 
representative. Therefore, the case selection rationale and analytical strategy employed 
in this thesis are elaborated below.  
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3.2.1.1 Case Selection Rationale 
The selection of Wuhan in Hubei Province as the fieldwork site is justified because the 
characteristics of the ageing problem in Wuhan are generally typical of those found in 
China as a whole: 
 The ageing rate (the proportion of elderly over 60) in Wuhan was 20.72% in 2016, 
higher than the national average level (16.7%) (Hubei Provincial Department of 
Civil Affairs, 2017b). Wuhan is an old industrial city with a large population of 
retired elderly, so the aged population receives priority as a pressing problem from 
local government.  
 In the reform of elder care, Wuhan (in Hubei Province) is often selected as a pilot 
city. Examples include the House-for-Pension Scheme (Wuhan is the only 
second-tier city), investment funds for developing an elder care industry (Hubei 
Province is one of the eight pilot provinces), public and private partnership (PPP) 
projects on care of the elderly (Hubei Province is one of the fifteen pilot provinces), 
and so on.  
 Wuhan has a strong record in trying to explore different forms of PPP projects to 
extend elder care, from the beginning of ‘Public Construction and Private 
Operation’ and ‘Private Construction and Public Subsidy’17  to more complex 
shareholding co-operative models. This makes it an ideal venue for studying 
various funding models. 
The cases in this research are selected from the nursing institutions belonging to the 
Wuhan Elder care Industry Association. The Association was founded in December 
2015. It was launched by Wuhan Municipal Civil Affairs Bureau and organised by 
public and private nursing institutions located in and around Wuhan, together with other 
relevant agencies, such as insurance companies and tourist agencies.
18
 The latter 
agencies are involved in every aspect of the elder care industry, including social care 
                                               
17
 These funding models will be examined in Section 5.3. 
18
 These are agencies that offer travel and entertainment to elderly people. 
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services, medical care and rehabilitation, products for the elderly, training for service 
staff, tourism, etc. Association members usually organise some activities themselves 
(e.g., annual conferences) and invite government officials and academic scholars to join 
in others, such as seminars to communicate experiences and lessons related to the elder 
care industry. Academic scholars and government officials also engage in fieldwork to 
investigate these agencies and produce academic work.  
In two of these seminars the author had access to high ranking government officials and 
some professors in a university. One seminar was held in the Department of Public 
Administration in Zhongnan University of Economy and Law in May 2015, where a 
group of professors and representatives from Hubei Provincial Department of Civil 
Affairs discussed their latest fieldwork concerning home-based community elder care 
services in Hubei Province. This research project was funded by Hubei Province 
Department of Civil Affairs, and attendance made it possible for the author to interview 
the director of the Social Welfare and Charity section in this department. The other 
seminar was held in Hubei Province Academy of Social Sciences in December 2016. A 
representative from the Wuhan Municipal Bureau of Civil Affairs and some members 
from the Wuhan Elder care Industry Association attended the seminar and discussed the 
marketisation of elder care provision in Wuhan. Thus, the author was able to confirm 
case selection and to identify participants for interview. 
In order to achieve the objectives of the research, case studies were selected to cover the 
different types of funding models in PPP elder care projects in Wuhan. Four cases were 
chosen: Wuchang District Sunshine Welfare House, Wuhan East Lake District Fozuling 
Welfare House, Hanchuan Social Welfare House/Hanchuan Elderly Apartment, and 
Wuhan Social Welfare House/Xiehe Elderly Apartment. Table 3.1 gives details of each 
case selected: 
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Table 3.1 General Information on Each Case 
Name of the nursing 
institution 
Foundation 
date 
Location Types of PPP project 
Nature of 
private sectors 
Wuchang District 
Sunshine Welfare House 
2007 
Wuchang 
District, 
Wuhan 
Private construction and 
public subsidy 
Private 
non-profit 
organisation 
Wuhan East Lake New 
Technology Development 
Zone Fozuling Welfare 
House 
2013 
Hongshan 
District, 
Wuhan 
Public construction and 
private operation 
(commission) 
Private 
non-profit 
organisation 
Hanchuan Social Welfare 
House / Hanchuan Elderly 
Apartment 
2016 
Hanchuan 
(close to 
Caidian 
District, 
Wuhan) 
Public construction and 
private operation 
(contracting out) 
Private 
company 
Wuhan Social Welfare 
House / Xiehe Elderly 
Apartment 
2017 
Jiang’an 
District, 
Wuhan 
R-O-T 
(rebuild-operate-transfer) 
and franchising 
Private 
company 
 
Because of practical problems, the case study research was conducted at different times: 
from April to June 2015 and October to December 2016, the fieldwork consisted of 
semi-structured interviews in four public nursing institutions and two private nursing 
institutions in and around Wuhan. During this period, however, Hanchuan Social 
Welfare House and Wuhan Social Welfare House were still public nursing institutions 
run by the government. The new initiatives in cooperating with private companies in 
elder care provision made necessary further interviews to investigate funding issues, 
especially the mixed funding models employed in these cases. So, during August 2017, 
several telephone interviews were conducted to procure more information on these 
PPPs. 
3.2.1.2 Analytical Strategy 
Case study methodology in this thesis entails multiple-case design with a single unit of 
analysis. The main analytical strategy chosen for the case studies is ‘description’ with 
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the main focus on the structure and performance of funding arrangements in PPP elder 
care projects in Wuhan. The findings from each case study and the specific analytical 
techniques used to produce the comparative cross-case analysis are presented 
descriptively in Chapter 7. The analytical steps taken are the following: 
(1) Brief introduction of basic background information on each nursing institution, 
including its foundation date, building area, accommodation rate, etc.  
(2) Identification of the specific funding model for elder care provision and 
examination of how ‘public private partnership’ operates in each case. 
(3) Examination of the operating situation under public private partnership and 
analysis of any problems within each case. 
(4) Evaluation of experiences and lessons of each case and summary of the overall 
performance of different approaches and models 
To sum up, the qualitative multiple-case study was chosen as an appropriate research 
strategy for this thesis. It can incorporate different research methods to suit research 
questions. Cases were selected according to their type of PPP project and funding model. 
The analytical strategy in the case studies is descriptive and explanation-building in its 
assessment of the comparative performance of the case studies. 
3.2.2 Qualitative Research Methods: Data and Source Materials 
The focus of this section is on the specific research methods of data collection applied 
in this thesis. This thesis uses document analysis and semi-structured interviews as its 
qualitative methods.  
3.2.2.1 Document Analysis  
Document analysis is a type of qualitative research in which the data source and its 
content are reviewed and assessed rigorously and systematically by the researchers 
(Corbetta, 2003). This approach is usually used in social science to facilitate impartial 
and consistent analysis of written policy (Altheide, 1996). The application of document 
analysis methodology has three aims in this thesis:  
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 Systematic exposure of the strategy behind elder care provision, funding policy (at 
both national and local levels) and China’s elder care funding structure. 
 Comprehensive examination of policies relevant to PPP for elder care, and mapping 
the actors involved in PPP elder care projects. This helped in the selection of 
interview participants for the case study. 
 Establishing the basic information for specific empirical cases of PPP in elder care 
projects. The purpose is to identify the questions that might be raised in the 
interview schedule.  
The above information was to be contrasted with data from the case studies. When 
selecting the documents for analysis, it was necessary to consider in advance: the 
department/organisation/person involved, the types of documents to be reviewed, and 
the time of publication and release of these documents (Altheide, 1996). Documents 
usually come from a wide range of sources, including personal documents in both 
written and visual form; official documents from the state and private organisations; and 
mass media and virtual sources (Bryman, 2016). For this thesis, documents were 
collected from the following sources:  
(1) Governmental and official written documents, both at national and local levels, 
including policy and evaluation documents from government bodies and other 
actors involved in policy making in such areas as elderly welfare, social assistance, 
social security, and tax policy;  
(2) Statistical databases from the National Bureau of Statistics (including those 
covering demographic and economic development); and  
(3) A wide range of other sources, including academic papers, websites and 
discussion forums.  
The documents analysed, grouped by category, are presented in Tables 3.2 and 3.3.  
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Table 3.2 Documents as Source of Data in this Thesis (National Policy) 
Sources of 
data 
Functions and contents Examples 
Chinese State 
Council 
Chinese State Council is the 
central government of China. 
Its duty is to design 
important national plans and 
strategies. 
1. Construction Plan of Social Elder care Service 
System (2011-2015) (issued December 2015). 
2. Implementation Suggestions on Accelerating 
Promotion of Elder care Service Industry (issued 
September 2013). 
Ministry of 
Civil Affairs 
Its duty is to design the plans 
related to social welfare, 
elder care, social assistance, 
etc. 
1. Suggestions on Promoting Home-based Elder care 
Services (issued February 2008). 
2. Development Policy Suggestions on Encouraging 
Social Capital to Participate in the Elder care 
Service Industry (issued February 2015). 
Ministry of 
Finance  
Its duty is to design taxation 
plans, fiscal collection and 
payment, etc. 
1. Notification of government purchasing elder care 
services (issued September 2014). 
Ministry of 
Human 
Resources 
and Social 
Security 
Its duty is to implement 
policy related to pensions, 
LTCI, medical care 
insurance, etc. 
1. Guided Suggestion on Launching Pilot of 
Long-term Care Insurance (issued July 2016). 
National 
Ageing Work 
Committee 
Office 
Its duty is to propose policy, 
plan and implement 
measures for China’s ageing 
workforce, including elderly 
welfare, etc.  
1. Suggestions on Further Promoting Preferential 
Policies for Elderly (issued December 2013). 
National 
Development 
and Reform 
Commission 
Its duty is to study important 
issues related to economic 
reform and social 
development, and to produce 
macro-economic policy, etc. 
1. Notification of Accelerating Promotion of 
Construction of Healthcare and Elder care Service 
Project (issued September 2014). 
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Table 3.3 Documents as Source of Data in this Thesis (Local Policy, Statistics and Others) 
Documents 
Sources of 
data 
Functions and contents Examples 
Local 
policy 
Hubei 
Provincial 
Department 
of Civil 
Affairs  
Its duty is to implement 
national policy from 
Ministry of Civil Affairs and 
to design policies relevant to 
Hubei Province. 
1. Thirteenth ‘Five-Year’ Plan of Social 
Elder care Service System Construction 
in Hubei Province (issued 2017). 
Wuhan 
Municipal 
Bureau of 
Civil Affairs  
Its duty is to implement 
national and provincial 
policy and design plans for 
social welfare, elder care, 
social assistance, etc. in 
Hubei Province. 
1. Thirteenth ‘Five-Year’ Plan of the 
Development of Elder care in Wuhan 
(issued 2017). 
Policy documents published in such cities as 
Beijing, Shanghai, Qingdao, and Jingmen. 
1. Notification on Establishing Subsidy 
Regulation for Elderly People with 
Financial Difficulties and Disabled 
Elderly People in Beijing (issued 2017) 
Statistics  
National 
Bureau of 
Statistics 
Its duty is to collect and 
publish statistics related to 
the economy, demography, 
labour, etc. 
1. China’s Statistical Annual Report. 
2. Statistical Bulletin of National 
Economy and Social Development. 
Others
19
 
Academic 
research, 
websites, 
discussion 
forums and 
others 
 
1. China National Knowledge 
Infrastructure (CNKI): articles 
associated with care for the elderly and 
LTC. 
2. Government portal websites (at both 
national and local level). 
3. Discussion forums/seminars of 
government work.  
 
Document analysis in this thesis focuses on the documents’ contents, rather than the 
process and context of each production (Coffey, 2014). Document analysis in this thesis 
is used to investigate policy approaches and strategies for elder care funding, as well as 
to map actors at the local policy level. However, the documents analysed have their 
limitations. First, documents are used to understand the institutional context and specific 
official purpose, and may sometimes reveal a purpose that is not relevant to the 
                                               
19
 Such sources are essentially of a secondary nature, being produced by people who are not directly 
involved with policy making or its execution. 
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researcher’s interests (Corbetta, 2003). Documents in this thesis are mainly used as 
background information to identify the interview questions and then to complement the 
interview method. 
Second, the direct translation of some terms might be misunderstood by English readers. 
For instance, in the Chinese government’s official documents, certain key terms appear 
frequently, such as ‘socialisation’ (‘shehuihua’ in Chinese), ‘social forces’ (‘shehui 
liliang’ in Chinese), ‘social capital’ (‘shehui ziben’ in Chinese) and ‘social elderly 
people’ (‘shehui laoren’ in Chinese). To English readers, the term ‘socialisation’ refers 
to the extension of state ownership and control while to Chinese readers it implies just 
the opposite, that what were originally public-funded products/services can be provided 
by the society/market. To some extent, thus, the connotation of ‘socialisation’ is similar 
with the terms ‘marketisation’ and ‘privatisation’. Similarly, ‘social forces’ refers to the 
social (private) agencies that are involved in the provision of care for the elderly; and 
‘social capital’ stands in contrast to government capital and means investment by 
private or third sectors (‘private capital’). ‘Social elderly people’ means the elderly 
people who are not paid for by the government, and so this thesis uses the term ‘private 
elderly people’ instead. In addition, there are other specific terms used only in China, 
such as the ‘4-2-1 family’, ‘loss of the only child family’, and ‘Three-Nos’ elderly 
people. All these terms are explained in the footnotes.  
3.2.2.2 Semi-structured Interviews 
Qualitative interviews were suitable for the data collection in this thesis. The interviews 
conducted for this research were semi-structured, containing elements of both the 
structured and the unstructured interview (Bryman, 2016):  
 Because of differences in participants’ background and position, the interview 
schedule had a pre-set number of questions while still ensuring that initial interview 
questions were sufficiently open-ended to allow participants to comment from their 
own perspectives and in their own terms.  
 Clarification and exploration of some themes was sometimes necessary to avoid 
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misinterpretation by the participants of the questions. 
 Unstructured interviews tend to be more flexible, and this allows participants to 
focus on what they think is important and to elaborate on their ideas. New questions 
can be asked to follow up on participants’ replies or the order of questions can be 
altered. 
Thus, this research used one-to-one, in-depth, semi-structured interviews to allow the 
participants to provide detailed insights into the research topic. The system for selecting 
participants and the interview procedures used are presented below.  
Selection of the Participants 
Participants in this research were selected mainly from the following three groups: 
 Government: the interviews were with senior staff, such as chief executives or 
heads of governmental departments, the aim being to have participants involved in 
policy development and policy implementation within the field of elder care 
funding. 
 Nursing institutions: interviews were conducted with presidents, managers and 
administrative staff working in these organisations. Beyond general information on 
the organisation, information was sought specifically on financial resources and the 
PPP funding model adopted.  
 Insurance companies: interviews were conducted with the managers of insurance 
companies. The areas of interests included private and policy-based LTCI and the 
‘House-for-Pension’ Scheme.  
Access to organisations was granted through networks of academic contacts in which 
trusting and confidential relationships had already been built. Table 3.4 presents details 
of the participants: 
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Table 3.4 General Information on the Interviewees 
Identifier Organisation types Interviewees’ position 
Government 
Hubei Provincial Department of Civil 
Affairs 
Director of Social Welfare and Charity 
Office 
Wuhan Municipal Bureau of Civil Affairs Director of Administrative Office 
Hanchuan Municipal Bureau of Civil Affairs Vice-director of Administrative Office 
Jingmen Municipal Bureau of Human 
Resource and Social Security 
Director of Medical Care Insurance 
Bureau 
Nursing 
institutions 
Wuchang District Sunshine Welfare House President  
Wuhan East Lake District Fozuling Welfare 
House 
President 
Hanchuan Social Welfare House/Hanchuan 
Elderly Apartment 
President of Hanchuan Social Welfare 
House and the manager of Hanchuan 
Elderly Apartment  
Wuhan Social Welfare House/Xiehe Elderly 
Apartment 
Administrative staff of Wuhan Social 
Welfare House and the manager of the 
PPP project company 
Wuhan Hezhong Healthcare and Retirement 
Community 
Administrative staff 
Wuhan Qiaoya Elderly Apartment  Secretary of Manager’s Office 
Insurance 
companies 
Hezhong Life Insurance Company Limited 
(Wuhan branch) 
Manager  
Hezhong Life Insurance Company Limited 
(Beijing branch) 
Manager  
 
Interviews were conducted between April and June 2015, October and December 2016, 
and in August 2017: the majority of the interviews were conducted face-to-face and in 
the first two periods. However, there were major changes in elder care funding policy 
(at both national and local level) which led to the introduction of PPP systems in some 
nursing institutions in the year 2016~2017. So, supplementary telephone interviews 
were conducted in August 2017, including interviews with: 
 The Director of the Medical Insurance Bureau from Jingmen Municipal Bureau 
of Human Resource and Social Security about public LTCI. 
 Staff members from the Hanchuan Elderly Apartment and the Xiehe Elderly 
Apartment about their PPPs elder care projects. 
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 A manager from Hezhong Life Insurance Company Limited (Beijing Branch) 
about policy-based LTCI
20
.  
The speed with which earlier material became outdated indicates just how quickly elder 
care policies that involve collaboration between public and private funders are 
developing in China. The research was aimed at a moving target and hitting it was a 
challenge. 
Interview Procedure  
At the start of the interview, participants were informed of the research objectives, the 
timescale of the interview, the usage and storage of the data, anonymity procedures, etc. 
Interviews were arranged at a time and place which suited the participants. Questions 
were made understandable and unambiguous, and participants were made to feel that 
their answers would contribute to the research (Bryman, 2016). In the first and second 
periods (April~June and October~December 2015), in-depth interviews were conducted 
face-to-face and lasted between one and two hours. Later in August 2017, several 
additional telephone interviews were conducted, in order to obtain the latest information 
of public LTCI and PPP elder care projects. 
An interview schedule was developed based on the thesis research questions. The 
schedule clearly stated the information that needed to be collected, but permitted 
flexibility enough to adapt to each case study and participant. The focus of the 
interviews is mainly the elder care funding structure, financial sources for a nursing 
institution, PPP elder care funding, its practical operation, etc. The topics included in 
the interview schedule can be grouped under three main headings (see Tables 3.5 and 
3.6).  
                                               
20
 More detail of policy-based LTCI will be introduced in section 6.4.3. 
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Table 3.5 Interview Schedule Topics (Government) 
Organisations Topics Research areas 
Government  
Aged population Characteristics 
Elder care provision 
1. Overall situation of public and private nursing 
institutions in Hubei Province; 
2. PPP elder care projects (with types) in Hubei Province. 
Elder care funding 
1. Important policy documents, including the 
contents-related subsidy standard, public welfare lottery 
funds and fiscal transfer payment ; 
2. Funding source for elder care (construction and 
operating stage). 
Public LTCI 
1. Implementation situation; 
2. Computational basis of contribution. 
Others  
1. (Private) non-profit organisations which provide elder 
care services; 
2. Social donation to elder care;  
3. Problems in elder care provision and funding in Hubei 
Province; 
4. Other issues concerning policy development and 
implementation. 
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Table 3.6 Interview Schedule Topics (Nursing Institutions and Insurance Companies) 
Organisations Topics Research areas 
Nursing 
institutions 
Basic background of the 
organisation  
Location, date founded, size, number of beds 
Basic information on the 
elderly living in the 
organisation  
1. Number of ‘Three-nos’ and ‘Five-Guarantees’ 
elderly people, and number of private elderly people; 
2. Degree of disability among the elderly (mild, 
medium and severe); 
3. Personal financial resources of elderly (pension and 
children). 
Charge fee 
The price standard of service fee, bed fee and living 
fee. 
Initial investment in the 
construction of organisation  
Expenditures on assets depreciation fee, rent, 
equipment and facilities, etc. 
Financial sources 
1. Construction stage: fiscal subsidy, social donation 
and land lease; 
2. Operating stage: subsidy standard, preferential 
administrative fees. 
PPP elder care project 
1. Types of PPP; 
2. Specific contents of PPP contract; 
3. How PPP project company works; 
4. Roles of public and private sectors. 
Human resource 
1. Number of doctors, nurses and other administrative 
and service staff; 
2. Salaries. 
Insurance 
companies 
Private insurances for the 
elderly 
Implementation of policy-based LTCI (Beijing) and 
‘House-for-Pension’ Scheme, and the possible 
problems. 
 
The above topics suggest a number of interview questions which explore elder care 
funding models and PPP elder care funding at the administrative level, in policy fields, 
and in nursing institutions. There are 15 audio records of the interviews, and the 
transcribed interviews capture the necessary information to answer the research 
questions.  
3.2.3 Quantitative Research Methods 
In this thesis, the case studies are used as an analytical basis for identifying different 
typologies of PPP elder care projects and typical funding models for institutional care in 
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China. However, as this thesis will demonstrate, public expenditure and public LTCI 
play a very important role in current Chinese funding for elder care. This research uses 
quantitative and statistical analysis to study the important factors which affect the scale 
of these two funding models. It then establishes a financial model and verifies its 
feasibility. 
3.2.3.1 Empirical Analysis of the Efficiency of Public Expenditure on Elder care 
Services 
We first construct input and output indicators of the efficiency of public expenditure on 
elder care services in the 31 regions of China for the year of 2015. By using data 
envelopment analysis (DEA) and DEAP 2.1 software (Coelli, 1996), we calculate the 
relative efficiency of public expenditure (the overall evaluation of multiple inputs and 
outputs) on elder care services in these 31 regions.
21
 Later, we evaluate the DEA 
calculation results – the comprehensive efficiency, technical efficiency and scale 
efficiency of the decision-making units and choose two regions (Hunan and Yunan) to 
suggest how to improve the efficiency of the decision-making units.  
3.2.3.2 Empirical Analysis on the Effects of Public Expenditure on Care Services for 
the Elderly 
This analysis is based on the data related to social security and elder care services from 
the perspective of the demand and supply side, and a construction of elder care service 
index system for China.
22
 The components are formed through a process of refining 
and quantifying, and are used to calculate an elder care service index in both urban and 
rural areas of China from 2011 to 2015. We present the results in four scatter diagrams 
by using Stata statistical software and comparing the investment direction and 
effectiveness of elder care funding between urban and rural areas. In addition, the 
statistical characteristics of the variables are presented, and results based on 
multiple-linear regression analysis are verified. 
                                               
21
 The application of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is introduced in Appendix 1. 
22
 The introduction of key indices of elder care services in this research will be presented in Table 8.14 
and section 8.3.2. 
69 
 
3.2.3.3 Statistical Analysis on Forecasting the Supply and Demand Costs of Long 
Term Care (LTC)  
The statistical analysis is divided into two frameworks – demand and supply costs of 
LTC. The calculation of demand cost mainly follows two steps. The first step is to 
calculate the population of disabled elderly people in China. Based on the available data 
of the population over 60 years in different regions of China in 2015, we use the 
proportion standard identified by China’s Ageing Scientific Research Centre (Jing and 
Li, 2014), which finds that the proportions of severely, moderately and mildly disabled 
elderly people are 1.08%, 0.31% and 4.83% of all people over 60 years. We then 
calculate the population of disabled elderly people in 2016. We use the population 
estimated by the United Nations (2017) and the disability rates provided by National 
Statistical Bureau (2004) and Li, Tang and Wang (2016) to estimate the population of 
different age groups of disabled elderly people between 2020 and 2050 (see Table 9.5). 
In the second step, we calculate and estimate the demand cost for LTC. Because there is 
no unified nationwide standard of LTC service charges, we assume that costs of LTC 
for severely, moderately and mildly disabled elderly people are 40%, 30% and 20%
23
 
of average social salary
24
. The first two standards refer to the cost of institutional care, 
and the third standard is for community and home-based elder care. Then, we estimate 
the costs of LTC from 2020 to 2050. We assume the annual growth rate in the average 
social salary will be 3%. Because of the huge estimated increase in the population of 
elderly people between 2020 and 2050, we have reduced the proportion standards of the 
costs for LTC to severely, moderately and mildly disabled elderly people to 30%, 25% 
and 20%
25
 of average social salary. 
                                               
23
 According to the publication ‘Notification of Adjusting the Standard of Nursing Care Expense for 
Work-related Disabled Employees’ (Ministry of Labour, Ministry of Finance and All-China Federation of 
Trade Unions, 1992), the costs of nursing care for severely, moderately and mildly disabled employees 
are 50%, 40% and 20% of the average social salary. Then, I assume that the proportion criteria of LTC 
expense are lower than the previous ones, so I choose ‘40%, 30% and 20%’ as the proportion criteria to 
calculate the demand for LTC in 2016 (see Table 9.1). 
24
 Average social salary refers to the average salary of all employees within one region in one period. 
The growth rate of average social salary is 3% between 2020 and 2050, which is defined according to the 
previous average growth rate.  
25
 When I applied ‘40%, 30% and 20%’ to estimate the demand for LTC from 2020 to 2050, I found that 
the amount of demand is more than the supply, which makes it unrealistic and unsustainable, so I reduced 
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The calculation of supply costs also follows two steps. We first calculate total supply 
costs of LTC by using the cross-section data of population of people enrolled in the 
public medical insurance scheme
26
 and disposable income per capita (using 
multiple-linear regression to estimate future data from previous data) to calculate the 
total supply costs of LTC. After reviewing the public LTCI schemes in several pilot 
cities, we chose Jingmen’s public LTCI as the financial model and analysed its 
feasibility at the national level.
27
 Because of the unduly low financial rate (0.4% of 
local disposable income) in Jingmen, we set three standards of 0.7%, 1.0% and 1.4% as 
the financial rate to define low, median and high estimates of supply cost. Second, we 
estimated the supply costs of LTC between 2020 and 2050, and calculated the possible 
financial rate that can meet the future demand for LTC funds. 
3.2.4 Ethical Considerations 
Ethical issues need to be considered in order to protect the rights, dignity, privacy and 
safety of the research participants, to safeguard the researchers conducting the study, to 
ensure the high quality and viability of the research, and to maintain the reputation of 
the university (Social Research Association, 2003). This thesis is guided by the ethical 
scrutiny process of Warwick University. This ensures that all research involving 
collection of individual-level information from human participants and their data 
addresses relevant ethical considerations and is subject to appropriate ethical review. As 
the research design did not require any detailed information about the clientele of the 
institutions under review, the need for extensive ethical protection was limited. 
Even so, the author has recognised the entitlement of participants to ethical protection. 
Before interviews were carried out, participants were fully informed of the research 
objectives and design, data management and its usage. Permission was also collected 
for recording the interviews. During the course of the interviews, participants were also 
                                                                                                                                         
the values to ‘30%, 25% and 20%’ to calculate the estimation of future demand for LTC (see Tables 9.6, 
9.7 and 9.8). 
26
 We assume that urban and rural residents are all covered by a public medical insurance scheme, and 
that people enrolled in a public medical insurance scheme will also be enrolled in a public LTCI scheme. 
27
 The details of Jingmen’s public LTCI scheme will be introduced in section 6.4.2. 
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made aware that they had the option to cease or pause the audio recording or even end 
the interview and retrieve all data at any point.  
Because some of the information participants provided might be considered sensitive, 
confidential and anonymous treatment of participants’ data was the norm at both 
professional and personal levels. The information provided by participants cannot reveal 
their identity and no personal information will be shared without the participants’ 
permission. Participants were told how and why their personal data were being stored 
and assured that all data are password-protected.  
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Chapter 4 Historical Development and Rationales Leading to 
the Construction of the Elder Care System in China 
 
 
This chapter is structured into three sections. First, China’s current ageing phenomenon 
is presented by examining the four main features of an aged population. Second, this 
examination is followed by a review of the development of China’s elder care service in 
three historical contexts: 1949~1982, 1982~2000 and 2000~the present. Third, the 
rationales leading to the construction of the social elder care service system in China are 
discussed from three perspectives – changes of policy orientation, economic transition 
and market prosperity, and social development and urbanisation.  
 
4.1 An Ageing Society in China: Longevity Risk and its Features 
A decrease in death rates and fertility rates generally exists across the world. From a 
global perspective, an aged population is an inevitable result of demographic transition. 
China is one of the most rapidly ageing countries of the twenty-first century, and its 
elderly population is comprised of over 200 million people. Compared with other 
developed countries, China only took 18 years to become an ageing society (from 1981 
to 1999), while the United Kingdom, United States, Germany and Japan took about 47, 
71, 40 and 24 years (World Health Organisation, as cited in Fang, 2015). Aside from 
additional public pension pressure, the issues associated with an ageing society have 
emerged as another great challenge for China in the twenty-first century: the family 
planning policy, rapidly increasing longevity, rural to urban migration, the weakened 
role of the family care model and the limitations of formal care provision in the past 30 
years, all interact to exacerbate the problem.  
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4.1.1 An Increasing Aged Population 
According to the definition provided in the ‘Law of the People’s Republic of China 
Regarding the Protection of the Rights and Interests of the Elderly’ (1996), an aged 
population is comprised of citizens of 60 years and above (Lin, 2015). In China, since 
the end of twentieth century, ageing trends and their internal structure (i.e. the way the 
aged population is distributed) are astonishing. The Sixth Nationwide Demographic 
Census (National Statistical Bureau, 2011) shows that the number of people over 60 
years in China reached 178 million by the end of 2010; that is, 13.26% of the total 
population, which is an indicator that China has already become an ageing society. This 
ageing trend has become far more serious over the past few years, and at the end of 
2016 the aged population had increased to 230 million, a percentage of 16.7% (National 
Statistical Bureau, 2017a). Chart 4.1 illustrates the growth trend of this aged population. 
It can be seen that growth gradually accelerates year after year. Estimates by Di et al. 
(2016) of the trend of China’s aged population predict that the growth trend will not 
slow down, due to advanced medical technology and increased life expectancy, as 
shown in Chart 4.2. It is estimated that the aged population will reach 310 million by 
the end of 2026, approximately accounting for 25% of total population, and the aged 
population will increase to 410 million by the end of 2036 and 470 million by the end of 
2040 (ibid). 
With the ever-increasing aged population, China’s ageing society is accompanied by 
four typical characteristics: 
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Chart 4.1 Numbers and Proportions of China's Aged Population (over 60) from 2008 to 2016 
Data Source: Statistical Bulletin of Social Services Development (Ministry of Civil Affairs, 2016d). 
Chart 4.2 Average Life Expectancy in China (1980, 1990, 2000, 2005, 2010 and 2020) 
Data Source: Strategic Research Report on Health China 2020 (Ministry of Health, 2013). 
First, when observing China’s overall aged population trend, I am not solely concerned 
with the expansion of the overall scale (size) of the aged population in China, but also 
with the rapid ageing phenomenon acting on its internal structure due to increased life 
expectancy. That is to say, the proportion of China’s population which is over 60 is 
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growing so fast that the very mature population (of people over 80 years) keeps rising. 
This age group reached 23 million in 2013, and may increase by 1 million annually until 
2025. By 2050, it is estimated that the proportion of elderly people over 80 years will 
have continued to grow from 11.5% to 23.2%, which means one out of four people of 
the aged population will be over 80 by the middle of the twenty-first century (Di et al., 
2016). 
Second, the number of mature people with incapacities and chronic illness is on the 
increase. According to the ‘Sixth Nationwide demographic Census’ (National Statistical 
Bureau, 2011), mature people with incapacities account for 2.95% of the total number 
of the aged population (over 60 years), and 57.55% of them were aged between 72 to 86 
years in 2010. From a gender perspective, the proportion of people with incapacities 
who are women is higher than men – 58.36% and 41.64% respectively (Lin, 2015).  
Third, the first generation to be brought up in ‘one child’ families was born in the early 
1980s. This generation is now in their thirties and leaving home to start their own 
families. Most of their parents are in their fifties which is near retirement age for 
China
28
. The strong influence of the fertility control policy has had implications for the 
aged population, if we reflect that fewer children are being born, related to an increase 
of ‘empty-nest’ families emerging in the last three decades. The skew towards a mature 
population is exacerbated by the rising number of ‘loss of only child’ families – there is 
even a special rite, called ‘Shidu jiating’ in Chinese, for the loss of an only child. There 
were at least 1 million families, in 2012, that had lost their only child, and the figure 
rises by approximately 76,000 each year (Wu and Tang, 2013).  
Finally, fluctuations are to be expected in the total dependency ratio. Powell and Cook 
(2010) predict that China will reach a higher ‘dependent burden’ earlier in the 
twenty-first century than was previously forecast. It is estimated that the dependency 
                                               
28
 The retirement age in China currently is 60 for men and 55 for female civil servants and 50 for female 
workers (Chinese State Council, 1978). Due to public pension payment pressure, academics and 
politicians in China propose postponing the retirement age. For instance, in 2013, in the third plenary 
meeting of 18
th 
CPC Central Committee (Central Committee of the CPC, 2013), it was suggested that it 
was necessary to move forward in ‘… designing a gradual postponing retirement age policy’. Yin (2014) 
predicts that the Ministry of Human Resource and Social Security will post an announcement on 
postponing the retirement age in China in 2020. 
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rate for the elderly in China will be 30% in 2023, and increase to 60% in 2047. This 
means that less and less labour force provided by younger generations would be 
available to support the elderly in the middle of twenty-first century. Thus, the burden 
of elder care that will fall on China’s economically active population and economy are 
predicted to become the main social dependency burden in the future. That is, the 
working population and the country’s economy will face increasing pressures in order 
to support and provide the social services needed by older persons. From the 
perspective of the dependency ratios of children and elderly people, they are roughly the 
same before 2022; but the gap between these ratios is widening, in fact, the elderly 
dependency ratio might be 38% higher than the children’s dependency ratio by the 
2050s (Di et al., 2016).  
Therefore, increasing attention, stimulated by the impact of fast demographic changes 
on the ageing structure and the size of the aged population, incorporating the four 
characteristics raised above, is of vital importance to the problem of provision and 
funding policies concerning elder care. 
4.1.2 China’s Transformation in Family Structure 
Before the 1980s, Chinese couples could have two or more children, so that they could 
be looked after by their children when they were old. However, since the 1980s due to 
the ‘one-child’ policy the fertility rate has dropped dramatically and family structure has 
gotten smaller (Whyte, Feng and Cai, 2015). In the cities, new family structures have 
arisen, such as, the ‘4-2-1’ family, and the ‘empty-nest’ family. In October 2015, the 
Chinese government proposed a ‘two-children’ policy (Xinhua News, 2015), so that the 
current generation in their ‘20s’ and ‘30s’ might face a challenge in the near future of 
taking care of eight grandparents, four parents and two children at the same time. Apart 
from the influence of demographic policy on birth control, this transformation of family 
structure can lead to some social issues which will be discussed over the next two 
paragraphs. 
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First of all, filial piety is a vital component of traditional Chinese family values. 
Respecting, supporting and taking care of the elderly is one’s legal duty, rather than a 
social responsibility. If children abandon obligations of care towards their parents, they 
will be condemned by the public. Even though some parents are open-minded and 
willing to live in a nursing institution in order to reduce their children’s burden, parents 
might give up this idea as they do not want their children to be criticised or even 
accused of neglecting their elders by other people. Thus, traditional values greatly 
influence the current ‘4-2-1’ family structure.  
Second, the existence of ‘4-2-1’ family structure enhances mutual assistance among 
family members. For instance, if the grandparents are healthy, and can take an active 
part in daily housework, they could take care of their grandchild when the young couple 
are engaged at work. Within a traditional Chinese family, the grandparents will do as 
much as they can to contribute to their children’s family, not only in financial terms, but 
also with invaluable labour.  
In recent years, the ‘4-2-1’ family model has gradually separated into two parts – ‘4’ 
(the ‘empty-nested’ family model) and ‘2-1’ (the nuclear family model), which makes 
the family structure even smaller. The possible causes of a generation of ‘empty-nest’ 
families are as follows: rapid economic development and globalisation after the 1980s, 
have brought in more and more job opportunities for younger generations who are 
quicker and smarter in absorbing new thoughts and technologies, so that they can get 
well-paid jobs and not depend on their parents. Besides this rapid development and 
opportunity, a difference in education, living habits and modes of thinking between 
older and younger generations also lead to the phenomenon of the ‘empty-nest’ family, 
both in urban and rural areas. The alienation of affection and distant relationships have 
greatly challenged traditional modes of family elder care, and might generate more 
conflicts between the two generations.  
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4.1.3 An Uneven Ageing Situation in Urban and Rural Areas 
Under an overall influence of social and economic development, the proportion of aged 
population is mainly driven by three factors – fertility, death and rural-urban migration 
(Du and Wang, 2010). According to ‘The Sixth Nationwide Demographic Census’ 
(National Statistical Bureau, 2011), urban and rural fertility rates in China were 0.88 
and 1.44 births per woman. At the same time, due to satisfactory sanitary conditions, 
medical resources and social security provisions for the urban elderly, the average life 
expectancy in urban areas is longer than that of rural areas – 76 years and 69 years 
respectively. Although death acts as a decreasing factor on aged population in the cities, 
and also elsewhere, there is an additional increasing factor caused by rural-urban 
migration. According to official national demographic statistics, the aged population of 
urban residents increased by 21.82 million, while the same in rural areas decreased by 
13.73 million from 2015 to 2016 (National Statistical Bureau, 2017a). Average 
disposable income per capita is three times more for urban residents compared with 
rural residents. So cities can absorb any rural surplus of young labour by offering more 
job opportunities with good salaries, as a result, less young people stay in rural areas 
due to a lack of similar opportunities (Liu, 2014b). For the first time, in 2005, the 
proportion of people over 60 in rural areas was higher than in urban areas, although, this 
gap is less than 2%. This gap has widened since then, by the end of 2011 the proportion 
of people aged over 60 in rural and urban areas was 15.5% and 12.0% respectively, and 
it is estimated that this gap will not narrow in the future (ibid). What is worse, an 
imbalance of labour resources, capital, and public facilities between urban and rural 
areas in China has resulted in an uneven distribution in elder care in urban and rural 
areas. 
4.1.4 Elderly Poverty: Getting Old before Getting Rich 
From the experience of a developed country such as the US, when it first became an 
ageing society the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was at least 2,000 US dollars per 
capita, which is an upper-middle level even by current standards. When China first 
became an ageing society, at the end of 1990s, the GDP per capita was around 640 
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dollars, far less than that of the developed countries (Li, 2013). With an ever-increasing 
aged population in China, the facets of problematic phenomena related to aged 
impoverishment are much more complicated, and the solutions to these problems are 
more difficult to obtain than ever before. 
Compared to developed countries, poverty levels in the aged population of China 
demonstrates a phenomenon of ‘getting old before getting rich’ (‘weifu xianlao’ in 
Chinese). The majority of elderly Chinese people are relatively poor in their old age for 
different reasons. First of all, elderly people are amongst the lowest-income groups, and 
are more vulnerable to poverty due to a lack of, or inadequate, economic resources. 
Secondly, social welfare levels are quite low in China, and most elderly people are 
marginalised from daily care or other social security schemes. The minimum and basic 
income guarantee is not sufficient to prevent poverty brought about by sickness. Thirdly, 
most elderly Chinese people hold the traditional view to save money for their unmarried 
or married children and grandchild, and thus, they might remain poor in their old age 
due to this custom (National Ageing Work Committee Office, 2013a).  
 
4.2 The Historical Development of Elder Care in China 
Following the formation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, a socialist and a 
centrally planned economy was established by the new rulers. With the Chinese 
economic reform (‘reform and opening-up’) that started in 1978, China abandoned its 
planned economic isolationism and adopted an open socialist market economy 
(Dahlman and Aubert, 2001). The development of China’s elder care services system 
was accompanied by an everlasting evolution in the political and economic situation, 
social transformation and demographic changes. While maintaining its political and 
economic uniqueness, China has utilised different welfare characteristics for the elderly 
people in different periods under specific historical contexts. In general, the 
development of the construction of the elder care service can be illustrated through the 
following three periods: 1949~1982, 1982~2000 and 2000~the present. 
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4.2.1 Family-supported Elder Care (1949~1982) 
The first period lasted from the founding of the People’s Republic of China to the early 
stages of reform and opening-up. During that time, China’s elder care service was not 
given adequate attention by the new government. There are three reasons: firstly, new 
China had just been founded and the Chinese Government had to prioritise the recovery 
of the damaged infrastructure, and improve basic living conditions for the impoverished 
population (Dong, 2010). Secondly, thanks to Chairman Mao’s proposal that ‘more 
people means more labour force’, women were encouraged to have more children. The 
Chinese population underwent a period of rapid growth and the demographic structure
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was reformed. As a result of increased birth rates the younger generation formed a large 
percentage of the whole population, so there was a low social care demand for the 
elderly at that time (Tsai, 1987). Thirdly, the traditional idea of ‘bringing up sons to 
support parents in their old age’ (‘yanger fanglao’ in Chinese) was deeply rooted among 
Chinese households. Elderly people preferred to stay at home and be taken care of by 
their children until the end of life. Therefore, the elder care service at this period was 
mainly recognised as the responsibility of family members, and supplemental welfare 
packages were provided for people through other forms. For instance, a universal 
lifelong employment policy was adopted in cities for the Work Unit (‘Danwei’ in 
Chinese) system, which is comprised of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), government 
departments, and other organisations in the public sector (Ringen and Ngok, 2013). In 
rural areas, the local government offered social security to local citizens through ‘land 
reform’ – ‘gaining welfare at the cost of land’, implementing an agricultural cooperative 
movement, establishing a People’s Commune (‘renmin gongshe’ in Chinese)30, and 
allocating benefits to local citizens by their collective labour (Lin, 2006). Throughout 
this period, the elder care service was relatively simple, as it only concentrated on basic 
                                               
29
 The demographic structure refers to the extent to which the proportion of each age group is 
transforming.  
30
 The People’s Commune (renmin gongshe) was the largest collective unit in rural areas in the late 
1950s. The Communist Party took the land back from the farmers and forced them to join the ‘People’s 
Commune’, where people were divided into production brigades and production teams.  
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levels of demand – providing adequate food and clothing. However, there were some 
distinctive differences between urban and rural elder care services during this period. 
In the cities, urban residents’ elderly welfare can be divided into two forms. The first 
one was arranged by the Danwei system, which guaranteed a job for life for almost 
every urban citizen of working age. Such an arrangement was known as the ‘iron rice 
bowl’ (‘tiefanwan’ in Chinese), characterised by the provision of cradle-to-grave social 
security for its workers (Fang, Zhang and Fan, 2002). The Danwei system functioned as 
a self-sufficient ‘mini welfare state’, and more than 80% of the urban labour force was 
covered by it (ibid). At their retirement, retirees received pensions which were based on 
a percentage of their salary, and also enjoyed medical healthcare and entertainment 
provided by the Danwei system. Another form of urban residents’ elderly welfare 
focused on the ‘Three-Nos’ Policy31, where ‘Three-Nos’ elderly people depended only 
on government relief, or went to the Production and Education Institutes
32
 (Dixon, 
1981; Liu, 2014b). By the end of 1953, there were approximately 920 of these kinds of 
institutions across the nation which accommodated around 100,000 elderly people 
(‘Contemporary China’ Editorial Board, 1994). After the ‘Socialist Transformation’33, 
the Production and Education Institute threw out anyone with the ability to work. Some 
institutions became nursing homes
34, and only accepted ‘Three-Nos’ elderly people. In 
1961, the Ministry of Internal Affairs started to reorganise welfare agencies, which 
involved addressing the services that they provided, so they could meet the population’s 
social welfare needs.  
                                               
31
 The ‘Three-Nos’ Policy refers to those who have no source of income, no working capacity, and no 
legal support or care obligations. 
32
 The ‘Production and Education Institute’ (‘shengchan jiangyangyuan’ in Chinese) is the predecessor 
of the Social Welfare House (‘shehui fuliyuan’ in Chinese). Its original intention was to accommodate the 
homeless, and provide education and training for them. At present, the main purpose for the Social 
Welfare House is to support urban-living ‘Three-Nos’, including the elderly, and disabled and abandoned 
children (in order to protect the legal rights of vulnerable groups and maintain social stability). 
33
 The Socialist Transformation is put forward from the general line of the transition period since 1953, 
and its main content is to carry on socialist transformation in the agriculture industry, handicraft industry 
and capitalist commercial industry, in order to eliminate private ownership and set up public ownership.  
34
 In China, retirement institutions for the elderly are named in different ways, for instance, ‘nursing 
institution’ refers to the ones in the cities, and the phrase ‘nursing home’ is ‘jinglaoyuan’ in Chinese, 
which translates as a place for the elderly people in rural areas. But there are also some special terms for 
nursing institutions in China, such as ‘Social Welfare House’ (‘shehui fuliyuan’ in Chinese), which is a 
kind of public nursing institution. 
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During this period of development, the welfare system in China’s rural areas went 
through a stage of collective elder care (before 1978) and a stage of family-supported 
elder care (after 1978). Since 1953, the agricultural cooperative movement started with 
vigour, and individual farmers’ private land ownership was replaced by socialist 
collective ownership. In August 1958, the Chinese Communist Party introduced a 
‘Resolution on the Establishment of People’s Commune in the Rural Areas’, which 
officially defined the rural People’s Commune as rural social basic units. Farmers were 
organised into communes based on the collective ownership of land (Ringen and Ngok, 
2013). Ensuing from this background, of the collective ownership of land and the 
People’s Commune system, family production units were replaced by collective 
production units, and the peasant household economy transferred to the collective 
economy. Collective organisations implemented the production and organisation of 
resources according to unified plans, and distributed financial resources in the same way 
(Lin, 2006). Mao (1977) points out in the Preface to the ‘China’s Socialist Climax in the 
Chinese Countryside’ that all collective organisations have the responsibility to help 
mature people who have no children, no working ability, and no financial resources, as 
well as helping those who have the ability to work but live in a difficult environment. 
Under these circumstances, all able-bodied adult famers worked for the People’s 
Communes through which daily necessities were distributed, and according to the 
egalitarianism distribution principle, rural elderly people could also satisfy their basic 
social needs (mainly food and clothing) from the People’s Commune, regardless of 
whether they were able to work or not. For the poorest rural households, especially 
those who had no children and no working ability, a ‘Five-Guarantees’ system (Third 
Conference of the First National People’s Congress, 1956) funded by rural collective 
organisations was developed to cater for their basic demands (food, clothing, firewood, 
education for their children and funeral) through an unified institutional arrangement 
(Chen, Ngok and Philips, 2008; Liu, 2014a). Therefore, during this period, the function 
of rural family care was relatively weakened, instead, collective organisations bore the 
main responsibility of security for the elderly people.  
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The negative impact of the egalitarian and agricultural cooperative movements, in the 
centralised-planned economy, caused some common problems in rural areas: inefficient 
agricultural production, laggard technology production, and a shortage of basic 
necessities. A majority of farmers lived in poverty. After 1978, rural areas abolished the 
People’s Commune and began to implement the ‘Household Contract Responsibility 
System’35. Farmers were endowed with autonomy, in the production and management 
of their land, which symbolised the starting point for the reform of agricultural 
management (Lin, 2006). Land is the most important possession for a rural family, as it 
can provide them with various means for food production and livelihood. The reform 
stimulated an increase in farming, which rapidly enhanced efficiency in agricultural 
production. Under the ‘Household Contract Responsibility System’, elderly with 
working ability gained more income from their labour, and those who could not work, 
had the option of renting their land to others and gaining from this investment. At this 
time, the function of elder care was returned completely to the family, as more elderly 
people engaged in some light physical work, such as housework and taking care of their 
grandchildren. Because of mutual assistance within the family, these elderly people 
benefited from financial or spiritual support from their children when they needed it, 
including the coverage of daily care, medical expenses and spiritual comfort, etc.  
In summary, the elderly welfare system, though characterised by a sharp urban-rural 
divide and a low level of government provision, only offered basic social protection for 
both workers and farmers (Leung and Nann, 1995). However, the outsourcing of social 
responsibility from the urban Danwei system, or rural cooperative organisations, was 
pursued via a painful process of trial and error, and elder care institutions suffered 
severely during the period of Cultural Revolution (1966~1976)
36
 (Dong, 2010; Ringen 
                                               
35
 In 1978, the third Plenary Session of the 11
th
 Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party 
pioneered a new phase of reform and opening-up policy. The reform started in the countryside in the early 
1980s, as local governments allocated land to each household. This conduct was later defined as the 
‘Household Contract Responsibility System’.  
36
 The Cultural Revolution was a socio-political movement which was set into motion by Mao Zedong 
from 1966 until 1976. Its stated goal was to preserve ‘true’ Communist ideology in the country by 
purging remnants of capitalist and traditional elements from Chinese society, and to re-impose the 
position of Mao and his thought as the dominant ideology within the Party. The movement paralyzed 
China politically and negatively affected the country’s economy and society to a significant degree.  
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and Ngok, 2013). As to the elder care system, the urban ‘Three-Nos’ and rural 
‘Five-Guarantees’ elderly people were the main service objects (elderly people targeted 
by the government) during this time, while the majority of elderly people had to rely on 
their family.  
4.2.2 Government-leading Elder Care (1982~2000) 
The second period started from the beginning of the reform and opening-up policy until 
2000. Since the start of 1980s, China carried out transformative reform from a 
centralised-planned economy to a market-based economy. Economic liberalisation 
developed forcefully, as demonstrated by unprecedented industrialised growth, 
marketisation and modernisation. Due to the collapse of cooperative organisation and 
the bankruptcy of SOEs, the provision of security by way of guaranteed access to jobs 
or land was gradually discontinued. The egalitarian welfare system disappeared, and in 
the cities there was an increase in laid-off workers and young retirees (from 40-50 
years), who were more likely to need social services from their local community (Wong 
and Poon, 2005; Yang, 2016). During this time, the diversity of elder care services 
attracted attention from Chinese academics and politicians, and the Chinese 
Government attempted to create a social welfare system which was independent from 
the Danwei or the cooperative system.  
The new Constitution of 1982, with subsequent amendments and additions, introduced 
various social rights for the elderly (Ringen and Ngok, 2013). In the same year, the 
National Ageing Work Committee Office was established, with an aim to design an 
ageing work network from central to local government. In 1984, the Ministry of Civil 
Affairs proposed the idea that ‘society can do social welfare work’, encouraging social 
sectors, such as individuals, private companies, social organisations, and so on, to 
participate in the delivery of elder care (Yang, 2016). In August 1993, the Ministry of 
Civil Affairs (1993) and other fourteen ministries jointly issued another document 
entitled ‘Suggestions on Accelerating the Development of Community Services’, which 
established the goal of a community service network. In March 1998, the Ministry of 
Civil Affairs selected 13 locations, as pilot cities, to launch what was termed the 
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‘socialisation of social welfare’ project in order to promote a ‘residents’ service 
industry’. In the same year, the General Office of Chinese State Council (1998) issued 
the ‘Suggestions on Accelerating the Socialisation of Social Welfare’, and further 
promoted projects all across the nation. In 1996, ‘The Law on the Protection of Senior 
Citizens’ Rights’ pointed out that the contents of elder care should be transferred from 
living security (food and clothing) to a comprehensive package incorporating housing, 
healthcare, rehabilitation and entertainment, while ensuring quality of service. In its 
latest amended version (2015), the law denotes that the legal contents of elderly welfare 
include family support, social security, participation in social development, legal 
liability, etc. Moreover, the law dictates that Chinese society should extend care to 
ensure that elderly people, especially those in difficulty, can be provided with a 
treasured sense of security, belonging and worthiness. Since 1999, several relevant 
documents were issued, such as ‘Temporary Measures for the Administration of Social 
Welfare Institutions’ (Ministry of Civil Affairs, 1999), ‘Basic Norms on Elderly Social 
Welfare Institutions’ (Ministry of Civil Affairs, 2000) and ‘Design Specifications of the 
Architecture for Elderly people’ (Ministry of Construction and University of Harbin, 
2006). These documents created guidelines for a standardised construction of elderly 
institutions, and selective criteria for elder care service management. During this period, 
various elderly institutions were founded, including administrative departments for the 
elderly, nursing homes, elderly entertainment centres, etc. The number of these elderly 
institutions increased from 33,000 in 1986, to 40,000 in 2000 (Chen, 2014). The 
accepted group of elderly people in these elderly institutions were not only provide 
cover for the ‘Three-Nos’, but also others who needed elder care.  
During the 1990s, the rural elderly welfare system in China was gradually improved. In 
order to standardise the rural ‘Five-Guarantees’ system, and ensure that they received 
basic living conditions, Chinese State Council (1994) promulgated ‘Regulations on the 
Provision of Rural ‘Five-Guarantees’ Elderly People’ in 1994. In this document, 
provisions listed for the ‘Five-Guarantees’ system changed to food, housing, clothing, 
healthcare and funeral costs. Thus, the ‘Five-Guarantee’ system was viewed as social 
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relief for the rural poor, and collective provision still played a role in its welfare 
characteristics. On 18 March 1997, the Ministry of Civil Affairs (1997) issued the 
‘Interim Measures for the Management of Rural Nursing Homes’, in order to further 
strengthen the management of rural nursing homes and enhance service quality (Nie and 
Yang, 2006). The achievements were remarkable during this period; in 1999, the state 
allocated 110 million RMB’s relief funds, while the funds collected from the local 
government were substantially higher, at 1.7 billion RMB. In addition, there were 
nearly 2,003,000 ‘Five-Guarantees’ elderly people receiving care, and the average 
annual living allowance for one rural ‘Five-Guarantees’ elderly person was 994 RMB, 
an increase of 14.4% from the year before (Liu, 2014c). 
Community began to play an important role in this period, because the community met 
elderly people’s needs and in addition promoted a housekeeping service and provided 
mutual assistance within neighbourhoods. However, the community care provision also 
encountered some challenges: firstly, low efficiency in the community care centres, 
malignant competition and a lack of supervision by the government, seriously affected 
the development of the elder care system; secondly, most community care centres only 
accepted healthy people, while refusing the very elderly and/or disabled; thirdly, 
communities were limited in financial and human resources, so that the majority of rural 
elderly people were unable to access community provided services.  
4.2.3 The Market-oriented Elder Care System (2000~the Present) 
The third period runs from 2000 to the present, and 2000 was a transformative point for 
establishing a social elder care system in China. In 2000, the country, as a whole, 
became an ageing society. In addition, smaller family sizes and labour migration 
forcibly weakened the family’s role in elder care. Government at all levels promoted 
social care provision for the elderly by increasing financial support and encouraging 
investing bodies to participate in the elder care services industry under less restrictive 
conditions (Tian and Yang, 2016).  
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Since 2000, several cities, such as Shanghai and Ningbo, launched home-based 
community care in order to combine the functions of both family and community. In 
February 2006, the idea of a ‘home-based, community-reliant and 
institution-supplemented elder care system’ was officially addressed in the following 
document: ‘Suggestions on Accelerating the Development of Elder Care Service 
Industry’ (General Office of Chinese State Council, 2006). Since then, the importance 
of elder care has attracted increasing attention across the nation and there has been a 
move toward a system which incorporated government, community and nursing 
institutions. During this time, the quality and quantity of relevant nursing institutions 
improved. From the beginning of 2006, there were around 38,000 elderly welfare 
institutions; available beds for social elder care increased from 15.35 million, in 2006, 
to 31.49 million, in 2010; and numbers of accepted elderly people increased from 13.03 
million to 24.26 million during the same period (Chen, 2014). Thus, the accommodation 
rates of nursing homes significantly increased. With the continuous development of 
government-guided social investment in the elder care system, several other 
mixed-delivery forms of care arose in China, such as ‘Private Construction and Public 
Subsidy’ and ‘Public Construction and Private Operation’. From 2006 to 2010, the 
number of registered private nursing institutions was 4,141, accounting for 10.6% of the 
total nursing institutions. Geographical distribution was distinctive: more in the east, 
developed areas, and less in the west, undeveloped areas; more in the cities and less in 
the countryside. In 2011, the ‘12th Five-Year plan of Ageing Affairs (2011-2015)’ 
described the situation more clearly as aimed at ‘…developing a moderate universal 
elderly welfare system’, and addressing the interactive relationships between families, 
communities and nursing institutions.  
In the same year, the Ministry of Civil Affairs (2011) issued the ‘Construction Plan of 
Social Elder Care Services System (2011-2015)’ which stated that ‘…solving the elder 
care problems for disabled and semi-disabled elderly people’ was a pressing task in 
order to strengthen the social elder care service system, and maintain social harmony 
and stability. It also pointed out that the central government plays a leading role in 
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planning and guidance, cultivating the market, and encouraging ‘social powers’ (‘shehui 
liliang’ in Chinese)37 to contribute towards the construction and operation of elder care 
services. Since 2013, several documents have addressed the role of ‘social capital’ 
(‘shehui ziben’ in Chinese)38 in delivering and operating elder care services, and more 
mixed models for investment have been proposed, such as Public and Private 
Partnerships (PPPs). By the end of 2014, all kinds of nursing institutions and facilities 
for elder care existed across the nation: 94,110, in total, of which 18,927 were 
community care institutions; there were 57.78 million available beds for social elder 
care; and 1.88 million community care and day-care services beds (Qing, 2016).  
In China’s rural areas, with the development of urbanisation and new construction, rural 
areas started to explore a new model of mutually assisted elder care, depending on 
collective economy and village self-governance. They also build regional elder care 
centres, usually based on the existing rural welfare housing, and offer beds for day-care 
and short-term care, especially for the ‘left-behind’ elderly people. Rural areas make 
full use of farmhouse courtyards to provide relevant facilities for elder care, such as 
day-care centres, nursing homes and elderly activity stations, which were established 
during this period. At the same time, several other places, such as rural Party-building 
activity rooms
39
, clinic centres, libraries and schools, are required to support the elder 
care service in local areas, and organise relevant activities for elderly people. In 2013, 
the Ministry of Civil Affairs and Ministry of Finance jointly donated special lottery 
funds of 3 billion RMB to rural welfare housing, where more than 50 million elderly 
people received elder care services. The coverage rate of community care in rural areas 
was 37% by the end of 2014 (Qing, 2016).  
Above all, since 2000, the contradiction between the increasing demand for social elder 
care and the gradually weakening function of family care, has forced the Chinese 
                                               
37
 The term ‘social powers’ (‘shehui liliang’ in Chinese) in this thesis refers to those basic units which 
could contribute to social development, these units include: individuals, social organisations, 
non-government organisations, associations, non-profit organisation and private companies, etc. 
38
 The term ‘social capital’ (‘shehui ziben’ in Chinese) in this thesis refers to an investment of ‘social 
power’.  
39
 ‘Party-building activity rooms’ refers to a place for members of CPC to have meetings to study CPC 
guidelines, and they are also used to organise other activities for the elderly people.   
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government to motivate and lead ‘social powers’ to deliver elder care services. The 
elder care system moved towards industrialisation and marketisation during this period. 
The development of China’s elder care industry gradually introduced new 
accomplishments related to innovative investment channels, operation and competition 
mechanisms, to meet the diversified and multi-level needs of elder care.  
 
4.3 Rationales for the Construction of the Social Elder Care System in 
China 
According to the previous section, the historical development of China’s elder care 
services has demonstrated the necessity of constructing a social elder care system that 
can offer multiple provisions through the participation of government, community and 
market. This section examines the changing rationales involved in the construction of 
the social elder care system in China from three perspectives – policy, economy and 
society.  
4.3.1 Changes of Policy Orientation 
Since the ‘reform and opening-up’ policy came into being in the late 1970s, China has 
established a series of policies on social security which cover pension and medical care 
in urban and rural areas. The constantly enlarging coverage of elderly people supported 
by the social security system, and increased financial support of this make a convincing 
argument that there have been great advances made in protecting the elderly’s basic 
rights, and guaranteeing their financial income when they retire. However, China’s 
social elder care system is still in its initial explorative stage. Traditional informal care 
faces greater challenges than ever before, due to the ever-increasing aged population 
and smaller family structures. Since the twenty-first century, the Chinese Government 
started to concentrate on the construction and development of the social elder care 
system to meet an increasing demand for social care. In order to relieve the burden of 
traditional family care and advocate for ‘social power’, to invest in social services for 
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the elderly, it is inevitable that China will need to further establish and improve its 
social elder care system in line with economic and social development (Li, 2013). 
According to relevant policy documents, policy orientation changes over time in 
relation to social elder care, and mainly demonstrates the following three stages: 
4.3.1.1 Elder Care as a Social Affair: Emphasising the Importance of the 
‘Socialisation’ of Elder Care 
The year 2000 is regarded as a milestone for the politics of elder care, as the care 
service is first regarded as a service industry, and the term ‘social elder care system’ 
starts to appear in official documents. In February 2000, the General Office of Chinese 
State Council (2000) issued the document ‘Suggestions on Accelerating the Realisation 
of Social Welfare Socialisation’.40 The document points out that China’s increasing 
aged population and smaller family size has led to a great demand for social care among 
the elderly. However, for a long time China’s social welfare has mainly been provided 
by the state, and some emerging problems, such as a lack of welfare institutions, 
inadequate funding sources, and low quality social services, makes it difficult to satisfy 
the constantly increasing demand. In response to these, the government is forced to 
broaden the scope of its care provision, and introduce more providers in the elder care 
industry. This document also proposes aims to establish a social welfare network by the 
end of 2005; a network which is connected to a range of diversified ownerships, 
including family, community and social welfare institutions. The proposed overall 
requirements for welfare socialisation involve investors, service objects, service patterns 
and service staff. The Chinese State Council formulated a number of preferential 
policies for the ‘social powers’ who participate in establishing elder care institutions. 
Above all, this welfare socialisation document is regarded as a turning point for the 
                                               
40
 The ‘socialisation’ of social welfare in this content means that the provision of social welfare is the 
mutual responsibility of the whole society. ‘Socialisation’ of social welfare is different from a 
marketisation of social welfare, as it not only highlights the role of government in supervision and 
financial support, but also promotes a cooperative mechanism between community, institutions and 
family. The ‘socialisation’ of social welfare includes the following aspects: the pluralisation of welfare 
providers, a diversification of investment channels, and the professionalisation of services staff.  
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construction of elder care, and would later be applied as a guideline document for 
relevant policies.  
Later in the same year, The CPC Central Committee and Chinese State Council (2000) 
issued another report – ‘Decision on Strengthening the Work of Elder Care’. It is the 
first time that an ‘elder care service industry’ was proposed, and developed a 
consumption market for the elderly. The aim of a comprehensive consumption market is 
to provide suitable products and projects to guide elderly people to purchase and 
consume rationally and reasonably throughout their lives, in order to satisfy their 
demands for later in life on different levels and within different groups
41
. The idea of a 
consumption market is also considered an effective approach to ensure the efficient 
consumption and distribution of resources in Chinese society. Later in June 2006, 
‘Suggestions on Accelerating the Development of Elder Care Service Industry’ – the 
first report to focus only on the elder care service industry – was issued by the General 
Office of Chinese State Council (2006). It defines main policy measures in order to: 
develop social welfare for the elderly; improve social service institutions and 
home-based elder care services; develop the elderly’s consumption market; and launch 
pre-employment training for the service staff.  
4.3.1.2 Elder Care as Industry: Extending the Patterns of Provision for Social Elder 
Care 
In August 2006, the National Ageing Work Committee Office publish ‘Eleventh 
‘Five-Years’ Plans of the Development of Ageing Programmes in China (2006-2010)’, 
which proposed guidance to develop ageing programmes from 2006 to 2010. Specific 
requirements and guarantee measures cover nearly all aspects of the elderly; including 
social security, infrastructures, industry, spiritual life, legal rights, and social 
participation. At the same time, Ministry of Civil Affairs took a major role in leading 
and coordinating relevant departments to perform their functions, and ensured the 
implementation of the elder care system. It was announced that there were almost 
                                               
41
 The consumption demand for elder care will be discussed insection 4.3.2. 
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39,553 social welfare institutions (comprised of 1,456 comprehensive Social Welfare 
House, 6,724 nursing institutions in cities, and 31,373 nursing houses in towns and the 
countryside), and a further 1.7 million beds for the elderly in China by the end of 2006 
(Dou, 2007). 
Realising that traditional family-supported elder care is the main care model over the 
comparative long term in China, an increasing number of politicians and academics 
promote a home-based elder care pattern, as a supplement to the traditional 
family-supported care, and which also promotes home-based care by combining the 
functions of self-care and social services. In 2008, the National Ageing Work 
Committee Office (2008), Ministry of Civil Affairs and 8 other ministries and 
committees worked together and published a report: ‘Suggestions on Promoting 
Home-based Elder Care Services’. This report stated that ‘government and social 
powers rely on community, and offer daily care, household service, rehabilitation 
nursing care and spiritual consolation to the elderly people who prefer staying at home’. 
This document also proposed four basic principles to promote home-based elder care: 
people oriented; community reliance; adjusting measures to local conditions; and 
socialisation. 
At the fifth plenary conference of the ‘Seventeenth Central Committee of Chinese 
Communist Party’, October 2010, ‘priority to develop the social elder care system’ was 
proposed as a strategic goal for national economic and social development. In 2011, two 
important documents: the ‘Twelfth ‘Five-Year’ Plan of Development in China’s Ageing 
Development (2011-2015)’ (China State Council, 2011a) and the ‘Construction and 
Planning of the Social Elder Care System (2011-2015)’ (Chinese State Council, 2011b) 
were issued, which both analyse the background of China’s ageing society, and arrange 
the to-do-list of social elder care from 2011 to 2015. The former document, above, 
points out that there are conflicts and problems in the designs of ageing programmes, 
such as: an unimproved social security system, inadequate non-profit service facilities, 
an underdeveloped service network, and social administrative system, etc. Thus, local 
government is required to cope with the challenges of an ageing society from the 
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standpoint of materials, spirituality, service provision, policies, and institutional and 
procedural mechanism. Moreover, the document further proposes main tasks for elder 
care in the future, including: social security, healthcare and sanitation, family 
construction, social administration, living conditions, spiritual and cultural life, industry, 
rights protection and international academic cooperation (Chinese State Council, 2011b). 
The latter document, as above, states the necessity of establishing a social elder care 
system which contains three components: home-based, community-reliant and 
institution-supported elder care, and explains their functional orientations in Chinese 
society. For example, that social elder care should focus on elderly people’s actual 
needs, and meet basic service demands for low-income, lonely and disabled elderly 
people, as well as improving service conditions for all elderly people. This document 
also lists a series of aims and tasks regarded to construction models, fundraising 
approaches and supporting measures.  
In December 2012, a revised version of the ‘Law on Protection of Rights and Interests 
of Seniors’ (National People’s Congress, 2012) was released after its first 
implementation in 1996. The law provides regulations in family support, social security, 
social services, preferential treatment, liveable environment and legal responsibility, etc. 
It points out the importance of caring for ‘…elderly people’s spiritual demand[s]’42, and 
emphasises elderly people’s increased legal rights to receive spiritual services – apart 
from material allowances from family, society and the government. Thus, the 
implementation of the new amended law has proved to be timely and useful in a context 
of an ageing society in China. 
4.3.1.3 Elder Care as Social Investment: Expanding Investment Channels of Social 
Elder Care  
In 2012, the Ministry of Civil Affairs (2012a) issued ‘Implementation Suggestions on 
Encouraging and Guiding Private Capital to Enter the Field of Elder Care’. This 
document encourages the private sectors (national and international) to participate in 
                                               
42
 Chinese elderly people’s spiritual demands mainly come from companionship, from relatives and 
friends, and through respect and recognition from society. 
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financing social elder care systems in different areas; not only in building community 
day care centres and nursing institutions, but also to offer facilities and care services. In 
addition, the private sectors are also advocated to develop and expand other areas within 
the elder care industry, such as cooking and healthy eating, clothing, nutrition and 
healthcare, medical rehabilitation, leisure activities and tourism, culture and media, 
finance, real estate, and so on.  
In September 2013, the Chinese State Council (2013) issued ‘Several Suggestions on 
Accelerating the Development of Elder Care Services Industry’. The report points out 
the goal in 2020 is to establish a home-based, community-reliant and 
institution-supported social elder care system across the nation. Comprehensive 
facilities (or service) centres will be built in 90% of towns and countryside, in over 60% 
of rural communities. This means that 35~40 beds per 1,000 elderly people are 
guaranteed across the nation in order to improve service quality and market capacity. In 
addition, this document emphasises the construction of nursing institutions, the 
development of rural elder care, and a combination model of healthcare and social 
service (‘yiyang jiehe’ in Chinese). The proposed policies cover six areas: investment, 
land supply, preferential taxation, fiscal support, employment and the involvement of 
non-government organisations (i.e. charities). According to this document, government 
advocates and encourages different forms of investments, from various channels, to 
pour into the construction and development of social elder care. The policies related to 
funding issues are illustrated by the following four aspects:  
Investment policy. Government at all layers should increase investment in the 
construction, operation and management of the social elder care system by introducing 
private capital. Then, financial institutions, including banks, insurance companies, etc., 
should expand the scope of mortgage credit; applying approaches, such as credit support, 
financial discounts and petty (payday) loans to increase the investment in social elder 
care. Additionally, insurance companies are encouraged to invest in elder care, for 
instance, by launching a ‘House-for-Pension’ Scheme for the elderly and liability 
insurance for nursing institutions. 
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Preferential tax policy. All nursing institutions benefit from paying no sales tax on the 
care services that they provide. For non-profit nursing institutions, there are no relevant 
administrative and institutional fees, no building tax or land use tax on their properties, 
and even no business income tax. For private nursing institutions, administrative and 
institutional fees can be cut to half. In addition, according to the ‘Taxation Law’, social 
donations can be deducted before income tax. Moreover, some operational fees, for 
instance, water, electricity, gas and heating are paid according to a residential criterion, 
rather than a business criterion.  
Subsidy supporting policy. Local governments should launch an evaluation mechanism 
for elder care services, increase subsidies to disabled and very elderly people who are 
also experiencing economic difficulties. In order to encourage private sectors and 
charitable organisations to participate in the provision of elder care, the government will 
provide investment grants, operational subsidies, financial loan discounts and service 
purchasing, etc. In addition, more than half of welfare lottery funds should be 
transferred and used in constructing and developing the local social elder care industry, 
a proportion that would increase with the growth of the aged population. Moreover, 
pension, healthcare insurance, and minimum living standard support (MLSS) should be 
adjusted according to local economic and social developments, or the increasing of 
employees’ average incomes and the price of commodities.  
The involvement of non-profit organisations. Local governments need to guide 
non-profit organisations to participate in the construction of the elder care system, 
elderly product development and elder care services, and voluntary activities. The elder 
care service industry is regarded as a major innovative field, as it is shown in provisions 
(No.25 to No.28) of ‘Guiding Suggestions on Encouraging Social Investment in the 
Investment and Financing Mechanism of Major Innovative Fields’ (Chinese State 
Council, 2014b). The Chinese State Council encourages ‘social powers’ to invest in 
infrastructure construction for the elderly, and launches the reform of public nursing 
institutions – transforming state-owned training rehabilitation institutions into private 
nursing institutions. It also advocates the government, at all layers, to expand the scale 
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of government purchasing and create an equal business environment for all social care 
operators. Local governments should give rights of dependent pricing to private nursing 
institutions under what is considered normal pricing policy in the local area. This 
document also suggests promoting PPP mechanisms in building and operating elder 
care projects, guaranteeing the interests of all participants, and establishing risk 
prevention, supervision and exit mechanisms.  
Later, the State Development and Reform Commission and the Ministry of Civil Affairs 
(2015) issued a brief, guiding the ‘Management of Service Charges in Nursing 
Institutions’. Apart from the preferential tax policy, mentioned above, it also proposed 
the decrease of cable TV maintenance fees, and a cancelation of administrative and 
institutional fees for private nursing institutions. 
In the beginning of 2015, the Ministry of Civil Affairs (2015a) and other 9 departments 
jointly issued ‘Implementation Suggestions on Encouraging Social Capital 
Participating in the Development of Elder Care Service Industry’. This document 
highlights the decisive role of market in the allocation process of resources and further 
encourages the social powers to become the main force to develop a social elder care 
services industry, including the home, community and institutional care services. It also 
encourages the social powers to develop relevant projects on entertainment, education, 
sports, tourism and healthcare services, and legal consulting services for the elderly. 
Additionally, commercial banks, insurance companies and security companies are 
encouraged to develop some financial products, such as financial management, credits, 
loans and insurances which are suitable for the elderly. As for investment policies, this 
document claims that 30% of local welfare lottery funds should support private nursing 
institutions.  
In December 2016, the Chinese State Council (2016b) released ‘Several Suggestions on 
Opening the Elder Care Service Market and Enhancing the Quality of Elder Care 
Services’. This document points out two approaches to expand the elder care services 
market: one is to relax market access conditions, including reducing the barriers to entry, 
easing the investment boundary for foreign investors and cancelling administrative 
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procedures; and another approach is to optimise the market environment, including 
improving government services, establishing a pricing mechanism, reforming public 
nursing institutions and strengthening the credit system.  
Above all, when I conducted a review of relevant policies on social elder care in China, 
I found that the state is aware of the impact of ageing issues on Chinese society. 
Changes implemented in policy documents and their concentration on social elder care 
have gone through different political processes over time (Figure 4.1). The socialisation 
of welfare was first announced in the report of ‘Suggestions on Accelerating the 
Realisation of Welfare Socialisation’ (General Office of Chinese State Council, 2000). 
Since then, more regulations and rules related to social elder care have been issued. The 
contents of the document, ‘Suggestions on Accelerating the Elder Care Service 
Industry’ (General Office of Chinese State Council, 2006) has demonstrated that the 
issue of social elder care is no longer regarded as merely a social affair, but a range of 
various aspects within a services industry. At the fifth plenary conference of the 
‘Seventeenth Central Committee of Chinese Communist Party’ in October 2010, 
‘priority to develop social elder care’ was first proposed as a strategic goal of national 
economic and social development, as stated in the report of ‘Twelfth ‘Five-Year’ Plan of 
China’s Aging Development (2011-2015)’ (Chinese State Council, 2011a) and 
‘Construction and Planning of Social Elder Care (2011-2015)’ (Chinese State Council, 
2011b). Since then, it is obvious that main government policies focus on funding issues 
of social elder care, I refer to reports, such as ‘Implementation Suggestions on 
Encouraging and Guiding Private Capital to Enter the Field of Elder Care’ (Ministry 
of Civil Affairs, 2012a) and ‘Several Suggestions on Accelerating the Development of 
Social Services Industry for Elderly People’ (Chinese State Council, 2013). 
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Figure 4.1 Main Documents Related to Elder Care System Development (2000~2016) 
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4.3.2 Economic Transition and Market Prosperity 
Since the introduction of economic reforms in 1978, China started the transition from a 
centralised-planned economy to a market-oriented economy (Fang et al., 2002: 431). In 
the last two decades, the Chinese economy has experienced astonishing growth, and 
become the world’s second largest economy, after the United States. In recent years, 
China’s modernisation and marketisation propelled the service industry to become the 
largest category of GDP with a share of 48% in 2014 (World Bank, 2015a). The elder 
care industry is recognised as one of the most promising new service industries of the 
twenty-first century. 
With an improvement of living quality, elderly people’s consuming demands rise too. 
Elderly people use a range of appropriate, accessible and adequate services to their 
social demands. These services are not just constrained to food, living space, clothes, 
and healthcare, but also daily care, spiritual comfort, social relationships, psychological 
consultation, healthcare nutrition, culture, education, tourism, entertainment, legal 
assistance, and so on. According to Figure 4.2, the supply sides of the elder 
consumption market responding to the demand are the elder financial market, elder 
products market and social elder care service market. These consumer factors create a 
good opportunity to develop a consumption market for the elderly, according to the 
book, ‘Data Analysis of the Sampling Survey of the Aged Population in Urban/Rural 
China 2010’ (Wu and Guo, 2014). Due to smaller family structures and migration, the 
number of empty-nest families is increasing – nearly 50% of elderly couples live alone. 
16.5% of urban, and 28.6% of rural elderly people feel lonely and unhappy while living 
alone, one possible solution is a focus on increasing their spiritual comfort and social 
connections. The quality of medical and healthcare conditions has greatly improved 
during the last ten years. The coverage rates of public healthcare security have reached 
95.8% in urban, and 98.3% in rural areas (in 2010), which is 40.0% and 89.4% higher 
than that in 2000, respectively.  
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Figure 4.2 Market Categories for the Elderly People in China 
 
With regards to the elderly’s demands for services and goods, there are usually two 
perspectives: capital amount and absolute quantity. First, the proportion of elderly 
expenditure to GDP, in 2011, was 5.55%, and is predicted to increase to 14.64% by 
2020, and 28.97% by 2040. The capacity of consuming demand is 1-2 trillion RMB in 
2011, and it is predicted to increase to 10 trillion RMB by 2020. Second, demands for 
beds in nursing institutions reached 45.98 million in 2015, and the number of general 
nursing assistants was 10.49 million. The demand for beds for long-term care increased 
to 4.4 million, and the numbers of professional nursing assistants for long-term care and 
home-based elder care were 3.36 million and 3.13 million respectively (Wuhan 
University, 2013).  
The above predicted data only presents potential demands for social elder care. As long 
as the provision of the social elder care industry can guarantee the quality and quantity 
of elder care services, these potential demands will become actual demands. At present 
there is a huge gap between the demand and supply of elder care services in China. 
Thus, the demand for elder care provides a great opportunity to develop the elderly 
consumption market. 
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4.3.3 Social Development and Urbanisation 
Due to freedoms of fertility since the 1950s, and the ‘one child policy’ since the early 
1980s in China, the first generation, that is, the first generation of the ‘baby boom’ 
(those born in the 1950s) have to confront conflicts such as whether to take care of their 
parents, while their only child may not bear the burden of family care for their parents 
anymore. Apart from demographic policy, other social events contributed to the 
generation and development of social elder care in China. In this section, I will present 
two major factors that affect the issue of elder care. 
4.3.3.1 Evolution of Community Services 
In the late 1980s, the central government decided to transform community services by 
segregating them by geography: the basic unit of urban administrative jurisdiction, 
which restructures the absolute urban governance system, and guarantees the stability 
and control of ‘an organised society’ (Wu, 2002; Zhang and Yan, 2014). Of equal 
importance, the government intended to expand community services to fulfil the service 
gap caused by the collapse of work-unit systems. Unlike the urban community, which 
was formed resulting from the missing function of the work-unit system, the rural 
community was formed in the process of new rural construction, with an aim to narrow 
the urban-rural differences (Chinese State Council, 2011b). It facilitated the 
modernisation of local areas and improved the quality of public services. Accordingly, a 
Residential Committee is the main provider of community services in both urban and 
rural China, and its main objects are widows/widowers, orphans, and the disabled. 
However, overloaded administrative responsibilities, lack of financial sources and low 
payment, led to a transitional reform of the Residential Committee in the mid-1990s 
(Lin, Gabbard and Hwang, 2009). In response to the growing aged population and their 
urgent demands for social services, the Chinese central government began to advocate a 
community-based elder care service pattern across the nation (Xu and Chow, 2011).  
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4.3.3.2 A New Form of Urbanisation  
China’s urban population has dramatically increased during the last three decades, and 
first exceeded the rural population by the end of 2011 (World Bank, 2015b). 
Urbanisation occupies a significant position in public policy decision-making, thus, 
rapid urban growth would bring about many social issues. A traditional definition of 
urbanisation is that it refers to the growth of an urban population, which is mainly 
driven by two factors in China: first, rural-urban migration; second, a rise in the number 
of cities. Urbanisation occurs when cities absorb rural surplus labour by offering more 
job opportunities (Li and Piachaud, 2004). Since the 1980s, the urban population of 
China has increased steadily, mainly due to the influx of rural-urban migrants (Wu, 
Webster, He and Liu, 2010). In addition, along with the strategy of the ‘Chinese-style 
Urbanisation Way’, urbanisation underwent unprecedented development. The number 
of cities soared to 655 by the end of 2008, with an average of 11 cities growing annually 
during this period (National Statistical Bureau, 2009).  
The rapid process of urbanisation has given rise to a number of social problems, for 
instance, an imbalance of urban and rural development, and unequal benefits and rights 
for the rural-urban migrants (due to the urban household registration system). In this 
respect, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and Chinese State 
Council (2013) together proposed the term, ‘New Form of Urbanisation’ in the 
‘Planning of New Form of Urbanisation (2014~2020)’ document. The ‘New Form of 
Urbanisation’ is distinguished from the traditional concept of urbanisation, in that the 
growth of the urban population is not merely a determinant for urban development, but 
also combines with other characteristics among different sized cities, towns and rural 
communities, such as urban-rural integration, economical and intensive production, 
friendly eco-environment and harmonious development.  
In the process of the new form of urbanisation, social issues related to elder care 
emerged gradually. First, rural-urban migrants cannot enjoy the same, and adequate, 
public services as urban citizens, especially pension and healthcare services, as well as 
social elder care services. Second, the phenomenon of ‘left-behind’ elderly people is 
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even worse than before, especially in rural areas, where young people move to cities and 
leave their parents back home. Therefore, the elder care issues of rural-urban migrants 
should also be taken into consideration by the local government.  
4.4 Summary 
Based on the previous demonstration, it can be concluded that the aged population is 
currently a pressing issue in China. An issue that challenges the traditional way of 
providing care for the elderly. The issue of the aged population seems particularly 
complicated in China due to demographic changes, shrinking family structures and the 
weakened function of family care, rural-urban migration, and the limitations of formal 
care provision, in particular. Thus, this chapter reviews the development of social elder 
care from a historical perspective by examining the main policy documents and their 
function in guiding the social elder care system towards socialisation and marketisation 
(via the participation of different ‘social powers’); for the purposes of satisfying the 
elderly’s urgent demand for social elder care, transforming the government’s function in 
providing elder care, and addressing the importance of social investment in making up a 
deficiency of public investment. However, whether social elder care is affordable for 
Chinese elderly people, how China’s social elder care is formed and what the 
problematical issues within the social elder care system are, has not been discussed in 
this chapter. Therefore, the next chapter will review the current situation of social 
security for the elderly, elder care services provision and the problems of China’s social 
elder care system.  
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Chapter 5 Funding Models for Elder Care in China 
 
 
The previous two chapters examined the characteristics of the aged population in China 
– characteristics which are relevant within the context of this thesis. I traced major 
government policies, private initiatives and analysed the increasing challenges brought 
about by rapidly growing demands for social elder care. Embedded within these, it was 
argued that aged population growth has received increasing attention in China, and 
traditional elder care (primarily provided by family and self-reliance) may be gradually 
eroded by demographic shifts and socio-economic transformations in Chinese society. 
At present, China’s elder care industry mainly consists of production and service 
industries which are, in general, divided into five areas: the provision of products (e.g., 
drugs, medical appliances and mobility aids); daily care and long-term care; relevant 
facilities in homes and nursing institutions; finance and insurance services; education, 
culture, and entertainment. Each area is considered to have an enormous market profit 
potential. According to the report ‘Plans of China’s Elder Care Service Industry’ 
(National Ageing Work Committee Office, 2015), it is estimated that the total market 
value of China’s elder care industry will exceed 10 trillion RMB by 2030, of which the 
outputs of elder care services (daily care and long-term care) will be approximately 3 
trillion RMB. Thus, escalating demands for social elder care generate urgency within 
Chinese society to explore all market and social potential, to expand the elder care 
industry. 
In Chapter 5, I summarise and analyse funding models of elder care that have been 
applied in China. This analysis is subdivided into two chapters: the first addresses direct 
and indirect subsidies to providers of elder care; the second examines initiatives which 
aim to enable consumers to pay for care. Both policies involve different collaborations 
and partnerships between the government and the private sector that create sub-models 
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for elder care funding. Each model has its own characteristics, functions, and 
multifaceted challenges. This first chapter offers a brief introduction to the overall 
funding structure of elder care, identifying the various channels through which policy 
promotes a viable industry. It describes, with examples, the collaborative arrangements 
created between public and private sectors in the production of elder care and evaluates 
the outcomes of these collaborations. 
 
5.1 The Overall Structure of the Elder Care Funding System in China 
Currently, China is building a multi-subject and multi-channelled elder care funding 
system that involves government, private enterprise, social organisations and 
individuals at every level.  
Direct funding models for elder care 
(1) Public funding model. There are four sub-sections under this model: the first two 
sub-sections are central fiscal payment and fiscal transfer payment based, which means 
that funding resources mainly come from public tax revenues. The remaining two 
sub-sections are non-taxation funding sources, i.e., public welfare lottery funds and 
charitable donations.  
(2) Mixed funding model. Categories under this model are determined according to the 
degree to which investors participate in the operational processes of elder care provision, 
and sources arise from mixed funds. The most common mixed funding models in China 
are ‘Public Construction and Private Operation’ and ‘Private Construction and Public 
Subsidy’. Meanwhile, the establishment of government-led investment funds in the 
elder care industry creates opportunities for the government to introduce an appropriate 
market mechanism, and to cooperate with private investors via PPPs. The above mixed 
models offer more control/power to the private management of the elder care system, 
and introduce some private financial investment. 
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(3) Market funding model. This model refers to a private enterprise fund for 
in-the-market financing, where elder care services are mainly structured around a 
commercial old-age real estate model, and a commercial insurance company old-age 
model. These two investors – one the commercial real estate developer, and the other 
the commercial insurance company – usually have huge funding resources, so they do 
not need to rely on the government’s fiscal support. In this way, they can provide 
high-end elder care services to elderly people with a relatively high retirement income 
which enables them to pay for such a care service. 
Indirect funding models for elder care 
Indirect funds originate from different government policy provisions during the 
construction and operation of elder care services. Indirect funding models mainly 
consist of land leasing/grants, preferential taxation and financial credit in order to 
support the development of the elder care industry.  
Accordingly, in reference to the examples above, the overall elder care funding structure 
is presented in Figure 5.1. 
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Figure 5.1 The Overall Structure of Funding Models for Elder Care in China 
 
The figure above demonstrates the multiple and complex ways in which elder care is 
currently financed in China, involving direct and indirect ways of stimulating the 
consumption and production of care. Necessarily, this has involved the creation of 
multiple and varied typologies to coordinate resources between the public and private 
sectors.  
 
5.2 Public Funding Models 
Public funds for elder care services are allocated and distributed by national and local 
government or other public sectors. In 2012, the Ministry of Civil Affairs (2012b) 
launched the programme ‘Promotion of the Construction of Social Elder Care Service 
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System’, in which it introduced a project named ‘Respecting, loving and helping the 
elderly’ in the Twelfth ‘Five-Year’ period (2011~2015). In this project, public funds are 
distributed through the implementation of various plans: (1) ‘Sunshine Plan’ 
(‘yangguang jihua’ in Chinese), (2) ‘Moonlight Plan’ (‘yueguang jihua’ in Chinese), (3) 
‘Starlight Plan’ (‘Xingguang jihua’ in Chinese), (4) ‘Happiness Plan’ (‘Xingfu jihua’ in 
Chinese) and (5) ‘Sunset Plan’ (‘Xiaguang Jihua’ in Chinese). These five plans are 
described in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1 Five Plants for the Distribution of Public Funds for Elder Care in China 
Projects Supported objects Subsidy standards 
Sunshine Plan 
Nursing institutions at 
a municipal level 
Provincial governments subsidise nursing institutions 
with more than 18,000 square meters and at least 500 
beds the sum of 5 million RMB; and 3 million RMB 
to nursing institutions of more than 11,000 square 
meters, and with at least 300 beds. 
Moonlight Plan 
Comprehensive social 
welfare centre at a rural 
level 
Subsidies are based on the scale of each institution’s 
construction and the total number of beds. Elder care 
institutions with more than 200 beds and 7,000 
square meters receive a subsidy of 2 million RMB; 
institutions with more than 100 beds and 4,000 
square meters receive a subsidy of 1 million RMB.  
Starlight Plan 
Facilities for elder care 
services in the urban 
community  
A new urban community day care centre with more 
than 30 beds and 200 square meters receives a 
subsidy of 500,000 RMB. A new-built or rebuilt 
elder care services centre in the urban community 
receives a subsidy of 100,000 RMB. 
Happiness Plan 
Facilities for elder care 
services in the rural 
community 
The local government provides a mutual assistance 
nursing house (new-built or re-built) with a subsidy 
of 50,000 RMB. 
Sunset Plan 
Service facilities for 
rural ‘Five-Guarantees’ 
households 
Local governments raise funds for the construction of 
elder care service facilities, and the central 
government offers an appropriate subsidy. 
Throughout the country, no less than 100 million 
RMB is allocated annually to rural areas by central 
government. The total investment from 2006 to 2010 
was 5 billion RMB.  
Data Sources: The above information is from the official website of China’s Ministry of Civil Affairs and 
then summarised by the author. 
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Specifically, the public funding sources mainly come from the following four sources: 
central fiscal expenditure, local fiscal expenditure, public welfare lottery funds and 
charitable donations. 
5.2.1 Central Fiscal Expenditure 
Since the twenty-first century, the Chinese central government has invested in 
community or nursing institutions in order to establish a nationwide elder care service 
system. In 2001, the Ministry of Civil Affairs implemented a ‘Starlight programme of 
community elderly welfare service’ for 3 consecutive years, which involved a total 
investment of 13.4 billion RMB, and built 32,000 ‘Starlight aged homes’ across China 
that benefited more than 30 million elderly people (Wang, 2012).  
In 2008, the National Development and Reform Commission and the Ministry of Civil 
Affairs invested 200 million RMB, respectively, to support the development of the rural 
‘Five-Guarantees’ system so as to support the construction of community services; at 
the same time, the Ministry of Finance also arranged 1.8 billion RMB to subsidise 
public community health services (Ao, 2012).  
During 2009 to 2011, the National Development and Reform Commission and Ministry 
of Civil Affairs invested 1.4 billion RMB in special funds from their central budget 
which supported the preliminary construction and development of elder care service 
systems throughout the country (Wang, 2012). Later, in 2012, the Ministry of Civil 
Affair arranged another 3.1 billion RMB central-special funds to sustain elder care 
service facilities in local areas (National Ageing Work Committee Office, 2013b). In 
addition to this, since 2013, accumulated central-specialised funds have invested 3 
billion RMB in the elder care systems of rural areas, and founded 100,000 happiness 
houses called ‘xingfuyuan’ in Chinese43 (National Ageing Work Committee Office, 
2013b; Yang, 2013). 
                                               
43
 Rural Happiness House (‘xingfuyuan’ in Chinese) refers to a place that offers daily care to local elderly 
people in rural areas. The houses differ from nursing homes (‘jinglaoyuan’ in Chinese) which provide 
nursing and elder care.  
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From 2014~2015, the central government allocated 4.8 billion RMB of special funds to 
form a kind of ‘government-led investment fund’ for healthcare and the elder care 
service industries
44
 (CNSTOCK News, 2014). Eight provinces were selected as pilot 
regions, including Hunan, Inner Mongolia, Jilin, Jiangxi, Shandong, Anhui, Hubei and 
Gansu, in order to carry out a market-oriented approach to promote the development of 
a local elder care services industry. In this way, central government, local governments, 
financial institutions and private enterprises jointly set up a funding platform using a 
market-oriented operational model, which supports the development of home-based, 
community and institutional elder care services (ibid). 
During 2013~2016, the total public funding expenditure for elder care services came to 
54.89 billion RMB (Table 5.2), which, as shown below accounts for a very small 
proportion of general public fiscal revenue.  
Table 5.2 Central Financing on Elder Care in China (2013~2016) (billion RMB) 
Year 
General 
public fiscal 
revenue 
Investment demands 
for elder care borne 
by the government 
Public fiscal 
expenditure on 
elder care 
Public welfare 
lottery funds on 
elder care 
Total public 
expenditure 
central local 
2013 12921 115.3 11.18 1.28 11.53 23.9 
2014 14035 121 12.24 1.6 14.54 28.4 
2015 15221.7 119.3 13.34 2 17.85 33.2 
2016 15955.2 126.7 18.13 2.48 21.37 42 
Data Sources: All general public fiscal revenue data derives from the ‘Public Bulletin of the Development 
of Social Services’ published by the Ministry of Civil Affairs in various years. The rest of the data 
originates from ‘Research on the Investment Scale of Fiscal Funds for the Elder Care Service Industry in 
China’ published by China’s Macroeconomic Forecasting Department (2015). 
 
In the Thirteenth ‘Five-Year’ period (2016~2020), China will invest 290.8 billion RMB 
in the elder care service industry with an average amount of 58.16 billion RMB planned 
annually.  
                                               
44
 More details of the government-led investment fund will be discussed in section 5.3.3. 
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5.2.2 Local Fiscal Expenditure (including Fiscal Transfer Payments) 
Since 1994, the total amount of funds given to elder care from fiscal transfer payments 
has experienced a rapid growth trend. For example, nearly 5.2 trillion RMB was 
provided to elder care by the end of 2015 (Chart 5.1) – 23 times higher than in 1994. 
From 2013 to 2016, the accumulated amount of fiscal transfer payments that was 
invested in local elder care system was 55 billion RMB (excluding public welfare 
lottery funds and charitable donations) (Ministry of Civil Affairs, 2016d). However, if 
those funds are equally distributed over the four years, from 2013 to 2016, then the 
proportion of expenditure on elder care services is very small, when compared to funds 
spent on other areas, such as pensions and medical insurance. 
There are special funds allocated from fiscal transfer payments to provide basic pension 
provisions, medical insurance and medical assistance. For instance, fiscal transfer 
payments towards China’s basic pension, medical care insurance and medical assistance 
were 566.6, 255.8 and 14.1 billion RMB in 2017, respectively (Ministry of Finance, 
2017). However, elder care services have not been included yet in this general fiscal 
budget. 
 
Chart 5.1 Amount of Fiscal Transfer Payment since 1990 (billion RMB) 
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Data Sources: The database of ‘Central Budget Summary of Fiscal Transfer Payment’ published by the 
Ministry of Finance in various years. 
 
Compliant with Chinese ‘from top to bottom’ policy-making processes, local 
governments respond to national policy directives to financially support elder care 
services, and to stimulate the construction and operation of relevant elder care facilities. 
Formulated and implemented locally, incentives and subsidies vary substantially in 
numbers and procedures across regions. 
Accounting for more than 95% of total investment, the local government plays an 
important role in the provision and funding of elder care services or facilities (China’s 
Macroeconomic Forecasting Department, 2015). Local funding sources invest in the 
construction and development of the local elder care services industry including 
infrastructure and relevant facilities. In addition they pay for old-age allowances 
andother subsidies forelderly people, or special groups of elderly people such as the 
very mature population (of people over 80 years), ‘Three-Nos’ and ‘Five-Guarantees’ 
elderly people. Various forms of subsidies coming from fiscal transfer payments have 
effectively enhanced opportunities for Chinese elderly people to gain from social and 
economic development. 
In general, the reconstruction and expansion of any public nursing institutions are fully 
funded by local government. ‘Three-Nos’ and ‘Five-Guarantees’ elderly people are 
further covered by the MLSS System (Ministry of Civil Affairs, 2016b). Chart 5.2 
shows that although the number of elderly people enjoying public elder care has 
gradually decreased, levels of subsidy have gradually increased. 
Subsidies for private nursing institutions mainly consist of two parts: (1) local 
government offers a one-time construction subsidy, and preferential policies on land 
acquisition to eligible private nursing institutions
45
; and (2) local government provides 
occupied beds in private nursing institutions with a monthly subsidy
46
. 
                                               
45
 National standards of eligible nursing institutions can be found in the official document ‘Measures of 
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Apart from the government’s direct investment in the construction of elder care service 
facilities, national policy directives have urged local governments to apply ‘subsidy 
preferential policy treatments’, such as tax exemptions, and reduced utility rates.47 
 
Chart 5. 2  Number of ‘Three-Nos’ and ‘Five-Guarantees’ Elderly People  
and the Subsidy Amount 
Data Sources: ‘Public Bulletin of the Development of Social Services’ published by the Ministry of Civil 
Affairs in various years.   
 
5.2.3 Public Welfare Lottery Funds 
The national welfare lottery is the official lottery of China, which has been issued in 
various forms, such as scratch cards, dual-coloured balls, and so on, since 1987. The 
national welfare lottery fund is non-tax revenue which is accumulated, distributed and 
administered by the central and provincial government (Ministry of Finance, 2007). 
According to a statement released by the Welfare Lottery Distribution and Management 
Centre, for the period of 1987~2016 welfare lottery tickets worth more than 1.52 trillion 
                                                                                                                                         
Central Subsiding Initiatives in the Construction of Elder Care System’ (National Development and 
Reform Commission, 2009). More information onthe construction subsidy will be discussed in section 
5.3.2. 
46
 More information of the operational subsidy will be discussed in section 5.3.2. 
47
 More information of preferential policy on tax and administrative fees will be discussed in section 5.5. 
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RMB were sold, raising 475 billion RMB for the national welfare fund. At the end of 
2016, China’s welfare lottery sales were 206.5 billion RMB, an increase of 2.47% 
annually (Xinhua News, 2017). Since 1987, 30%~35% of public welfare lottery sales 
were classified as public welfare lottery funds raised by the state. These funds aim to 
support the elderly, the disabled, those who have been orphaned, and those in poverty 
(‘fulao, zhucan, jiugu, jikun’ in Chinese). Wealth redistribution and accumulation can 
be realised under a public welfare lottery funding system. Although the growth of the 
national welfare lottery indicates that there is a strong demand for the lottery as an 
entertainment medium for the Chinese people, it has also demonstrated that state 
taxation is not the only financial resource available for the development and provision 
of all forms of social welfare.  
According to relevant policy, 50% of public welfare lottery funds allocated by the 
central government are further divided as follows: 60% is invested in a social security 
fund, 30% in a specialized public fund, 5% in social welfare to be delivered by the 
Ministry of Civil Affairs, and 5% in public sports affairs allocated by the State Sports 
General Administration. The remaining 50% of public welfare lottery funds remain in 
local areas to develop elder care services (Ministry of Finance, 2006). Since 2011, an 
accumulated amount of approximately 100 billion RMB welfare lottery funds have been 
utilised at national and local levels to support the development of the elder care service 
industry (Ministry of Civil Affairs, 2016a). Since 2014, Ministry of Civil Affairs has 
promoted an initiative to use public welfare lottery funds to purchase social services, 
including staff training, research, social assistance, and so on, as well as exploring more 
innovative modes of funding, such as ‘venture philanthropy’ (‘gongyi chuangtou’ in 
Chinese)
48
 to satisfy local residents’ potential demands (Chinese State Council, 2014a). 
Thus, public welfare lottery funds have been applied as an efficient financial 
mechanism to supplement public budgets in raising funds for the development of public 
welfare projects, and improving the welfare of society as a whole.  
                                               
48
 The term ‘venture philanthropy’ refers to charitable funds raised by applying venture capital and 
business management to achieve charitable aims. 
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According to current regulations, more than half of welfare lottery funds are used to 
support social security for the elderly, and launch welfare programmes on elder care. It 
has been predicted that standards of elder care will increase with the growth of the aged 
population (Chinese State Council, 2013). These welfare lottery funds are mainly 
invested in: training programmes for service and administrative staff working in nursing 
homes; social assistant programmes and rehabilitation treatment programmes covering 
different staff training needs in order for them to work with elderly people who are 
disabled or struggling with serious diseases; building and expanding social welfare 
institutions; and improving facilities for elderly people in urban or rural communities 
(Ministry of Civil Affairs, 2016a).  
Considering the practicalities of population size and structure, and differing degrees of 
financial difficulty in different regions, the Department of Civil Affairs at provincial 
level distributes public welfare lottery funds to welfare projects in accordance with local 
elder care needs. For instance, the amount of welfare lottery sales in Guangdong 
Province is the highest when compared to other areas in China. According to 
distribution regulations, 50% of public welfare lottery funds will be allocated in 
Guangdong Province. Of this, 70% will be invested in social welfare projects as 
specialised funds, 6% as retained funds allocated by the Guangdong Provincial 
Department of Finance, and 24% as special funds allocated by the Guangdong 
Provincial Department of Civil Affairs. The Guangdong Provincial Department of Civil 
Affairs invests their 24% of special funds as follows: disabled people (20%), medical 
assistance (20%), especially in well-developed areas, and the remaining 60% into other 
areas, such as rural elder care services, urban home-based community elder care 
services, and so on (Feng, 2015). 
5.2.4 Charitable Donations 
Charitable donations are another public funding source for elder care in China, usually 
raised by donation, individually or collectively. In 2016, the National Foundation 
received 62.5 million RMB from charitable donations (Ministry of Civil Affairs, 2016d). 
As seen from Chart 5.3, the Ministry of Civil Affairs received public donations of 65.45 
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billion RMB by the end of 2015, and these funds enabled the formation of 30,000 
charity stations and supermarkets
49
 throughout the country. Thus, as a kind of non-tax 
revenue, charitable donation, together with the public welfare lottery fund, constitutes a 
source of financial support for the development of the elder care industry. However, in 
an interview with the director of the Hubei Province Department of Civil Affairs, the 
director pointed out that charitable donation as a public funding resource for elder care 
is proportionately very small, and it is difficult to calculate exact amounts of donations 
invested in elder care. As a consequence, the major funding resources for elder care in 
China are fiscal payment and public welfare lottery funds.  
 
Chart 5.3  Charitable Donation Amounts collected by the Ministry of Civil Affairs  
(2008~2015) (Unit: billion RMB) 
Data Sources: Statistical Bulletin of Social Services Development (Ministry of Civil Affairs, 2016d). 
 
                                               
49
 ‘Charity station’ (‘shehui juanzeng zhandian’ in Chinese) refers to a place that is established by the 
local government (e.g. the Bureau of Civil Affairs), which allocates by necessity (e.g., water, food, tents, 
etc.) to areas effected by poverty and disasters. ‘Charity supermarket’ refers to an institution that sorts out 
and sells donated clothes, and then donates their sales to welfare institutions for the disabled and 
unemployed. At present, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenyang, etc. have built charity supermarkets.  
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5.3 Mixed Funding Models: Varied Typologies of Public and Private 
Partnerships (PPPs) 
This section mainly examines the varied typologies of PPP funding elder care services.  
5.3.1 ‘Public Construction and Private Operation’ (‘gongban minying’) 
Nursing institutions under the ‘Public Construction and Private Operation’ model are 
different from other public or private nursing institutions, the former are originally 
public nursing institutions (‘Social Welfare Houses’) fully funded by the government 
during their construction period, but subsequently operated and managed by non-profit 
organisations, private enterprises or individuals through a series of market economic 
practices. Due to fiscal pressure from the local government, ‘Public Construction and 
Private Operation’ becomes a useful method to conduct a market-based reform of public 
nursing institutions, which corresponds to governmental changes and political 
transformations focusing on the ‘Socialisation of Social Welfare’ in China. Specifically, 
the ‘Public Construction and Private Operation’ model is conducted as follows: first, 
local government has already built nursing institutions, then individuals or private 
sector companies operate and manage them following an invitation to tender; second, 
local government transfers the contracted management rights of existing elder care 
institutions to the management of private sectors or individuals. Generally speaking, this 
model has two distinctive characteristics: on one hand, it introduces market-based 
economic rules, including the reform and innovation of human resources management, 
operational management and the distribution of resources into the elder care industry; 
on the other hand, it changes the way government funds elder care, and applies opening 
bids to attract individuals or the private sector to contribute to the construction and 
management of nursing institutions, while local government only takes responsibility 
for inspection and supervision.  
The operational mode of ‘Public Construction and Public Operation’ is presented in 
Figure 5.2.  
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Figure 5.2 Operational Mode of ‘Public Construction and Private Operation’ in Elder Care 
 
In December 2013, the Ministry of Civil Affairs (2013) issued a report – ‘Notification of 
Carrying Out the Pilot Reform of Public Nursing Institutions’ – which urged the 
government at all levels to select one public nursing institution in its own area to carry 
out a pilot market-based reform. As a result the first batch of pilot projects commenced 
in 2014. For instance, 18 public nursing institutions (containing approximately 8,000 
beds) in Zhejiang Provincial underwent market-based reform through a public auction 
procedure (Zhejiang Provincial Department of Civil Affairs, 2014); Hubei Province 
selected 27 public nursing institutions (Hubei Provincial Department of Civil Affairs, 
2014); in Beijing, 215 out of 400 public nursing institutions underwent the same reform, 
and any newly established public nursing institutions in Beijing will be directly 
operated and managed in a market-based way (Beijing Municipal Bureau of Civil 
Affairs, 2015); in Nanjing, more than 80% of public nursing institutions have gone 
through ‘Public Construction and Private Operation’ reform (Office of Nanjing 
Municipal Government, 2016); and in Jiangsu Province, more than 100 public pension 
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institutions and rural nursing homes launched the reform (People’s Government of 
Jiangsu Province, 2016).  
In the Thirteenth ‘Five-Years’ Period (2016~2020), China will launch the second stage 
of the reform in public nursing institutions, providing more subsidies and other financial 
support for these public-pilot nursing institutions. By 2020 the Chinese government 
plans to run 50% of all public institutions, in most provinces, by ‘Public Construction 
and Private Operation’ (Ministry of Civil Affairs, 2016e). 
5.3.2 ‘Private Construction and Public Subsidy’ (‘minban gongzhu’) 
Under the ‘Private Construction and Public Subsidy’ Model, non-profit organisations, 
private companies or individuals can purchase/rent buildings and facilities for the 
purpose of providing elder care services in local areas, and operate these buildings and 
facilitiesin a market-based way. As seen in Figure 5.3, under this model, local 
governments reallocate their fiscal budget (taxation revenue, public welfare lottery 
funds and social donations) to establish a fund pool. Local governments not only invest 
in the construction of nursing institutions, but also subsidise services during their 
operation. Non-profit and private enterprise can use a competitive market-based 
approach in their management and price-making decisions. Clients can then purchase 
these elder care services according to their financial resources. 
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Figure 5.3 Operational Mode of ‘Private Construction and Public Subsidy’ in Elder Care 
 
In 2013, the Ministry of Civil Affairs (2013) proposed the term ‘Three Subsidies’ 
(‘sanbu’ in Chinese) to describe the funding policy of the elder care system in China. 
These three subsidies are: (1) a subsidy for services (People: ‘bu rentou’ in Chinese), 
which includes an old-age allowance to the very mature, and subsidises the services that 
are provided for elderly people; (2) a subsidy for the construction of nursing institutions 
(Bricks: ‘bu zhuantou’ in Chinese). Local governments are required to fund the costs of 
facilities, and the construction subsidy standard is usually according to the number of 
built beds; and lastly, (3) a subsidy for the operation of nursing institutions (Beds: ‘bu 
chuangtou’ in Chinese). The standard subsidy for beds is usually related to the number 
of used beds. In practice however, the ‘Three Subsidies’ Policy varies in different 
regions, largely dependent on a region’s economic condition and fiscal capacity. We 
now turn to view the content of these three subsidies in turn: 
Subsidy for Services (People) 
Types of subsidy under this category mainly consist of two parts: old-age allowance and 
service subsidy. First, old-age allowance refers to the subsidy that is given to people 
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who are over 80 years of age
50
. At present, 27 provinces and cities have promoted the 
old age allowance policy. The standard subsidy amount ranges from 100 to 500 
RMB/month/person. There were approximately 23.56 million people receiving this 
subsidy by the end of 2016. Second, the service subsidy aims to provide elder care 
services to elderly people who have a disability, and the very mature (over 80s) or 
elderly (over 70s) who have experienced the ‘loss of one child’51. At present, 20 
provinces and cities have promoted the service subsidy.  
Subsidy for the Construction of Nursing Institutions (Bricks) 
In the construction stage of a nursing institution, the local government grants one-time 
construction subsidies to new or expanding private nursing institutions. In order to 
increase the effective provision of beds for elder care, the local government, at all levels, 
launched various subsidy standards ranked according to different local economic 
situations (Table 5.3).  
In some cities, in order to increase subsidies, the district government also grants 
subsidies to local nursing institutions. For instance, in Beijing, the district government 
allocates the same amount of subsidy as the municipal government, so the subsidy 
standard equals 50,000 RMB/bed (Beijing Times, 2013). In some places, the local 
government subsidises the cost of rent as well. For instance, in Jing’an District of 
Shanghai, the district government pays 0.3 RMB/square meter/daily to private nursing 
institutions for three years. If an institution’s average bed area is over 30 square meters, 
the subsidy standard can be increased to 0.5 RMB/square meter/daily (Shanghai Jing’an 
District Government, 2013).   
                                               
50
 More details of the old age allowance will be discussed in section 6.6.1. 
51
 More details of the service subsidy will be discussed in section 6.6.2. 
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Table 5.3 Construction Subsidy Standard for Private Nursing Institutions 
in Different Provinces and Cities in China 
Provinces 
and Cities 
Operational 
Subsidy 
(RMB/bed) 
Implementation 
Date 
Provinces 
and Cities 
Operational 
Subsidy 
(RMB/bed) 
Implementation 
Date 
Beijing 20,000~25,000 2011 Henan 1,500~3,000 2011 
Tianjin 10,000~15,000 2011 Hubei 500~4,000 2012 
Hebei 3,000 2010 Hunan 5,000~10,000 2011 
Shanxi 1,000 2012 Guangdong 2,000~3,000 2011 
Inner 
Mongolia 
5,000~9,000 2011 Guangxi 1,000~3,000 2012 
Liaoning 6,000~7,000 2011 Hainan 2,500 2012 
Jilin 2,000~3,000 2011 Chongqing 2,000~4,000 2012 
Heilongjiang 1,000~2,000 2012 Sichuan 5,000~10,000 2011 
Shanghai 10,000~20,000 2011 Guizhou  3,000 2015 
Jiangsu 5,000~10,000 2012 Yunnan 5,000~10,000 2011 
Zhejiang 1,000~6,000 2011 Shaanxi
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 2,000~3,000 2011 
Anhui 1,200~5,000 2012 Gansu  5,000~10,000 2012 
Fujian 2,500~5,000 2012 Qinghai 5,000 2010 
Jiangxi 2,000 2011 Ningxia  5,000 2012 
Shandong 2,000~8,000 2011 Xinjiang 1,000~5,000 2011 
Data Sources: All data for the above construction subsidy standards are from the relevant governmental 
documents in different regions. 
 
Subsidy for the Operation of Nursing Institutions (Beds) 
The local government directly subsidises private nursing institutions at the operational 
stage. Due to differences in ageing trends and economic development levels the subsidy 
standard varies across different regions (Table 5.4).  
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 Two provinces are the same in Chinese–‘Shanxi’, but their Chinese characters are different: the one 
on the left column, above Inner Mongolia, is ‘山西’ (Shanxi) and the one on the right column, above 
Gansu, is ‘陕西’ (Shaanxi). 
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Table 5.4 Operational Subsidy Standard for Private Nursing Institutions 
in Different Provinces and Cities in China 
Provinces and Cities Operational Subsidy 
(RMB/bed) 
Provinces and Cities Operational Subsidy 
(RMB/bed) 
Beijing 300~500 RMB/month Henan 50~150 RMB/month 
Tianjin 
1,050~2,250 
RMB/annual 
Hubei 
360~2,400 
RMB/annual 
Hebei 100 RMB/month Hunan 160 RMB/month 
Shanxi 100 RMB/month Guangdong 100~500 RMB/month 
Inner Mongolia 100~300 RMB/month Guangxi  100 RMB/month 
Liaoning 200~400 RMB/month Hainan 50 RMB/month 
Jilin 1,200 RMB/annual Chongqing 200 RMB/month 
Heilongjiang 1,200 RMB/annual Sichuan 1,200 RMB/month 
Shanghai 100~200 RMB/month Guizhou  200 RMB/month 
Jiangsu 30~200 RMB/month Yunnan 50 RMB/month 
Zhejiang 100~200 RMB/month Shaanxi  ---- 
Anhui 1,200 RMB/annual Gansu  ---- 
Fujian 1,000 RMB/annual Qinghai 30 RMB/month 
Jiangxi 100 RMB/month Ningxia  100 RMB/month 
Shandong 360~720 RMB/annual Xinjiang 100 RMB/month 
Data Sources: All data for the above operational subsidy standards are from relevant governmental 
documents in different regions. 
 
Apart from the numbers of occupied beds, additionally, differences in subsidy standards 
also depend on an elderly person’s degree of disability. For instance, in Shanghai’s 
Jing’an District, according to the regulations, the district government subsidises 200 
RMB/month for each bed. If the disability degree of an elderly person is moderate or 
severe, subsidies add an extra 50 or 100 RMB respectively (Shanghai Jing’an District 
Government, 2014). 
5.3.3 Elder Care Industry Investment Funds 
Since 2014, the central government has allocated 2.4 billion RMB of special 
government-led investment funds for the elder care industry (i.e. elder care industry 
investment funds) in 8 provinces in China, including Hunan, Inner Mongolia, Jilin, 
Jiangxi, Shandong, Anhui, Hubei and Gansu. The total amount of investment was 4.8 
124 
 
billion RMB over two successive years (CNSTOCK News, 2014). This government-led 
investment fund is also viewed as the ‘Fund of Funds (FOF)’, because it can stimulate 
the ‘leveraging’ role of central fiscal expenditure viaa market-oriented operating method 
which includes equity, guarantee, or acquisition (Wu, 2015). For example, this 
government-led investment fund can attract and encourage 5 times more social capital 
investment from financial institutions and other social organisations in order to jointly 
set up an elder care investment fund, called a sub-fund (ibid). At present, there are 
mainly three models that are under the operation of elder care industry investment 
funds: 
The firstmodel involves establishing a PPP fund (Fund of Funds: FOF). The local 
government (usually the Department/Bureau of Finance) authorises government 
investment platforms, financial institutions or other social investors to jointly establish 
and found a PPP funds management institution (Figure 5.4).  
 
Figure 5.4 Structure of Elder Care Industry Investment Funds (1) 
 
The second model establishes several different PPP sub-funds (Figure 5.5). For instance, 
in interview, the Director of the Hubei Provincial Department of Civil Affairs, stated 
that the government-led investment fund was 600 million RMB in 2014, and launched 5 
different sub-funds on elder care, which attracted another 3 billion RMB of private 
capital into the elder care industry investment fund (the ratio between the 
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government-led fund tosocial capital was 1:5, and is run by five different fund 
management institutions).
53
 
 
Figure 5.5 Structure of Elder Care Industry Investment Funds (2) 
 
The third model establishes both a PPP fund and PPP sub-funds (Figure 5.6). Under this 
model, the total investment of the PPP fund is equivalent to the sum of investment of 
each sub-fund. The government will authorise different management institutions to 
manage PPP sub-funds respectively. 
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 More detail of elder care industry investment funds in Hubei Province will be discussed in section 7.4.  
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Figure 5.6 Structure of Elder Care Industry Investment Funds (3) 
 
So far, in addition to the first 8 pilot provinces in 2014, other provinces/cities have 
launched elder care industry investment funds, as demonstrated in Table 5.5:  
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Table 5.5 Current Situation of Elder Care Investment Fund in Provinces/Cities in China 
Province 
Foundation 
date 
Fund 
amount 
(billion 
RMB) 
Duration 
of the 
fund 
Investment 
method 
Investment field 
Hunan 2015.8 4.5 8 Equity Healthcare, elder care  
Hubei 2016.3 4.4 8 Equity  
Inner 
Mongolia 
2017.2 1.34 8 Equity 
Elderly department 
Elder care service centre 
Jilin 2016.1 1 8 Equity  
Jiangxi 2015.12 3 8 Equity 
Tourism for elderly, medical care, 
elder care 
Shandong    8 Equity  
Anhui 2016.1 4.5 8 Equity Elder care, medical care 
Gansu    8 Equity  
Jiangsu 2016.3 2 8-10 Equity  Medical care, elderly resident 
Shaanxi 2017.8 1-1.5 8 
Equity  
Credit  
Joint investment 
Rebuild and expansion of the 
nursing institutions, combination 
of medical care and elder care 
Dalian
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  1 8 Acquisition 
Combination of medical care and 
elder care 
Fujian 2015.1 6 8 Equity 
Nursing institutions, community 
care, home-base elder care, 
medical rehabilitation 
Data Sources: All data are from the government documents in each province. Some data were 
unavailable in these documents.  
 
5.3.4 Other PPPs 
Currently, the allocation of elder care institutions is quite uneven in providing quality 
and efficient facilities and services. In some private elder care institutions, the facilities 
are of a good standard, but the costs are relatively higher so many elderly people cannot 
afford private care, resulting in vacant beds and wasted resources; while in public elder 
care institutions, due to the limited number of beds at lower prices, elderly people 
usually have to wait for a bed for a long time, so a public elder care system cannot 
alleviate the pressure of elderly people’s care demands. Therefore, the increasing 
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 Dalian is a coastal city in Liaoning Province. 
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demands for elder care and a shortage of care provision in China have led the Chinese 
Government to make the elder care industry an urgent priority. The government has 
taken major steps to facilitate private investment into the elder care industry over the 
last few years. The state is necessarily involved in the provision of elder care as a 
quasi-public good and this forms the foundation for a PPP model. In recent years, the 
Chinese government has increased efforts to promote PPP projects in elder care industry 
by actively creating a sound policy environment within which market-based provision 
can flourish.  
5.3.4.1 Overall Situation of PPP Projects on Elder Care in China 
In 2014, the first 30 results of PPP projects publicised by the Department of Finance 
only included one project on elder care: the expansion and rebuild of a ‘combination of 
healthcare and elder care’ project. By 2015, 10 out of 206 documented PPP projects 
were associated with elder care. By the end of 2016, the total number of elder care PPP 
projects was 283 – 89% of them were initiated and dominated by the government, while 
the other 11% were initiated by social or private organisations (Cooperative Centre of 
Government and Social Capital, 2016). As shown in Chart 5.4, since the first PPP 
projects started in 2012, there appears to be a dramatic increase during 2014 to 2015. 
This astonishing phenomenon can be attributed to a series of official directives issued 
from 2014 onwards, including one important report from the National Development and 
Reform Committee (2014) on speeding up the construction of healthcare and elder care 
service projects. It points out the necessity of encouraging social capital by applying a 
‘… PPP approaches through sole proprietorship, joint venture, cooperation, joint 
operation, share participation and lease, etc., to participate in healthcare, elder care, 
sports facility construction and public sector reform’ (ibid).  
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Chart 5.4 Number of PPP Projects on Elder Care in China (2011~2016) 
Data Sources: The data is from the National PPPs Information Platform Project Database, established 
by the Cooperative Centre of Government and Social Capital (2016). 
 
These 283 PPP projects were distributed in 24 regions. The top 3 regions were: 
Shandong province (50 PPP projects), Guizhou province (41 PPP projects) and Henan 
province (22 PPP projects) (Cooperative Centre of Government and Social Capital, 
2016). 
5.3.4.2 Funding Structure of PPP Projects on Elder Care 
The funding model of a PPP project is operated by a Special Purpose Company (SPC) 
which is assigned by the government, and funded by the government and private 
companies. The general funding process of this model is seen in Figure 5.7: 
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Figure 5.7 Funding Structure of PPP Projects on Elder Care 
 
Government and private company fund a Special Purpose Company and make a 
concession contract. This Special Purpose Company is granted with a franchise right to 
design, build and operate nursing institutions. In order to ensure PPP projects will be 
funded, the government signs a contract with the banks or other financial institutions 
involved, taking account of the operating cash flow and the condition of the assets of 
the private company (Gan and Jiang, 2017). 
5.3.4.3 Investments and Returns under PPP Projects 
From the perspective of investment tendency (Chart 5.5), by the end of 2016, the 
amount invested in nearly half of these PPP projects was below 0.2 billion RMB – and 
only 46 were over 1 billion RMB.  
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Chart 5.5 Investment Tendency of PPP Projects on Elder Care in China 
Data Sources: The data are from the ‘National PPPs Information Platform Project Database’ 
(Cooperative Centre of Government and Social Capital, 2016), and filtered by the author. 
 
The return mechanisms of PPP projects on elder care include three forms: government 
payment, user charge and viability gap funding (Chart 5.6). User charge, also the 
self-financing form, is the most popular form within PPP projects, accounting for 70% 
of PPP projects’ income and a total investment amount of approximately 105 billion 
RMB. However, when a user charge is inadequate and cannot deliver reasonable returns 
for social or private organisations, the government will provide additional funding to 
cover the viability gap, which affects nearly 27% of the PPP projects of this type. Only 
3% of the PPP projects on elder care are fully funded by the government.  
5.3.4.4 Investment Distribution in PPP Projects on Elder Care 
The investment field of PPP projects is mainly distributed in the elder care industry 
(nursing institutions and elder care services), as a ‘combination of medical treatment 
and elder care’ (‘yiyang jiehe’ in Chinese) and elderly apartments (Chart 5.7). 56.2% of 
PPP projects invest in the elder care industry (nursing institutions and elder care 
services), while 24.0% and 18.4% invest in a combination model and apartments. 
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Chart 5.6 Return Mechanisms of PPP Projects on Elder Care in China 
Data Sources: The data are from the ‘National PPPs Information Platform Project Database’, established 
by the Cooperative Centre of Government and Social Capital (2016). 
 
 
Chart 5.7 Distribution of Investment Field of PPP Projects on Elder Care in China 
Data Sources: The data are from the ‘National PPPs Information Platform Project Database’, established 
by the Cooperative Centre of Government and Social Capital (2016). 
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5.3.4.5 Operational Models of PPP Projects on Elder Care 
The most common operational models of PPP projects on elder care in China are 
summarised in Table 5.6. By the end of 2016 (Chart 5.9) over 83% of the operation 
models were BOT (Build-Own-Transfer) and BOO (Build-Own-Operation). 
Table 5.6 Classification of Operation Models of PPP Projects on Elder Care 
Classification PPP models Investor 
Property 
right 
Operation and 
maintenance 
Contract 
period 
Outsourcing 
Operation & Maintenance 
(O&M) 
Government Government 
Government 
and market 
Generally no 
more than 8 
years 
Management Contract 
(MC) 
Government Government Market 
Generally no 
more than 3 
years 
Franchise 
Lease-Operate-Transfer 
(LOT) 
Government 
and market 
Government Market 
20 to 30 
years 
Build-Operate-Transfer 
(BOT) 
Government 
and market 
Government Market 
20 to 30 
years 
Transfer-Operate-Transfer 
(TOT) 
Government Government Market 
20 to 30 
years 
Rebuild-Operate-Transfer 
(ROT) 
Government 
and market 
Government Market 
20 to 30 
years 
Concession 
Government 
and market 
Government Market 
20 to 30 
years 
Privatisation 
Build-Own-Operate 
(BOO) 
Government 
and market 
Market Market Permanent 
Buy-Build-Operate 
Government 
or 
government 
and market 
Market Market Permanent 
Data Sources: Cooperative Centre of Government and Social Capital (2016). 
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Chart 5.8 Distribution of Operational Models of PPP Projects of Elder Care (2016) 
Data Sources: The data is from the ‘National PPPs Information Platform Project Database’, established 
by the Cooperative Centre of Government and Social Capital (2016). 
 
An outsourcing model is usually a short-term project where the government applies a 
market-based approach, and purchases relevant social services from a social 
organisation or private company. For instance, in the O&M model, the government 
signs a short-term contract with a social organisation or a private company, and 
transfers their profitable business to them, including catering, laundry, social work and 
real estate management.  
A franchising model can transfer operational responsibilities and risks from the public 
sector to the social or private sector. In this instance the government only plays a role as 
a public interest regulator. Take the BOT model, for instance, which refers to 
government provided land, and preferential policies for the social or private sector, 
which is responsible for the full or part construction of nursing institutions and, in 
addition, obtains a franchise over a certain time period. During the franchising period, 
social or private agencies operate independently and earn service income from their 
elderly users. In some cases, however, the government needs to subsidise these 
institutions to cover the viability gap if these social or private agencies do not have 
adequate profits. This model usually has a long operational period, from 20 to 30 years. 
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When the ownership period expires, the nursing institution is returned to the 
government. 
In a privatisation model, the private sector will eventually own the property of the 
project. For instance, in the BOO model, there will be two approaches according to the 
nature of the private agency involved. If it is a profitable company, the government 
might offer cheaper land for building nursing institutions or permit a land asset 
mortgage, and then the company is required to fund the construction and operation of 
the nursing institution on that land. If the company is a non-profit organisation, the 
government will offer land without a land-transfer fee, and this non-profit organisation 
is required to fund the operation of its nursing institution. 
 
5.4 Market Funding Model 
In order to expand the private provision of elder care services, market funding 
approaches (usually via the development of real estate for elder care) operate as Private 
Finance Initiatives (PFIs). At present, there are an increasing number of large scale 
private enterprises, such as real estate and commercial insurance companies, who 
engage with the elder care industry in a business capacity. This indicates their primary 
motivation is to make a profit. The participation of private enterprise also helps to solve 
the elder care system’s financial difficulties. Two typical market funding models are 
illustrated in the next two subsections below to expand on these points. 
5.4.1 Commercial Old-Age Real Estate Model 
Commercial old-age real estate ventures are elder care facilities built by real estate 
developers. ‘Elder Care + Real Estate’ is the latest model in the construction of elder 
care in China. By integrating the real estate industry with other related industries, it 
becomes possible to combine the development of real estate with elderly people’s 
lifestyle needs, and most importantly to provide the elderly with a comfortable 
residence (Wang, 2011). Thus, the commercial old-age real estate model can create 
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more residential value and commercial benefits than a traditional real estate model. The 
differences between ‘commercial old-age’ and ‘traditional residential’ real estate are 
given in the follow table: 
Table 5.7 Differences between Traditional Residential Real Estate and Old-age Real Estate 
  
Traditional residential  
real estate 
Commercial old-age real estate 
Funding sources 
for construction 
self-collected funds; bank loans; 
advance payment of house property 
self-collected funds; bank loans; insurance 
funds; land concessions; government 
subsidies for beds 
Profit points sale or possession of property 
rental; property sales; product sales; 
property services fee; care service fees 
Sales models mortgage or one-time payment 
reverse mortgage; membership; rental; 
property sale 
Facilities and  
services 
provision of home safety, daily 
property management and services. 
the real estate developers can provide 
various facilities and services, such as a 
daily care centre, elderly university, 
rehabilitation centre, etc.  
Products 
planning  
business or residence 
healthcare centre, elderly university and 
other special supporting facilities 
Property use residence, investment elder care 
 
The commercial old-age real estate model takes real estate for elder care as a long-term 
funding project which introduces business operational ideas and community 
management ideas into elder care provision, and creates comprehensive projects on 
healthcare services, universities for the elderly, hotels, restaurants and supermarkets, 
etc.  
At present, there are over 20 medium and large real estate enterprises that have been 
announced and have publicised their entry into the old-age real estate industry across 
China, including Vanke (wanke), Poly (baoli), Greentown (lvcheng), and Ocean 
(yuanyang) (Zhao, 2014). For instance, China’s largest elder care institution – 
xiaoxianfang – was built by Heng’an, Vanke and Greentown real estate enterprises. 
However, as these real estate enterprises are profit-driven, so they develop real estate in 
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order to obtain cheap land. They pursue profit, rather than public welfare. In some 
extreme cases, in order to achieve performance targets set by the central government, 
some local governments encourage such real estate enterprises to build luxurious 
nursing institutions. As construction costs for luxury accommodation is high, this results 
in higher service costs and further results in a large number of empty beds as most 
ordinary elderly people may not be able to afford them. 
5.4.2 Commercial Insurance Company Old-Age Model 
As one of the main participants in the elder care funding system, insurance companies 
contribute to elderly people’s income security and guarantee elder care funding. For a 
long time, there has been a distinctive division between the elder care funding system 
and the elder care service system. Insurance companies, although they have sufficient 
funds, might not invest in the provision of elder care services over the long run, because 
sustaining a return is always their principal concern. With government support, however, 
insurance companies enter the elder care industry and launch funding models that offer 
good returns on their investment, for example, the ‘Sustainable Healthcare Retirement 
Community’ model.  
In September 2010, the Chinese Insurance Regulatory Commission (2010) issued 
‘Interim Measures for the Investment in Real Estate by Insurance Funds’, which 
proposes that insurance funds invest in the real estate industry related to elder care, and 
medical care, via different measures, such as debt, equity or property rights. At present, 
Hezhong Life Insurance Company, Taikang Life Insurance Company, China Life 
Insurance Company, Xinhua life Insurance Company, Taiping Life Insurance Company 
and many other life insurance companies plan to establish their own elder care 
communities. For instance, Hezhong Life Insurance Company has built elder care 
communities in several big cities, such as Wuhan (the capital city of Hubei Province), 
Shenyang (the capital city of Liaoning Province), Nanning (the capital city of Guangxi 
Province) and Hefei (the capital city of Anhui Province). Included here, the Elder Care 
Community in Caidian District, Wuhan, was the first elder care community to be 
invested in by an insurance company. The manager of Hezhong Elder Care Community 
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(Wuhan Branch) stated in an interview that Hezhong Life Insurance Company bought a 
2,000 Mu (1 Mu = 666.67 square metres) piece of land in the Caidian District, Wuhan, 
and received a land preference policy from the local government as it developed this by 
building an elder care community. Thus, it only paid 800,000 RMB/Mu, much cheaper 
than the local market price of 20 million RMB/Mu. In the first construction project, it 
developed 480,000 square meters, and provided 2,005 rooms and 4,000 beds. By their 
third project, the company had already expanded to 30,000 beds and a total investment 
of 3 billion RMB. 
Elder care communities built by insurance companies can extend business to industry 
chains associated with the elder care industry; connecting the upstream (pension, 
healthcare insurance, retirement financial plans and other financial industries) to the 
downstream (medical care and daily care, etc.), so that the elder care community 
business can provide comprehensive support for the elderly.  
 
5.5 Indirect Funding Models for Elder Care in China 
No matter what kind of provision is put in place for elder care, profit margins can be 
very small from the perspective of service suppliers, especially as they are faced by 
large numbers of low-income and low-consumption elderly people. In these respects, 
service suppliers save some costs in tax, land and bank loans in the process of 
constructing a nursing institution – according to a series of preferential policies 
regarding taxation, land leasing and credit loans, etc.  
5.5.1 Preferential Taxation Policy 
There are different tax policies regarding the construction and operation of elder care. 
First, nursing institutions do not pay value-added tax on their services income (Ministry 
of Finance, 2016). Second, contributions to business income tax can be reduced under 
two circumstances: (1) non-profit nursing institutions do not pay business income tax; 
and (2) other nursing institutions can deduct half of their services income from their 
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taxable income. Third, nursing institutions do not pay building tax, urban land use tax 
and farmland conversation tax, that is, if they use their own buildings and land to 
provide elder care services. Fourth, if nursing institutions receive donations from 
individuals or other social organisations, they can be proportionally deducted from the 
amount of income tax due (Chinese State Council, 2013). 
In addition to the four tax benefits above, local government allows other preferential 
policies for nursing institutions. For instance, utilities – such as water, electricity, gas, 
heating, telephone, television and internet network and other facilities – are paid at a 
lower rate according to residential criteria, rather than business criteria. Therefore, 
nursing institutions save operating costs thanks to preferential tax policies (ibid).  
5.5.2 Land Leasing/Grant Policy 
The land leasing and grant policy for elder service facilities are the most basic 
conditions required for the development of elder care real estate and the elder care 
service industry. There was no single document on land use and facilities for elder care 
services until April 2014 when the Ministry of Land and Resources (2014) issued 
‘Guided Suggestions on Elder Care Facility Land Use’, which introduces nine aspects 
of land use for elder care service facilities, including: scope, purpose, planning, 
systematic management, and supervision. In China, all land is public, so it is either 
owned by the state or collective organisations, and the provisional models for land use 
are mainly transfer, bid, auction and negotiation. The 2014 report consists of three parts. 
First, it clearly defines land specification, and provides guidelines that distinguish the 
usage of land for non-profit nursing homes compared to commercial nursing homes. In 
order to encourage the private sector to operate elder care institutions, local government 
offers reasonable rent leasing standards for land or buildings. Second, making full use 
of idle land or buildings and developing land into elder care facilities is encouraged by 
local government, with land for elder care provision being considered a priority in terms 
of land leasing. For instance, if existing idle land or buildings in a factory, school or 
community is transformed into a non-profit nursing home that operates for more than 
one year, annual rent cannot be increased for five years. If the private company later 
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changes their usage of the land to a specification other than elder care provision, then, it 
has to pay an extra land fee. Third, if the private sector uses idle land or building for a 
commercial purpose, they should only use it to offer elder care or other relevant services. 
If they transfer the land or building to provide services unrelated to elder care, they need 
to initiate a lease/grant transfer procedure which comes at a cost because they cannot 
change the usage of the land specification unless they pay a land premium rent (i.e. 
land-use fees).  
A conflict of policy incentives emerges in the allocation of land for new construction 
purposes. The majority of private-sector elder care facilities are registered as 
not-for-profit entities in order to gain tax exemptions. Due to the scarcity and escalating 
cost of land and economic growth targets, local governments tend to favour for-profit 
organisations when approving land deals, rather than non-profit entities that do not 
generate tax revenue (Feng, Liu, Guan and Mor, 2013). 
5.5.3 Credit Funding Policy 
Credit funding for the elder care service industry generally comes from commercial 
banks or other financial institutions. No matter what kind of nursing institution, over 
half of an institution’s financial resources are from bank loans. For instance, if nursing 
institutions are formed from PPP projects, it will be easier for them to get loans from 
banks through a government-backed guarantee. If nursing institutions are built by real 
estate developers, it also will not be difficult to get bank loans, because real estate 
projects usually result in a high profit return and stable cash flow. However, with the 
transformation of China’s commercial banks to an independent type of corporate 
business, banks are likely to become more cautious before lending money to nursing 
institutions. For instance, asset disposal and profit distribution in non-profit nursing 
institutions might be restricted according to the relevant bank’s policy, so nursing 
institutions might not obtain loans very easily. The same situation exists for other 
small-scale nursing institutions which cannot guarantee stable and profitable income.  
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Thus, the Ministry of Civil Affairs and the China Development Bank (2015) published a 
joint statement on developing financial support for the construction of the social elder 
care service system. In this document, the China Development Bank proposed issuing 
loans to the following projects: (1) community home-based elder care facilities; (2) 
home-based service networks; (3) nursing institutions; (4) training bases for elder care 
service staff; and (5) other elder care industry projects, including private enterprises that 
offer services, and related products, to the elderly. The maximum duration of these bank 
loans is 15 years, but they can be extended another 3 years. Additionally, the bank also 
proposes providing a certain proportion of credit support to the elder care industry 
annually, or associating this support with government credit, which not only reflects the 
commercial bank’s support for the construction of social welfare facilities, but also 
makes full use of financial resources to alleviate the enormous funding pressure 
experienced by nursing institutions. 
In addition, another innovative funding model – special bonds – has been introduced. 
According to the policy ‘Guidance on Issuing Special Bonds for Elder Care Industry’ 
(National Development and Reform Commission, 2015), the private sector can issue 
special bonds to the public, and use the capital to launch elder care projects, including: 
purchasing land and relevant facilities (existing public buildings, such as schools and 
hospitals); also rebuilding and expanding current nursing institutions. For instance, 
Zigui Investment Company (in Zigui, Hubei Province) issued special bonds for elder 
care. The total amount of bonds is 800 million RMB, including 400 million RMB to be 
used in the establishment of a combination of medical and elder care, and the rest 
dedicated to its operation and management (National Development and Reform 
Commission, 2017). 
 
5.6 Summary 
This chapter has demonstrated collaborations created by national/local governments and 
the private and social sectors to promote the provision of elder care facilities and 
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support for China’s fast-growing elderly population. From the funding models provided 
above, we can see that new initiatives are commonly based on government policies to 
fund service supply (provision) – such as increasing the numbers of beds for elder care 
and building more nursing institutions. Wealth redistribution is secured through the use 
of public funds to support the basic security of the ‘Three-Nos’ and ‘Five-Guarantees’ 
elderly people, while other elderly people in economic difficulty cannot enjoy the same 
benefits and they have to fend for themselves. Thus, China’s elder care funding system 
demonstrates is only partially redistributive. Moreover, these new initiatives have been 
mostly promoted in larger cities (usually capital cities) and richer provinces where local 
fiscal conditions and business acumen are better developed, and where more resources 
are available to meet elder care needs. In such cities, richer populations are also capable 
of paying for elder care. The picture is very different in rural areas where the elderly 
have less means to make such payments, and where commercial ventures find the 
prospect of creating a viable industry less attractive.  
As shown above, with the exception of pure state-funded nursing institutions, 
consumers must pay for at least a proportion of the care that they receive. The ways in 
which governments have sought to increase the retirement incomes and reinforce the 
consumption of elder care is therefore a pertinent question. The following chapter 
addresses policy initiatives designed to alter the current situation where there is 
deficient demand for elder care. This draws our attention to the incomes of the elderly in 
order to ascertain their capacity to pay for elder care. In addition to the direct and 
indirect subsidies provided by government to foster service provision, policy has also 
paid extensive attention to retirement income, to enable the elderly to pay for the 
services they need, thereby promoting a viable elder care industry by raising public 
demand. The nature of these policies and an assessment of their weaknesses and 
strengths is provided in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 6 Financial Resources: the Ability of Elderly People 
to Pay for Elder Care Services 
 
 
The previous chapter examined the elder care funding system, and addressed 
government policies to create an elder care industry by stimulating the extension of 
elder care provision via financial incentives to the private companies. This chapter 
addresses the initiatives taken to raise the retirement incomes of elderly people and 
stimulate their ability to pay for elder care services. According to statistics released by 
the Chinese Ageing Scientific Research Centre (2015), over 24 million people were 
over 80 years old, and over 40 million elderly people were disabled or semi-disabled by 
the end of 2014. It was estimated by Li Zhihong, the vice director of the National 
Ageing Work Committee Office, that this number will rise to 29 million and 42 million 
respectively by 2020 (Xinhua News, 2016). Contemporarily, China has an increasing 
aged population who experience difficulties in living independently due to chronic 
disease and disability, health problems that are rising. It is unrealistic to leave such 
elderly people to rely on their children for LTC. Therefore, relevant policies have been 
issued concerning increases in elderly people’s retirement incomes, their demand for 
elder care services, and satisfaction with the services that they can afford. However, 
whether this additional retirement income and other old-age benefits for elderly people 
can provide cover for meaningful payments towards elder care services is the first of 
two main issues examined in this chapter. The other issue concerns whether these 
elderly people’s actual purchasing power can raise their consumption of elder care 
services. 
This chapter is divided into seven sections. Section 6.1 briefly introduces the current 
social insurance system for the elderly in China, and the overall structure of financial 
resources provided for the elderly by addressing insurance benefits and alterative 
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old-age benefits for the elderly in China. Section 6.2 examines and assesses the pension 
system for the elderly in China, and the basic medical insurance system is explored in 
section 6.3. Section 6.4 reviews both public and private LTCI schemes that have been 
promoted in recent years, and which have involved, to varying degrees, collaborations 
between commercial companies and the government in the financing of elder care. I 
discuss the potential and pitfalls of this funding model, then examine two other benefits 
for elderly people: social assistance (MLSS system and rural ‘Five-Guarantees’ system) 
in section 6.5, and universal financial support (old-age allowance and service subsidy) 
in section 6.6. Section 6.7 then examines the differences in financial conditions between 
urban and rural elderly populations, and analyses the reasons behind the low purchasing 
power of many elderly people. Finally, the chapter summarises the overall patterns of 
supply and demand for elder care services in order to assess whether, by raising the 
purchasing power of elderly people, Chinese policy is succeeding in creating a viable 
industry in this sector. 
 
6.1 The Structure of Financial Resources for Elderly People in China 
Corresponding to China’s level of socio-economic development and an increasing aged 
population, the Chinese government regards the establishment of an elderly social 
security system as a priority task. Its undertakings for the aged population largely 
comprises of focusing on gradual improvements to form a comprehensive social 
security system involving the government, society, the family and the working 
individuals together to guarantee elderly people’s basic standard of life. China’s social 
security system is mainly categorised into three parts: social insurance, social assistance 
and social welfare. These three parts are based on guidelines issued by the central 
government, while its administration and specific logistics are managed by the local 
authorities. A comprehensive national framework of social insurance is codified in the 
‘Social Insurance Law’ (National People’s Congress, 2011), which includes five 
components: pension, medical insurance, unemployment insurance, work-related injury 
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insurance and maternity insurance. Together with another mandatory housing fund, this 
system is also called ‘Five Insurances and One Fund’ (‘wuxian yijin’ in Chinese). In 
general, the ‘Five Insurances and One Fund’ scheme for Chinese working 
people/residents is taken out of their income on a mandatory basis; contributions toward 
the ‘Five Insurance and One Fund’ for employees and enterprises accounts for over 
16.5% (employee) and over 40.0% (employer) of an employee’s total income, 
respectively. This involves an incredibly high labour on-cost, and such additional 
obligations discourage employers from taking on more people or, by employers’ refusal 
to contribute to the scheme, leave employees to pay into the fund themselves on behalf 
of their company. All contributions ensure a basic social right and living standard for all 
Chinese citizens. As basic pension and medical insurance alone cannot satisfy a 
financial demand for elder care, so other methods are used as financial resources for 
elderly people to pay for their elder care services. These financial resources can be 
grouped into the following five categories: 
 The pension system. A pension is the main source of income for elderly people in 
China. The pension system currently in place has three pillars: The first pillar is a 
basic pension which contains four parts according to different groups of people 
(employees working in urban enterprises, those working in the public sector, urban 
residents and rural residents). The second pillar – an occupational pension – only 
covers a minority of urban employees. Lastly, commercial insurance products for 
old age are considered to be the third pillar, which is on a voluntary basis for anyone 
who has extra income to purchase private insurance products, such as personal 
depositing insurance and the ‘House-for-Pension’ Scheme.  
 Medical insurance system. Getting access to prompt medical care is also important 
to elderly people in China. Public medical insurance covers nearly all elderly people, 
and has two components: a basic medical insurance system and a new rural 
co-operative medical system. 
 Long-term care insurance (LTCI) scheme. Under this category, public LTCI is 
considered as social insurance, and has been launched in some pilot cities since 
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2016. Some private insurance companies can offer commercial LTCI products to 
anyone who purchases them. In addition, another new initiative called policy-based 
LTCI has been established since 2016, which involves coordination between each 
private company and the government. 
 Social assistance. This contains a Minimum Living Standard System (MLSS) for 
‘Three-Nos’ elderly people and a Rural ‘Five-Guarantees’ Support System for 
‘Five-Guarantees’ elderly people.  
 Universal financial support. This financial support is known as a ‘subsidy for the 
people’ (bu rentou) under the ‘Three Subsidies’ (sanbu) policy and involves a wide 
amount of cover for all groups of elderly people. Two main forms exist under this 
category: an old-age allowance for elderly people over 80 years; and a service 
subsidy which is usually applied on an ‘elder care card’ for elderly people over 65 
years, which can only be used for elder care services.  
The categories of all these financial sources above are presented in the Figure 6.1: 
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Figure 6.1 Categories of Financial Sources for Elderly People in China 
 
The following section will examine these five financial sources in detail. 
 
6.2 The Pension System in China 
China’s multiple level pension system includes: a basic pension, occupational pension 
(enterprise supplementary pension) and commercial pension.  
6.2.1 Basic Pension System 
At present, a basic pension is the primary financial resource for elderly people in China. 
Pension programmes were first set up for the urban and formal sector, and then 
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gradually expanded to the rural and informal sectors. In general, China’s basic pension 
system is mainly separated into three parts: urban employees (enterprise employees, 
civil servants and institution staff), urban residents and rural residents. Thus, the 
pension system is distinctively different between urban and rural areas, as well as 
among different social groups.  
6.2.1.1 Urban Enterprise Pension System      
China’s pension reforms, starting in the early 1990s and ending in mid-2000s, aimed to 
cover China’s entire urban labour force; and transferred the relatively generous benefit 
of a defined-benefit pension system to a defined-contribution model by placing 
responsibility on both the employees and employers. According to the State Council 
Document – ‘Decision on Establishing a Unified Basic Pension System for Enterprises 
Employees’ (Chinese State Council, 1997), the urban pension system planned to move 
away from a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system to a partially funded system, in preparation 
for the increasing aged population (Zhao and Xu, 2002). At present, the basic structure 
of the urban employee’s pension system is one comprised of a mandatory two-part 
system, which includes defined benefit ‘social pooling’ account features which are 
pay-as-you-go (PAYG) in nature, and a defined contribution ‘personal account’. The 
first part is financed by enterprises with contribution rates of up to 20% of a total 
employee’s salary; the personal account on the other hand is intended to be fully funded, 
financed by an employee with 8% of their salary (Dunaway and Arora, 2007). 
Supplementary contributions can also be made on a voluntary basis. Pensions are 
payable after a minimum of fifteen years of contributions.  
The 1997 pension reform has generated three groups of employees: the old, middle and 
new group. The ‘old group’ (‘laoren’ in Chinese) are people who retired before 1997 
and received a pension based on the old pension system; the ‘new group’ (‘xinren’ in 
Chinese) entered the labour market after 1997, so a new multi-pillar pension system 
applied to them. In between the old and new group are the ‘middle group’ (‘zhongren’ 
in Chinese) who worked before 1997 and retired after 1997, they will receive a pension 
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according to social pooling and individual accounts, but will also receive compensation 
for lost contributions to individual accounts (Ebbers, Hagendijk and Smorenberg, 2012). 
By the end of 2015, the population participating in the basic pension scheme reached 
262.19 million, as the number of retirees reached 91.42 million. The national average 
pension level was around 2,300 RMB/month (Ministry of Human Resources and Social 
Security, 2016), and the overall pension fund was 2,934.1 billion RMB, while 
disbursement of the pension fund was 2,581.3 billion RMB (ibid). This implies that in 
the near future, alterations (in terms of higher contributions or reduced/restructured 
pension rights) will be required in order to prevent pension funds falling into deficit. 
The state has set up an adjustment mechanism for the basic pension, by which the state 
adjusts the level of the basic pension of enterprise retirees according to price 
fluctuations and rising wages at local level. 
6.2.1.2 Pension System in the Public Sector 
With reform progress in state-owned enterprises, enterprise employees first took the 
step towards reforming their pension system. This led to a ‘dual-track framework’ 
which has been operated by two distinctive pension systems in the enterprise and public 
sector (government, universities, and other research institutions) for nearly three 
decades. The pension system for employees in government and other public institutions 
is a non-contributory benefit system which is financed via central tax revenues, and 
administered by individual work-units. Usually, a retiree from these public institutions 
receives a pension of up to 80%~90% of the replacement rate if they have worked for 
30 years. Since the 1990s, enterprise employees were required to pay their own monthly 
insurance premiums, but only received a pension of approximately 60% of the average 
social salary. The disparities between these two urban employees’ pension systems have 
been criticised by the general public, and attempts to reform the pension system for 
government and public institutions started from October 2014. This reform currently 
covers 38.7 million people (7.17 million from the government, and 31.53 million from 
other public sectors). The aim of new reform is to merge these two different pension 
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systems together, and to make use of the contribution mechanism already in place 
associated with benefit payment (Chinese State Council, 2015a).  
It is the same with the basic pension provided for the employees of urban enterprises. 
The pension reform in the public sectors has generated some practical issues, for 
instance, the pension level for those who worked before 2014 and retired after 2014 will 
be negatively affected. In an interview with an official from the Hubei Provincial 
Department of Local Taxation, they stated that the replacement rate drops roughly 
5%~10% compared with the original rate.  
6.2.1.3 Urban Residents’ Pension System 
On July 1, 2011, the Chinese State Council (2011c) carried out a pilot of the urban 
residents’ pension system, aiming to achieve full pension coverage for urban residents 
by the end of 2012. People who are at least 16 years old, non-employed urban residents 
(excluding students) can join this system in their registered Hukou residence area. 
Financial resources for the urban residents’ pension fund are sourced from individual 
contributions and government subsidies, which create personal accounts and social 
pooling. There are 12 annual contribution levels for this personal account, ranging from 
100 RMB to 2,000 RMB (Chinese State Council, 2011c). The higher the annual 
contribution, the more monthly pension a resident will receive. Government subsidy is 
no less than 30 RMB/person annually. Local government can increase these standards 
according to the local economic situation. Meanwhile, residents are required to 
contribute to their personal account for 15 years before they receive a monthly pension. 
Eligible urban residents can receive 55 RMB per month when they reach the age of 60. 
If urban residents were over 60 when the policy was introduced and do not qualify for 
the urban enterprise pension system, then they do not need to contribute to the urban 
residents’ pension system and receive the monthly basic pension (ibid).  
By the end of 2015, there were 504.72 million urban residents enrolled in this pension 
scheme, and over 148 million urban residents collected this pension. The average 
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amount provided under this pension scheme was 1,192 RMB/month (Ministry of 
Human Resources and Social Security, 2016). 
6.2.1.4 New Rural Pension System  
In 2009, the Chinese State Council (2009) released ‘Guided Suggestions on the 
Launching New Rural Pension Pilot Guidance’, which is an important document in the 
context of an ageing rural population. The significance of the new rural pension system 
lies in guaranteeing a basic standard of living for rural residents as well as shrinking the 
pension gap between urban and rural areas (Gao, Su and Gao, 2013). This pension 
scheme allows rural residents to make voluntary contributions to individual accounts 
that are subsidised by local and central government. Standards of individual 
contributions are set over 10 levels from 100 to 500 RMB, and the government provides 
an extra subsidy of 30 RMB/person annually (20 RMB from provincial government and 
10 RMB from local government). There are basic pension and personal account 
pensions. The standard of a monthly basic pension is 60 RMB/person, which includes 
55 RMB from the central government and 5 RMB from the local government; while the 
monthly distribution of a personal account pension is the accumulated amount divided 
by 139. Related regulations ensure that rural residents over 60 can receive the monthly 
basic pension without contributions if their children pay an enrollment fee. Rural 
residents whose age is under 60 need to contribute to the pension system for more than 
15 years.  
At present, although the urban residents’ pension system and the new rural pension 
system have almost realised full coverage among all urban and rural residents, the 
pension schemes still remain at a low support capacity which is not adequate for all 
elderly people to be able to purchase the same standard of social services (Liu, 2011). In 
addition, in order to build a unified and standardised pension system for rural and urban 
residents, the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security (2016) issued ‘Service 
Regulations of the Basic Pension System for Urban and Rural Residents’ in January 
2016. This pension scheme, together with other social assistance and benefits, will 
better guarantee elderly people’s basic standard of living in the future. 
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6.2.2 Occupational Pension 
The occupational pension is a kind of supplementary pension for employees, in addition 
to their basic pension. An occupational pension has been viewed as an additional benefit 
for the employees, such wage benefits (workfare) helps a company to enhance its 
competitiveness by attracting motivated employees by offering a retirement income. In 
2004, the Ministry of Labour and Social Security
55
 (2004a and 2004b) released two 
important documents: ‘Temporary Measures for Occupational Pensions’ and 
‘Temporary Measures for the Management of the Occupational Pension Fund’.56 The 
first document initiated regulation on the establishment of voluntary occupational 
pensions in China. According to the first document, annual pension contributions of the 
enterprise shall not exceed 1/12 of total salary costs for the previous year; and the total 
contributions from the enterprise and their employees should not exceed 1/6 of this sum. 
By the end of 2016, the number of enterprises that launched an occupational pension 
was approximately 76,300, an increase of 138% since 2007, yet less than 1% of the total 
of registered urban enterprises (Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, 
2016). As shown in Table 6.1, the number of employees enrolled into this scheme was 
23.25 million, only accounting for 8.3% of the total population that had enrolled in the 
basic pension scheme (ibid). 
                                               
55
 In March 2008, the Ministry of Labour and Social Security and the Ministry of Human Resource 
merged and became the Ministry of Human Resource and Social Security.  
56
 Another version of the second document has since been released (in 2011). 
153 
 
Table 6.1 Development of Occupational Pension in China (2008~2016) 
Year 
Population of enrolment in 
the Basic Pension Scheme 
(million) 
Population of enrolment in 
Occupational Pension Scheme 
(million) 
Percentage 
(%) 
Number of 
Companies 
2008 165.87 10.38 6.2 --- 
2009 177.43 11.79 6.6 --- 
2010 194.02 13.35 6.8 --- 
2011 215.65 15.77 7.3 44,900 
2012 229.81 18.47 8 54,700 
2013 241.77 20.56 8.5 66,100 
2014 255.31 22.93 8.9 73,300 
2015 262.19 23.16 8.8 75,500 
2016 278.26 23.25 8.3 76,300 
Data Sources: ‘Statistical Bulletin of the Development of National Human Resource and Social Security 
Work’ published by the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security in various years. 
 
In contrast, the occupational pension scheme in government departments and public 
institutions is compulsory and is funded by contributions from government departments 
and their employees – 8% and 4% of their tax-based salaries, respectively (Chinese 
State Council, 2015c). The proportion of payment is adjusted according to local 
economic development.  
Above all, the development of occupational pensions is seriously lagging behind. The 
majority of enterprises haven’t established such a pension scheme, so accumulated 
occupational pension funds are very small. Moreover, the development of occupational 
pension schemes is regionally imbalanced. For instance, occupational pensions are more 
developed in the eastern region of China compared to the central and western regions. 
Moreover, occupational pensions usually cover senior leaders and outstanding 
employees in state-owned enterprises or profitable, foreign-funded enterprises and, as a 
consequence, only account for 6%~8% of the total working population (Xuan and Zhao, 
2016).   
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6.2.3 Commercial Pension 
A commercial pension is an important part of the structure of national retirement 
income. As the third pillar of the pension system, the commercial pension is on a 
voluntary basis for anyone who has extra income. Personal depositing insurance and the 
‘House-for-Pension’ Scheme are typical of this type of pension.  
6.2.3.1 Personal Depositing Insurance 
Chinese savings, the result of individual thrift, have been higher than the rest of the 
world’s major economies for some time. In 2013, 38.46% of household income went 
towards household savings; in 2014, the proportion of China’s total savings accounts 
was 48.67% of that year’s GDP, far higher than the world average of 24% (Chinese 
State Council, 2017a). Thus, personal deposit insurance seems to hold great potential in 
China, which helps to correct the structural imbalance of China’s pension system. 
Personal deposit insurance is a supplementary insurance that employees can choose 
voluntarily. Employees can purchase personal deposit insurance and these extra 
contributions go into a personal account. The interest rate for these personal deposits is 
higher than the bank savings interest rate. When these insured individuals reach 
retirement age, they can opt to receive a lump sum or receive payments in installations. 
In 2016, the premium income of personal deposit insurance was 860 billion RMB, 
accounting for 25% of the income generated by insurance premiums. However, life 
insurance premium income was 150 billion RMB, accounting for only 4.4% of the 
income generated by insurance premiums, which benefited only 17.07 million elderly 
people (Dong and Yao, 2016).  
6.2.3.2 ‘House-for-Pension’ Scheme 
With the accelerating size of the aged population and many unsolved problems in 
China’s funded pension system, new social issues makes this area even more 
complicated and difficult to face for governments. Due to rising life expectancy it can 
be predicted that the elderly will spend more in the future for care, and pensions, the 
main retirement income for the elderly, are not enough to cover the costs of LTC 
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services. In this respect, China has explored a ‘House-for-Pension’ Scheme so as to 
increase elderly people’s financial resources.  
In September 2013, the Chinese State Council (2013) proposed running a pilot 
‘House-for-Pension’ Scheme (also called a reverse mortgage loan, see Figure 6.2) in a 
report titled ‘Several Suggestions on Accelerating the Development of the Social Service 
Industry for Elderly People’. The ‘House-for-Pension’ Scheme allows elderly property 
owners to re-mortgage their homes to a bank or an insurance company, and receive 
either fixed monthly payments depending on the market value of the property and the 
applicant’s life expectancy, or alternatively, a guaranteed form of old age care. The 
‘House-for-Pension’ Scheme intends to help elderly people financially and improve 
their current living standards. In 2014, the China Insurance Regulatory Commission 
(2014) issued ‘Guidance and Suggestions on Implementing a Pilot ‘House-for-Pension’ 
Scheme’ (Exposure Draft). This document devised regulations on the conditions and 
requirements of elderly people and insurance companies. Four cities – Beijing, 
Shanghai, Guangzhou and Wuhan – were nominated as the first pilot cities. In this draft, 
the ‘House-for-Pension’ Scheme was divided into two models – participative and 
non-participative products – according to the way of disposing the appreciation of a 
re-mortgaged house. The first model, the participative product, proposed that insurance 
companies could share a specific proportion of the appreciation of a re-mortgaged house 
according to the agreed contract; while the second model, the non-participative product, 
referred to a scheme where all appreciation from the property will be returned to the 
insured elderly people and their heirs. As a matter of fact, the ‘House-for-Pension’ 
Scheme also covered a series of related financial products, including real estate 
evaluation, housing preservation and maintenance, housing transfer, LTCI, financial 
planning and investment in elder care real estate (Southeast Morning Post, 2013). 
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Figure 6.2 ‘House-for-Pension’ Scheme (or ‘Reverse Mortgage Loan’) in China 
 
However, this proposal caused a public outcry, because it contradicts the traditional 
Chinese idea of rearing children to look after their parents in old age, bequeathing the 
property to the children in return. At the same time, the appraisal of house values and 
the function of government are also of central concern to the insurance companies (Guo, 
2013). From their perspective, they do not show as much interest in such a scheme as 
the draft originally anticipated. Three out of seven insurance companies which took part 
in related research and the discussion process of the ‘House-for-Pension’ Scheme failed 
to submit their final implementation plans, while the other four (the Ping’an, Taikang, 
Xingfu, Hezhong insurance companies) still wanted to claim a preferential taxation 
incentive. What is worse, this scheme is confronted by multiple risks. Lin, Peng and 
Chen (2014) stated that 70 year leases makes it difficult for insurance companies to 
implement this scheme. For example, if an insured person owns a house when they are 
30 years old and then retires at 60, when the house is pledged to an insurance company, 
according to the regulations of property ownership (70-year leases), an insurance 
company can only have a maximum of 40 years’ ownership upon this house. However, 
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if this insured person dies at 80, the insurance company only has a 20-year disposition 
right. Additionally, once the house is mortgaged to an insurance company, the insured 
person may neglect to maintain it, and in this situation, moral hazard will emerge and 
affect the house’s actual value (Southeast Morning Post, 2013). Insurance companies 
could face a great loss if the house is sold during the insured period. Moreover, the legal 
risk needs to be highlighted due to a lack of legal policies for the ‘House-for-Pension’ 
Scheme, and conflicts that might be incurred after the contract is signed, from the 
appraisal of house value to proprietary rights, all of which might result in a loss for 
elderly people and insurance companies (Qu, 2014). Thus, it has taken some time for 
the Chinese government and related insurance companies to put this scheme into effect, 
and to persuade Chinese citizens to accept a ‘House-for-Pension’ Scheme.  
Taking all the above pension schemes into account, China’s pension system is mainly 
based on the national basic pension scheme, because the scale of enterprise occupational 
pensions and the commercial pension is relatively small. 
 
6.3 Public Medical Insurance System 
The framework for China’s medical insurance system is much more complex and 
fragmented than that of its pension schemes: due to the existence of different social 
groups, various regulations in different regions, as well as a different range of medical 
projects. In general, the medical insurance system in China can be categorised into the 
following two parts: 
6.3.1 Basic Medical Insurance System in Cities 
China’s employee medical insurance system was established in 1998, based on the 
document ‘Decision on the Establishment of a Basic Medical Insurance System for 
Urban Employees’ (Chinese State Council, 1998). Like the pension scheme, employers 
and employees are required to make contributions to the basic medical insurance 
scheme which combines an individual account with a social pooling account. 
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Employees contribute 2% of their monthly salary towards their individual account, 
while employers usually contribute between 6%~12% of their workforce’s salary – a 
proportion of which (usually 30%) goes into the employees’ individual accounts while 
the rest goes to the social pooling account. The employees’ individual account is 
supposed to cover the cost of any medical treatment that amounts to around 10% of the 
local average annual salary to four times the local average annual salary. Employees 
have to pay for any medical expenses that cost in excess of five times their average 
wage.  
In addition, urban residents’ basic medical insurance was launched in 2007. It covers 
nearly all non-employed urban residents, including children, students (technical 
secondary school, vocational high school) and other urban residents who do not qualify 
for employees’ medical insurance. The standard annual contribution for people aged 
over 70 is 120 RMB from individuals and 440 RMB from local government. Their 
reimbursement ration is 50% for third-grade hospitals, 60% for second-grade hospitals 
and 65% for first-grade hospitals
57
. 
6.3.2 New Rural Co-operative Medical System 
Since 2002, the Chinese government started to establish a new rural co-operative 
medical system to improve access to healthcare, and relieve the financial burden of 
healthcare on rural residents with the aim of achieving universal healthcare coverage in 
rural areas, and also to narrow the gap between rural and urban areas in terms of public 
services and social protection. The system is guided, organised and subsidised by 
central, provincial, and county governments. This system demonstrates two important 
features: voluntary participation by rural residents, and an emphasis on protection 
against catastrophic illnesses. The new rural co-operative medical benefit package is 
modest: inpatient service and some high-expenditure outpatient services are covered, 
                                               
57
 In China, hospitals are divided into three grades. First-grade hospitals are basic community hospitals, 
which provide a comprehensive list of services including medical treatment, preventive measures, 
rehabilitation and healthcare. Second-grade hospitals are regional hospitals which provide technical 
guidance for first-grade hospitals, and participate in monitoring high risk groups. Third-grade hospitals 
provide comprehensive medical and healthcare services, and develop teaching and research for medical 
technology across different regions, cities and provinces.  
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although the fraction of costs that are covered depends on the availability of funding. 
Payment to providers is still dominated by the fee-for-service model, but a growing 
number of counties have piloted and implemented alternative payment methods, such as 
capitation and case-based payment. 
 
6.4 Long-term Care Insurance (LTCI) 
LTCI first started as a form of commercial insurance in 2006, and in 2016 LTC was 
given high priority by the Chinese government which began to promote it through social 
insurance in some pilot cities. Thus, this section will examine three categories of LTCI: 
6.4.1 Commercial LTCI 
The creation of commercial LTCI has a longer history than that of public LTCI. At 
present, there are 16 insurance companies promoting such commercial insurance 
products. The total number of registered LTCI products is over 140 (Chen, 2014). 
China’s LTCI was developed from health insurance. In 1996, Ping’an insurance 
company launched health insurance, and later in 1997 some serious illness and 
comprehensive medical insurance products were issued. After 2000, advanced medical 
insurance and dividend serious illness insurance became prevalent, and promoted the 
rapid development of commercial healthcare insurance. LTCI usually needs a longer 
contribution period than health insurance (typically more than 10 years); in most cases, 
people can obtain a more cost-effective insurance plan if they are young and healthy, 
otherwise they have to pay a higher insurance premium. 
The first commercial LTCI product was introduced by the Peoples Insurance Company 
of China in June 2006, which advertised ‘No Worries of LTCI for Personal Health’. 
Later, the Guo Tai Insurance Company launched another commercial LTCI plan – 
‘Kang Shun LTCI’. According to this plan, if the insured’s health status is determined 
by the insurance company as requiring LTC, he or she can receive 20% of the premium 
as a LTC fund within six months. In addition, the China Life Insurance Company 
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promoted a commercial LTCI plan – ‘Guo Shou Kang Xin LTCI’. Benefits from this 
plan mainly include a LTC allowance, an old-age disease benefit, and a death benefit. 
The Kun Lun Health Insurance Company later launched a series of care insurance 
products which provided insured individuals with disease insurance, LTCI and 
healthcare insurance. The insured could also receive 10 times their original insured 
amount of longevity care allowance back from the insurance company. 
Since 2015, more public policies concerning LTCI have been issued. A policy 
introducing tax relief for commercial health insurance was issued in May 2015. This 
regulation claimed that if the individual purchased a specific commercial health 
insurance product they were allowed to receive a pre-tax deduction with a maximum 
amount of 200 RMB/month (Chinese State Council, 2015b).  
According to a LTCI Investigation Report (China Insurance Industry Association, 2016), 
the popularity of commercial LTCI is very low because many people think they are too 
young and healthy to be aware of the risks of LTC in their old age. Besides, the high 
insurance premium is another reason for less demand for long-term healthcare insurance. 
People would rather depend on alternative investment approaches, such as housing 
property, social insurance (pension and basic medical insurance) and financial support 
from their children. Commercial LTCI has been promoted for more than 10 years. It has 
encountered some other problems and challenges during this period. 
Firstly, the age range of targeted customers is too narrow. On the one hand, customers 
who can purchase LTCI products should not be over 60; on the other, only elderly 
people aged 70~88 can receive these benefits. So insurance companies lose potential 
customers aged from 60~70, just as this group start to realise the importance of elder 
care. Meanwhile, if insurance companies do not compensate for increased care service 
fees for those who are over 88, these products still cannot guarantee the recipients 
economic security.  
Secondly, the insurance premium of commercial LTCI is relatively high. If the insured 
purchases commercial LTCI at the age of 30, they need to pay 6,300~8,800 RMB 
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premiums annually, which is 2.16~2.34 times higher than supplementary healthcare 
insurance, and 2.95~3.1 times higher than life insurance (Jing and Xie, 2014). Thus, 
commercial LTCI is not affordable for the majority of middle to low income families.  
Thirdly, unlike multiple forms (cash benefits and LTC services) that are offered in 
Western countries, in China payments of LTCI are restricted to a certain proportion of 
reimbursement on medical treatments or social services, rather than the actual and direct 
costs of elder care services. As an interview with a manager from a life insurance 
company confirmed, commercial LTCI is not universally understood by its potential 
clients, although it is some time since it was introduced. The younger generation would 
rather purchase an investment product with more guaranteed profit returns, so that they 
do not recognise LTCI as value for money. The manager also stated that for those who 
know the benefits of commercial LTCI, nearly half of them do not trust the commercial 
insurance company. This may be due to the immaturity of commercial long-term 
insurance, and the dominant tradition of family care in China. So such schemes are not 
that popular in China currently.  
6.4.2 Public LTCI 
Given the rapid increase in total LTC expenditure and pension pressure, LTCI has been 
seen as an economic method to solve the increasing demand for LTC, which will 
operate as a social insurance scheme in line with China’s five current social insurance 
programmes. 
In June 2016, the Ministry of Human Resource and Social Security (2016) released the 
document ‘Guided Suggestions on Launching a Long-term Care Insurance Pilot Plan’, 
which emphased its important position in the goals of the Thirteenth ‘Five-Year’ Plan. 
The department selected 15 cities to launch a pilot LTCI plan by 2020, including 
Shanghai, Chongqing, Chengdu (the capital city of Sichuan Province), Changchun (the 
capital city of Jilin Province), Qiqihar (in Heilongjiang Province), Ningbo (in Zhejiang 
Province), Suzhou and Nantong (in Jiangsu Province), Anqing (in Anhui Province), 
Shangrao (in Jiangxi Province), Qingdao (inShandong Province), Jingmen (in Hubei 
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Province), Guangzhou (in Guangdong Province), Chengde (in Heibei Province) and 
Shihezi (in Xinjian Province). According to this document’s proposals, these pilot cities 
needed to first establish a policy framework of LTCI according to local economic 
conditions. Current coverage includes people who have contributed to basic healthcare 
insurance, while the use of funds provided is independent of any provided by basic 
healthcare insurance. The funding structure consists of three parts: individual 
contribution, a healthcare insurance fund and fiscal subsidy. The criteria of each part 
vary between different regions, and can be adjusted according to the economic 
environment and practical implementation situations within each region. Below, three 
pilot projects are reviewed: Qingdao (a coast city in Shandong Province), Jingmen (in 
Hubei Province) and Shanghai.  
In July 2012, Qingdao was the first city to propose Long-term Medical and Care 
Insurance. It covers elderly people enrolled in the Urban Basic Medical Insurance 
System. LTCI is funded by the municipal government and draws funds from Basic 
Medical Insurance Funds at fixed periods. This scheme offers: (1) special hospital 
medical care (to a maximum imbursement of 170 RMB/day for an individual); (2) 
medical care in care institutions that combine medical treatment and elder care 
(maximum imbursement is 65 RMB/day for an individual); (3) residential care 
(maximum imbursement is 50 RMB/day for an individual); and (4) community care 
(maximum imbursement is 800~1,600 RMB/annual for an individual). The 
imbursement rate of these benefit criteria varies from 40% to 90% according to the 
contribution level (Qingdao Municipal Bureau of Human Resource and Social Security, 
2014). 
In November 2016, Jingmen released a LTCI policy which also covered the elderly who 
enrolled in the Urban Basic Medical Insurance System. As for the contribution criteria 
of this scheme, 0.4% of local residents’ disposable income (over the last year) is defined 
as the base amount of their LTCI contribution, which is divided into three parts: 
personal contribution (37.5%), social pooling funds of public medical insurance (25%) 
and fiscal subsidy (37.5%) (Jingmen Municipal People’s Government, 2016). An 
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interview with an official from the Jingmen Municipal Bureau of Civil Affairs revealed 
that, according to the base amount calculation of LTCI in 2016: eligible candidates pay 
30 RMB annually, the local government subsidises 30 RMB/person/annual, and pooling 
funds of medical insurance is 20 RMB for a person annually. Contribution methods 
differ according to different groups: contributions for working employees are directly 
deducted from their salary account; contributions for retirees and the self-employed are 
deducted from their personal medical insurance account; low-income groups and the 
disabled are not required to contribute to this scheme and are subsidised by fiscal 
revenue. Thus, unlike other forms of social insurance, the LTCI provided under this 
scheme is actually a flat rate, fixed amount, and is not earnings-related. Moreover, it is 
more convenient for elderly people to enjoy LTC services and cash payment compared 
with medical insurance. LTCI only covers payments in the following respects: (1) 
residential care: 100 RMB/day for elderly people (80% paid by LTCI and 20% paid by 
individuals); (2) institutional care: 100 RMB/day for a bed (75% paid by LTCI and 25% 
paid by individuals); and (3) hospital medical care: 150 RMB/day for a bed (70% paid 
by LTCI and 25% paid by individuals) (Jingmen Municipal People’s Government, 
2016).  
In December 2016, the Shanghai Municipal Government (2016) issued ‘Measures for 
Pilot LTCI in Shanghai’. The funding principle of LTCI is the same as that for medical 
insurance, which is to ‘determine payment according to the contributions and ensure a 
balance between contribution in and payments out’. Contribution approaches are 
divided into two different groups: (1) for people enrolled in the Basic Medical Insurance 
Scheme (the first group) contributions from the company and employee amounts to 1% 
of the total medical insurance base amount, and 0.1% of personal contributions of 
his/her medical insurance respectively; (2) for people enrolled in the Resident Medical 
Insurance Scheme (the second group), residents contribute around 15% of the average 
amount of contributions of ‘the first group’, and the rest is shared between the 
municipal and district government. During the pilot period, however, individuals and 
companies do not need to contribute to this scheme, instead, LTCI funds are transferred 
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from a medical insurance account. According to regulations, LTC services consist of 
community home-based elder care, institutional care, and hospital medical care. As a 
result, the expenses reimbursement regulation is based on three kinds of services: (1) 
the expense reimbursement rate is 90% of the expenses of community home-base care; 
(2) the expense reimbursement rate is 85% of the expenses of institutional care; (3) the 
medical care expense reimbursement is determined according the basic medical 
insurance regulation.  
As seen from these three pilot plans, funding resources for public LTCI mainly depend 
on public medical insurance funds. Eligible participants for public LTCI are those who 
were previously enrolled in the Urban Basic Medical Insurance Scheme. In fact, all 
these LTCI schemes are very immature, and what is promised and what is actually 
delivered may differ considerably in different pilot cities, so we cannot make any 
judgements about their respective performances as of yet. But, if we review current 
financial arrangements in these LTCI schemes, we can find that the earning-related 
financial model may not sustainable. We take Shanghai’s LTCI scheme as an example, 
the financing scale of LTCI in Shanghai (contribution from company and employee 
amounts to 1% of the total medical insurance base amount, and 0.1% of personal 
contributions of his/her medical insurance respectively) greatly exceeds the LTC needs. 
According to a rough calculation, the enterprise has to pay around 600~700 
RMB/month for each employee if they join in the LTCI insurance scheme, so the 
financial burden on enterprises and individuals is relatively heavy. By contrast, 
Jingmen’s LTCI scheme is much easier to operate and manage. It does not increase the 
burden on enterprises, which can also rationally use the medical insurance balance 
funds (25% of the contribution base is from public medical insurance funds). However, 
0.4% of the financial rate (the contribution base is 0.4% of local residents’ disposable 
income) is too low to satisfy the elderly people’s LTC demands. Thus, we suggest that 
Jingmen’s LTCI scheme, but with a higher contribution base, can be applied to other 
regions of China. In the chapter 9, we use Jingmen’s public LTCI scheme as the typical 
case to conduct a feasibility analysis on the national level.   
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6.4.3 Policy-based LTCI 
In practice, an overall social insurance plan for LTC in China is unrealistic at present, 
and commercial LTCI remains unpopular among the majority of people. With this in 
mind, Beijing first proposed a policy-based LTCI plan, with an aim to overcome the 
shortcomings of the former two plans.  
In the Haidian District, Beijing, 2016, the District Bureau of Civil Affairs (Haidian 
District) and Life Insurance Company (Beijing Branch) jointly launched a cooperative 
project on policy-based LTCI. This was the first policy-based insurance aimed at 
providing professional LTC for frail elderly groups of people, to alleviate the pressure 
of care placed on families to provide for elderly relatives.  
This voluntary LTCI scheme is designed for Haidian District registered residents 
(excluding university students) who are over the age of 18. An insurer can purchase this 
insurance product in a consulting centre for disability and mutual assistance in any 
Haidian sub-district office. LTCI funds consist of three components: personal 
contribution, government subsidy and mutual assistance funds from nursing institutions 
(Figure 6.3).   
 
Figure 6.3 Components of Policy-based LTCI Funds 
 
Individuals contribute no more than 100 RMB per month (see the different contribution 
standards listed in Table 6.2) and need to contribute for at least 15 years. The 
government will subsidize 20%~30% of the total amount of contribution funds 
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according to the age range of the insured, and if the contribution period is no more than 
15 years. If the insured is over 60 years old, they need to contribute to the insurance for 
15 years continuously (the district government will subsidise 20%~30% of the personal 
contribution) and can still receive elder care services during this contribution period.  
Table 6.2 Contribution Standards of Policy-based LTCI (2016) 
Age 
group 
Personalpayment limit 
(annual) 
Government subsidy 
(annual) 
Average personal 
contribution amount 
(RMB/person/month) 
Urban 
registered 
household 
Rural 
registered 
household 
Urban 
registered 
household 
Rural 
registered 
household 
18~39 
1,140 RMB 
standard contribution base The district 
government 
subsidise 
20%~30% of 
the personal 
contribution. 
The district 
government 
subsidise 
20%~30% of 
the personal 
contribution. 
75 65 
40~59 
1,254 RMB 
increasing standard 
contribution base by 10% 
83.6 73.83 
over 60 
1,368 RMB 
increasing standard 
contribution base by 20% 
91.2 81.2 
Data Sources: Office website of Beijing Government (www.beijing.gov.cn).  
 
As for the over-65s, the extent of their disability will be assessed by a professional 
institution and divided into three levels based on ‘Assessment of Daily Living Ability’: 
mild, moderate or severe. Then, they can receive elder care in the value of 900 
RMB/month, 1,400 RMB/month and 1,900 RMB/month. The management and 
operation of funds is conducted by the commercial insurance company. Elder care costs 
are reimbursed by the commercial insurance company via LTC mutual assistance funds. 
Currently, Haidian district government has arranged a budget of 10 million RMB to 
fund this project.  
The policy-based LTCI scheme in Beijing has offered a wealth of experiences for other 
regions to design their own funding model. It involves several strengths which are 
described below: 
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The aim of policy-based LTCI is to provide elderly people with social care when they 
are incapable. This delivery mechanism is more suitable for China’s current elder care 
demand, as the majority of Chinese elderly prefer family care rather than institutional 
care. LTCI funds pay for basic and professional elder care for frail elderly, such as day 
care, rehabilitation care, hospice care, etc. An interview with an official from the 
District Bureau of Civil Affairs revealed that the average pension for a retiree was less 
than 3,500 RMB/month in 2015, although it is enough for their basic living needs this 
amount might not be adequate for their care demands if they get a severe illness or 
cannot take care of themselves. Some children of these insured are more concerned 
about what kind of elder care services their parents will receive after they buy insurance, 
and whether these services can really relieve the pressure of caring for their parents. So, 
LTCI is a good option for the elderly people to receive professional elder care and 
relieve the economic burden on their families.  
Besides, the policy-based LTCI scheme has a price advantage over other similar 
insurance products, because there is really no reasonable profit on a policy-based LTC 
scheme, which also saves in service costs as commercial insurance companies arrange 
the delivery of LTC for reasonable prices. Compared with commercial insurance 
products, the annual contribution of a commercial insurance product is 2~3 times more 
than policy-based LTCI (Jing, Yang and Zhu, 2017). 
Additionally, a policy-based LTCI scheme applies a commercial insurance operational 
mechanism, so it ensures the efficiency of the delivery of LTC services. The 
interviewee from the District Bureau of Civil Affairs stated that this market-oriented 
operation can overcome the shortcomings of current commercial and public LTCI, and 
magnifying the social benefits of fiscal expenditure. The interviewee further stated that 
multiple participation and coordination from the government, the market and society 
will effectively promote the development of the elder care industry.  
Moreover, compared with other social LTCI schemes conducted in other pilot cities, 
policy-based LTCI expanded its coverage to more elderly people, not merely restricting 
the insurance to those who were enrolled in either of the main urban medical insurance 
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schemes. Unlike commercial LTCI schemes that usually reject over-60 purchasers, 
policy-based LTCI can be purchased by people over 60, and they can enjoy LTC 
whenever they need it.  
 
6.5 Social Assistance for Elderly People 
With the rapid development of a market-oriented economy, China has established a 
social assistance system which includes long-term basic living assistance (minimum 
living standard support system and rural ‘Five-Guarantees’ provision), special 
assistance (healthcare, housing and legal aid) and temporary assistance (disaster rescue, 
homelessness assistance and temporary relief) (Ding and Liu, 2014). The following 
measures are commonly applied in relieving elderly poverty and guaranteeing elderly 
people’s basic standard of life. 
6.5.1 Minimum Living Standard Support (MLSS) System 
The MLSS system was established in nearly 600 cities, between 1995 and 1999, in 
order to assist Chinese households with income levels below the subsistence minimum 
(Wu and Huang, 2007: 171). This system, supported by local government, can 
guarantee a basic living standard and the material demands of urban and rural residents. 
Minimum living standard refers to the local variation of real living costs indicated by a 
representative basket of goods, and this indicator would increase with economic growth 
(ibid). According to Table 6.3, the standard of MLSS in both urban and rural areas kept 
increasing from 2010 to 2016, and the latest standard isshown in Table 6.4. In terms of 
the ‘Regulations on Minimum Living Security for Urban Residents’ (Chinese State 
Council, 1999), urban ‘Three-Nos’ elderly people shall receive subsistence allowance 
according to the local minimum living standards. At present, poor elderly people in the 
cities can also enjoy relief aid for their basic needs. In some places, the local 
government also gives priority assistance to widowed elderly, who enjoy additional 
subsistence allowances of 20% based on the local standard. However, MLSS adopts a 
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low standard which is insufficient in that it only covers basic needs, such as clothing, 
food, water, electricity and gas, and thus does not cover LTC.  
Table 6.3 Situation of MLSS in the Urban and Rural China (2010~2016) 
 
Year 
MLSS in the urban areas MLSS in the rural areas 
Population 
(million) 
Average level 
(RMB/month) 
Population 
(million) 
Average level 
(RMB/annual) 
2010 3.32 251 18.45 1,404 
2011 3.42 288 19.32 1,718 
2012 3.36 330 20.17 2,068 
2013 3.30 373 20.75 2,434 
2014 3.14 411 20.64 2,776 
2015 2.93 451 20.04 3,178 
2016 2.54 495 18.59 3,744 
Data Sources: ‘Statistical Yearbook of China’s Civil Affairs’ published by the Ministry of Civil Affairs in 
various years.  
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Table 6.4 Minimum Living Standard Support in Urban and Rural Areas of China (2016) 
Regions Urban Rural  Adjustment Date 
Beijing 800 RMB/month 800 RMB/month 2016 
Tianjin 780 RMB/month 780 RMB/month 2016 
Shijiazhuang (Hebei) 550 RMB/month 4,000 RMB/annual 2013 
Taiyuan (Shanxi) 500~530 RMB/month 320~400 RMB/month 2016 
Hohhot (Inner Mongolia) 515~565 RMB/month 3,644 RMB/annual 2016 
Shenyang (Liaoning) 620 RMB/month 380 RMB/month 2016 
Changchun (Jilin) 360~510 RMB/month 280~300 RMB/month 2016 
Harbin (Heilongjiang) 510 RMB/month 3,000 RMB/annual 2016 
Shanghai 880 RMB/month 880 RMB/month 2016 
Nanjing (Jiangsu) 750 RMB/month 750 RMB/month 2016 
Hangzhou (Zhejiang) 744 RMB/month 744 RMB/month 2016 
Hefei (Anhui) 510 RMB/month 510 RMB/month 2016 
Xiamen (Fujian) 7,320 RMB/annual 7,329 RMB/annual 2015 
Nanchang (Jiangxi) 480~510 RMB/month 310 RMB/month 2016 
Qingdao (Shandong) 580~650 RMB/month 470~580 RMB/month 2016 
Zhengzhou (Henan) 550 RMB/month 320 RMB/month 2016 
Wuhan (Hubei) 580 RMB/month 320 RMB/month 2016 
Changsha (Hunan) 450 RMB/month 450 RMB/month 2016 
Guangzhou (Guangdong) 745 RMB/month 745 RMB/month 2016 
Nanning (Guangxi) 290 RMB/month 130 RMB/month 2016 
Haikou (Hainan) 520 RMB/month 460 RMB/month 2016 
Chongqing  420 RMB/month 230 RMB/month 2013 
Sichuan Province 450~550 RMB/month 400~500 RMB/month 2016 
Guiyang (Guizhou) 545~583 RMB/month 278~583 RMB/month 2016 
Yunnan Province 475~530 RMB/month 215~295 RMB/month 2016 
Lhasa (Tibet) 640 RMB/month 2,450 RMB/annual 2016 
Xi’an (Shaanxi) 565 RMB/month 255~265 RMB/month 2016 
Lanzhou (Gansu) 387~515 RMB/month 2,453 RMB/annual 2016 
Xining (Qinghai) 403 RMB/month 2,970 RMB/annual 2016 
Yinchuan (Ningxia) 440 RMB/month 2,400 RMB/annual 2016 
Urumchi (Xinjiang) 395 RMB/month 215 RMB/annual 2016 
Data Sources: MLSS data was retrieved from relevant documents in the Department of Civil Affairs in 
different cities. The regions in brackets are provinces, next to the capital city of that province.  
 
6.5.2 Rural ‘Five-Guarantees’ Support System 
The Chinese State Council (2006) released the document of ‘Implementation 
Regulations on Rural Five-Guarantees’ on 1 March, 2006. It stated that subsistence 
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allowances for the poor rural elderly should be not lower than local average living 
standards, and local government could set a reasonable allowance level based on local 
economic conditions. The local government arranged rural ‘Five-Guarantees’ funding in 
their annual budget plan, while central government offered subsidies to areas in 
financial difficulty. In addition, more rural social welfare service centres and rural 
nursing homes were built and related facilities were improved, and they could offer 
collective support, including free daily care, medical assistance, regular physical 
examination and legal advocacy services, to poor rural elderly people.  
 
6.6 Universal Financial Support 
Currently, governments at all levels have launched relevant policy that aims to increase 
benefits for elderly people – old-age allowance and service subsidy fall under this 
category.  
6.6.1 Old-age Allowance 
China has universally established different standards of living allowance in different 
regions for elderly who are the ‘older old’ (e.g., usually those over 80 years). According 
to the documents ‘Suggestions on Further Strengthening the Work of Preferential 
Treatment for the Elderly’ (National Ageing Work Committee Office, 2013b) and 
‘Notification of Establishing Subsidy Policy for the Elderly on a Provincial Level’ 
(Ministry of Civil Affairs, 2014), people who are over 80 can receive an old-age 
allowance. At present, 26 provinces (regions and cities) have issued relevant policies for 
an old-age allowance. However, when the policy is implemented in the specific regions, 
the standards of old-age allowances vary among different ages. The elderly population 
is usually divided into three age groups: 80~89 years old, 90~99 years old and over 100 
years old. In most areas of China, people over 100 can receive an old-age allowance up 
to 100 RMB/month, and the amount keeps rising. In Tianjin, the old-age allowance for 
people over 100 years is 500 RMB/month, which is the highest among the regions; in 
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Hebei Province, Shanxi Province, Jilin Province, Shanghai and five other regions, the 
standard is 300 RMB/month; Ningxia Province offers 450 RMB/month for people over 
90; Qinghai province and Shanxi province, two underdevelopment areas, offer 90 
RMB/month and 50 RMB/month for people over 70, respectively (Wu, 2016).  
6.6.2 Service Subsidies for Elderly People 
The service subsidy aims to provide elder care services to elderly people who have a 
disability, and the very old (over 80s) or elderly (over 70s) who have experienced the 
‘loss of one child’. For instance, Beijing launched an ‘elder care service card’ policy, 
and 48,000 elderly people have already enjoyed this policy. Under the policy disabled 
elderly people can receive 300 RMB/month, and ‘loss of one child’ families can receive 
100 RMB/month. All these subsidies are not paid in cash but transferred onto an ‘elder 
care service card’, which can only be used to buy elder care services in home-based 
elder care service centres (Beijing Municipal Bureau of Civil Affairs, 2016). In 
Shanghai, elder service subsidies are also used as a kind of ‘non-cash service 
vouchers/cards’ to purchase various types of elder care services (Liu, 2014d). Standard 
benefits are calculated based on service hours and prices, which are determined 
according to an elderly person’s degree of disability. Disabled grades are divided into 
mild, moderate and severe, and the monthly service hours are 30, 40 and 50 hours 
respectively, while the service price is 18, 18 and 20 RMB/hour respectively (Shanghai 
Municipal Bureau of Civil Affairs, 2015). 
 
6.7 Discussion of Outcomes 
This chapter has reviewed current categories of retirement income for all Chinese 
elderly people. The main financial sources aim at ensuring elderly people’s basic living 
standards while not solving their demand for elder care. Additionally, China 
experiences huge variation in financial situations between different regions, and among 
different groups of elderly people. This discussion will first summarise the fiscal 
expenditure, disposable income and pension level across different regions during 
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2014~2015, and summarise how the balance of financial sources can be used to pay for 
elder care. Second, it will review the financial resources gap between urban and rural 
elderly people, and analyse the reasons for the low consumption of elder care in China. 
Third, it will compare and draw conclusions about different funding models/sources for 
elder care from the supply and demand side (which have been reviewed in chapters 5 
and 6).  
6.7.1 Fiscal Expenditure and Pension Distribution across Different Regions 
As shown in Table 6.5, expenditure on elderly welfare increased dramatically during 
2014~2015 across different regions of China. The overall basic pension level and 
welfare level for elderly people in China also demonstrates that the living standard of 
elderly people is rising, and the retirement life of the elderly has been greatly improved. 
This is based on the situations of different provinces, for instance, in some economically 
undeveloped regions, such as Hebei, Shanxi, Shaanxi, Henan, Gansu, Guizhou, Tibet, 
Qinghai, Ningxia and Xinjiang Province, etc., the basic pension level exceeds the local 
urban disposable income level, while rich regions (municipalities directly under the 
central government: Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and Chongqing; eastern, coastal regions: 
Zhejiang and Guangdong Province, etc.) show the opposite, in an adverse direction. 
This indicates that fiscal expenditure is focused most strongly on undeveloped and poor 
regions. Thus, the redistribution function of fiscal expenditure is obvious and follows 
basic welfare principles. 
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Table 6.5 Pension per capita and Disposable Income per capita in Urban China (2014 and 2015) 
Regions  
(Provinces 
and Cities) 
2014 2015 
Growth 
Rate of 
Elderly 
Welfare 
Elderly Welfare 
(Fiscal 
Expenditure) 
Million RMB 
Disposable 
Income per 
capita 
RMB/annual 
Pension per 
capita 
RMB/month 
Percentage of 
Pension to 
Disposable 
Income 
Elderly Welfare 
(Fiscal 
Expenditure) 
Million RMB 
Disposable 
Income per 
capita 
RMB/annual 
Pension per 
capita 
RMB/month 
Percentage of 
Pension to 
Disposable 
Income 
National  4,735.89 28,843.9 2,070 86.12% 19,274.21 31,790.3 2200 83.04% 307% 
Beijing  516.64 48,531.8 3,050 75.41% 1,326.46 52,859.2 3355 76.16% 157% 
Tianjin 69.39 31,506 2,295 87.41% 262.87 34,101.3 2525 88.85% 279% 
Hebei  189.53 24,141.3 1,950 96.93% 788.35 26,152.2 2232 102.42% 316% 
Shanxi 97.65 24,069.4 2,389 119.11% 279.4 25,827.7 2630 122.19% 186% 
Inner Mongolia 91.23 28,349.6 2,097 88.76% 702.63 30,594.1 2142 84.02% 670% 
Liaoning 72.74 29,081.7 2,050 84.59% 340.84 31,125.7 2234 86.13% 369% 
Jilin  3.7 23,217.8 1,722 89.00% 122.88 24,900.9 1935 93.25% 3221% 
Heilongjiang 49.50 22,609 1,846 97.98% 170.37 24,202.6 2119 105.06% 244% 
Shanghai  101.94 48,841.4 2,936 72.14% 572.06 52,961.9 3283 74.39% 461% 
Jiangsu 107.26 34,346.3 2,236 78.12% 1,916.5 37,173.5 2460 79.41% 1687% 
Zhejiang 294.37 40,392.7 2,593 77.03% 1,205.93 43,714.5 2640 72.47% 310% 
Anhui 113.94 24,838.5 1,890 91.31% 543.82 26,935.8 2024 90.17% 377% 
Fujian 170.55 30,722.4 2,160 84.37% 374.43 33,275.3 2322 83.74% 120% 
Jiangxi 329.38 24,309.2 1,892 93.40% 449.02 26,500.1 2046 92.65% 36% 
Shandong 325.17 29,221.9 2,268 93.14% 1,661.06 31,545.3 2454 93.35% 411% 
Henan 158.92 23,672.1 1,940 98.34% 318.86 25,575.6 2087 97.92% 101% 
Hubei 78.83 24,852.3 2,039 98.45% 657.32 27,051.5 2213 98.17% 734% 
Hunan 181.13 26,570.2 1,818 82.11% 550.99 28,838.1 1918 79.81% 204% 
Guangdong 314.07 32,148.1 2,200 82.12% 1,389.87 34,757.2 2400 82.86% 343% 
Guangxi 283.89 24,669 2,182 106.14% 706.92 26,415.9 2305 104.71% 149% 
Hainan 43.89 24,486.5 1,825 89.44% 240.77 26,356.4 2007 91.38% 449% 
Chongqing 124.69 25,147.2 1,688 80.55% 327.67 27,238.8 1838 80.97% 163% 
Sichuan 92.16 24,234.4 1,790 88.63% 1,040.41 26,205.3 1886 86.36% 1029% 
Guizhou 89.7 22,548.2 1,977 105.21% 463.09 24,579.6 2140 104.48% 416% 
Yunnan 91.14 24,229 1,977 97.92% 34.621 26,373.2 2150 97.83% 280% 
Tibet --- 22,015.8 3,320 180.96% 15.63 25,456.6 3678 173.38%     --- 
Shaanxi 135.71 24,365.8 2,116 104.21% 1,048.79 26,420.2 2300 104.47% 673% 
Gansu 118.95 21,803.9 2,065 113.65% 269.42 23,767.1 2168 109.46% 126% 
Qinghai 10.94 22,306.6 2,593 139.49% 347.77 24,542.3 2910 142.28% 3079% 
Ningxia 0.44 23,284.6 2,169 111.78% 107.80 25,186 2469 117.64% 24401% 
Xinjiang 478.49 23,214 2,298 118.79% 726.08 26,274.7 2500 114.18% 52% 
Data Sources: The data of ‘fiscal expenditure’, ‘disposable income’ and ‘pension’ are from ‘Blue Book of 
Elder Care Indexes in Urban China’ (2017) published by the Development Research Centre Group of the 
Chinese State Council (2017). The data of ‘percentage of pension to disposable income’ and ‘growth rate 
of elderly welfare’ were calculated by the author.  
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6.7.2 Purchasing Power for Elderly People in China 
By 2016, there were 40.63 million disabled elderly people in China, while only 2.69 
million of them chose institutional care, accounting for 6.7% of the total disabled 
elderly population (National Ageing Work Committee Office, Ministry of Civil Affairs 
and Ministry of Finance, 2016). The reason for this low demand for social elder care 
largely lies in insufficient purchasing power of elderly people, because most of them 
belong to middle and low income groups. As shown above, the majority of the elderly 
population in China belong to middle and low income groups, because their main 
financial resources are from the basic pension. Generally speaking, most private nursing 
institutions target the relatively rich elderly. As for those non-profit private nursing 
institutions which are also market-based operations, their service prices may still be too 
high for the majority of elderly people. The majority can hardly afford to pay for elder 
care using their own pension.  
At present, there is a huge difference in financial conditions between urban and rural 
elderly people. Thus, the following subsections will examine these differences in 
relation to pensions and other financial resources, to analyse the reasons for the low 
purchasing power of elderly people.  
6.7.2.1 Basic Pension Income Gaps between Urban and Rural Elderly People 
The basic pension gap between urban and rural elderly people is widening. In urban 
China, according to a investigation conducted by the Renmin University of China 
(2016), by 2016 the average pension in government departments and public institutions 
was 3,174.69 RMB/month, and the average pensions of the employees in urban 
enterprises and urban residents were 2,400.22 RMB/month and 1,387.2 RMB/month, 
respectively. With the development of China’s economy and growing maturity of the 
pension schemes, retirement income rises continuously. From 2005 to 2016, the 
Chinese government enhanced the basic pension level for retirees in urban enterprises – 
introducing a growth rate of 5.5% from January 2017 (Ministry of Human Resource and 
Social Security and Ministry of Finance, 2016).  
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In rural China, since July 2011 every rural elderly person over 60 years received a 
minimum basic pension of 55 RMB/month funded by the central government (Chinese 
State Council, 2009). Local governments can increase the standard of their basic 
pension for the local elderly according to local economic conditions. In 2015, the basic 
pension level increased from 55 to 70 RMB/month (Ministry of Human Resources and 
Social Security and Ministry of Finance, 2015). The expenditure on pensions in central 
and western undeveloped regions is fully fund by the central government, while in the 
eastern developed regions, the basic pension for rural residents is half funded by central 
government and half funded by the local government (Ministry of Finance, 2009). This 
demonstrates that the redistribution of funding a basic pension in different regions and 
different group of elderly people can be quite diverse, while basic pension gaps between 
urban and rural residents are still huge.  
6.7.2.2 Main Financial Resources for Chinese Elderly People 
At present, there is a huge difference of financial resources between urban and rural 
elderly people. 
Main Financial Sources for Urban Elderly People 
Urban elderly people usually rely on different forms of financial resources, which 
consist of two elements: (1) self-owned financial resources, including labour income, 
pension, property, commercial insurance, and rental income from housing property, etc.; 
(2) non self-owned financial sources, for instance, government subsidy (MLSS and 
old-age allowance) and financial support from family (children and other relatives). As 
shown in Table 6.6, labour income, pension and family support are the main financial 
sources for urban elderly people, and their amounts vary greatly. The proportion of 
labour income decreased from 32.99% in 2000 to 12.8% in 2015. Around 10% of 
elderly people were still engaged in work at this time, and earneda salary (Renmin 
University of China, 2016). The proportion of those taking pensions increased from 
19.16% in 2000 to 41.1% in 2015, hence pensions became the primary financial source 
for elderly people. As for other personal income, over 85% of urban elderly people have 
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their own housing property (6% have two housing properties and 1% have three housing 
properties) (ibid). So, rental income from property is also considered to be a constant 
financial source for urban elderly people.  
Table 6.6 Constitution of Financial Sources for the Urban Elderly Population (by %) 
 2000 2010 2015 
Labour income 32.99 36.6 12.8 
Pension 19.61 28.9 41.1 
Minimum Living Standard Support 3.9 4.1 3.4 
Family support 40.7 28.2 39.1 
Property 0.4 0.4 0.8 
Commercial insurance 0.03 0.03 0.1 
Others  2.37 1.77 2.7 
Total  100 100 100 
Date Source: ‘Follow-up Investigation Report of Ageing Society in China’ published by Renmin 
University of China (2016). 
 
In addition, urban elderly people also mainly rely on family support. As shown in Table 
6.6, family support is major source of funds for the elderly (40.7% in 2000, and 39.1% 
in 2015), although this shows a slight downward trend.  
Main Financial Sources for Rural Elderly People 
Apart from rural elderly people’s basic pension and old-age allowance, as examined 
above, there are some other forms of financial sources available: (1) there were 
approximately 39.7% rural elderly people undertaking farming or raising livestock 
(cows, chicken, etc.) in 2015, and earning income connected to farming (Renmin 
University of China, 2016). At the same time, these rural elderly people can receive an 
agricultural subsidy from the central government (Ministry of Finance and Ministry of 
Agriculture, 2016); (2) subsidy for the ‘loss of agricultural land’. Due to the 
development of rural areas, agricultural land might be expropriated by local government. 
In order to guarantee the basic living standard of rural residents affected by the 
expropriation of land, central government introduced the ‘loss of agricultural land’ 
pension policy, where rural elderly who are over 60 can receive a pension of up to 129 
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RMB/month (Ministry of Labour and Social Security, and Ministry of Land and 
Resource, 2007). 
6.7.2.3 Reasons to Low Purchasing Power in terms of Elder Care 
Since 2000, Chinese elderly people’s financial conditions have improved, however, as 
shown in Table 6.7, there is still a large gap between the income and expenditure levels 
of urban and rural elderly people, which indicates a continuing problem of imbalance 
between urban and rural elderly people. There are some other reasons that explain why 
Chinese elderly people have lower purchasing power in terms of elder care.  
Table 6. 7 Income and Expenditure for Elderly People 
in Urban and Rural China(2000,2006,2010 and 2016) (Unit:RMB) 
income/ 
expenditure 
Indexes 2000 2006 2010 2016 
Income overall average monthly income 
urban 708 996.92 1,491 1,994.17 
rural 186 226.83 396.33 635.08 
constitution of 
retirement 
income 
proportion of supportive income58 to 
total income 
urban 73% 75.90% 86.80% 79.40% 
rural 10.70% 13.60% 18.70% 36% 
proportion of elderly people enrolling 
in the pension system 
urban 72.20% 78% 84.70% 100% 
rural 5.50% 4.80% 34.60% 100% 
average monthly income 
(including urban basic pension) 
urban59 904 990 1,527 2,400 
rural 14.75 30.75 74.17 141.21 
Expenditure average monthly expenditure 
urban 727 835.67 1,318.25 1,230.33 
rural 190 224.25 396.58 --- 
expenditure on 
medical care 
proportion of elderly people enrolling 
in the public medical insurance scheme 
urban 60.80% 74.10% 95.30% 98.90% 
rural 3% 44.70% 98.30% 98.60% 
averagemonthly expenditure on medical 
care for elderly people 
urban 1,664 885 1,565 1,889.79 
rural 422 287 378 --- 
proportion of expenditure on medical 
care to total expenditure 
urban 19.07% 8.80% 8.75% 12.80% 
rural 18.51% 10.70% 7.95% --- 
expenditure on 
basic necessity 
proportion of expenditure on basic 
necessity to total expenditure 
urban 63.30% 64.20% --- 56.50% 
rural 77.20% 75.50% --- --- 
Data Source: ‘Blue Book of Elder Care Indexes in Urban China’ (Development Research Centre Group 
of the Chinese State Council, 2017) published by China Development Press. 
                                               
58
 Supportive income includes social insurance or other benefits issued by the government, this is 
distinguished from the income earned from other channels. 
59
 Under this category, the data of average monthly income is only taken from urban employees. 
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First, as shown in Table 6.7, both urban and rural elderly people’s overall income is 
increasing. By 2016, the income of urban and rural elderly people reached 23,930 RMB 
and 7,621 RMB respectively, with an annual increase of 5.9% and 9.1% respectively, 
demonstrating that there has been evident investment in financial support for rural 
elderly people. Urban elderly still receive relatively more support than rural elderly 
people – 79.4% (urban) compared to 36% (rural). In addition, nearly all urban and rural 
elderly enrol in the public medical insurance scheme, and medical care expenditure 
accounts for a large proportion of elderly people’s income. Over 50% of elderly 
people’s expenditure is spent on basic necessities, which means that they have less 
money to pay for elder care and/or medical care. Finally, rural elderly people’s 
disposable income is low. According to the China Family Health Development Report 
(National Family Planning Commission, 2015), the high income urban households (the 
top 20%) earn 19 times more than low income rural households (the bottom 20%), 
which indicates that the gap between urban and rural households is obvious.  
Second, although China’s social security system is universal, in that it almost covers all 
elderly people, the standards are relatively low. So the system is not conducive to 
increase the service consumption of low-income elderly people, especially those in rural 
areas. This is mainly due to different pension scheme arrangements among different 
groups, and in different regions. In developed and rich areas, the elderly receive higher 
pension benefits, while in undeveloped and poor areas (small and medium-sized cities 
and rural areas), the elderly might receive lower basic pension benefits. Due to the 
recalibrations of pension policy in recent years the pension level of urban retirees has 
been raised, while the majority of rural elderly areas only receive a basic pension (of 
more than 100 RMB), and do not have access to other financial sources except an 
agricultural subsidy. In addition, although the public medical insurance scheme covers 
all Chinese people, elderly people have to pay themselves despite medical care being 
viewed as a crucial necessity. In 2013, the average out-of-pocket cost of medical care 
(hospitalisation) was 16.7% and 33% for urban and rural elderly people, respectively 
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(National Family Planning Commission, 2015). Thus, the poverty rate of the elderly in 
rural China is relatively high, while the welfare level is relatively lower.  
6.7.3 Conclusion: Supply and Demand Side of the Elder Care Funding System 
Based on the current situation of China’s elder care funding system, which has been 
evaluated in chapters 5 and 6, the overall structure of the elder care funding system (the 
demand side) was established by observing existing funding models, elderly people’s 
sources of funds, targeted elderly groups, levels of security, etc. As shown in Table 6.8, 
the social assistance model for ‘Three-Nos’ and ‘Five-Guarantees’ elderly people is 
based on a MLSS System; public LTCI has been established in some pilot cities, for 
those already enrolled in the basic medical insurance system; and a universal model was 
established for those over 60 years, such as an old-age allowance for those over 80, and 
a service subsidy for those over 65. In addition, various commercial insurance products 
have been launched by private insurance companies, such as private pension, private 
LTCI, and the ‘House-for-Pension’ Scheme.  
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Table 6.8 Comparison of Elder Care Funding Models in China (Demand Side) 
Funding 
Models 
Social Assistance 
Model 
Social Insurance 
Model 
Universal Model 
Commercial 
Insurance Model 
Sources of 
funds 
Fiscal revenue, public 
welfare lottery funds, 
charitable donations 
Premium and 
government subsidy 
Fiscal revenue, public 
welfare lottery funds, 
charitable donations 
Premium paid by 
the individuals 
Forms MLSS system 
Public long-term care 
insurance (LTCI) 
Old-age allowance, 
service subsidy for 
elderly people 
Private pension, 
private LTCI, 
‘House-for-Pension’ 
Scheme 
Targeted 
elderly group 
‘Three-Nos’ and 
‘Five-Guarantees’ 
elderly people 
The insured who have 
enrolled into medical 
insurance 
Elderly people over 65 
years 
The insured who 
purchase relevant 
insurance products 
Compulsory or 
voluntarily 
Legal 
Compulsory in the pilot 
cities 
Legal Voluntarily 
Government 
responsibility 
Government-dominated Government-dominated Government-dominated 
Market-based 
mechanism and 
government 
supervision 
Contribution No contribution 
Benefits based on 
contribution 
No contribution 
Benefits based on 
contribution 
Government 
financial 
pressure 
Lighter 
Related to the local 
administrative costs 
and subsidy level 
Heaviest Lightest 
Level of 
security 
Basic 
Related to the local 
economic condition 
Relatively low, related 
to the local economic 
condition 
Related to the 
premiums of 
insurance products 
 
From a supply-side perspective, anelder care industry has been created in China which 
incorporates re-financing and investment via different mixed funding models that 
include ‘Private Construction and Public Subsidy’, ‘Public and Private Partnerships’, a 
market funding model, elder care industry investment funds and an elder care bond 
funding model. The characteristics of each funding model are summarised in Table 6.9.  
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Table 6.9 Comparison of Elder Care Funding Models in China (Supply Side) 
Funding 
Model 
Private 
Construction 
and Public 
Subsidy 
Public and 
Private 
Partnerships 
Market 
Funding Model 
Elder Care 
Industry 
Investment Funds 
Elder Care 
Bond Funding 
Model 
Sources of 
funds 
Private capital 
and government 
subsidy 
Government 
and private 
capital 
Private capital 
Government and 
private capital 
Private capital 
Degree of 
compulsory 
Government 
guidance, 
market 
participation 
Government 
guidance, 
market 
participation 
Private financial 
initiative 
Voluntary 
agreement 
Voluntary 
agreement 
Responsibility 
Private sectors, 
government 
subsidises 
insurance 
liability 
insurance 
Shared 
responsibility 
between public 
and private 
sectors 
Enterprises’ 
responsibility 
Shared 
responsibility 
between public and 
private sectors 
Enterprises’ 
responsibility 
Operational 
mode 
Quasi 
market-based 
Quasi 
market-based 
Market-leading 
Government-leading 
via equity 
Market-leading 
via bond 
Funding scale 
250 billion 
RMB 
150 billion 
RMB 
67.8 billion 
RMB 
FOF: 7.2 billion 
RMB 
Sub-fund: 36 
million RMB 
5.2 billion RMB 
Number of 
projects 
12,000 241 29 400 6 
Data Sources: Statistics of funding scale and number of projects of ‘Public Construction and Private 
Subsidy’, Public and Private Partnerships, elder care industry investment funds and elder care bond 
funding model were sourced from relevant government documents (2015 and 2016). The statistics of 
financing scale and the number of projects in the marketing funding model were sourced from the 
insurance companies involved. 
 
Above all, in the process of funding elder care, funding sources, policy intervention and 
financial methods, all play an important role in diversifying the funding channels 
available for elder care on both a supply and demand level. 
In spite of diversification on both demand and supply side, evident gaps remains and the 
challenge at local level lies in deciding how to utilise available resources in order to 
extend access to elder care to lower income groups. How localities, and public and 
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private agencies seek to address these challenges is examined in the following chapter. 
Here the research addresses four case studies from Wuhan, Hubei Provinces, to examine 
in more detail how public-private partnerships have combined (and with what degree of 
success) to create new facilities and opportunities, to enable an extension of elder care 
to more elderly people in the local community.  
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Chapter 7 Funding for Institutional Care in Wuhan, Hubei 
Province: Case Studies 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters have reviewed the current funding structure of social elder care 
and social security for the elderly in China, and discussed problematic issues within the 
funding structure. Within the general models that have been outlined in previous 
chapters, local government is given room to determine strategies pertinent to local 
circumstances. Hence, in each of the case studies outlined below, we witness slightly 
different types of PPP arrangements based on different funding models that allow us to 
observe a variety of elder care arrangements and funding emerging from recent reforms. 
This chapter will look at the situation from a different perspective, examining the 
problems encountered at a local level by examining the experience of four nursing 
institutions in and around the city of Wuhan, the capital of the Hubei Province in central 
China. 
This chapter is divided into four sections. First, it examines the overall situation of the 
aged population in Wuhan. Subsequently, it reviews the provision and funding policy 
for the elder care industry in Wuhan since 2011, especially the policy promoting the 
elder care market and the cooperation of social forces. Four typical cases – (1) Wuchang 
District Sunshine Welfare House, (2) Wuhan East Lake New Technology Development 
Zone Fuzuling Welfare House, (3) Hanchuan Social Welfare House and (4) Wuhan 
Social Welfare House – are used to discuss and analyse how Public and Private 
Partnerships (PPPs) are working in providing and funding elder care in Wuhan. The 
features of these funding models (their advantages as well as problems) are evaluated 
and some issues emerging from these four cases studies are discussed.  
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7.2 Overall Situation of the Aged Population in Wuhan, Hubei 
Province 
Wuhan is the capital city of the Hubei Province, which is located in central China. 
Lying at the intersection of the middle reaches of the Yangtze and Han rivers, the 
capital is well known for its important geographic role in the transportation history of 
China, as it connects to other major cities with dozens of highways and railways. 
Wuhan is also regarded as an important economic base within the Yangze River 
Economic Zone, as developments in technology and education have profoundly affected 
the strategic layout of the ‘Rise of Central China’. As we can see from the map of 
Wuhan (Figure 7.1), it is currently divided into 13 districts. The central districts of 
Wuhan consist of seven areas: Wuchang, Hongshan, Qingshan, Jiang’an, Hangyang, 
Jianghan and Qiaokou; the suburbs of Wuhan include six areas: Huangpi, Xinzhou, 
Jiangxia, Caidian, Hannan and Dongxihu. 
 
Figure 7.1 Map of Wuhan 
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Over the past five years, the aged population in Wuhan has faced increasing challenges. 
There were 17.28 million people over 60 years at the end of 2016 in Wuhan, which as 
20.72% of the total population is higher than the national average of 16.7% (Hubei 
Provincial Department of Civil Affairs, 2017b). As can be seen from Chart 7.1, over the 
last six years the aged population increased at the rate of an average 75,500 every year, 
with a year-on-year growth rate of 5.49%. It is estimated that the proportion of elderly 
people will increase to 21% in 2020 and 30% in 2030 (Zhang, 2013). Semi-disabled and 
disabled elderly in Wuhan, numbering approximately 296,000, account for 17.1% of the 
total aged population, higher than the national average level of 11.5% (Hubei Provincial 
Department of Civil Affairs, 2017b). 
 
Chart 7.1 Aged Population (in millions) over 60 in Wuhan since 2010 
Data Source: The data is from the ‘Wuhan Aged Population Report’ (2010~2016) issued by the Hubei 
Provincial Department of Civil Affairs (2017b).  
 
Besides, as shown in Chart 7.2 there are more aged females than aged males in Wuhan. 
The higher the age, the wider the sex ratio gap between males and females.  
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Chart 7.2 Gender of Aged Population (in thousands) in Wuhan in 2016 
Data Source: The data is from the ‘Wuhan Aged Population Report’ (2010~2016) issued by the Hubei 
Provincial Department of Civil Affairs (2017b). 
 
Additionally, regarding the distribution of the aged population in different districts in 
Wuhan, the aged population in eight districts was over 100,000 by the end of 2016 
(Chart 7.3). The first three districts are Huangpi, Wuchang and Xinzhou. As illustrated 
in Chart 7.3, the majority of central districts have more elderly people than the suburbs. 
As to the proportion of elderly people, all central districts except the Hongshan District 
of Wuhan exceed 20% by the end of 2016, far more than in the suburbs. Among them, 
the proportion of elderly people in the Wuchang District exceeds 20% for the first time. 
The highest proportion is from the Qingshan District which used to be an industrial area 
– 26.81%, rising by 1.24% from the previous year. The lowest proportion is from the 
Hannan District at 14.21%. 
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Chart 7.3 Population of Elderly People (in thousands) in Different Districts in Wuhan in 2016 
Data Source: The data is from the ‘Wuhan Aged Population Report’ (2010~2016) issued by the Hubei 
Provincial Department of Civil Affairs (2017b). 
 
Chart 7.4 Proportion of Elderly People over 60 in Different District in Wuhan in 2016 (by %) 
Data Source: The data is from the ‘Wuhan Aged Population Report’ (2010~2016) issued by the Hubei 
Provincial Department of Civil Affairs (2017b). 
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Moreover, the aged population phenomenon also presents itself in the increased 
numbers of the very elderly population (over 80). By the end of 2016, those aged 80 and 
above were 244,850 in Wuhan as a whole, accounting for 2.44% of the total population, 
and 14.17% of the total aged population (Hubei Provincial Department of Civil Affairs, 
2017b). The numbers of the very elderly population increased by 17,800 from 2016 to 
2017. The growth rate of the over 80s was 7.84%, well above the growth rate of the 
over 60s elderly population at 5.49% (ibid). This group is widely distributed in 13 
districts of Wuhan (Chart 7.5). Among them, the Wuchang District had 35,494 elderly 
people over 80. According to Chart 7.6, the proportion of very elderly people (over 80) 
among elderly people (over 60) was over 10%, and the situation in the central districts 
is much more serious than those in the suburbs (Chart 7.6). Some common features of 
this age group (over 80) are loneliness, disability, poverty and disease. Therefore, they 
are more likely to need elder care.  
 
Chart 7.5 Population of Elderly People over 80 (in thousands) 
in Different Districts in Wuhan in 2016 
Data Source: The data is from the ‘Wuhan Aged Population Report’ (2010~2016) issued by the 
Department of Civil Affairs of Hubei Province (2017b). 
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Chart 7.6 Proportion of Elderly People over 80 in Different Districts in Wuhan in 2016 (by %) 
DataSource: The data is from the ‘Wuhan Aged Population Report’ (2010~2016) issued by the 
Department of Civil Affairs of Hubei Province. 
 
Furthermore, issues of the ‘empty-nest’ and ‘4-2-1’ family models are increasingly 
serious. According to the Sixth Demographic Census (Hubei Provincial Statistical 
Bureau, 2011), 27% of elderly households in the cities comprised of couples, and 21% 
of single elderly people (Li, 2013). In some communities, the proportion of 
‘empty-nest’ families was over 75% (the average was around 40%), a phenomenon that 
was more serious in rural Hubei at around 60% (Jiang, 2016).  
 
7.3 Varieties of Provision of Social Elder Care in Wuhan, Hubei 
Province 
According to the ‘Thirteen ‘Five-Year’ Plan of the Development of Elder Care in 
Wuhan’ (Wuhan Municipal Bureau of Civil Affairs, 2017) and the ‘Thirteen 
‘Five-Year’ Plan of Social Elder Care Service System Construction in Hubei Province’ 
(Hubei Provincial Department of Civil Affairs, 2017a), the construction and 
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development of the elder care system in Wuhan has achieved great things from 2011 to 
2015. The reasons being as follows:  
First of all, social security for the elderly in the Hubei Province is improving. The basic 
pension for enterprise retirees was adjusted and increased for 5 consecutive years, 
reaching 2,213 RMB/month by the end of 2015, and increased by 88.2% by the end of 
the Eleventh ‘Five-Year’ Period. The average centralised and decentralised support for 
Rural ‘Five-Guarantees’ elderly people was enhanced to 5,692 RMB/annual and 3,917 
RMB/annual respectively. Meanwhile, the provision of an old-age allowance to elderly 
over 80 years is expanding, and the cumulative payment of elderly benefits was more 
than 400 million RMB by the end of 2015 (Wuhan Municipal Bureau of Civil Affairs, 
2017).  
Second, in the Twelfth ‘Five-Year’ period, the relevant facilities for elder care services 
increased. From 2011 to 2015, there were 918 facilities for elder care, including: 512 
urban home-based community service centres, 120 rural elderly mutual care centres, 15 
public nursing institutions, 146 community nursing institutions, 49 private nursing 
institutions and 76 rural welfare houses. The total number of beds was 61,000, which 
increased by 5,000 annually during 2011 to 2015, and there were 37 beds per 1,000 
elderly people (aged 60) by the end of 2015. Above all, the overall provision level of 
elder care in Wuhan topped the list of 15 provincial capital cities in China (Hubei 
Provincial Department of Civil Affairs, 2017b).  
Third, an increasing number of private organisations participate in the elder care 
industry. By the end of 2015, accumulated funds invested in the elder care industry 
from private organisations were more than 4 billion RMB. More than 5,800 social 
organisations engaged in offering services related to elder care, such as home-based 
elder care services like housekeeping, meal delivery, rehabilitation, spiritual comfort, 
etc. Meanwhile, the total number of private nursing institutions reached 217 by the end 
of 2015, providing over 30,000 beds for elder care. Therefore, the private sector and 
community services were gradually becoming the main supplier of elder care provision 
in Wuhan by 2015 (Wuhan Municipal Bureau of Civil Affairs, 2017).  
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Fourth, the coverage of beneficiary elderly has expanded and the allowance level 
increased. Apart from urban ‘Three-Nos’ and ‘Five-Guarantees’ elderly people, the 
social elder care system also offers various forms of social services (e.g. free 
door-to-door home care and free annual medical check-ups, etc.) to the very elderly 
people (over 80) or disabled elderly people, the ‘empty-nest’ elderly people and other 
seniors with low financial resources (Yin, 2016). At the end of 2015, an old-age 
allowance covered all elderly people over 80 years in Wuhan, and the resulting 
cumulative grant is over 0.4 billion RMB (Wuhan Municipal Bureau of Civil Affairs, 
2017). 
Since 2015, Hubei Province has issued a series of official documents concerning the 
expansion of elder care coverage achieved by supporting private organisations to 
develop the elder care industry. In an interview with the Director of the Social Welfare 
and Charity Office, Hubei Provincial Department of Civil Affairs, the director stated 
that elder care development in Hubei Province includes the following four working 
priorities: the first is to further liberalise the elder care service market, and encourage 
more social forces to adopt a joint-stock cooperative system, PPP model and other 
models to operate a nursing institution. Second, to develop policies on land grants, 
credit financing, tax relief, construction and operational subsidies for beds. Third, to 
standardise pricing by establishing a market-based mechanism for the service charges of 
nursing institutions, innovating the service provision approach. The fourth priority is to 
reduce barriers to entry and support new entrants into the elder care industry by 
improving the administrative efficiency of registration and approval to establish a 
nursing institution.  
 
7.4 Funding Initiatives in the Development of Social Elder Care in 
Wuhan, Hubei Province 
Currently, the local governments in Hubei Province follow the national subsidy policy – 
‘Three subsidies’ (sanbu) policy (Ministry of Civil Affairs, 2013) – which proposed a 
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metaphor to describe the elder care subsidy system: ‘bricks’ (‘zhuantou’ in Chinese), 
‘beds’ (‘chuangtou’ in Chinese) and ‘person’ (‘rentou’ in Chinese). The financial input 
for ‘bricks’ and ‘beds’ is included in the process of constructing nursing institutions, 
and funding for the ‘person’ relates to the operational stage, or is included under other 
old-age allowances and benefits.  
In the latest official document from the Hubei Provincial Department of Civil Affairs 
(2017a), the overall funding situation for elder care in Hubei Province showed that in 
2016, the total subsidies for promoting a local elder care service system were 110 
million RMB. Local authorities have raised the subsidy levels of the construction and 
operation stages for private non-profit nursing institutions. The construction subsidy for 
each bed is around 1,500 RMB, an increase of 50%. Local authorities also subsidise 
nursing institutions’ security risk insurance. Besides this, Hubei Province will prepare 
special funds of 20 million RMB to support 20 areas to build provincial exemplary 
community home-based elder care centres. Provincial demonstrative projects will be 
purchased by government but managed by the private sectors. Above all, Hubei 
Province explicitly requests that all local authorities should increase investment in the 
construction and operation of the social elder care services. Specifically, funding 
arrangements in Wuhan’s elder care industry can be illustrated from the following 
perspectives: 
First, public welfare lottery funds are still the main financial resource for the 
construction of elder care in Wuhan. Each year 50 percent of local public welfare lottery 
funds are invested in the social elder care system; for example, the Wuhan Finance 
Department arranged for 101.79 million RMB to be provided to the elder care industry 
in 2017 (Hubei Provincial Department of Civil Affairs, 2017a). In the case of public 
nursing institutions, they are fully funded by the local government, however, these 
institutions have experienced a financial deficit in recent years, as they struggle to 
maintain sustainable management and operational practices. As a result, they have to 
accept to care for private elderly clients in addition to the ‘Three-Nos’ and 
‘Five-Guarantees’ elderly people. Meanwhile, the Wuhan municipal government is 
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exploring other approaches to reform public nursing institutions, and expand investment 
channels, such as ‘Public Construction and Private Operation’ and ‘Private Construction 
and Public Subsidy’, where local governments plan to subsidise every bed in private 
nursing institutions with 2,000 to 4,000 RMB at the construction stage. Besides land, 
property is a major intangible asset. In the big cities where land is very scarce, local 
governments usually authorise public-owned buildings to develop as sites for elder care 
services. Investors may receive free resources (e.g., land or buildings, facilities, etc.), or 
only pay a percentage of the resource depreciation fee. Hubei Provincial Finance 
Department is the biggest fundraiser for the social elder care system. Since 2008, it has 
raised over 1 billion RMB and subsidised nearly 85 public nursing institutions in the 
reconstruction of buildings and facilities. 
Second, there are different forms of subsidies at the operation stage. In the case of 
public nursing institutions, local governments provide a monthly subsidy to ‘Three-Nos’ 
and ‘Five-Guarantees’ elderly people – according to the local MLSS System. As for 
private nursing institutions, the local government subsidises the elderly according to 
their fiscal resources. So, subsidy levels across Hubei Province differ from region to 
region, ranging from 360 to 2,400 RMB/person/annual. The local government also 
offers preferential policies, for instance, a reduction in business income tax and 
added-value tax. Administrative fees, such as water, electricity, gas and heating may be 
paid according to residential criteria, rather than business criteria.  
In December 2016, Hubei Provincial Department of Civil Affairs (2016) issued 
‘Temporary Measures of Guided Funds for Elder Care Service Industry in Hubei 
Province’. The Hubei government arranged government-sponsored investment funds 
(FOF: 600 million RMB), and set up 5 sub-funds (4,400 million RMB) run by 5 fund 
management institutions respectively (Table 7.1). 
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Table 7.1 Establishment of Elder Care Industry Funds in Hubei Province 
Fund Management Institutions Private Partners 
Amount of Funds 
(million RMB) 
Hubei Gaolong Healthcare Industry Investment 
Fund Partnership Company 
Mayinglong Pharmaceutical Group 
Limited Company 
500 
Jiuzhoutong Gaotou Elder Care Industry 
Investment Fund Partnership Company 
Jiuzhoutong Pharmaceutical Group 
Limited Company 
2,400 
Yichang guotou Elder Care Industry Investment 
Fund Partnership Company 
Yichang Guotou Group 500 
Jiaotou Hanjiang Healthcare Industry Centre 
Hubei Provincial Transportation 
Investment Company 
500 
Wuhan Ruide Capital Industry Fund 
Tongjitang Pharmaceutical Limited 
Company 
500 
Total amount  4,400 
Data Sources: The above information was obtained from internal government documents while I was 
doing investigation work in the Hubei Provincial Department of Civil Affairs.  
 
In the next section, I use four typical cases to discuss and analyse how nursing 
institutions are funded under different forms of co-ordinated co-operation between the 
government and the private sectors.  
 
7.5 Case Studies 
The first case – Wuchang District Sunshine Welfare House – is a non-profit 
organisation, which is a typical example of a nursing institution running on a ‘Private 
Operation and Public Subsidy’ funding model. The second case is another private 
nursing institution – Wuhan East Lake New Technology Development Zone, Fuzuling 
Welfare House. This welfare house is run on a ‘Public Construction and Private 
Operation’ model, and was a purely public nursing institution which became a private 
one. The third case is Hanchuan Social Welfare House (now called ‘Hanchuan Elderly 
Apartment’), which is also typical for the ‘Public Construction and Private Operation’ 
funding model, except it has both public and private operational systems. The fourth 
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case, Wuhan Social Welfare House (now called ‘Xiehe Elderly Apartment’) is currently 
viewed as the biggest PPP elder care project in elder care in China. All of these case 
studies are based on semi-structured interviews which were conducted in April~June 
2015, and in August 2017.  
7.5.1 Case Study One: Wuchang District Sunshine Welfare House 
Wuchang District Sunshine Welfare House (which I will refer to as Sunshine Welfare 
House from this point onwards) is one part of the Wuhan Sunshine Medical Care Group. 
Wuhan Sunshine Medical Care Group is a group of comprehensive elder care service 
institutions that are famous for combining elder care (nursing institutions) with medical 
care (hospitals). Its hospital in Wuchang District used to be a state-owned hospital for 
employees, which after restructuring was privatised. Its nursing institution, the Sunshine 
Welfare House, used to be an old factory building and a staff dormitory. The institution 
was a state-owned enterprise, subsequently rebuilt and expanded into a place for elder 
care in 2007. Its approximate scale is 10,000 square meters, with an outdoor area of 
3,000 square meters, and the building can accommodate 600 elderly people. The 
Sunshine Welfare House has a comfortable environment, well-equipped elder care 
facilities, thorough servicing procedures and professional nursing staff, all of which can 
meet different levels of medical and elder care demand.  
The most impressive feature of Sunshine Welfare House is that it can provide medical 
care services as well as daily elder care. The doctors do rounds of the wards every day, 
and nurses take the body temperature and blood pressure of the elderly, this routine is 
structured in order to prevent disease by offering prompt medical treatment. 
Construction Funding Arrangements 
According to an interview with its manager, as the institution is defined as a private 
non-profit organisation it is difficult for Sunshine Welfare House to obtain bank loans. 
So, in the construction stage, its main funding source was from self-raised funds, 
approximately 4.8 million RMB. The local government single subsidy provided 2,000 
RMB for each bed, so the total fiscal subsidy the institution received is 1.2 million 
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RMB, accounting for 20% of its total funds. On top of this, the local government issued 
an operational subsidy of 100 RMB/person/month before August 2017, so these sources 
of subsidised income, in total, amount to 720,000 RMB a year (in the operational stage). 
In August 2017, the local government raised the operational subsidy standard from 100 
to 200 RMB/person/month. All these subsidies are directly invested in the provision of 
elder care. 
Operational Situation 
Considering funding arrangements for the operational stage, the rent for Sunshine 
Welfare House is 1.5 million RMB annually. One plan is to self-raise approximately 2 
million RMB (of business income mainly from medical care) towards the maintenance 
of relevant facilities, such as fire-fighting apparatus, barrier-free facilities for the 
disabled, in order to enhance safety standards, and be able to request further operational 
subsidies from the government.  
At present, all 600 beds are occupied. Among them, 200 beds are used for medical care 
for the elderly, leaving 400 beds for non-medical elder care. There are four levels of 
care services provided: intensive care, first-grade care, second-grade care and 
third-grade care, depending on the (dis)ability of the elderly person involved. The 
institution’s charging standards contains three parts: medical/elder care, bed, and living 
costs (including food and other fees). The medical/elder care fee has six grades 
according to the level of need and the capacity to pay: 1,600, 1,400, 1,200, 1,000, 800 
and 600 RMB/person/month. Bed charging fees range from 400 to 1,000 
RMB/person/month. The living costs fee is 600 RMB/person/month. Thus, a total fee 
for one elderly person ranges from 1,600~3,200 RMB/month.  
Besides the associated costs above, there are around 300 employees in the Sunshine 
Welfare House, including administrative staff, doctors and nurses, and service staff. 
There are little profits when all income and expenses are offset.  
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Evaluation of Case Study One 
From the perspective of its funding structure, the model for the Sunshine Welfare House 
contains three participants: the government, the private sector and individuals 
(individual investors and clients). Under the ‘Private Operation and Public Subsidy’ 
funding model, local government usually subsidises beds in the construction and 
operational stage. In the construction stage, local government grants a one-time subsidy 
to beds based on quantity. In the operational stage, a subsidy is released according to the 
occupation rate of beds, and subsidy standards differ according to the client’s condition. 
In this case, the government subsidy only accounts for 20% of the pre-period 
investment cost, without any bank loans or other credit finance. Sunshine Welfare 
House has to depend on self-financing and uses operating income (mainly from service 
and bed fees charged to the elderly and their families) to rebuild and expand the 
institution. All government subsidies are only available when the local government 
assesses whether their standards have been met. As a private non-profit institution, the 
Sunshine Welfare House encounters financial pressure because they cannot obtain bank 
loans. Thus, they have to raise funds by themselves in order to have enough money for 
the pre-period construction.  
From the perspective of its operational mode, the Sunshine Welfare House completely 
operates under a market-oriented and privatised system, as this enables the institution to 
determine a price, and sell services to those who can afford them. Unlike public social 
welfare houses, it does not need to accept ‘Three-Nos’ elderly people. This private 
non-profit institution is different compared to other private institutions, as it needs to 
register under the local Bureau of Civil Affairs rather than the Industrial and 
Commercial Bureau
60
. As the Sunshine Welfare House can determine its own pricing 
structure, their service and bed fees can be set lower than other private nursing 
institutions, however, this costing strategy affects their operating income. 
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 In China, a private company needs to register under the Industrial and Commercial Bureau, so they 
might go through a complicated procedure to do so. While, if a private non-profit institution provides 
elder care, they register under the local Bureau of Civil Affairs, which is easier for them to do more 
quickly. Meanwhile, they also enjoy more preferential policies and more subsidies.  
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From a client perspective, this model is unfair as the current government’s subsidy 
policy is more likely to benefit suppliers rather than individuals. Elderly people need to 
pay for elder care services by themselves. Their main source of funding is from their 
pension. If the pension is not enough, then their family (children or grandchildren) 
might support them. In practice, the government supports the development of the elder 
care industry, by providing the social capital to participate in delivering elder care, 
while ignoring the purchasing capacity of the elderly, especially, as care fees might 
prove unaffordable. In this case, care and bed fees in Sunshine Welfare House are 
relatively affordable compared to private nursing institutions, and are welcomed by the 
elderly. According to the interviewed manager, she admits that they first consider the 
possible expenditure and other operating costs, and then determine a suitable price 
range for the elderly. Only in this way, can the Sunshine Welfare House make ends 
meet, and create a small operating balance, or the welfare house would not be 
sustainable.  
From the perspective of care being considered a product for the consumption of the 
elderly, products clearly demonstrate a kind of commodity attribute rather than a 
welfare attribute. What kind of care services consumers choose depends on their 
purchasing power. ‘Three-Nos’ elderly can access free elder care in a public social 
welfare house, while elderly people with low incomes are not a specific targeted group 
for the government to protect. Without universal coverage of public LTCI, the elderly 
and their families might bear a heavily economic burden in the long-term.  
7.5.2 Case Study Two: Wuhan East Lake New Technology Development Zone, 
Fozuling Welfare House 
Wuhan East Lake New Technology Development Zone Fozuling Welfare House (which 
I will refer to as Fozuling Welfare House) was built in February 2012, with an 
approximate area of 14,000 square meters, and a total investment of 60 million RMB 
which aimed, specifically, to provide elder care services to ‘Three-Nos’ and 
‘Five-Guarantees’ elderly people. Fozuling Welfare House is a comprehensive public 
nursing institution, with: 515 beds, a canteen, laundry, medical clinic, entertainment and 
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fitness centres, and other relevant facilities. In June 2013, the local government 
launched the ‘Public Construction and Private Operation’ reform in Fozuling Welfare 
House, and chose Wuhan Sunshine Medical Care Group – a private non-profit 
organisation – as a social commissioning agency (via a bidding procedure) which has a 
comparative advantage in the provision of medical care, as it could then operate the 
Fozuling Welfare House in a market-based way.  
Commission Contract 
At the start of 2013, the local government and Wuhan Sunshine Medical Care Group 
signed a commission contract. This marked the first ‘Public Construction and Private 
Operation’ elder care project in Wuhan. The contract contained the following terms: 
(1) The period for the contract is 10 years. The commissioning agency does not need to 
pay any asset depreciation fees
61
 in the first five years. There is no other government 
subsidy in the construction period, so the commissioning entity has to self-finance in 
order to expand or build other relevant facilities (e.g., medical equipment and 
pharmaceutical resources for a clinic). In the subsequent five years, the commissioning 
agency needs to pay asset depreciation fees to the local government (this amount is still 
not known at the moment). 
(2) Sufficient beds should be ensured to support all ‘Three-Nos’ and ‘Five-Guarantees’ 
elderly people (total existing number is 217), after which 100 beds should be reserved 
for those who need medical care, and finally, the rest can be provided as a private elder 
care service.  
(3) The contractor is responsible for the attendance of all ‘Three-Nos’ and 
‘Five-Guarantee’ elderly people, and the government subsidises them with 850 
RMB/person/month, while the subsidy standard for private elderly people is 200 
RMB/person/month.  
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 In this case, the assets depreciation fees refer to the collocation of the cost of assets (the existing 
buildings or the facilities, such as beds and equipment) to periods in which the assets are used. 
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(4) The relevant departments from local government, such as the Bureau of Civil Affairs 
and the Bureau of Sanitation, conduct regular inspections every month, and evaluate 
institutions on different criteria concerning service quality, the state of appliances and 
equipment, etc. Once an institution has passed the inspection, the local government 
releases the subsidy.  
Operational Situation 
Sunshine Medical Care Group invested 3 million RMB in purchasing relevant facilities, 
and improving the environment for medical and elder care provision during the 
construction period. Currently, except for 217 ‘Three-Nos’ and ‘Five-Guarantees’ 
elderly, in Fozuling Welfare House there are around 100 private elderly people. The 
welfare house also opened a professional hospital for local people, and employs nearly 
80 doctors and nurses there. Thus, Fozuling Welfare House is basically running 
profitably.  
As this is the second elder care project for Sunshine Medical Care Group, it still uses 
the same service price standards as outlined in case one: a medical/elder care fee with 
six grades: 1,600, 1,400, 1,200, 1,000, 800 and 600 RMB per person/month; bed 
charging fees that range from 400 to 1,000 RMB per person/month; and a living 
charging fee of 600 RMB per person/month. As the interviewed manager clarified, 
Fozuling Welfare House is located in a rural-urban continuum where the residents are 
relatively poor, compared to the central districts. So, given that situation, Fuzuling 
Welfare House actually asks less than the service prices listed. 
Additionally, Sunshine Medical Care Group set up a team of professional nursing staff 
and introduced a series of improved management procedures in Fozuling Welfare 
House. According to questionnaire results from monthly regular inspections, the degree 
of satisfaction from the patients and elderly people is over 90%. Thus, the service 
quality of medical care and elder care in Fozuling Welfare House is acceptable to the 
majority of their clients.  
 
202 
 
Evaluation of Case Study Two 
In case study two, the relationship between the government and Sunshine Medical Care 
Group is subject to contractual law. After obtaining operating rights from the 
government, Fozuling Welfare House transformed from a purely public nursing 
institution to a nursing institution that is owned by the government, but operated by 
Sunshine Medical Care Group on a market basis. Sunshine Medical Care Group 
assumes sole responsibility for all profits and losses. The typical feature of this case is 
the separation of ownership (government) and management (Sunshine Medical Care 
Group). In this instance, this commission mode can be evaluated from the following 
aspects: 
First, the ‘Public Construction and Private Operation’ model demonstrates how the 
government can release its responsibility for providing and funding elder care to a 
non-profit organisation. Governments are not the only entities able to provide public 
goods. The ‘Public Construction and Private Operation’ model of the elder care 
industry makes it possible that a social party, no matter whether it is a private company 
or a non-profit organisation, can bring more positive elements from market rules and 
provide elder care services with a market-oriented approach, which not only satisfies 
care demands from different groups of the elderly, but also promotes the development 
of the elder care industry.  
Second, this case also shows that this ‘Public Construction and Private Operation’ 
model can produce more positive economic results for both the local government and 
Sunshine Medical Care Group. For one thing, it reduces public subsidies from local 
government. For instance, before the reform, as the interviewed manager puts it, the 
local government used to pay over 7 million RMB to sustain the basic operation of 
Fozuling Welfare House (e.g., maintenance of relevant facilities, personnel allocation, 
etc.), and to support all ‘Three-Nos’ and ‘Five-Guarantees’ elderly people each year. In 
contrast, after the reform local government only needed to pay an operational subsidy 
towards ‘Three-Nos’ and ‘Five-Guarantees’ elderly people’s care (850 
RMB/person/month), and private elder care (200 RMB/person/month). Assuming there 
203 
 
are 217 ‘Three-Nos’ and ‘Five-Guarantees’ elderly people and 100 private elderly 
people, the government only needs to pay 3.36 million RMB. Thus, the local 
government saves roughly 4 million RMB a year. The interviewed manager also stated 
that since there are no asset depreciation fees in the first five years, expenditure is 
reduced. In the operational stage, the government subsidy for ‘Three-Nos’ and 
‘Five-Guarantees’ and private elderly people has a surplus each month. Thus, the 
current overall financial situation is generally sound.  
Third, the ‘Combination of Medical and Elder Care’ service model in Fozuling Welfare 
House has more advantages in market competition. The hospital not only provides a 
convenient and safe medical environment for local residents, but also produces profits 
and cross-subsidises Fozuling Welfare House. Further, the improved quality of medical 
care services attracts more elderly people willing to pay for the elder care services.  
7.5.3 Case Study Three: Hanchuan Social Welfare House / Hanchuan Elderly 
Apartment 
Hanchuan Social Welfare House was built in 2011. It is a public, fully-funded 
institution and its main responsibility is to take care of ‘Three-Nos’ elderly people and 
orphans. In the early stage of construction, the total invested funds were around 13.5 
million RMB, including: 4.4 million RMB of public welfare lottery funds, 4.11 million 
RMB municipal special funds, 2.5 million RMB of social donations, and 2.47 million 
RMB self-raised funds. The building area is 8,500 square meters and accommodates 
300 elderly people. From 2009 to May 2016, the number of elderly living in Hanchuan 
Social Welfare House was only around 130 people, including 36 ‘Three-Nos’ elderly, 
and the rest were private elderly people who needed to pay for the services and living 
expenses. In the coming years, Hanchuan’s local government intends to launch a 
privatisation reform, and support social forces to invest in the elder care industry, in 
order to relieve the fiscal pressure, increase accommodation rates and improve the 
quality and efficiency of elder care. In June 2016, a market-based mechanism was 
introduced as a ‘Public-Private Partnership’ in Hanchuan Social Welfare House. Under 
this new agenda, the original social welfare house has two systems: ‘Three-Nos’ elderly 
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people are still supported by the government; the remaining empty beds and relevant 
facilities are run by a private company and operated privately through contract 
management. 
Before the ‘Public and Private Partnerships’ Reform 
Before May 2016, Hanchuan Social Welfare House was a public institution that only 
accepted ‘Three-Nos’ elderly people, and the remaining empty beds were provided to 
other elderly people in order to generate profits. But during an investigation in May 
2015, I found the empty bed rate to be more than 50% most of the time. As for the 
relevant policy, the subsidy for ‘Three-Nos’ elderly people in Hanchuan was 820 
RMB/person/month in 2015. Prices for other elderly people ranged from 1,110 RMB to 
2,600 RMB/person/month according to their dependency level. In interview, the 
president of Hanchuan Social Welfare House stated that several problems have been 
generated in the delivery of public elder care services, and these can be arranged as 
follows: 
First, according to the MLSS System in Hubei Province, the minimum living standard 
was 410 RMB/month in 2015, which was lower than Wuhan MLSS level (580 
RMB/month). The standard in Hanchuan should be adjusted and might increase around 
10 to 20 RMB every year. As to the monthly subsidy for ‘Three-Nos’ elderly people in 
the Social Welfare House, the MLSS system determined that it should be at least 200% 
of local minimum living standard, so every ‘Three-Nos’ elderly people in Hanchuan 
should receive at least 820 RMB/month. These subsidies should be covered by the local 
fiscal budget and transferred to the Hanchuan Social Welfare House directly. In 
practical terms, however, these subsidies are not covered by the local fiscal budget. 
Instead, the MLSS Centre issues the subsidies, so the actual amount is usually lower 
than the regulated amount (around 650 RMB/month) due to inadequate tax revenues. 
The social welfare house is a non-profit organisation and service pricing is decided by 
the local Price Bureau
62
, so they could not charge more to other elderly people in order 
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 The Price Bureau is an administrative organisation which is responsible for price control. It mainly has 
three functions: first, it should implement state price guidelines, policies and regulations; second, it is 
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to improve their operating income and relieve their costs. In actual terms, elderly 
people’s living costs and service staffs pay together exceed the welfare house’s actual 
financial capacity. 
Second, the requirements for the acceptance of private elderly people in Hanchuan 
Social Welfare House are quite strict. The president states that elderly people with 
infectious diseases, mental disorders, and even chronic diseases are excluded from the 
waiting list, because if these people are gravely ill or get hurt while living there, it may 
require greater responsibility from the Social Welfare House. This responsibility not 
only comes from financial pressures (e.g., recruiting professional nurses/social workers 
to take care of them), but also from criticisms made by elderly people’s families if their 
relatives experience accidents (which might contribute to their death).  
Third, the president of Hanchuan Social Welfare House says that the welfare house is a 
public, non-profit organisation, and as their administrative staff are civil servants, their 
income is ratified and issued by the state. Unlike private nursing institutions, they can 
only take care of ‘Three-Nos’ and ‘Five-Guarantees’ elderly people. If they accept 
private clients, they cannot earn much money from this business because the service 
price charged is usually very low. In addition, more elderly people means that they have 
to recruit more service staff to take care of them, raising expenses and threatening to 
undermine any profit. So, the incomes of these administrative staff will not vary 
according to business performance. Without any performance incentive mechanism, 
staff’s monthly income will not increase, as a result, they do not show much enthusiasm 
for their work, and do not care how many elderly people are served. This is the reason 
why the welfare house is more likely to reject private elderly people who come for elder 
care and accounts for much lower accommodation rates as well. 
Fourth, concerning service staff, the welfare house usually hires local female workers 
and does not offer them formal and professional training in order to save labour costs. 
Their average age is over 50 years, and their educational levels are poor. Hanchuan 
                                                                                                                                         
responsible for the overall macroeconomic regulation and control on the prices on the provisional level; 
third, it is responsible for the monitoring system of province’s prices and price information network. 
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Social Welfare House provides them with accommodation and meals, and their salary is 
very low, only about 1,500 RMB/month, around the average local income. Hanchuan 
Social Welfare House suffers staff shortages. Up to May 2015, there were only five full 
time service staff taking care of the elderly, which meant one staff member had to take 
care of 12 elderly with low-grade nursing demands, 8 elderly with general nursing 
demands and 4 with special nursing demands. Therefore, the low income of working 
staff and low level of service quality, all impact on the provision of social elder care.  
As the interviewed president put it, if Hanchuan Social Welfare House wanted to 
change the present situation and solve the problems listed above, an urgent reform was 
needed as soon as possible, introducing market-based mechanisms and cooperation with 
private nursing institutions. 
‘Public Construction and Private Operation’ Contract  
In June 2016, Hanchuan municipal government signed a contract with a private nursing 
institution. The contact terms state:  
(1) The duration of contract is 3 years, and if business performance goes very well, the 
government will renew the contract;  
(2) The government will transfer 256 beds and all remaining elder care facilities to the 
private nursing institution to manage and operate independently;  
(3) The private nursing institution should give the government 350,000 RMB to cover 
annual depreciation of assets. Any operating expenses in the maintenance and the 
introduction of new equipment during the operational period must be funded by the 
private agency. When/if the contract expires, what the agency paid towards any 
maintenance and equipment costs (in advance) cannot be withdrawn or deducted from 
the previous asset depreciation charge;  
(4) The government subsidises elder care services, and the subsidy standard is 360 
RMB/person/per year. The institution is exempt from business tax and value added tax; 
water, electricity and other utility charges are collected according to civil standards; 
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(5) The private nursing institution only recruits private elderly people who are needed to 
pay for beds and services, while the ‘Three-Nos’ elderly are still taken care of by the 
Hanchuan Social Welfare House. The private nursing institution has the right to make 
its own management decisions (e.g., independent pricing) and determine its own 
possible risks and losses. 
After reform: Performance and Achievements 
After the restructuring of its operating approach, the private nursing institution renamed 
the social welfare house as ‘Hanchuan Elderly Apartments’. Currently, there are 160 
elderly people living there. The service charging standard has 7 grades: 1,200, 1,450, 
1,550, 1,750, 2,150, 2,400 and 2,600 RMB per person/month. In addition, they need to 
pay a 500 RMB bed fee and 500 RMB for living expenses. The majority of the elderly 
are from rural areas and their basic pension is only around 100 RMB, so they are 
supported by their children. 40% of the elderly are urban residents who can afford most 
of their service fee by using their pension.  
The president of the Hanchuan Social Welfare House stated, at interview, that when 
they first considered introducing market mechanisms (subject to their cooperative 
project), they found that one of the competitors owned two other private nursing 
institutions in Hanchuan, and they are both run very well. After much consideration and 
negotiation, Hanchuan Social Welfare House and the private company finally signed 
this cooperation contract. After the ‘Public Construction and Private Operation’ reform, 
the most distinctive transformation of Hanchuan Social Welfare House is the 
accommodation rate, increasing from below 40% to more than 70%. The efficiency of 
provision for relevant facilities and services has also improved. The reform solved the 
problems that were rooted in fully public-funded operation and management approaches, 
and takes advantage of the utilisation value of social resources and a market competition 
mechanism. Moreover, the government can use the asset depreciation fee to further 
invest in the construction of public elder care facilities. 
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Evaluation of Case Study Three 
As seen in the previous investigation of case study three, the ‘Public Construction and 
Private Operation’ reform of Hanchuan Social Welfare House not only reduced the 
government’s financial burden, but also promoted improved elder care provision. 
However, the reform also generated some problems that cannot be ignored: 
First, the level of government subsidy for private elderly people is too low. The subsidy 
standard is only 360 RMB annually, much lower compared with other nursing 
institutions in Wuhan’s central districts. This is primarily due to local fiscal conditions 
in Hanchuan that prevent the raising of more realistic revenues.  
Second, the overall pricing system of social care adjusts to market-based standards, and 
as a consequence prices would increase under a marked-based economy. In this case, 
only ‘Three-Nos’ and ‘Five-Guarantees’ elderly people could enjoy public welfare and 
free elder care services. While, private elderly people have to pay for services if they 
would like to enjoy quality services. Thus, the welfare nature of elder care services 
declines because the majority of very poor private elderly people might have to be 
removed from the current elder care system.  
Third, from the perspective of the Hanchuan municipal government, due to a shortage 
of public funds, it has to ask for an asset depreciation fee from a private company. The 
use of clients’ fees to pay asset depreciation to local government demonstrates a 
strategy to reduce fiscal subsidies in the provision of elder care, and removes clear 
distinctions between public and private funding systems. However, this conduct leads to 
a heavy economic burden for the private investor. In August 2017, an interviewed 
manager said that their first year’s retained profit was roughly 30,000 RMB which was 
far beneath their original expectations. So, they were considering increasing the service 
fees next year.  
7.5.4 Case Study Four: Wuhan Social Welfare House / Xiehe Elderly Apartment 
Wuhan Social Welfare House is the largest public nursing institution in the Jiang’an 
District, Wuhan. It is financed directly by the state. Wuhan Social Welfare House was 
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built in 1964 with an approximate area of 20,000 square meters, and more than 800 beds. 
It mainly takes care of ‘Three-Nos’, disabled elderly people with economic difficulties. 
Its accommodation rate was over 98%, of which 72% were disabled elderly. Due to the 
growing numbers in the aged population, current provisions cannot accommodate the 
increased demands for elder care. Thus, from 2011 to 2015, Wuhan Social Welfare 
House went through a large scale reconstruction and expansion, with 550 million 
RMB’s total investment, aimed at establishing the largest comprehensive nursing 
institution in Wuhan.  
The new building’s area is 99,400 square meters, with 2,066 beds. This new Wuhan 
Social Welfare House has two parts – Block A and Block B, which were invested with 
270 million RMB and 280 million RMB by the local government, respectively. Block A 
has 989 beds and opened to the public in March 2017. It is still used as a public nursing 
institution operated by Wuhan Social Welfare House, and bears its original functions 
and responsibilities. Currently, there are 199 ‘Three-Nos’ elderly people, and 102 
private elderly people. Block B has only just completed its basic construction and 
decoration. It was designed by the Hubei Province Department of Civil Affairs to 
introduce a PPP mechanism and to cooperate with two national Fortune 500 companies 
– Jiuzhoutong Pharmaceutical Group Limited Company (‘Jiuzhoutong’) and Shanghai 
Renshou National Pharmaceutical Limited Company (‘Renshoutang’). These two 
private companies and the local government jointly funded the reconstruction of Block 
B with total investment amount of 124 million RMB. Then Block B was renamed as the 
‘Xiehe Elderly Apartment’ and opened to the public in May 2017. This new building 
has twenty-five floors. The first to seventh floors are where the hospital is located, and 
201 beds for medical care. From the eighth to the twenty-fifth floor are elderly 
apartments, comprised of 876 beds: including 176 beds for healthy elderly, 350 beds for 
semi-disabled elderly and 350 beds for disabled elderly. This PPP elder project is 
currently viewed as the largest one of its kind in China. 
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‘Public-Private Partnership’ Funding Structure 
The PPP project on the reconstruction of Wuhan Social Welfare House (Block B) was 
initiated under a ROT model (Rebuild-Operate-Transfer), and its franchising contract 
duration is 25 years. Wuhan Social Welfare House and other two private companies 
(Jiuzhongtong and Renshoutang), who won the bidding, formed a separate project 
company – ‘Wuhan Jiuzhoutong Renshoutang Medical and Elder Care Limited 
Company’. This company will furnish Block B with updated intelligent systems and 
purchase medical equipment and pharmaceutical resources.  
The total investment on the PPP elder care project of Wuhan Social Welfare House is 
124 million RMB. It includes a 6.16 million RMBs management fee that will go into the 
government public fiscal account annually, and this amount will increase by 3% every 3 
years. Then, the company will pay another 6 million RMB as a deposit to the local 
government. In addition, this new company’s registered capital is 24.8 million RMB 
(20% of the total investment). Wuhan Social Welfare House invested 2.48 million RMB 
(10% of the registered capital) and two private companies invested 22.32 million RMB 
(90% of the registered capital). Thus, Wuhan Social Welfare House accounted for 10%, 
and Jiuzhoutong and Renshoutang jointly share the other 90% of the company’s shares. 
The remaining 80% of total investment, on the other hand, is funded by Jiuzhoutong 
and Renshoutang, mainly coming from bank loans (Figure 7.2). 
Government
Bank
Project Company
Registered capital:
24.8 million RMB
Wuhan Social Welfare House
Investment amount:
2.48 million RMB(10%)
Jiuzhoutong and Renshoutang
Investment amount:
22.32 million RMB(90%)
Pay 
back
lending
franhising
operation
agreement
authorise
Joint
investment
 
Figure 7.2 ‘Private and Public Partnerships’ Funding Structure 
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Project Transaction and Investment Return Mechanism  
As to the main functions and responsibilities of the two operators: Jiuzhoutong is 
responsible for medicine, hospital management and armamentarium (medicines, 
equipment and techniques used by medical practitioners), while Renshoutang mainly 
deals with the daily routines of elderly apartments, providing the elderly with medical 
care and elder care services. The operational income of this project company mainly 
comes from the users’ charges, including elder care service fees, medical expenses, and 
health check-up fees, home-based care services fees, supermarket business income, and 
e-commerce platform income. The charging fees are structured as follows: the bed fee 
has three levels: 800 RMB, 900 RMB and 1,000 RMB/month; the elder care service fee 
also has three levels: 1,000 RMB, 2,000 RMB and 3,000 RMB/month; and the living 
expense fee is 700 RMB/month. In this case, the local government does not offer an 
operational subsidy to new elderly apartments (the project transaction structure is shown 
in Figure 7.3). 
 
Figure 7.3 Project Transaction Structure 
 
As for the distribution of profits, if the rate of return is less than 5% Wuhan Social 
Welfare House does not participate in profit sharing; if the rate of return is over 5% 
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Wuhan Social Welfare House will be allocated 30% from any excess profit, 
Jiuzhoutong and Renshoutang will share the remaining 70%. Moreover, the project 
company established a ‘Loving and Caring Elderly Fund’, aimed at organising activities, 
or offering welfare benefits for the elderly. At present, Jiuzhoutong and Renshoutang 
have already invested 2 million RMB and 1 million RMB respectively. Wuhan Social 
Welfare House will invest 30% of the excess amount of the profit if the rate of return is 
over 10%.  
Evaluation of Case Study Four 
First, the coordination of Wuhan Social Welfare House: Jiuzhoutong and Renshoutang 
can make full use of the advantages of being private companies. Their business is not 
only confined to medical and elder care services, but also extends to e-commerce 
platforms and home-based services within the local communities. Their business 
provides over 1,000 jobs, and has improved the provision of local services. Besides this 
franchise between companies there exists a long-term contract which encourages the 
companies to prioritise the sustainable development of their joint project. This 
settlement is better organised than a rental contract, which has a standard rental duration 
of 3 years.  
Second, the organisational structure of the project company is typical. In this case, for 
example, there is a board of directors and supervisors. The manager of the project 
company stated that the three agencies (i.e.., Wuhan Social Welfare House, Jiuzhoutong 
and Renshoutang) have only one director and supervisor on the board, and the 
representative from the local government has a right of veto. So, in this PPP elder care 
project, the local government (on behalf of Wuhan Social Welfare House) exercises 
extensive power over operational decision-making.  
Third, this PPP elder care project is very successful in dealing with financial pressure. 
Wuhan Social Welfare House (Block A) receives a government subsidy and annual 
management fee from the two private companies, as well as profit shares each year, so 
its funding channels have increased compared to what it used to have access to. 
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Meanwhile, as the manager of the project company phrases it, the share price of 
Jiuzhoutong (as a listed company) increased by 5%, and obtained net profits valuing 
200 million RMB on the contract date (23 February 2017). In addition, Jiuzhoutong also 
sold some facilities to Block A and on the e-commerce platform which resulted in 
further profits.  
Fourth, the manager stated at interview that the transaction costs for a PPP project 
company are relatively high. For instance, the two private companies paid 1 million 
RMB to the bidding company to secure the contract. In addition, the government 
demands a separate accounting firm, and the project company pays 1 million RMB 
annually to this firm.  
 
7.6 Discussion 
As the four case studies illustrate, resources are unevenly distributed among different 
public nursing institutions in different districts. In the central district of Wuhan, the 
demand for institutional care always exceeds supply; and nursing institutions with good 
conditions, such as Wuhan Social Welfare House, are always full of elderly people due 
to their good reputation and reasonable prices. In some cases, elderly people would 
rather wait for several months to stay there, rather than go elsewhere. However, in the 
suburban districts this situation is reversed, there are so many surplus beds in social 
welfare houses. In some districts 50% of beds are empty.  
The cost of the construction and management of most private nursing institutions is 
relatively high, and needs huge initial investment at an early stage. The elder care 
industry belongs to an industry with small profit margins which is difficult to 
self-finance. As a consequence, investors without ample financial resources hesitate to 
invest in the elder care industry. The implementation of the ‘Public Construction and 
Private Operation’ reform unlocked a market for private investment, because the 
government offered a building and other relevant facilities as an incentive. Yet, private 
subjects need to invest at the operational stage, even if they do not have any financial 
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burden at the construction stage. Likewise, in the operational stage, the government will 
contribute a subsidy through the purchase of services, to help private companies relieve 
their operational expenses.  
From the perspective of government’s role: on the one hand, the government transfers 
its role from a provider to a supervisor, renouncing some of its previous functions to 
society and the market. It then primarily focuses on the overall plan and design of 
policy, supervising and inspecting from a macro-economic perspective. For, on the 
other hand, by reforming investment structures the government reduces the pressure for 
more public expenditure.  
The difference in government subsidies across different regions leads to unexpected 
distortions. More prosperous localities usually receive higher subsidies for their nursing 
institutions, while in poorer areas this result is reversed. In an inferior (worse) economy, 
elderly people are poorer and may not be able to afford private elder care. For instance, 
in the Hanchuan Social Welfare House, the service fee is lower than most other nursing 
institutions in the central districts of Wuhan. However, because the money that the 
welfare house receives via an operational subsidy is much lower than in other places, it 
is harder for them to provide adequate care. So, it seems that the lower purchasing 
power of the elderly, and a poorer tax base can affect the fairness of social elder care 
provision in different regions. 
 
7.7 Summary 
This chapter has reviewed four typical cases of PPP projects on elder care in Wuhan, 
which operate under different funding models. As was demonstrated, the provision of 
elder care coordinated between the government and other social agencies is successful 
to some extent. This strategy relieves the government’s financial burden, and allows the 
private sectors to operate nursing institutions via the introduction of a market 
mechanism. Meanwhile, it offers better treatment and facilities to those with the 
resources to pay for them. This represents a reorientation of social policy away from 
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redistribution and towards market principles. Additionally, it generates more job 
opportunities for local areas, and thus has both economic and social effects on Chinese 
society.  
However, experiences outlined in the four case studies also illustrate the gradual 
undermining of the welfare nature of elder care. Once the originally public elder care 
services are operated through a market-based approach, prices will increase and the 
elderly and their families have to bear these price hikes. Meanwhile, the rights and 
responsibilities of different participants (local government and private organisations) are 
somewhat unclear, and might restrict the development of the elder care industry. 
Moreover, even with social investment, the problem of inadequate resources continues 
to haunt poorer districts – where, presumably, private corporate incentives to invest are 
also lower. This creates a degree of maldistribution of elder care services in different 
regions.  
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Chapter 8 Empirical Analysis of the Financing Efficiency of 
Elder Care: Based on the Perspective of Public Expenditure 
 
 
The previous chapters have examined different models of elder care funding, as well as 
case studies of PPP projects on elder care services in some detail in order to evaluate 
their impact. One of the common criticisms of public-private partnerships in the 
provision of elder care services stems from a realisation that private money will be 
invested in accordance with the expectations of making maximum profit. Market-based 
mechanisms are expected to create private profits accordingly, in contravention to any 
welfare principle. Drawing upon the previous research, this chapter will now look at the 
distribution of public resources between richer and poorer districts, and between urban 
and rural areas. The purpose of this chapter is to investigate whether the investment, 
from a quantitative perspective and in terms of improving elder care services, can 
achieve its desired efficiency in different parts of China. To do this requires a 
quantitative evaluation based on the application of a series of indicators that can 
measure the degree to which resources are distributed according to need. The results can 
only be an approximation of the overall picture as China’s policy related to elder care 
services continues to roll out at a different pace over disparate areas – the information 
presented in this chapter is a snapshot of a constantly changing field of enquiry.  
This chapter is divided into three sections. First, to examine the current situation of 
nursing institutions and their relevant facilities for elderly people in various years and 
among different regions. Second, to conduct a quantitative analysis on the efficiency of 
public expenditure in elder care by using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), which 
identifies the need for efficiency improvements in eight regions. Subsequently, the third 
section, establishes an elder care service index system which calculates and compares 
measures of elder care services in both urban and rural districts in different regions of 
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China from 2011~2015. This index system enables an analysis of the trends and 
characteristics, and the differences and effects of public expenditure work, in elder care 
among the different regions of, and the urban and rural areas, in China. 
 
8.1 Situation of Nursing Institutions and Relevant Facilities for Elderly 
People 
According to the relevant official statistics (Table 8.1), the number of nursing 
institutions and relevant facilities for elderly people increased between 2010 and 2016, 
in 2014 especially it rose by 40%. Government publications also reveal other 
characteristics:  
In terms of nursing institutions, during 2010~2012, their number kept rising, but since 
2013, this started to fall, while the number of beds in nursing institutions has not 
experienced a substantial decline. This suggests that nursing institutions in China are 
moving away from small-scale institutions in a decentralised industry and are instead 
moving towards an intensive and large-scale industry.  
As to the number of community service institutions, the method of counting these has 
changed. Before 2014, community service institutions only included community service 
centres/stations, and after 2014, others were added, such as, community elder care 
institutions and community assistance elder care facilities. As shown in Table 8.1, 
community service institutions developed rapidly with an average growth rate of 30% in 
recent years, and in 2014, the growth rate even reached 60%. The decline in the number 
of nursing institutions and the increase in the number of community service institutions 
demonstrate that the government has tended to support community and home-based 
elder care more than institutional care.  
In terms of the population of elderly people in nursing institutions, this increased by 
54% from 2010 to 2016, however the accommodation rate dropped from 76.8% in 2010 
to 51.2% in 2016. Presumably these changes are largely due to the rising numbers of 
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beds for elder care. Although a large amount of investment has been put into the 
construction of elder care services, there still remains a great challenge as only half of 
the total number of beds in the nursing institutions is occupied (with a decreasing trend), 
thus creating an imbalance of supply and demand.  
Table 8.1 Situation of Nursing Institutions and Relevant Facilities 
for Elderly People in China(2010~2016) 
Year 
Number of institutions for the elderly Number of beds for the elderly Population 
of elderly 
people 
living in 
nursing 
institutions 
(thousands) 
Accommodation 
rate 
Number of  
nursing 
institutions 
Number of 
community 
elder care 
service 
institutions 
Total 
Number of 
beds in 
nursing 
institutions 
Number of 
beds in 
community 
service 
institutions 
Total 
Number 
of beds 
per 
thousand 
elderly 
people 
2010 39,940 56,957 96,897 3,149,000 12,000 3,161,000 17.8 242.6 76.8% 
2011 42,828 70,547 113,375 3,532,000 160,000 3,692,000 19.1 260.3 70.5% 
2012 44,304 103,428 147,732 3,967,000 198,000 4,165,000 21.5 293.6 70.5% 
2013 42,475 127,391 169,866 4,296,000 641,000 4,937,000 24.4 307.4 62.3% 
2014 33,044 202,560 235,604 3,903,000 1,875,000 5,778,000 27.2 318.4 55.1% 
2015 27,752 240,315 268,067 3,746,000 2,981,000 6,727,000 30.3 362.0 51.8% 
2016 28,080 252,900 280,980 4,073,000 3,229,000 7,302,000 31.6 374.0 51.2% 
Data Sources: ‘Statistical Yearbook of China’s Civil Affairs’ published by Ministry of Civil Affairs in 
various years.  
 
Seen from the situation of elder care services in different regions of China (Table 8.2), 
we can find that the percentage of elderly people in the majority of regions is over 13%. 
As for the accommodation rate in elder care institutions, the highest is in Tibet 
(although its aged population rate is the lowest, 8.33%), and Fujian and Hebei have the 
lowest accommodation rates (26.30% and 27.19%). In terms of the number of beds per 
thousand elderly people, most regions have achieved the national ‘90-7-3’ elder care 
plan
63
, however, the situation in different regions is uneven, for instance, institutional 
beds per thousand elderly population in Hainan, Jilin and Yunnan are relatively low, at 
                                               
63
 The ‘90-7-3’ elder care plan refers to a structure of the distribution of elder care services, which is 
divided into three parts: 90% of elderly people choose home-based elder care services, 7% of elderly 
people choose community elder care services and only 3% of the elderly population stay in nursing 
institutions.  
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14, 16.8 and 19.4 respectively. In other regions, such as Zhejiang, Inner Mongolia, 
Beijing and Tibet, the statistics are high (50, 48.5, 46.3 and 42.5) and substantially 
exceeds the national standard. 
Table 8.2 also shows that, in the operation of nursing institutions, there is an imbalance 
of revenue and expenditure in some regions. In other words, the total revenue from the 
operation of nursing institutions is lower than total operating costs. This phenomenon is 
mainly due to three reasons. First, family care is still prevalent, reflecting Chinese 
traditions, so only a minority of elderly people (mainly disabled elderly people whose 
care is expensive) are resident in nursing institutions. Second, with less retirement 
income, most elderly people (especially rural elderly people) cannot afford the relatively 
high expense of institutional care. Third, with the expansion of elder care provision, 
public subsidies for elder care are inadequate, so private investors have to pay more of 
the running costs of nursing institutions.  
In addition, as seen from the overall financing situation of elder care (Table 8.3), the 
percentage of social welfare expenditure on elder care accounts for 0.36% of public 
expenditure and 0.08% of GDP. There are distinctive regional differences in these 
percentages: for instance, the percentage of social welfare expenditure on elder care to 
public expenditure, where the maximum is spent in Shaanxi (0.6%) and the minimum in 
Ningxia (0.05%); and considering the percentage of social welfare expenditure on elder 
care to the GDP, the maximum is spent in Qinghai (0.25%) and the minimum in Jilin 
(0.04%).  
These secondary statistics only describe the current overall situation of public 
expenditure on elder care services in China, but do not reflect the efficiency of the 
above indicators in terms of elder care funding and the relationship between these 
indicators. Thus, the next two sections (8.2 and 8.3) will explore these two issues. 
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Table 8.2 Situation of Elder Care in Different Regions of China (2015) 
Regions 
Percentage 
of elderly 
people 
over 60 
years 
Number of 
beds in 
nursing 
institutions 
Population of 
elderly people 
living in 
nursing 
institutions 
Accommodation 
rate 
Revenue 
from the 
operation 
of nursing 
institutions 
(million 
RMB) 
Operating costs of 
nursing 
institutions and 
community elder 
care service 
institutions 
(million RMB) 
Number of 
beds per 
thousand 
elderly 
people 
National  16.14% 6,763,300 2,915,600 51.78% 36.14 36.49 30.5 
Beijing  14.32% 146,000 7.7,100 56.65% 2.80 2.82 46.3 
Tianjin 14.33% 67,000 28,600 48.72% 0.75 0.78 31.1 
Hebei  16.38% 4,807,000 110,100 27.19% 2.34 2.26 39.6 
Shanxi 14.32% 89,100 39,400 51.57% 0.92 0.89 16.8 
Inner Mongolia 16.40% 199,100 119,000 55.97% 0.55 0.69 48.5 
Liaoning 19.09% 264,100 106,300 58.31% 2.63 3.45 33.4 
Jilin 18.75% 88,400 40,600 62.85% 0.27 0.27 16.8 
Heilongjiang 17.00% 192,400 98,700 62.11% 0.60 0.56 29.7 
Shanghai 18.17% 135,900 73,900 58.60% 0.41 0.39 31.1 
Jiangsu 19.74% 622,900 226,100 49.03% 3.45 3.40 39.4 
Zhejiang 17.89% 493,000 121,600 36.45% 1.48 1.42 50 
Anhui 17.11% 358,000 139,000 46.80% 6.49 0.68 34.2 
Fujian 13.05% 135,200 29,800 26.30% 0.80 0.77 27.2 
Jiangxi 14.13% 177,000 118,200 69.08% 0.47 0.39 27.2 
Shandong 20.09% 656,000 292,200 50.15% 3.92 3.97 33.3 
Henan 12.97% 344,000 209,200 64.31% 1.15 1.10 27.9 
Hubei 17.66% 300,000 163,800 60.53% 2.27 2.23 28.7 
Hunan 17.09% 227,000 136,400 65.86% 1.58 1.73 19.5 
Guangdong 11.06% 254,100 83,600 47.10% 2.55 2.57 21.2 
Guangxi 14.92% 163,500 71,700 45.07% 0.54 0.52 22.8 
Hainan 14.00% 16,900 7,000 52.24% 0.24 0.22 14 
Chongqing 21.67% 184,600 91,800 66.23% 0.44 0.35 27.3 
Sichuan 20.39% 521,100 283,500 64.40% 1.34 1.27 29.8 
Guizhou 15.26% 151,200 47,500 39.62% 0.22 0.24 28.3 
Yunnan 12.77% 116,400 46,600 50.65% 0.63 0.56 19.4 
Tibet 8.33% 10,800 11,600 78.91% 0.016 0.013 42.5 
Shaanxi 15.82% 146,800 78,600 59.73% 1.82 1.67 24.4 
Gansu 14.04% 113,100 18,700 23.67% 0.64 0.59 30.9 
Qinghai 11.67% 24,100 4,200 24.85% 0.081 0.079 34.5 
Ningxia 11.71% 18,100 9,000 56.25% 0.21 0.26 22 
Xinjiang 10.79% 66,400 31,700 64.56% 0.37 0.36 25.6 
Data Source: ‘Statistical Yearbook of China’s Civil Affairs’ published by Ministry of Civil Affairs 
(2015b). 
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Table 8.3 Financial Indices of Elder Care Services in Different Regions of China (2015) 
Regions 
GDP 
(million 
RMB) 
Public 
expenditure 
(million RMB) 
Social welfare 
expenditure on elder 
care (million RMB) 
Percentage of social 
welfare expenditure to 
public expenditure 
Percentage of 
social welfare 
to GDP 
National  72,276,790 15786,61 56,276 0.36% 0.08% 
Beijing  2,301,459 573,77 2419 0.42% 0.11% 
Tianjin 1,653,819 323,235 780 0.24% 0.05% 
Hebei  2,980,611 563,219 1,904 0.34% 0.06% 
Shanxi 1,276,649 342,297 1,045 0.31% 0.08% 
Inner Mongolia 1,783,151 425,296 1,627 0.38% 0.09% 
Liaoning 2,866,902 448,161 1,374 0.31% 0.05% 
Jilin 1,406,313 321,71 608 0.19% 0.04% 
Heilongjiang 1,508,367 402,066 875 0.22% 0.06% 
Shanghai 2,512,345 619,156 1,677 0.27% 0.07% 
Jiangsu 7,011,638 968,758 4,653 0.48% 0.07% 
Zhejiang 4,288,649 664,598 3,945 0.59% 0.09% 
Anhui 2,200,563 523,901 1,836 0.35% 0.08% 
Fujian 2,597,982 400,158 1,256 0.31% 0.05% 
Jiangxi 1,672,378 441,255 1,477 0.33% 0.09% 
Shandong 6,300,233 825,001 3,764 0.46% 0.06% 
Henan 3,700,216 679,935 1,925 0.28% 0.05% 
Hubei 2,955,019 613,284 2,145 0.35% 0.07% 
Hunan 2,890,221 572,872 2,379 0.42% 0.08% 
Guangdong 7,281,255 128,278 4,089 0.32% 0.06% 
Guangxi 1,680,312 406,551 1,737 0.43% 0.10% 
Hainan 370,276 123,943 450 0.36% 0.12% 
Chongqing 1,571,727 379,200 1,536 0.41% 0.10% 
Sichuan 3,005,310 749,751 3,733 0.50% 0.12% 
Guizhou 1,050,256 393,950 1,440 0.37% 0.14% 
Yunnan 1,361,917 471,283 1,314 0.28% 0.10% 
Tibet 102,639 138,146 214 0.15% 0.21% 
Shaanxi 1,802,186 379,200 2,273 0.60% 0.13% 
Gansu 679,032 749,751 988 0.13% 0.15% 
Qinghai 241,705 393,950 604 0.15% 0.25% 
Ningxia 291,177 471,283 231 0.05% 0.08% 
Xinjiang 932,480 138,146 1,762 1.28% 0.19% 
Data Sources: The data of GDP is from ‘China Statistical Yearbook’ published by National Statistical 
Bureau. The data of public expenditure and social welfare expenditure on the elder care are from 
‘Statistical Yearbook of China’s Civil Affairs’ published by the Ministry of Civil Affairs (2015b). The 
percentage of social welfare expenditure to public expenditure and GDP is calculated by the author.  
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8.2 Quantitative Analysis on the Efficiency of Elder Care Funding, 
Based on Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
This section first introduces the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) method, and then 
introduces the input and output indices which are used to conduct a DEA evaluation. 
Subsequently, it analyses the DEA calculation results and identifies the need for 
efficiency improvements in 8 regions. 
8.2.1 Introduction of DEA Method 
The DEA method is a non-parametric method in operations research and economics for 
the estimation and evaluation of production frontier efficiency, which is the set of 
optimal portfolios with the highest expected return, according to the performance of the 
production process consisting of muliti-index input and output (Seiford and Thrall, 
1990). This method can be applied to empirically measure and evaluate multiple 
objective decision making units. The DEA method can carry out a relative validity 
evaluation of the same type of decision-making unit, and compare the extreme values 
(the minimum and maximum values) of all decision-making units with the optimal 
frontier efficiency in order to find out the ultimate value of relative efficiency in each 
decision-making unit (Sherman and Zhu, 2013). In the DEA evaluation process, without 
assuming a particular general equation relating input and output in the decision-making 
units, it determines the effective production frontier by using extreme values of input 
and output in the decision-making units, so that it can reflect the optimal relationship 
between input and output. The DEA method can evaluate efficiency relative to that 
considered to be the best decision-making, so the final results are more objective 
because it does not consider the relation function of input and output in advance, which 
can thus avoid any artificial influence.  
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8.2.2 Construction of DEA Indicators of Elder Care Funding 
Since the 1980s, several relevant research projects have used DEA in the field of elder 
care, to assess elderly people’s welfare and the efficiency of the operation of nursing 
institutions. The selected indices in their research are presented in Table 8.4.   
Examining these relevant studies, we find that most of them are about labour efficiency 
in nursing homes, so information about human resources and beds are usually chosen as 
the input indices, and the numbers of different groups of elderly people usually form the 
output indices. However, there is currently little research on the financial aspect of elder 
care services. In this research, we select the BCC model (Banker, Charnes and Cooper, 
1984) from the DEA method to empirically analyse the efficiency of fiscal expenditure 
on elder care provision in different regions of China. Thus, in order to establish an index 
system on the efficiency of public expenditure on elder care services, 5 input indicators 
and 5 output indicators were selected which are presented in Table 8.5. 
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Table 8.4 Application of DEA in the Current Research on the Efficiency of Elder Care Services 
Author(s) 
Decision-making 
units 
Number 
of cases 
Number of 
indices 
Input indices Output indices 
Sexton, 
Leiken, 
Sleeper and 
Coburn 
(1989) 
Nursing homes 52 7 
Working hours of 
registered nurses / 
professional nurses / 
assistant nurses / 
administrative staff / 
physical therapists 
Care days for patients 
with reimbursement and 
patients without 
reimbursement 
Rosko, 
Chilingerian 
and Zinn 
(1995) 
Nursing homes 461 7 
Number of registered 
nurses / professional 
nurses / assistant 
nurses / physical 
therapists / others 
Care days for full-time 
patients / day care 
patients 
Kooreman 
(1994) 
Nursing homes 292 10 
Number of medical 
doctors / nurses / 
nurse trainees / 
therapists / carers / 
physical nurses / 
general workers / 
others 
Number of full-time 
patients (physical 
disability / 
psycho-geriatric / 
disability);  day care 
patients (physical 
disability / 
psycho-geriatric / 
disability) 
Wu (2011) 
Nursing 
institutions 
45 8 
Number of beds, 
number of carers, 
investment on the 
operation of nursing 
institutions and fixed 
assets  
Number of elderly 
people living in nursing 
institutions, business 
income of nursing 
institutions, numbers of 
independent and 
disabled elderly people 
Ren (2016) 
Nursing 
institutions 
28 7 
Number of 
administrative staff / 
doctors / carers / 
others 
Number of healthy 
elderly people / 
semi-disabled elderly 
people / disabled elderly 
people 
Zhen (2016) 
Nursing 
institutions 
23 6 
Number of used beds, 
number of carers, 
investment in the 
operation of nursing 
institutions and fixed 
assets 
Number of elderly 
people living in nursing 
institutions, business 
income of the nursing 
institutions 
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Table 8.5 Indicators of the Efficiency of Public Expenditure on Elder Care Services 
Input 
indicators 
 Basic construction expenditure  
 Elderly income supplementation 
 Population of elderly people over 60 years 
 Operation cost of the nursing institutions and community elder care service 
institutions 
 Original value of the fixed assets of the nursing institutions and community elder 
care service institutions 
Output 
indicators 
 Number of beds in the nursing institutions and community elder care service 
institutions 
 Number of nursing institution 
 Number of community elder care service institutions or related facilities 
 Number of staff in the nursing institutions 
 Population of elderly people living in the nursing institutions and community 
elder care service institutions 
 
8.2.3 Explanation of the Indices in the DEA Calculation Process 
In this research, the relevant data released for the year 2015 in 31 regions was selected 
(including direct-controlled municipalities: Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and Chongqing; 
and autonomous administrative subdivisions: Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, Guangxi, 
Ningxia and Tibet). The input and output indicators for the DEA calculation are 
presented in Table 8.6 and Table 8.7.   
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Table 8.6 Input Indicators of the Efficiency of Public Expenditure on Elder Care Services (2015) 
Regions 
Basic 
construction 
expenditure 
(million RMB) 
Elderly income 
supplementation 
(million RMB) 
Population 
of elderly 
people over 
60 years 
(million) 
Operating costs 
of the elder care 
institutions  
(million RMB) 
Original value of the 
elder care 
institutions’ fixed 
assets 
(million RMB) 
Total 23,990 56,276 221.83 36.49 49.9 
Beijing  3,550 2419 3.15 2.82 1.62 
Tianjin 344 780 2.15 0.78 0.5 
Hebei  592 1,904 12.12 2.26 2.43 
Shanxi 127 1,045 5.30 0.89 1.13 
Inner Mongolia 442 1,627 4.1 0.69 1.17 
Liaoning 306 1,374 8.4 3.45 1.8 
Jilin 62 608 5.25 0.27 1.26 
Heilongjiang 332 875 6.46 0.56 1.66 
Shanghai 93 1,677 4.36 0.39 0.68 
Jiangsu 2,955 4,653 15.79 3.40 5.75 
Zhejiang 791 3,945 9.84 1.42 2.54 
Anhui 854 1,836 10.44 0.68 1.2 
Fujian 302 1,256 4.96 0.77 0.49 
Jiangxi 1,556 1,477 6.50 0.39 1.83 
Shandong 1,806 3,764 19.69 3.97 3.03 
Henan 602 1,925 12.32 1.10 1.05 
Hubei 1,560 2,145 10.42 2.23 3.17 
Hunan 724 2,379 11.62 1.73 3.55 
Guangdong 973 4,089 11.94 2.57 3.49 
Guangxi 715 1,737 7.16 0.52 0.61 
Hainan 212 450 1.26 0.22 0.21 
Chongqing 1,238 1,536 6.5 0.35 0.83 
Sichuan 504 3,733 16.72 1.27 3.6 
Guizhou 1,423 1,440 5.34 0.24 1.05 
Yunnan 1,359 1,314 6 0.56 0.95 
Tibet 405 214 0.25 0.013 0.34 
Shaanxi 511 2,273 6.01 1.67 2.26 
Gansu 542 988 3.65 0.59 0.51 
Qinghai 791 604 0.7 0.079 0.08 
Ningxia 348 231 0.82 0.26 0.36 
Xinjiang 937 1,762 2.59 0.36 0.73 
Data Sources: All the data in Table 8.6 are from ‘Yearbook of Statistics in China’ (2015) published by 
National Statistical Bureau and ‘Yearbook of Civil Affairs in China’ (2015) published by Ministry of Civil 
Affairs. Elderly income supplementation includes universal financial support (old-age allowance and 
service subsidy for elderly people), and social assistance for elderly people (subsidy for the ‘Three-Nos’ 
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and ‘Five-Guarantees’ elderly people). The two indicators: operating costs and original value of the fixed 
assets, are the total aomunt from the nursing institutions and community elder care service institutions. 
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Table 8.7 Output Indicators of the Efficiency of Public Expenditure on Elder Care Services (2015) 
Regions 
Number of beds in 
nursing institutions 
and community 
elder service 
institutions 
Number of 
nursing 
institutions 
Number of 
community 
elder care 
service 
institutions 
Number of staff 
in nursing 
institutions and 
community elder 
service 
institutions 
Population of elderly 
people living in 
nursing institutions 
and community elder 
service institutions 
Total 6,763,300 27,752 88,341 5,641,300 2,915,600 
Beijing  146,000 597 249 155,300 77,100 
Tianjin 67,000 275 126 68,600 28,600 
Hebei  4,807,000 1,051 25,328 657,200 110,100 
Shanxi 89,100 712 413 92,400 39,400 
Inner Mongolia 199,100 674 1,708 103,600 119,000 
Liaoning 264,100 1,487 301 187,000 106,300 
Jilin 88,400 681 173 60,500 40,600 
Heilongjiang 192,400 779 562 123,900 98,700 
Shanghai 135,900 630 70 230,700 73,900 
Jiangsu 622,900 2,329 4,050 532,300 226,100 
Zhejiang 493,000 1,269 3,954 292,700 121,600 
Anhui 358,000 1,076 1,435 182,100 139,000 
Fujian 135,200 355 2,273 104,400 29,800 
Jiangxi 177,000 1,537 249 100,300 118,200 
Shandong 656,000 1,944 6,322 554,200 292,200 
Henan 344,000 1,075 1,787 253,700 209,200 
Hubei 300,000 1,658 3,464 264,000 163,800 
Hunan 227,000 1,751 5,734 290,600 136,400 
Guangdong 254,100 1,424 621 250,500 83,600 
Guangxi 163,500 476 11,964 182,900 71,700 
Hainan 16,900 83 47 12,200 7,000 
Chongqing 184,600 615 2,539 126,900 91,800 
Sichuan 521,100 2,547 4,189 27.0500 283,500 
Guizhou 151,200 804 2,629 114,200 47,500 
Yunnan 116,400 398 1,105 70,400 46,600 
Tibet 10,800 81 74 8,000 11,600 
Shaanxi 146,800 575 3,362 163,500 78,600 
Gansu 113,100 348 2,621 93,300 18,700 
Qinghai 24,100 35 643 26,100 4,200 
Ningxia 18,100 98 130 14,900 9,000 
Xinjiang 66,400 388 219 54,400 31,700 
Data Sources: All the data in Table 8.7 are from ‘Yearbook of Statistics in China’ (2015) published by 
National Statistical Bureau and ‘Yearbook of Civil Affairs in China’ (2015) published by Ministry of Civil 
Affairs. The nursing institutions refers to the places which can provide accommodation and elder care 
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services for elderly people. The community elder care service institutions and related facilities include 
both community elder care institutions, and community mutual assistance institutions and other facilities. 
The three indicators: the number of elderly people, number of beds and number of staff, are the total 
amount from the nursing institutions and community elder care service institutions. 
 
As we learn from the above data, it can be found that when there are more elderly 
people over 60 years, more nursing institutions and relevant facilities for the elderly are 
present in any one region. In some regions, such as, Tibet, Beijing, Shanghai, Jiangsu, 
Zhejiang, Inner Mongolia, Hebei, Heilongjiang, Shandong and Qinghai, the number of 
beds per thousand elderly people is above the national average. In some less 
economically developed regions, such as Inner Mongolia, Qinghai and Tibet, the 
population of elderly people is relatively small, but the provision for elder care seems to 
be greater than that found in other regions. 
8.2.4 Analysis on the Results of Static DEA Calculation   
With regard to analysing the available statistics, DEAP 2.1 software was used (Coelli, 
1996), and then an output-directed BCC model
64
 to calculate the relative efficiency of 
public expenditure on elder care services in 31 regions in China. Under the condition of 
variable scale return, the comprehensive efficiency can be divided into technical 
efficiency and scale efficiency (comprehensive efficiency is equivalent to the product of 
scale efficiency and technical efficiency), so that if there is no optimal comprehensive 
efficiency in the decision-making units, we can then analyse the results from the 
perspectives of technical efficiency and scale efficiency. Technical efficiency 
demonstrates whether the inputs and outputs have been effectively applied in the 
decision-making units, if the technical efficiency is less than 1.000, it means the input 
and output indicators have not reach the optimal state and thus need improvement. Scale 
efficiency demonstrates whether the production rate (ratio of output growth rate to the 
input growth rate) in each decision-making unit can achieve optimal productivity. In 
this thesis, for instance, it analyses the efficiency of public expenditure in the 
                                               
64
 Banker, Charnes and Cooper (BCC) introduced a variable return to scale version of the input-oriented 
CCR model (which was invented by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes), so it is named as the BCC model 
(Banker, Charnes and Cooper, 1984). More information of BCC model can be found in Appendix 1.  
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development of elder care in 31 regions of China. The output growth rate present the 
growth rate of the number of nursing institutions, community care service centres or 
related facilities, etc., and the input growth rate presents the growth rate of the funds in 
the construction of nursing institution or subsidies for the elderly people, etc.  
The calculation results are realised in Table 8.8. 
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Table 8.8 Results of DEA Calculation 
Regions Comprehensive 
efficiency  
Technical 
efficiency  
Scale 
efficiency 
Scale 
return
65
 
Beijing 1.000 1.000 1.000 - 
Tianjin 0.783 0.871 0.899 irs 
Hebei 1.000 1.000 1.000 - 
Shanxi 0.901 0.937 0.961 irs 
Inner Mongolia 1.000 1.000 1.000 - 
Liaoning 1.000 1.000 1.000 - 
Jilin 1.000 1.000 1.000 - 
Heilongjiang 1.000 1.000 1.000 - 
Shanghai 1.000 1.000 1.000 - 
Jiangsu 0.884 1.000 0.884 drs 
Zhejiang 0.841 1.000 0.841 drs 
Anhui 1.000 1.000 1.000 - 
Fujian 0.850 1.000 0.850 irs 
Jiangxi 1.000 1.000 1.000 - 
Shandong 0.936 1.000 0.936 drs 
Henan 1.000 1.000 1.000 - 
Hubei 0.957 1.000 0.957 drs 
Hunan 0.975 0.987 0.988 drs 
Guangdong 0.667 0.779 0.856 drs 
Guangxi 1.000 1.000 1.000 - 
Hainan 0.435 1.000 0.435 irs 
Chongqing 1.000 1.000 1.000 - 
Sichuan 1.000 1.000 1.000 - 
Guizhou 1.000 1.000 1.000 - 
Yunnan 0.518 0.529 0.978 irs 
Tibet 1.000 1.000 1.000 - 
Shaanxi 0.663 0.693 0.956 drs 
Gansu 0.826 0.919 0.900 irs 
Qinghai 1.000 1.000 1.000 - 
Ningxia 0.603 1.000 0.603 irs 
Xinjiang  0.728 0.740 0.984 irs 
Average value 0.889 0.95 0.936  
 
Seen from the above DEA calculation results for 31 regions of China, a comparative 
analysis will be discussed from the following three perspectives: 
                                               
65
 The results of scale return: ‘-’ means the scale return is stable and constant; ‘irs’ means an increase in 
the scale return, and demonstrates the local governments need to increase the expenditure on elder care if 
they want to improve the efficiency; ‘drs’ means an decrease in the scale return, and demonstrates that the 
efficiency will not be improved if local government continues to increase the expenditure. 
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Comparative analysis of the comprehensive efficiency 
According to the results, the national average comprehensive efficiency in 2015 was 
0.889, which is close to 1.000, so the overall situation is well enough. But there is a 
huge difference between regions, the comprehensive efficiency in Beijing, Hebei, Inner 
Mongolia and 13 other regions is 1.000, which means that public expenditure on the 
provision of elder care is effective in these areas; while, the comprehensive efficiency in 
Yunnan, Shaanxi, Ningxia, Shanxi, Hunan and 8 other regions is below 1.000 (Hainan 
and Yunnan are among the lowest, with only 0.435 and 0.518 respectively), indicating 
that the public expenditure on the provision of elder care is relatively ineffective. We 
also find that the regions with effective comprehensive efficiency rank higher in the 
number of beds per thousand elderly people (Table 8.2), such as Beijing, Hebei and 
Inner Mongolia, etc. 
Comparative analysis of technical efficiency 
Technical efficiency under the BCC model in this research refers to the total input 
(public expenditure) to the quantity of output (elder care provision). If the technical 
efficiency is close to 1.000, it indicates greater efficiency of public expenditure in the 
provision of elder care. As is shown in Table 8.7, the technical efficiency in Beijing, 
Hebei, Jiangsu and 20 other regions is 1.000, which suggests that the input of public 
expenditure in these regions achieves maximum output; while the technical efficiency in 
Tianjin, Hubei, Shanxi and 5 other regions is less than 1.000 (the minimum is 0.591 in 
Yunnan), which means in these regions, the public expenditure does not produce 
enough elder care provision.  
Comparative analysis of scale efficiency and scale return 
As is shown in Table 8.7, the scale efficiency in Tianjin, Shanxi, Jiangsu and 12 other 
regions is less than 1.000, suggesting that the growth rate of output (elder care provision) 
is less than the growth rate of input (public expenditure), thus these regions are not 
achieving optimal scale efficiency. In Tianjin, Shanxi, Fujian, Hainan, Yunnan, Gansu, 
Ningxia and Xinjiang, the scale return is increasing, suggesting that public expenditure 
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is inadequate and there is a need to expand investment so as to achieve the optimal 
output; while in Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Shandong, Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong and Shaanxi, 
the scale return shows the opposite tendency, which means the scale of public 
expenditure is relatively higher than expected. Thus, local government needs to consider 
the scale return on elder care projects. For instance, as to those elder care projects 
defined as having diminishing scale returns, local government needs to make 
adjustments to avoid the possibility of efficiency loss; as to those defined as having 
increasing scale returns, local government should further expand financial input for 
elder care so as to improve efficiency.  
Above all, as we learn from the overall calculation results, in those 15 regions with 
lower comprehensive efficiency, the situation of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, 
Hubei, Hainan and Ningxia, are mainly due to an inefficient scale. Among them, the 
scale returns in Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Shandong and Hubei are decreasing, thus, these local 
governments need to adjust their investment strategies and reduce public expenditure on 
elder care provision; while in Fujian, Hainan and Ningxia, increasing scale returns 
suggest that local government needs to increase public expenditure in order to achieve 
optimal output. 
However, the value of comparative efficiency of 1.000 only represents the investment 
on elder care as efficient, it cannot testify to any improvement in the overall welfare for 
elderly people or the satisfaction of their actual demand for elder care. In practice, under 
the government’s guidance, more market-oriented investment has been put into the 
construction of nursing institutions or other relevant facilities for elderly people, which 
leads to a relative waste of resources.  
8.2.5 Further Improvement of the Results  
The results of the DEA efficiency evaluation can judge whether the decision-making 
units are effective, and also provide a solution to improve the efficiency of inefficient 
decision-making units. The main method of doing this is to use the slack variables of 
inefficient decision-making units for further data analysis. These slack variables include 
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two parts: input redundancy and output deficiency. The optimal data is the ideal value 
of the index, which is the projection of each index on the production frontier. According 
to the calculation results from Table 8.8, the comprehensive efficiency in 15 regions is 
less than 1.000, then we remove 7 regions with a technical efficiency of 1.000
66
, so only 
8 regions need efficiency improvements (both technical efficiency and scale efficiency 
are less than 1.000), and these regions are Tianjin, Shanxi, Hunan, Guangdong, Yunnan, 
Shaanxi, Gansu and Xinjiang. According to the results of the efficiency improvement 
analysis, all these regions have the same problem – redundant input and deficient output, 
the extent of which differs between these regions. Then, two typical regions were 
chosen – Hunan (Table 8.9) and Yunnan (Table 8.10) – to further analyse their 
calculation results for efficiency improvement. 
 
                                               
66 If the technical efficiency is 1.000, it means that the inputs and outputs have been effectively applied in 
the decision-making units, so we only need to analyse the results of decision-making units where both the 
technical and scale efficiency is less than 1.000. 
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Table 8.9 Efficiency Improvement Statistics (Hunan) 
Indicators 
Original 
data 
Slack variables 
Optimal 
data 
Input 
redundancy 
Output 
deficiency 
Number of elderly people living in nursing 
institutions and community elder care service 
institutions 
136,400 
 
34,900 171,300 
Number of beds in nursing institutions and 
community elder care service institutions 
227,000 
 
108,700 335,700 
Number of nursing institutions 1,754  23.11 1,774.11 
Number of community service institutions 5,734  1145.72 6879.72 
Number of staff in the nursing institutions and 
community elder care service institutions 
290,600 
 
3,800 294,400 
Operational fees in nursing institutions and 
community elder care service institutions (million 
RMB) 
1.73 0 
 
1.73 
Basic construction expenditure (million RMB) 724 0  724 
Social welfare expenditure (million RMB) 2,379 50  2,329 
Original value of the fixed asset of nursing 
institutions and community elder care service 
institutions (million RMB) 
3.55 0.986 
 
2.564 
 
As is shown in Table 8.9, two input indicators in Hunan have redundancy, especially the 
indicator of ‘original value of the fixed assets’ and it can be decreased to 27.78% so as 
to reach the optimal result. It demonstrates that the investment in the construction of 
elder care services exceeds the capacity of the actual demand, or the investment has not 
been used effectively. In terms of the output indicators, all of them are deficient; the 
situation is much more serious in the number of elderly people living in the nursing 
institutions and community elder care service institutions, and the number of beds in the 
nursing institution and community elder care service institutions, and should be 
increased by 25.59% and 47.89% respectively. Thus, local government needs to 
consider the utilisation level of inputs, allocating the investment reasonably and 
improving the efficiency of public expenditure on elder care services. 
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Table 8.10 Efficiency Improvement Statistics (Yunnan)  
Indicators 
Original 
data 
Slack variables 
Optimal 
data 
Input 
redundancy 
Output 
deficiency 
Number of elderly people living in nursing 
institutions and community elder care service 
institutions 
46,600   50,800 97,400 
Number of beds in nursing institutions and 
community elder care service institutions 
116,400   81,800 198,200 
Number of nursing institutions 398   353.86 751.86 
Number of community service institutions 1,105   982.44 2,087.44 
Number of staff in nursing institutions and 
community elder care service institutions 
70,400   67,600 138,000 
Operational fees in nursing institutions and 
community elder care service institutions (million 
RMB) 
0.56 0   0.56 
Basic construction expenditure (million RMB) 1,359 500   859 
Social welfare expenditure (million RMB) 1,314 0   1314 
Original value of the fixed asset of nursing 
institutions and community elder care service 
institutions (million RMB) 
0.95 0   0.95 
 
In Yunnan (Table 8.10), the calculation results demonstrate that all five output 
indicators are seriously deficient and only one input indicator (social welfare 
expenditure) has excess capacity. Due to the low technical efficiency in Yunnan, thus, 
local government should pay attention to the management of input, and explore the 
approaches to improve the utilisation of the resources for elder care services.  
 
8.3 Empirical Analysis of the Effects of Public Expenditure on Elder 
Care Services: based on the Construction of an Elder Care Service 
Index System 
The arguments of this section are mainly divided into three parts. In the first part, we 
review the previous two studies related to elder care service indices, and then select 
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relevant variables to construct an elder care service index system to cover the whole of 
China. Subsequently, this section explains the indices and formulas that were used to 
calculate an elder care service index in both urban and rural areas from 2011~2015, and 
then analyses the trends and characteristics of public expenditure on elder care including 
their differences and effects among different regions of China, and between urban and 
rural China, in order to analyse the efficiency of the investment direction and the 
effectiveness of elder care funding between urban and rural areas. It finally sets up other 
relevant indices and evaluates the results of a multiple-linear regression analysis.  
8.3.1 The Construction and Analysis of an Elder Care Service Index in China 
In order to assess the quality of retired life and elder care for elderly people in different 
nations or regions, the calculation and analysis of index data related to elder care has 
recently become popular across the globe. Three typical approaches to creating an index 
are as follows: 
First, in the report ‘2017 Global Retirement Index: An In-depth Assessment of 
Retirement Security in the Developed World’ (Natixis Global Asset Management, 2017), 
we find an index incorporating 18 performance indicators grouped into four sub-indices 
assessing: the quality of financial services to help preserve savings value and maximise 
income; the material means to live comfortably in retirement; a clean and safe 
environment; and access to quality health services (Table 8.11). Based on these four 
sub-indices, the researcher calculated a mean score (a comprehensive ratio index 
ranging from 1% to 100%) for each category, and combined these category scores for a 
final overall ranking of 43 nations.  
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Table 8.11 Framework of the Global Retirement Index 
Finance retirement 
 Old-age dependency 
 Bank non-performing loans 
 Inflation  
 Interest rates 
 Tax pressure 
 Governance 
 Government indebtedness  
Material well-being 
 Income equality 
 Income per capita 
 Unemployment  
Quality of life 
 Happiness 
 Air quality 
 Water and habitat 
 Environmental factors 
Health 
 Life expectancy 
 Health expenditure per capita 
 Non-insured health expenditure 
Data Sources: ‘2017 Global Retirement Index: An In-depth Assessment of Retirement Security in the 
Developed World’ published by Natixis Global Asset Management (2017). 
 
China is ranked at 38
th
 place in 2017, and despite the growth of its overall score from 
the previous year China is still placed in the bottom 10 in all three indicators of the 
Health sub-index (second-lowest health expenditure per capita) and the Quality of Life 
sub-index. China has lower levels of income inequality and higher insured health 
expenditure compared to last year’s report, and income per capita has been rising. 
Within the Finances sub-index category China has the fifth-highest score for old-age 
dependency, and the third-highest score for tax pressure among all countries; while 
bank non-performing loans and government indebtedness fare relatively well. The 
country improves in two out of the four sub-indices, but the indices in this report are 
generally applied to measure the levels between different countries, with less focus on 
the measurement of different regions within one country. 
Second, Chen’s research (2015) proposed an index system for elder care in China which 
is based on the supply and demand side, and then divided into another four kinds of 
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indices (Table 8.12). However, Chen only considers the actual quantity of demand and 
supply side of data, without taking the ratio of the actual demand and supply into 
account. 
Table 8.12 Construction of an Index System for Elder Care in China 
First-level 
indices 
Second-level 
indices 
Third-level indices Fourth-level indices 
Demand 
Side 
Total demand 
Proportion of disabled elderly over 65 
years to the total ageing population 
Male/female 
Disability rate per thousand elderly people  
Total benefit 
Proportion of elderly people enjoying 
long-term care to the total aged 
population 
60~64/65~79/over 80 
Home-based care 
Institutional care 
Supply 
Side 
Employee 
Number of employees looking after 
hundred elderly people over 65 years 
Home-based care 
Institutional care 
Proportion of employees working  
in the provision of long-term care  
to total employees 
Full-time employees 
Temporary employees 
Female workers over 50 
Construction 
Number of beds for long-term care 
per thousand elderly people 
Nursing institution 
Hospital 
Fiscal input 
Proportion of public expenditure on 
long-term care to the GDP 
Medical care 
Community care 
Annual growth rate of fiscal  
expenditure on long-term care 
Medical care 
Community care 
Data Source: ‘Indices of the Development of Elder Care Services in China’ (Chen, 2015). 
 
Third, the report of ‘Blue Book of Elder Care Indexes in Urban China’ (Development 
Research Centre Group of the Chinese State Council, 2017), analyses elder care in 
urban China from the supply and demand side. Each part of the index includes four 
sub-indices (Table 8.13). The report points out that growing trends of China’s ageing 
population, such as differences of policy and capital, and a low level of elder care, are 
key factors which influence China’s urban elder care indices and lead to an imbalance in 
the supply and demand of elder care.  
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Table 8.13 Construction of an Index System of Elder Care in Urban China 
Supply Side 
 Policy 
 Capital 
 Services 
 Environment 
Demand Side 
 Population of urban elderly people 
 Growth rate of the elderly population 
 Dependency ratio 
 Internal structure of the elderly population 
Data Source: ‘Blue Book of Elder Care Indexes in Urban China’ (Development Research Centre Group 
of the Chinese State Council, 2017). 
 
Based on this previous research, the current indices of elder care are usually studied 
from two aspects: (1) subsistence and development, focusing on the demand for elder 
care under a unified fiscal system; and (2) supply and demand, focusing on the 
relationship between the supply and demand for elder care. But they all ignore some 
practical issues that reflect factors shaping China’s current ageing society. To further 
elaborate, at present, there is a major discrepancy between the urban and rural areas of 
China. This urban-rural divide is characterised in different ways, such as, the living and 
cultural environment, medical and sanitary conditions, and elderly welfare, etc. Thus, an 
index system needs to consider the practical situation of urban and rural areas separately 
in order to ensure the validity and reliability of the resulting indices. According to a 
‘90-7-3’ framework, only 3% of the elderly population will select institutional care. 
Then, taking this into account, we assume this 3% is spread evenly over the urban and 
rural population, and data on the ageing population is processed consistently with this 
ratio, in order to consider elderly people’s actual demand for services. Therefore, using 
the techniques described above, this section will establish a simplified structure of elder 
care indices (based on the supply and demand side) to measure the welfare effectiveness 
of public expenditure on levels of elder care (Table 8.14). 
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Table 8.14 Key Indices of Elder Care Services in this Research 
First-level 
indices 
Second-level 
indices 
Third-level indices 
Fourth-level 
indices 
Supply 
side 
Social  
security 
Number of beds in urban and rural nursing institutions 
The indices 
will be 
explained in 
Section 
8.3.2. 
Population of elderly people enrolling in a MLSS System in 
urban and rural areas 
Demand 
side 
Social 
insurance 
Population of elderly people enrolling the public pension 
scheme, and the issued pension amount 
Population of elderly people enrolling the public medical 
insurance scheme, and the issued insurance amount 
Data Sources: Data of pension, medical insurance and GDP per capita are from ‘China’s Statistical 
Yearbook’ published by National Statistical Bureau in various years. Data of ‘number of beds in the 
nursing institutions’ and ‘population of elderly people enrolling MLSS’ are from ‘China’s Civil Affairs 
Statistical Yearbook’ published by Ministry of Civil Affairs in various years.  
 
8.3.2 An Explanation of Key Quantitative Indices (Fourth-level Indices) 
According to the index selection in Table 8.14, 12 fourth-level indices are formed 
through a process of refining and quantifying the above four third-class indices, and 
subsequently structured processing was conducted as described respectively in the 
following four parts:  
8.3.2.1 Number of Beds in Nursing Institutions  
The data concerning the ‘number of beds in nursing institutions’ reflects welfare that 
can solve the accommodation problem for elderly people. The local government also 
needs to calculate the amount of funds to invest in the construction of elder care 
provision according to actual demand. In terms of a ‘90-7-3’ framework, only 3% of 
elderly people over 65 years prefer to go to nursing institutions, so actual demand can 
be calculated for urban and rural areas by dividing the ‘number of beds in nursing 
institutions’ by the following two quantitative variables: 
(1) Percentage of beds in nursing institutions in urban areas 
3%*years65overpeopleelderlyurbanofpopulation
nsinstitutionursingurbaninbedsofnumber
PBUit   
Where ‘P’ is for ‘percentage’, ‘B’ is for ‘beds’, ‘U’ is for ‘urban’, ‘i’ is for ‘provinces or cities’, and ‘t’ is 
for ‘time’. 
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(2) Percentage of beds in nursing institutions in rural areas 
3%*years65overpeopleelderlyruralofpopulation
nsinstitutionursingruralinbedsofnumber
PBRit   
Where ‘P’ is for ‘percentage’, ‘B’ is for ‘beds’, ‘R’ is for ‘rural, ‘i’ is for ‘provinces or cities’, and ‘t’ is 
for ‘time’. 
8.3.2.2 Population of Elderly People Enrolling in the MLSS System 
The Minimum Living Standard System (MLSS) is a national welfare system which 
aims to guarantee a basic living standard (mainly food and clothing) to poor residents in 
China. At present, the majority of poor residents under the MLSS system are 
low-income elderly people. To calculate proportions for rural and urban areas requires 
dividing the ‘population of elderly people enrolling in the MLSS System’ by the 
following quantitative variables: 
(1) Percentage of elderly people enrolling in the MLSS System in urban areas 
areasurbantheinyears65overpeopleelderlyofpopulation
areasurbaninSystemMLSStheinenrollingpeopleelderlyofpopulation
PLUit   
Where ‘P’ is for ‘percentage’, ‘L’ is for ‘MLSS’, ‘U’ is for ‘urban, ‘i’ is for ‘provinces or cities’, and ‘t’ is 
for ‘time’. 
(2) Percentage of elderly people enrolling in the MLSS System in rural areas 
areasurbantheinyears65overpeopleelderlyofpopulation
areasruralinSystemMLSStheinenrollingpeopleelderlyofpopulation
PLR it   
Where ‘P’ is for ‘percentage’, ‘L’ is for ‘MLSS’, ‘R’ is for ‘rural’, ‘i’ is for ‘provinces or cities’, and ‘t’ is 
for ‘time’. 
8.3.2.3 Population of Elderly People Enrolling in the Basic Pension Scheme and the 
Issued Pension Benefit 
Public pensionis the main source of income for elderly people. We subdivide the index 
into two dimensions: insured people (population of elderly people enrolling in the 
public pension scheme) and the pension benefit (issued basic pension), and then 
quantify each of these into another four variables: 
(1) Percentage of elderly people enrolling in the basic pension scheme in urban areas 
areasurbaninyears65overpeopleelderlyofpopulation
areasurbaninschemepensionbasictheinenrollingpeopleelderlyofpopulation
PPNUit 
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Where the first ‘P’ is for ‘percentage’, the second ‘P’ is for ‘pension’, ‘N’ is for ‘number’, ‘U’ is for 
‘urban’, ‘i’ is for ‘provinces or cities’, and ‘t’ is for ‘time’. 
(2) Percentage of elderly people enrolling in the basic pension scheme in rural areas 
areasruralinyears65overpeopleelderlyofpopulation
areasruralinschemepensionbasictheinenrollingpeopleelderlyofpopulation
PPNRit 
 
Where the first ‘P’ is for ‘percentage’, the second ‘P’ is for ‘pension’, ‘N’ is for ‘number’, ‘R’ is for ‘rural, 
‘i’ is for ‘provinces or cities’, and ‘t’ is for ‘time’. 
(3) Percentage of paid urban basic pension per capita to the GDP per capita 
capitaperGDP
areasurbantheincapitaperpaidpensionbasic
PPQUit   
Where the first ‘P’ is for ‘percentage’, the second ‘P’ is for ‘pension’, ‘Q’ is for ‘quantity’, ‘U’ is for 
‘urban’, ‘i’ is for ‘provinces or cities’, and ‘t’ is for ‘time’. 
(4) Percentage of paid ruralpension to the GDP per capita 
capitaperGDP
areasruraltheincapitaperpaidpensionbasic
PPQRit   
Where the first ‘P’ is for ‘percentage’, the second ‘P’ is for ‘pension’, ‘Q’ is for ‘quantity’, ‘R’ is for 
‘rural, ‘i’ is for ‘provinces or cities’, and ‘t’ is for ‘time’. 
8.3.2.4 Population of Elderly People Enrolling in the Basic Medical Insurance 
Scheme and the Benefit Paid 
Aside from the public pension scheme, the public medical insurance scheme is also a 
very important financial resource that reduces medical expenses for the elderly. Thus, 
this index was selected and divided into two dimensions: insured people (population of 
elderly people enrolling in the public medical insurance scheme) and benefit paid (under 
public medical insurance), and then the following four variables were generated: 
(1) Percentage of elderly people enrolling in the basicmedical insurance scheme in 
urban areas 
areasurbaninyears65overpeopleelderlyofpopulatin
areasurbaninschemeinsurancemedicalbasictheinenrollingpeopleelderlyofpopulation
PMNUit 
 
Where ‘P’ is for ‘percentage’, ‘M’ is for ‘public medical insurance’, ‘N’ is for ‘number’, ‘U’ is for 
‘urban’, ‘i’ is for ‘provinces or cities’, and ‘t’ is for ‘time’. 
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(2) Percentage of elderly people enrolling in the basicmedical insurance scheme in 
rural areas 
areasurbaninyears65overpeopleelderlyofpopulation
areasruralinschemeinsurancemedicalbasictheinenrollingpeopleelderlyofpopulation
=PMNRit
 
Where ‘P’ is for ‘percentage’, ‘M’ is for ‘public medical insurance’, ‘N’ is for ‘number’, ‘U’ is for 
‘urban’, ‘i’ is for ‘provinces or cities’, and ‘t’ is for ‘time’. 
(3) Percentage of urban basic medical insurance benefit per capita to the GDP per 
capita 
capitaperGDP
areasurbantheincapitaperbenefitinsurancemedicalbasicpaid
PMQUit   
Where ‘P’ is for ‘percentage’, ‘M’ is for ‘public medical insurance’ , ‘Q’ is for ‘quantity’, ‘U’ is for 
‘urban’, ‘i’ is for ‘provinces or cities’, and ‘t’ is for ‘time’. 
(4) Percentage of rural basic medical insurance benefit per capita to the GDP per 
capita 
capitaperGDP
areasruraltheincapitaperbenefitinsurancemedicalbasicpaid
PMQRit   
Where ‘P’ is for ‘percentage’, ‘M’ is for ‘public medical insurance’, ‘Q’ is for ‘quantity’, ‘R’ is for ‘rural, 
‘i’ is for ‘provinces or cities’, and ‘t’ is for ‘time’. 
8.3.3 Adjustments on the Variables 
In order to reduce data redundancy and improve data integrity, adjustments on the 
variables included: first, for ‘PB’ which is the ratio of the number of beds in nursing 
institutions to the actual demand of the elder care industry. If the value of ‘PB’ is more 
than 1, it implies an excessive investment by the government in the elder care industry. 
So, the index which is more than 1 will be set to the value of ‘1’, and it implies that the 
government gets full marks in this performance. Second, outliers are removed which 
might affect the results of the normalisation process, using the ‘min-max normalisation’ 
method to normalise other data, such as, ‘PL’, ‘PPN’, ‘PPQ’, ‘PMN’ and ‘PMQ’, to 
ensure all meet the requirements for calculation. Finally, an adjustment calculates the 
sum of the above six indices to obtain the elder care index ‘ECSI’ which ranges from 0 
to 6 in value. 
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According to the structure of the indices system, this process establishes both an elder 
care service index in urban China (ECSIU) and an elder care service index in rural 
China (ECSIR) respectively, presented in the following two formulas:  
ititititititit nPPQUnPPNUnPMQUnPMNUnPLUPBUECSIU   
ititititititit nPPQRnPPNRnPMQRnPMNRnPLRPBRECSIR   
Where ‘i’ is for ‘provinces or cities’, and ‘t’ is for ‘time’, and ‘n’ represents ‘normalisation’. 
8.3.4 Elder Care Service Index in Different Regions (2011~2015) 
Based on the availability of relevant data and previous formulas, the resulting index 
demonstrates both urban and rural elder care service indices in different provincesor 
cities (including municipalities: Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing; and 
autonomous regions: Xinjiang, Tibet, Qinghai, Ningxia and Guangxi Province) between 
2011~2015 (Table 8.15). If we distribute these data into a chart, we can observe the 
overall pattern of the elder care service index in bothurban and rural areasof different 
regions of China from 2011 to 2015 respectively.  
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Table 8.15 Average Elder Care Service Index in Urban and Rural Areas 
in Different Regions of China (2011~2015) 
Provinces or 
Cities 
Urban Elder 
Care Service 
Index 
Rural Elder 
Care Service 
Index 
Provinces or 
Cities 
Urban Elder 
Care Service 
Index 
Rural Elder 
Care Service 
Index 
Anhui 2.78  1.84 Jiangxi 2.41 2.00  
Beijing 3.11  2.02 Liaoning  2.88 1.01 
Fujian  2.67 1.34 Inner Mongolia 3.42 1.80  
Gansu 3.16  1.80 Ningxia 2.72  1.92  
Guangdong 2.28  1.40  Qinghai 3.03  2.40  
Guangxi 2.65  1.35 Shandong 3.21  1.64  
Guizhou 2.03 1.49  Shanxi  2.96  1.49  
Hainan  2.40 1.23  Shaanxi  3.29  2.13  
Hebei 2.48 1.40 Shanghai  3.64  2.17  
Henan  2.91 1.70 Sichuan  2.82  1.89  
Heilongjiang  1.91 1.68 Tianjin  3.52  1.77  
Hubei  2.04  1.73 Tibet 3.04  1.58  
Hunan  2.28 1.65  Xinjiang 3.39  1.83  
Jilin 2.00 1.72 Yunnan 2.62  1.52  
Jiangsu 3.04 1.93  Zhejiang 3.15 1.96  
   Chongqing 2.94  1.89  
 
Chart 8.1 Average Elder Care Service Index in Urban and Rural Areas 
in Different Regions of China (2011~2015) 
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As is shown in Chart 8.1, the Top 10 regions of the urban elder care service index are: 
Shanghai, Tianjin, Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, Shaanxi, Shandong, Gansu, Beijing, 
Jiangsu and Tibet. The lowest include Liaoning, Henan, and Heilongjiang, etc.; and the 
elder care services in the remaining regions fall between the two extremes. In rural 
China, Shanghai, Beijing, Qinghai, Shaanxi rank in the first few places. Although 
welfare policy (including elder care, medical care and pension policy) almost covers all 
parts of China, there is still a distinctive gap between the urban and rural elder care 
service index in all regions, which means that there is less public expenditure on elder 
care services in rural areas, and lower levels of welfare benefits for rural elderly people. 
Among all of these regions, the largest difference between urban and rural elder care 
services is in Liaoning (1.86) and the least difference occurs in Heilongjiang Province 
(0.23).  
The results in Table 8.15 also show the richer regions (e.g., Beijing, Shanghai and 
Tianjin) are undisputedly among the highest for the elder care service index, while less 
economically developed regions, such as Xinjiang, Tibet, Gansu, Shaanxi, also seem to 
have a relatively high elder care service index. It seems that the elder care servic index 
bears little relationship to local development, two reasons can explain this phenomenon: 
on one hand, in the rich regions, the population of migrant labour (including 
rural-to-urban migrants) is higher than in other places. These people have raised GDP in 
the local economy, but as only local household registered elderly residents can receive 
welfare benefits, the proportion of social welfare expenditure to GDP per capita is lower 
in the poor regions. On the other hand, the less economically developed regions, such as 
Qinghai, Shaanxi, Gansu, Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia, benefit from public 
expenditure which includes a share of a special subsidy for remote regions. So these 
areas have proportionately higher public expenditure (including fiscal transfer payments) 
than richer regions – which leads to a higher percentage of social welfare to GDP per 
capita. Thus, the overall elder care service index in the poor areas is higher than in some 
rich regions of China. This result also shows that special subsidies have a positive effect 
on overall levels of welfare.  
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When we review the provincial differences of both urban and rural elder care service 
indices in various years from 2011 to 2015 (Chart 8.2 and 8.3), Shanghai and Tianjin  
emerge as the two cities demonstrating the highest urban elder care service index in 
almost every year (Chart 8.2). According to Chart 8.3, the rural elder care service index 
of Qinghai, Shanghai and Shaanxi are among the highest. However, the characteristics 
of elder care service index trends in urban and rural areas are quite different. In the 
majority of cities, the elder care service index increased during 2011~2015, while the 
elder care service index was lower in nearly half of the rural areas by 2015. This result 
may be attributed to two reasons: first, due to rural-urban migration, the proportion of 
elderly people in rural areas increases faster than that of urban areas; second, compared 
with urban elderly people, the growth rate of retirement income for rural elderly is much 
slower. 
 
Chart 8.2 Elder Care Service Index in Urban China (2011~2015) 
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Chart 8.3 Elder Care Service Index in Rural China (2011~2015) 
 
8.3.5 Efficiency of Public expenditure on Elder Care: Based on Multiple-Linear 
Regression Analysis 
Public expenditure on elder care services in China is important, as a consequence it is 
necessary to find out how far this public expenditure has shaped funding strategies for 
elder care. The results will be evaluated from two perspectives: first, which is a more 
efficient way of funding elder care services? For instance, which can improve the elder 
care service index: an investment in elderly people (the demand side) or on the 
construction of elder care services and institutions (the supply side)? Second, do urban 
areas or rural areas need more public expenditure on elder care? Thus, in this section, 
two independent variables – elderly income supplementation and basic construction 
expenditure – are used to define the two investment directions of public expenditure in 
order answer these questions. Besides which, we also consider another two control 
variables in the multiple-linear regression model in order to get more informative 
results.  
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8.3.5.1 Explanation of the Formulas and Variables 
Dependent variable – elder care service index. The elder care service index in urban 
China (EDSIU) and the elder care service index in rural China (EDSIR) are applied as 
an index which comprehensively measures the level of elder care service in each. The 
calculation results of EDSIU and EDSIR have been presented above. 
Independent variable (1) – elderly income supplementation. The elderly income 
supplementation comes from central fiscal payments and fiscal transfer payments, 
calculated as benefits (e.g., MLSS, universal financial support and social assistance for 
elderly people) directly issued to elderly people. This is referred to as ‘investment in 
elderly people’. The data is from ‘China’s Civil Affairs Statistical Yearbook’ published 
by the Ministry of Civil Affairs from 2011 to 2015.  
Independent variable (2) – basic construction expenditure. This expenditure includes 
fiscal budget and public lottery welfare funds, which aim to generate income to build 
nursing institutions and relevant facilities for the elderly. We refer to it as ‘investment in 
elder care services’. The data is from ‘China’s Civil Affairs Statistical Yearbook’ 
published by the Ministry of Civil Affairs from 2011 to 2015.  
Control variable (1) – GDP per capita. Quality of life for elderly people is driven by 
many factors. The local economic development condition is one of the factors that 
directly affect their quality of life. GDP is a useful indicator which reflects the condition 
of local economic development. The data for GDP per capita in different regions is from 
the ‘National Statistical Yearbook’ published by the National Statistical Bureau from 
2011 to 2015.  
Control variable (2) – population of elderly people over 65 years. The degree of ageing 
in society will influence the level of elder care services provided in an area. If the 
demand is more than the supply, the situation will inevitably lower the availability of 
local elder care service level. So, this control variable eliminates any coefficient 
estimation bias due to this demographic factor. The data are from ‘China’s Demography 
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and Employment Statistical Yearbook’ published by National Statistical Bureau from 
2011 to 2015.  
In order to model the relationship between a scalar dependent variable and other 
independent variables, a multiple linear regression model was built which uses ordinary 
least squares (OLS) to analyse the influence of public expenditure on the level of elder 
care services. Thus, this model takes the forms below:  
itUit2it10it ε+Xλ+ONCONSTRUCTIβ+FUNDβ+β=EDSIU itlnlnlnln  
itRit2it10it ε+Xλ+ONCONSTRUCTIβ+FUNDβ+β=EDSIR itlnlnlnln  
Where ‘i’ is for ‘provinces or cities’, ‘FUND’ is for ‘elderly income supplementation in each province for 
various years’, ‘CONSTRUCTION’ is for ‘basic construction expenditure in each province for various 
years’; ‘X’ refers to other indices, such as, GDP per capita and population of elderly people over 65 years 
in each province; ‘ε’ is an unobserved random variable; ‘β0’ is the intercept term; ‘β1’ and ‘β2’ are two 
coefficients – ‘investment in elderly people’ and ‘investment in elder care services’. 
 
Considering the different numeric features of each variable, a logarithm (‘ln’) 
transformation was used to adjust all the variables before applying them to the 
regression analysis.  
8.3.5.2 Descriptive Statistical Analysis 
The value of dependent variables and independent variables can reflect their internal 
relationship. So after calculation, we can observe the overall statistical characteristics of 
these variables as presented in Table 8.16: the average elder care service index is 2.72 in 
urban and 1.73 in rural areas, and the average elderly income supplementation and basic 
construction expenditure are 11,400 and 349 million RMB. 
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Table 8.16 Descriptive Statistical Analysis on Some Main Variables 
Variables Observed 
value 
Average Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Urban elder care services index 155 2.72 0.39 1.91 3.85 
Rural elder care service index 155 1.73 0.32 0.94 2.76 
Elderly income supplementation 
(million RMB) 
155 11,400 6,070 1,000 28,700 
Basic construction expenditure 
(million RMB) 
155 349 744 2.5 6,220 
Population of urban elderly people 
over 65 years 
155 1,169,067 817,076.4 12,165.45 3,550,976 
Population of rural elderly people 
over 65 years 
155 3,119,635 2,390,858 141,119.2 9,220,389 
GDP per capita (RMB) 155 45,092.65 19,405.5 16,413 106,497 
 
8.3.5.3 Relationship between Public Expenditure and the Elder Care Service Index  
The amount of public expenditure has an effect on the level of social welfare and elder 
care in China, so this is used to analyse the relationships with the elder care service 
index in both urban and rural areas, through two important investment directions – 
elderly income supplementation (investment in elderly people) and basic construction 
expenditure (investment in elder care services) during 2011~2015 – using Stata 
statistical software. Thus, four scatter diagrams (Chart 8.4) are presented as below:  
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Chart 8.4 Scatter Diagrams of Public Expenditure and 
the Elder Care Service Index (2011~2015) 
 
As is shown in Charts (1) and (3), the position of most cases on the Y-axis (elder care 
service index) is higher if the position on the X-axis (elderly income supplementation) 
is lower. Comparing Charts (2) and (4), the position of most cases on the Y-axis (elder 
care service index) is also higher if the position on the X-axis (basic construction 
expenditure) is lower. Thus, it does not matter whether higher public expenditure occurs 
in urban or rural areas on social services, as basic construction will not necessarily 
result in improvement of the elder care service index. On the contrary, the regions with 
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lower public expenditure have a higher elder care service index. However, we cannot 
simply measure the level of elder care in a region by using the total amount of public 
expenditure as a single indicator, so the internal structure and relationship of public 
expenditure needs to be taken into consideration. 
Based on these results, more analysis on the efficiency of investment direction, and the 
difference in effectiveness of elder care funding between the urban and rural areas will 
be discussed from the following two perspectives – efficiency of investment direction 
and efficiency of elder care funding in urban and rural areas: 
(1) Efficiency of Investment Direction: Investing in Elderly People or in Elder Care? 
Seen from Chart (1) and (3) most cases are centrally distributed. In the middle of the 
X-axis (elderly income supplementation), there is a linear connection between the two 
variables – the elder care service index increases according to an increase in elderly 
income supplementation. So, from a statistical perspective, increasing expenditure on 
elderly income (investing in elderly people) will improve both the urban and the rural 
elder care index.  
Chart (2) and (4), on the contrary, show that most cases are distributed at the lowest 
level of the X-axis (basic construction expenditure). Unlike the elderly income 
supplementation data from Chart (1) and (3), this demonstrates that an increase in basic 
construction expenditure cannot lead to the enhancement of the elder care service index. 
There is no obvious difference in the basic construction expenditure of different regions, 
no matter what level the elder care service index is. This result can possibly be 
attributed to the availability of fewer subsidies for the construction of nursing 
institutions over previous years. It also might suggest that there has been insufficient 
time for the construction of nursing institutions to impact on the elder care service 
index.  
In this respect, these results indicate that an investment in elderly people is more 
efficient than an investment on the construction of elder care services, therefore, local 
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governments need to avoid excessive investment in the building of local nursing 
institutions and associated facilities for elderly people.  
(2) Effectiveness of Elder Care Funding in Urban and Rural Areas 
Comparing Chart (1) and (2), there is no significant linear correlation between the elder 
care service index and basic construction expenditure in the urban China, and it is the 
same for rural China when comparing Chart (3) and (4). Contrasting Chart (1) and (3), 
we find that the cases of the elder care service index are more dispersed in urban areas 
than in rural areas, which indicates that public expenditure works better in rural areas. It 
also suggests that in urban areas the lack of uniformity might reflect that a more uneven 
distribution of wealth influences elder care services. Thus, public expenditure exerts a 
greater influence in rural areas which are more likely to rely on public expenditure to 
improve the level of elder care.  
8.3.5.4 Evaluation of the Results of Multiple-linear Regression 
The previous series of scatter diagrams only illustrate the relationship between the elder 
care service index and public expenditure (elderly income supplementation and basic 
construction expenditure) in both urban and rural areas. In order to verify the results, 
there are two other control variables that might affect the level of the elder care service 
index: GDP per capita (economic development factor) and the population of elderly 
people over 65 years (demographic factor) in each province. The results of the 
subsequent multiple linear regression analysis are presented in Table 8.17.  
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Table 8.17 Coefficient of Public expenditure in Urban and Rural China 
Variables lnECSIU lnECSIR 
lnFUND 
0.280*** 0.518*** 
(0.0586) (0.062) 
lnCONSTRUCTION 
0.0149 0.0376** 
(0.0168) (0.0171) 
ln(population of elderly people) -0.441*** -0.502*** 
 (0.0362) (0.0367) 
LnGDP 0.192** 0.516*** 
 (0.0778) (0.0689) 
Constant -2.160* 0.68 
 (1.16) (1.016) 
Observation 155 
Number of provinces or cities 31 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
67
 
Note 1: The cited p-values may be under-estimates, as a consequence of the lack of independence of the 
five yearly observations within each province/city. 
Note 2: Elderly income supplementation and basic construction expenditure are the public funds to the 
nursing institutions and community elder care service centres, which reflect the overall public expenditure 
on all elderly population. While in the multiple-linear regression, I chose GDP per capita as the variable 
because it can more reflect the economic level in one region. 
 
The results of the multiple-linear regression demonstrate the following three aspects:  
First, the contribution degree of elderly income supplementation (FUND) to the elder 
care service index (0.280 in urban China and 0.518 in rural China) is significantly 
higher than that of basic construction expenditure (CONSTRUCTION) (0.0149 in urban 
China and 0.0376 in rural China). According to this result, an investment in elderly 
people is more efficient than an investment in the construction of elder care. So, the 
Chinese Government should give priority to increasing funding for elderly people, 
rather than blindly expanding investment on the construction of elder care services.  
Second, compared with urban China, elderly income supplementation and basic 
construction expenditure in rural China are more significant influences on the elder care 
                                               
67
 The (*) represents a result has reached the statistical significance level where it is very unlikely to have 
occurred given the null hypothesis.  
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service index, which means that elder care services in rural areas are more likely to 
depend on public expenditure compared to urban areas. So, the Chinese Government 
should invest more in rural areas.  
Third, as seen from Table 8.17 there is an obvious negative correlation between the 
control variable of the population (of elderly people over 65 years) and the elder care 
service index. This information means that any proportionate growth in the elderly 
population will negatively affect the elder care service index. However, the other 
control variable (GDP per capita) reflects the opposite phenomenon, which means that 
any increase of GDP per capita will positively affect the local elder care service index. 
Meanwhile, the results also suggest that GDP per capita is much more significant in 
rural China than in urban China; thus, assuming that rural residents’ retirement income 
reflects GDP per capita, to achieve welfare objectives, it is urgent to enhance rural 
residents’ retirement income.  
 
8.4 Summary 
This chapter has analysed the overall degree of efficiency of public expenditure on elder 
care services across different regions of China, as well as between urban and rural areas. 
Work on the construction of input and output indicators of elder care services finally 
produced DEA results from 31 regions of China, which demonstrate that 15 regions are 
working at a lower level of efficiency than expected, and 8 of them need efficiency 
improvement. This chapter also establishes an elder care service index, and calculates 
the elder care service index in both urban and rural areas across the 31 regions. It also 
compares and analyses the relationship of elderly income supplementation and 
construction expenditure on elder care services to the elder care service index. Evidence 
shows that an investment on elderly people creates a more efficient outcome than an 
investment on the construction of elder care facilities, with rural areas likely to benefit 
more from social investment than urban areas. Thus, the results produced by the 
quantitative methods outlined in this chapter, accord with particular practical 
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assumptions. First, excessive investment in the construction of elder care institutions 
and facilities may not positively result in the improvement of elder care, so it is crucial 
to instead increase the retirement income of elderly people. Second, the Chinese elder 
care industry is becoming market-based and self-funded, where elderly people exercise 
discretion over their choice of elder care as and when required. So if the retirement 
income of the elderly is increased it will increase their purchasing power and thence 
their welfare. If the government wishes an elder care industry to thrive, investment in 
elderly income supplementation offers the best means to achieve this goal. Third, the 
gap of public expenditure between urban and rural areas appears to have resulted in a 
lower level of elder care services in rural areas, so the government’s future investment 
priority should focus on the rural elder care industry.  
Based on the above discussion, we need to recognise these problems and choose an 
elder care funding strategy which is more suited to China’s current situation. The 
presentation of this strategy will be further discussed in the next and final chapters. 
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Chapter 9 Elderly Welfare Policy: A Feasibility Analysis for 
Establishing Public Long-term Care Insurance  
 
 
The previous analysis has shown that social policies related to elder care funding that 
rely on the supply side do not promote the sustainable development of an elder care 
industry. In the context of no public long-term funding, this chapter will focus on the 
demand side of elder care and attempts to find ways to resolve the problems existing on 
the supply side of elder care services. It is divided into three sections. First, it will 
review the pathway of China’s elderly welfare policy and propose a possible 
construction of elder care funding. Subsequently, it offers a feasibility analysis of a 
public LTCI scheme, and estimates the future supply and demand of LTC based on 
Jingmen’s LTC scheme.  
 
9.1 Path Selection of China’s Elderly Welfare Policy 
At present, the development of social policies globally and basically follows the path 
from ‘residual type’to ‘institutional type’ (or from ‘relief-type’ to ‘universal type’). At 
present, social welfare services for the elderly in China, which are currently being 
implemented, are essentially based on relief-type social assistance. They mainly target 
disadvantaged groups to help them meet their basic needs. With the development of 
society and the economy, rising public awareness of basic civil rights, and the setting of 
the goal to build a harmonious society by promoting social equity and justice, there are 
social and political pressures for changing the current social welfare model and 
promoting the transition from a residual type to a moderate universal type.  
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9.1.1 An Alternative Path between Equity and Efficiency: an Analysis of the 
Welfare System in China 
All countries in the world are seeking different paths of equity and efficiency in order to 
promote economic development while maintaining a sustainable system and a 
harmonious society. Economic growth and social equity are the two basic elements 
constituting the social welfare function. To achieve a steady increase in the level of 
social welfare, we must strike a sound balance between economic growth and social 
equity.  
China’s social welfare system has developed from a tax-funded, all-encompassing 
system under a planned economy, to a market economy that is restructuring 
responsibility between the state, employers, the market and individuals. During the 
transition, we have alternated between equity and efficiency. In the initial period of 
China’s reform and opening up, an over-emphasis on an efficiency goal created rapid 
and extensive economic growth. However, when the goal of economic development is 
over-emphasised, social equity will be weakened and this poses a threat to the 
enhancement of social welfare, which in turn will affect sustainable economic 
development. So, practices must focus on an ‘equal emphasis on efficiency and equity 
in primary distribution and redistribution processes, giving priority to equity in 
redistribution’ (Hu, 2007)68. Thus, under such circumstances, reallocating a portion of 
the wealth of the rich to the poor can increase the socio-economic utility of the poor 
without any significant reduction in the utility of the rich. It not only improves the 
efficient allocation of resources but also enhances social equity. Such improvements 
must be backed by the authority of government and the application of corresponding 
social policies. As the demand for LTC is under much pressure, while the elderly are 
mostly from low-income families, so China faces an urgent choice to solve the problem 
of unbalanced development in implementing new elderly welfare policies in order to 
improve the welfare of the low-income elderly population. 
                                               
68
 The pre-president Hu Jintao gave a speech in the Seventeenth National Congress Conference, which 
was entitled ‘Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive for New 
Victories in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society’.  
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9.1.2 Reconstruction of Elder Care Funding in China 
Social investment theory suggests that ‘positive returns on investment’ coincide with 
positive welfare as promoted by developmental social policies. The development of 
social policy in China has gradually shifted from a non-normative, individualised and 
fragmented form to a systematic and standardised form (Wu, 2004). Especially since the 
beginning of twenty-first century, with government intervention gradually increasing, 
China started to develop a ‘state-led social policy’. 
Below, we offer a proposal for China’s elder care funding system (as shown in Figure 
9.1) based on social investment theory and developmental social policy, whiledrawing 
lessons from ‘welfare pluralism’, based on the current situation of elder care in China. 
The fund raising scheme suggested here would be capable of paying for full and 
effective elder care services.  
The establishment of a public LTCI system in particular will provide funding for elder 
care services with government, society, enterprises, and markets bearing a reasonable 
portion of the costs involved. At the same time, the introduction of a market-based 
mechanism to an elder care industry can provide a sound operating environment. 
 
Figure 9.1 Funding System of Elder Care in China 
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9.2 Feasibility Analysis of Public LTCI in China 
Based on relevant economic and social indicators across China in 2015, this part 
attempts to promote the Jingmen LTCI scheme to the national level for empirical test 
(static measurement), calculating the degree to which adaptation of the Jingmen 
scheme
69
 is required to meet different socio-economic conditions in all regions of 
China in 2016. 
9.2.1 Related Economic Indicators Selected in Static Demand Calculation 
Meeting demand is the goal of finance, and the scale of demand determines the scale of 
funding. In this respect, the measurement of demand requires identifying two key 
variables, namely the population of disabled and semi-disabled elderly people, and the 
level of elder care services fees. The six principles of ‘daily living activities’ (DLA) 
offer a measurement of elderly people’s disabilities and functional status (Brie, 2014), 
which are ‘self-feeding, bathing, dressing, grooming, functional mobility and toilet 
hygiene’. We define the disability to do one or two actions as mild disability; with the 
disability to do three to four defined as moderate disability and five to six defined as 
severe disability. According to the measurement method used by China’s Ageing 
Scientific Research Centre, the proportion of disabled people accounts for 6.22% of the 
total population of the elderly in China in 2015, among them, the proportion of severely, 
moderately and mildly disabled elderly people are 1.08%, 0.31% and 4.83% 
respectively (Jing and Li, 2014). Based on these proportions, we could calculate the 
population of disabled elderly in different regions of China. However, as there is no 
nation-wide unified standard for elder care service fees, we assume that the payment 
level is roughly reflects a certain proportion (40%, 30% and 20%) of the local average 
social salary
70
, with specific payment levels as follows: 
 
 
                                               
69
 The details of LTCI schemes in Shanghai and Jingmen (Hubei Province) have been introduced in 
section 6.4.2. 
70
 Average social salary refers to the average salary of all employees within one region in one period.  
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numDratioSCF   
 
Where CF represents the total financial demand for LTC, S represents the local average private salary, 
and ratio represents the estimated ratio (40%, 30% and 20% respectively), numD is the population of 
disabled elderly people. The calculation results are shown in Table 9.1. 
 
According to Table 9.1, the regions with large-scale LTC fund demand include 
Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Guangdong, Sichuan, Hebei and Anhui, while the regions 
with small-scale LTC fund demand include Tibet, Qinghai and Ningxia. The share of 
LTC funds for disabled elderly people in these areas is around 0.25~0.51% of 2015 
GDP. Although the proportion of China’s LTC expenditure is not high compared with 
most OECD countries, it can be seen that Germany’s LTC expenditure accounted for 
only 0.23% of the GDP in the year when it was first piloted in 1995
71
, which makes it 
more sensible and reasonable that the initial cost and follow-up administrative expenses 
in China can be kept at a relatively low level during the initial period of the system. 
                                               
71
 The expenditure of LTC in 1995 in Germany is 5 billion Euros (Theobald and Hampel, 2012), and the 
1995 GDP of Germany is 2.592 trillion US dollars (World Bank, 2018). I use 1.2 as the currency 
exchange rate. 
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Table 9.1 Population of Disabled Elderly People in 2016 and 
the Results of Financial Demand for LTC 
Regions 
Elderly 
people over 
60 years 
(thousands) 
Population of disabled elderly people 
(thousands) 
Average 
local 
social 
salary 
(RMB 
per 
month) 
Elder care service fees (billions） 
Mild 
disabled 
elderly 
people 
Moderate 
disabled 
elderly 
people 
Severe 
disabled 
elderly 
people 
Total 
Mild 
disability 
(20%) 
Moderate 
disability 
（30%） 
Severe 
disability
（40%） 
National 221,828.9 10,714.3 687.7 2,395.8 13,798 5,169.1 171.17 256.76  342.35 
Beijing 3,150 152.1 9.8 34 195.9 9,282.5 4.36 6.55 8.73 
Tianjin 2,154.2 104 6.7 23.3 134 6,674.2 2.15 3.22 4.29 
Hebei 12,120 585.4 37.6 130.9 753.9 4,243.4 7.68 11.52 15.36 
Shanxi 5,300 256 16.4 57.2 329.6 4,316.9 3.42 5.12 6.83 
Inner Mongolia 4,100 198 12.7 44.3 255 4,761.3 2.91 4.37 5.83 
Liaoning 8,400 405.7 26 90.7 522.4 4,361 5.47 8.20 10.94 
Jilin 5,250 253.6 16.3 56.7 326.6 4,296.5 3.37 5.05 6.737 
Heilongjiang 6,461 312.1 20 69.8 401.9 4,073.4 3.93 5.89 7.86 
Shanghai 4,359.5 210.6 13.5 47.1 271.2 9,097.8 5.92 8.88 11.84  
Jiangsu 15,790 762.7 48.9 170.5 982.1 5,516.3 13.00  19.50  26.00 
Zhejiang 9,840.3 475.3 30.5 106.3 612.1 5,555.7 8.16 12.24 16.32 
Anhui 10,444.8 504.5 32.4 112.8 649.7 4,594.9 7.17 10.75 14.33 
Fujian 4,960 239.6 15.4 53.6 308.6 4.802.3 3.56 5.34 7.11 
Jiangxi 6,500 314 20.2 70.2 404.4 4.244.3 4.12 6.18 8.24 
Shandong 19,694 951.2 61.1 212.7 1225 4.772.5 14.03  21.05 28.06  
Henan 12,324 595.2 38.2 133.1 766.5 3.783.6 6.96  10.44 13.92 
Hubei 10,423.5 503.5 32.3 112.6 648.4 4.530.6 7.05  10.58 14.10 
Hunan 11,622 561.3 36 125.5 722.8 4.363.1 7.57 11.35 15.14 
Guangdong 11,940 576.7 37 129 742.7 5.482.3 9.77 14.66 19.54 
Guangxi 7,160 345.8 22.2 77.3 445.3 4.415.2 4.72 7.08 9.44 
Hainan 1,255.2 60.6 3.9 13.6 78.1 4.800 0.9  1.35 1.80 
Chongqing 6,500 314 20.2 70.2 404.4 5.045.3 4.90 7.35 9.79 
Sichuan 16,720 807.6 51.8 180.6 1040 4.909.6 12.25  18.38  24.51 
Guizhou 5,340 257.9 16.6 57.7 332.2 4.975.1 3.97 5.95  7.93 
Yunnan 6,000 289.8 18.6 64.8 373.2 4.380.3 3.92 5.89 7.85 
Tibet 253.9 12.3 0.8 2.7 15.8 8.154.1 0.31 0.46 0.62 
Shanxi 6,011 290.3 18.6 64.9 373.8 4.582.8 4.11 6.17 8.22 
Gansu 3,650 176.3 11.3 39.4 227 4.411.8 2.40 3.60 4.81 
Qinghai 697.7 33.7 2.2 7.5 43.4 5.090.8 0.53  0.80 1.06 
Ningxia 820.8 39.6 2.5 8.9 51 5.031.7 0.62 0.92 1.23 
Xinjiang 2,587 131.9 8 27.9 167.8 5.009.8 2.02 3.03 4.04 
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Data Sources: the data of ‘population of elderly people over 60 years’ and ‘average local social salary’ is 
from ‘2016 Statistical Yearbook’ (National Statistical Bureau, 2016), and the rest is calculated by the 
author.  
 
9.2.2 Selected Economic Indicators for LTC Provision 
The coverage of the public LTCI scheme in Jingmen has a wide range of contributors, 
covering almost all insured people covered by medical insurance (excluding those under 
18 years). Thus, the total costs of supply for LTC can be calculated as follows: 
rateincomepeoplerevenue   
Where ‘revenue’ represents the amount of LTC funds, ‘income’ represents disposable income per capita, 
and ‘rate’ represents financial rate of the LTC scheme.  
 
Because 0.4% is too low, we adjust the rates here according to three standard rates of 
0.7%, 1% and 1.4% to represent low, medium and high estimation. The calculation 
results are shown in Table 9.2 and 9.3:  
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Table 9.2 Estimated Supply Expenditure of LTC Funds (2015) 
Regions 
Total 
population 
(thousands) 
Population of elderly 
people enrolling in public 
medical care insurance 
scheme (thousands) 
Disposable 
income per 
capita 
(RMB/annual) 
Total disposable 
income per capita 
(billions) 
National 1,374,620 1,147,466 21,966.2 25,205.5  
Beijing 21,710 19,512 48,458 945.5  
Tianjin 15,470 13,903 31,291.4 435.0  
Hebei 74,250 60,714 18,118.1 1,100.0  
Shanxi 36,640 31,126 17,853.7 555.7  
InnerMongolia 25,110 21,828 22,310.1 487.0  
Liaoning 43,820 39,172 24,575.6 962.7  
Jilin 27,530 24,231 18,683.7 452.7  
Heilongjiang 38,120 34,089 18,592.7 633.8  
Shanghai 24,150 21,894 49,867.2 1,091.8  
Jiangsu 79,760 68,945 29,538.9 2,036.6  
Zhejiang 55,390 48,237 35,537.1 1,714.2  
Anhui 61,440 50,521 18,362.6 927.7  
Fujian 38,390 31,644 25,404.4 803.9  
Jiangxi 45,660 35,858 18,437.1 661.1  
Shandong 98,470 82,366 22,703.2 1,870.0  
Henan 94,800 74,905 17,124.8 1,282.7  
Hubei 58,520 49,637 20,025.6 994.0  
Hunan 67,830 55,342 19,317.5 1,069.1  
Guangdong 108,490 91,113 27,858.9 2,538.3  
Guangxi 47,960 37,109 16,873.4 626.2  
Hainan 9,110 7,305 18,970 138.6  
Chongqing 30,170 25,463 20,110.1 512.1  
Sichuan 82,040 69,012 17,221 1,188.5  
Guizhou 35,300 27,378 13,696.6 375.0  
Yunnan 47,420 38,355 15,222.6 583.9  
Tibet 3,240 2,476 12,254.3 30.3  
Shanxi 37,930 32,222 17,395 560.5  
Gansu 26,000 21,554 13,466.6 290.3  
Qinghai 5,880 4,700 15,812.7 74.3  
Ningxia 6,680 5,338 17,329.1 92.5  
Xinjiang 23,600 18,450 16,859.1 311.1  
Data Sources: The data of ‘total population’ and ‘average disposable income’ is from ‘2016 Statistical 
Yearbook’ (National Statistical Bureau, 2016), and the rest is calculated by the author.  
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Table 9.3 Estimated Demand and Supply Costs of LTC Funds (2015) 
Regions 
Supply costs (billions RMB) Demand costs (billions RMB) 
0.7% of the 
total 
disposable 
income 
1% of the 
total 
disposable 
income 
1.4% of the 
total 
disposable 
income 
Elder care 
service fee for 
mild disability 
(low estimation) 
Elder care service 
fee for moderate 
disability 
(median estimation) 
Elder care 
service fee for 
severe disability 
(high estimation) 
National 176.44  252.06  352.88  171.17  256.76  342.35  
Beijing 6.62  9.46  13.24  4.36  6.55  8.73  
Tianjin 3.05  4.35  6.09  2.15  3.22  4.29  
Hebei 7.70  11.00  15.40  7.68  11.52  15.36  
Shanxi 3.89  5.56  7.78  3.41  5.12  6.83  
InnerMongolia 3.41  4.87  6.82  2.91  4.37  5.83  
Liaoning 6.74  9.63  13.48  5.47  8.20  10.94  
Jilin 3.17  4.53  6.34  3.37  5.05  6.74  
Heilongjiang 4.44  6.34  8.87  3.93  5.89  7.86  
Shanghai 7.64  10.92  15.29  5.92  8.88  11.84  
Jiangsu 14.26  20.37  28.51  13.00  19.50  26.00  
Zhejiang 12.00  17.14  24.00  8.16  12.24  16.32  
Anhui 6.49  9.28  12.99  7.16  10.75  14.33  
Fujian 5.63  8.04  11.26  3.56  5.34  7.11  
Jiangxi 4.63  6.61  9.26  4.12  6.18  8.24  
Shandong 13.09  18.70  26.18  14.03  21.05  28.06  
Henan 8.98  12.83  17.96  6.96  10.44  13.92  
Hubei 6.96  9.94  13.92  7.05  10.58  14.10  
Hunan 7.48  10.69  14.97  7.57  11.35  15.14  
Guangdong 17.77  25.38  35.54  9.77  14.66  19.54  
Guangxi 4.38  6.26  8.77  4.72  7.08  9.44  
Hainan 0.97  1.39  1.94  0.90  1.35  1.80  
Chongqing 3.58  5.12  7.17  4.90  7.35  9.79  
Sichuan 8.32  11.89  16.64  12.25  18.38  24.51  
Guizhou 2.63  3.75  5.25  3.97  5.95  7.93  
Yunnan 4.09  5.84  8.17  3.92  5.89  7.85  
Tibet 0.21  0.30  0.43  0.31  0.46  0.62  
Shanxi 3.92  5.61  7.85  4.11  6.17  8.22  
Gansu 2.03  2.90  4.06  2.40  3.61  4.81  
Qinghai 0.52  0.74  1.04  0.53  0.80  1.06  
Ningxia 0.65  0.93  1.30  0.62  0.92  1.23  
Xinjiang 2.18  3.11  4.36  2.02  3.03  4.04  
Data Sources: The data above is estimated data and is calculated by the author.  
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According to the calculation results in Table 9.3, in the developed and rich regions, for 
instance, Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Guangdong, Fujian, Zhejiang and Jiangsu, the 
charges levelled exceed potential consumption rates. While in the undeveloped regions, 
such as Guizhou, Sichuan and Tibet, the supply cost is inadequate, so in these areas, the 
contribution rate needs to be higher. If the LTC funds can be distributed nationwide, the 
central government could redistribute the LTC funds from developed regions with a 
surplus to under developed ones with insufficient funds.  
 
9.3 Forecasting Supply and Demand Costs of LTC in China 
(2020~2050) 
Chinese scholars have separated ‘long-term care insurance’ from the concept of ‘elder 
care’ and study it as an independent institutional arrangement. Some scholars (see data 
source for Table 9.4) have predicted the total costs of LTC for the years 2020 to 2050 in 
terms of the scale and rate of fund-raising. The forecast results are shown below in 
Table 9.4: 
Table 9. 4 Summary of Current Studies on Forecast of Total Cost to LTC in China 
Year 
Zhu and Jia (2009) Wei and He (2012) Song and 
Zhu 
(2012) 
Cao 
(2014) Low 
estimation 
Median 
estimation 
High 
estimation 
Low 
estimation 
Median 
estimation 
High 
estimation 
2015 134.6 179.4 224.3    480.6 2587.25 
2020 181.7 242.2 302.8 676.92 817.49 983.8 657.6 3580.54 
2025 250.4 333.9 417.3    917.7 4931.62 
2030 350.1 466.8 583.5 1,885.50 2,749.88 3,982.61 1293.3 6593.15 
2035 462.0 616.0 770    1,809 9937.65 
2040 563.5 751.3 939.2 4,894.78 8,621.2 15,026.2 2,352.3 14341.77 
2045 666.5 888.7 1,110.9    3,009 18696.7 
2050 801.8 1,069.1 1,336.4 11,263.51 23,958.13 50,252.97 3,849.7 24687.34 
Data Sources: Zhu and Jia (2009); Wei and He (2012); Song and Zhu (2012); Cao and Chen (2014). The 
unit for all data is billion RMB.  
 
269 
 
Drawing on existing cost burden calculations, the highest cost estimates are by Wei and 
He (2012), who predict that by 2050 the total cost of LTC in China will reach 50.25 
trillion RMB. The lowest cost estimate is by Zhu and Jia (2009), who estimate that the 
maximum total cost of LTC by 2050 will be only 1.33 trillion RMB. The estimated 
demand calculated by Cao and Chen (2014) and Song and Zhu (2015) fall between 
these two. 
These calculations place emphasis on the principle of commercial insurance, and the 
design variables of rates are complex. Although it has a certain reference meaning to the 
actuarial balance of commercial LTC, this is not suitable for social insurance funding 
principles. Social security financing is a statutory fund-raising system established under 
government guidance and does not aim to make a profit. However, following the ‘law 
of large data’ principle and social policy precedent, the government measures the scale 
of fund-raising according to relevant economic and social indicators to achieve a policy 
goal of balancing revenue and expenditure. 
9.3.1 Forecast of Elderly Population for LTC 
We assume the disability rates by different age groups: 2.5% at 60~64 years, 4.0% at 
65~69 years, 5.3% at 70~74 years, 9.9% at 75~79 years, 25.1% at 80~84 years, 35.6% 
at 85~89 years, and 50.3% at over 90 years (National Statistical Bureau, 2004; Li et al., 
2016)
72
. The proportion of disabled elderly people is measured according to the United 
Nations (2017), the population of disabled elderly people from 2020 to 2050 is shown in 
Table 9.5. 
                                               
72
 The first five proportion ratios are referred from the investigation of 7 cities (Beijing, Chongqing, 
Harbin, Chengdu, Xi’an, Changsha and Shanghai) in China (Li et al., 2016), and last two proportion 
ratios are referred from ‘China’s Demographic Statistical Yearbook’ (National Statistical Bureau, 2004).  
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Table 9.5 Forecast of Population of Disabled Elderly People over 60 years 
from 2020 to 2050 (in thousands) 
Year Population 
Age groups 
60-64 65-69 70-74 75-79 80-84 85-89 Over 90 Total 
2020 
People over 60 years 76,684 73,589 45,439 27,032 16,664 7,897 3,009 250,314 
Population of disabled elderly 1,917 2,944 2,408 2,676 4,183 2,811 1,514 18,453 
2025 
People over 60 years 96,000 71,372 64,536 36,044 18,556 9,205 3,983 299,696 
Population of disabled elderly 2,400 2,855 3,420 3,568 4,657 3,277 2,003 22,182 
2030 
People over 60 years 115,718 89,835 63,198 52,027 25,347 10,565 4,931 361,621 
Population of disabled elderly 2,893 3,593 3,349 5,151 6,362 3,761 2,480 27,590 
2035 
People over 60 years 109,952 108,845 80,288 51,749 37,431 14,898 5,968 409,131 
Population of disabled elderly 2,749 4,354 4,255 5,123 9,395 5,304 3,002 34,182 
2040 
People over 60 years 88,810 103,907 98,140 66,723 38,038 22,650 8,454 426,722 
Population of disabled elderly 2,220 4,156 5,201 6,606 9,547 8,064 4,252 40,047 
2045 
People over 60 years 94,358 84,311 94,458 82,737 50,078 23,678 13,182 442,802 
Population of disabled elderly 2,359 3,372 5,006 8,191 12,570 8,430 6,630 46,558 
2050 
People over 60 years 119,969 89,966 77,241 80,675 63,341 32,029 15,640 478,861 
Population of disabled elderly 2,999 3,599 4,094 7,987 15,899 11,402 7,867 53,846 
Data Sources: The data of ‘population over 60 years’ is from ‘World Population Prospects: the 2017 
Revision, Key Findings and Advance Tables’ (United Nations, 2017). The population of disabled elderly 
people is calculated by the author according to the ratios.  
 
9.3.2 Forecast of Total Cost of Demand for LTC 
Since a unified national LTCI system has not been set up in China, there is no reliable 
relevant data on the status of LTCI to the current Chinese aged population. So a formula 
is used here to establish the demand for LTCI in China: 



m
i
iiCSTC
1
 
Where TC represents the total cost of LTC, 
iS  
represents the population of disabled elderly people in 
year i, and 
iC represents the average expense of LTC in the year of i. 
 
The calculation is based on the following assumptions: the proportion of disabled 
elderly people in specific age groups does not change from 2020 to 2050. During the 
forecasting period, 30%, 25% and 20% of the average commercial wage respectively 
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are the high, medium and low estimation of expense for LTC, with an average annual 
growth rate of 3%. The calculation results are shown in Table 9.6: 
Table 9.6 Forecast of China's LTC Costs for Disabled Elderly People (2020~2050) 
Year 
Predicted 
average social 
salary73 
（RMB/month） 
Forecast of LTC expense 
(RMB/month/person) 
Forecast of total expense of LTC 
(billions RMB) Costs of LTC 
as a share of 
GDP 
High 
estimation
（30%） 
Median 
estimation
（25%） 
Low 
estimation
（20%） 
High 
estimation
（30%） 
Median 
estimation
（25%） 
Low 
estimation
（20%） 
2020 5,992.4 1,797.7 1,498.1 1,198.5 398.1  331.7  265.4  0.28%~0.42% 
2025 6,946.8 2,084.1 1,736.7 1,389.4 554.7  462.3  369.8  0.37%~0.56% 
2030 8,053.3 2,416.0 2,013.3 1,610.7 799.9  666.6  533.3  0.34%~0.50% 
2035 9,336.0 2,800.8 2,334.0 1,867.2 1,148.8  957.4  765.9  0.38%~0.57% 
2040 10,822.9 3,246.9 2,705.7 2,164.6 1,560.3  1,300.3  1,040.2  0.41%~0.61% 
2045 12,546.8 3,764.0 3,136.7 2,509.4 2,102.9  1,752.5  1,402.0  0.44%~0.66% 
2050 14,545.1 4,363.5 3,636.3 2,909.0 2,819.5  2,349.6  1,879.7  0.48%~0.72% 
Data Sources: The date of GDP from 2020 to 2050 is from Li (2000). The data of ‘average social salary’ 
of 2016 is from ‘2016 Statistical Yearbook’ (National Statistical Bureau, 2016). The rest of the predicted 
data is calculated by the author 
 
As shown in Table 9.6 above, the total cost of LTC in the future grows steadily from 
2020. By 2050, the highest share of GDP will reach 0.72%. 
9.3.3 Forecast of Total Supply of LTC 
Using linear regression to predict increases in disposable income per capita from 2020 
to 2050, combined with predictions of the population of disabled elderly people shown 
in Table 9.5, the forecast of total demand for LTC can be obtained as shown in Table 
9.7: 
                                               
73
 We assume the average annual growth rate of average social salary is 3%. 
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Table 9.7 Forecast of Total Supply and Demand for LTC Funds (2020~2050) 
Year 
Population of 
people enrolling 
public medical 
insurance (million) 
Disposable 
income per 
capita 
(RMB) 
Total supply for LTC Funds 
(billions RMB) 
Total demand for LTC Funds 
(billions RMB) 
Future 
fincancial 
rate (0.7%) 
Future 
fincancial 
rate (1.0%) 
Future 
fincancial 
rate (1.4%) 
Low 
estimation 
(20%) 
Median 
estimation 
(25%) 
High 
estimation 
(30%) 
2020 1,175.8  31,086.5  255.9  365.5  511.7  265.4  331.7  398.1  
2025 1,199.4  40,195.0  337.5  482.1  674.9  369.8  462.3  554.7  
2030 1,219.5  49,305.1  420.9  601.3  841.8  533.3  666.6  799.9  
2035 1,225.1  58,414.9  500.9  715.6  1,001.9  765.9  957.4  1,148.8  
2040 1,212.4  67,524.9  573.1  818.6  1,146.1 1,040.2  1,300.3  1,560.3  
2045 1,186.8  76,634.8  636.7  909.5  1,273.3  1,402.0  1,752.5  2,102.9  
2050 1,154.8  85,744.7  693.1  990.2  1,386.3  1,879.7  2,349.6  2,819.5  
Data Sources: The data of ‘population of people enrolled public medical insurance’ is from ‘World 
Population Prospects: the 2017 Revision, Key Findings and Advance Tables’ (United Nations, 2017). We 
assume that 100% of age group (15-60 years) enrolling in public medical insurance scheme. 
 
Table 9.8 Forecast of Financial Rate (2020~2050) 
Year 
Demand (billions RMB) Future financial rate 
High estimation 
(30% of the average 
social salary) 
Median estimation 
(25% of the 
average social 
salary) 
Low estimation 
(20% of the 
average social 
salary) 
Future 
financial rate 
(High 
estimation) 
Future 
financial rate 
(Median 
estimation) 
Future 
financial 
rate (Low 
estimation) 
2020 398.1 331.7 265.4 1.39% 1.04% 0.70% 
2025 554.7 462.3 369.8 1.54% 1.15% 0.77% 
2030 799.9 666.6 533.3 1.88% 1.41% 0.94% 
2035 1,148.8 957.4 765.9 2.36% 1.77% 1.18% 
2040 1,560.3 1,300.3 1,040.2 2.87% 2.15% 1.44% 
2045 2,103.0 1,752.5 1,402.0 3.61% 2.70% 1.80% 
2050 2,819.5 2,349.6 1,879.7 4.60% 3.45% 2.30% 
Note: The future financial rate is calculated by future demand for LTC divided by the future population 
enrolling in basic medical insurance scheme and future disposable income per capita. 
 
By analysing the total demand for LTC funds, we can see that the demand for LTC 
funds for disabled elderly grows rapidly over time. Therefore, adopting an immutable 
fund-raising ratio will eventually lead to an imbalance between supply and demand. By 
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comparing the results in Table 9.7 and 9.8, it is clear that the estimated financial rate 
based on supply and demand for 2016 only applies till 2025 and that there will be a 
growing gap between supply and demand from 2030 onwards. Therefore, it is necessary 
to raise the financial rate to adapt to the increasing demand for LTC.  
By forecasting the financial rate in Table 9.8, we can see that China also needs to 
establish a dynamic and flexible fund-raising mechanism similar to some OECD 
countries, such as, Japan and Germany. With an increasing number of ageing elderly, 
the financial rate needs to be raised by at least 25% every five years from 2030 
onwards. 
 
9.4 Summary 
The implementation of the social insurance function of LTCI scheme can stimulate the 
effective demand for LTC, and thus further enhance the effective supply of elder care 
services. In this chapter, we attempted to adopt the Jingmen’s LTCI scheme, because it 
is simple and flexible to operate and so might be applicable to other places. Combined 
with public medical insurance funds, it helps save the administrative cost of a LTCI 
scheme. According to the results, the determining factor of LTC demand is the elderly 
disability rate. Disposable income per capita is the determinant factor in deciding 
premium income. Thus, future social policy needs to strive to improve people’s lives 
and increase the role of income distribution to enhance the capacity of the insured to 
sustain contributions. At the same time, financial rates need to be adjusted according to 
prevalent economic conditions, in order to make the LTC industry more sustainable. 
However, we should also bear in mind that due to the large population of disabled 
elderly people in China, it might be difficult to meet the demand in the early stage of 
implementation of public LTCI, before the scheme is mature. So, the tradition of family 
care and home-based care continue to play a vital role in current Chinese society. This 
chapter simply attempts to select a possible path for the future establishment of elderly 
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welfare policy by helping an aged population to raise retirement income and the ability 
to purchase LTC in the future.  
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Chapter 10 Conclusion  
 
 
At present, the narrow fiscal foundations of the Chinese government accompanied by 
vast population growth have profoundly influenced the sustainable development of the 
elder care industry, requiring immediate reforms in the funding of elder care. Thus, the 
Chinese government urgently needs to find an appropriate funding policy for China’s 
elder care services. This thesis systematically describes and analyses the operating 
mechanisms of China’s elder care as well as its funding models. It then analyses the 
degree of financial participation made by the government, market, non-profit and profit 
organisations in the provision of elder care services via the demonstration of four case 
studies and the statistical analysis of public expenditure on elder care. Finally, it 
estimates the potential financial demand for LTC in the future and proposes the most 
feasible elder care funding mechanism for China.  
This chapter first offers conclusions of the thesis around the five research questions 
identified in Chapter 1. It subsequently outlines the strengths and limitations of the 
research in terms of methodology, and makes some suggestions concerning future 
research to explore further the outcomes described here.  
 
10.1 RQ1: What are the Achievements and Problems of Current 
Funding Arrangements for Elder Care/LTC on the Supply Side in 
China? 
Since 2000, concerns have been arisen as to the rapid demographic shifts and the 
escalating demands of elderly people. The central Chinese Government has been 
actively promoting various approaches (mainly through expansion of supply of elder 
276 
 
care services) to encourage the social agencies to develop the construction of an elder 
care industry.  
10.1.1 Achievements of Elder Care Provision and Funding  
The Chinese Government adopts the ideas of ‘Neo-liberalism’ in its administration of 
the public sector, and introduces a market-based management mechanism from the 
private sector to promote the development of welfare, promoting individual and family 
responsibility. With the introduction of New Public Management (NPM) in the Chinese 
public sector, the government claims that these reforms can improve the performance 
and efficiency in the delivery of public goods and services by incorporating professional 
management ideas and approaches proposed by private agencies. In this respect, the 
Chinese Government has launched a series of policies related to the integration of 
various private resources and transferred what was originally a public responsibility 
over to private agencies. 
Responding to the requirements of central policies related to the construction and 
development of elder care services, local government at all levels has embarked on 
expanding elder care provision by encouraging private agencies to enter into the elder 
care industry, to produce elderly facilities or deliver elder care services via a 
market-oriented operational form. Since then, the number of nursing institutions and 
relevant elderly facilities in China has experienced a remarkable boom. According to 
the available data (see Table 8.1 in Chapter 8), the expansion of elder care provision in 
China has spurred the growth of the elder care system’s supply side (an increase in the 
number of beds for elder care services) from 2010 to 2016, particularly in home-based 
community elder care. With more varied market-oriented approaches used by private 
sector companies, in combination with public expenditure, more private funds have 
been invested in the construction of the elder care industry and the number of private 
nursing institutions is also growing.  
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10.1.2 Problematic Issues of Elder Care Provision and Funding  
Despite accelerated elder care expansion over the last few decades in China, several 
problems exist regarding funding issues within this process which are discussed below: 
10.1.2.1 Inadequate Public Fiscal Investment 
In recent years, there has been a serious shortage of public financial support in the field 
of social elder care services. The sources of public funds mainly come from central 
finance, local finance and public welfare lottery funds. At present, the central 
government has no special funds to invest in the elder care industry, and only a small 
amount of public lottery welfare funds and budget subsidy funds are included. 
According to the data provided by the Ministry of Civil Affairs, in the ‘twelfth 
Five-Year’ period (2011~2015), the budget for the central and local construction of 
elder care facilities only accounts for around 1.7% of total public expenditure on social 
services (Li and Xing, 2016). Although provincial governments have formulated 
subsidy policies for the construction of private nursing institutions, the proportion of 
their total investment is relatively low, compared with the investment from private 
participants, hardly reaching 10%. 
In 2013, the central government invested roughly 11.2 billion RMB public expenditure 
in the elder care industry, which is less than 0.1% of total public expenditure and 0.04% 
of national GDP (National Information Centre, 2014). Compared to other European 
countries, the gap in social care services expenditure is dramatic. For example, Sweden 
is the highest where social elder care accounts for 3.8% of the country’s GDP; the 
lowest proportion is in Italy, at 0.2% (OECD, 2015). Thus, China invests far less than 
the average developed country where the percentage of social care expenditure to GDP 
is 1.7% (ibid). According to ‘The Investigation in Urban Nursing Institutions in the 
Twelve Cities’ (Chinese Ageing Scientific Research Centre, 2015), 93.6% of private 
nursing institutions and 65.2% of public nursing institutions mainly depend on their 
service charges to make ends meet, while the average operational subsidy sourced from 
local fiscal funding is only 124 RMB/month, accounting for 5.63% of total institutional 
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service charges (Lin and Liang, 2016). It can be seen that elder care funds in China 
mainly come from private funds, so government financial subsidies occupy a small 
percentage of the overall funding structure. This lack of government responsibility, 
especially the shortage of public expenditure, directly enhances the cost of social elder 
care, reducing the investment efficiency of services and purchaser’s demand ability, 
further influencing the quality and accessibility of social elder care services. 
The reasons for insufficient public investment are as follows: first, there is a lack of 
local fiscal resources. Since the implementation of a new taxation system in 1994
74
, 
local tax revenue has fallen, and central tax revenue is being transferred to the local 
level. Public funds for elder care are mainly shared between the municipal government 
and district/county government. The major part of budget expenditure is shared by two 
levels of government according to a certain ratio, while the excess is covered by the 
district/county government. Additionally, the transfer payment system implemented by 
central government mightbe defective, in that it eliminates business tax, increasing the 
financial pressure of elder care on local government through a corresponding decrease 
in their budget
75
. Building or remoulding a nursing institution and developing 
infrastructure for the elderly needs financial support from local government, but without 
sufficient funds progress would be very slow. The second reason for insufficient public 
investment is the absence of an independent budget for elder care. At present, funds for 
elder care are not included in China’s social security budget system, nor is elder 
careallocated a separate specially designated budget heading. This situationis not 
conducive to the generation ofaccurate scientific statistics and accurate fiscal input by 
central or local government.   
                                               
74
 China’s 1994 tax reform mainly focuses on tax-sharing arrangements in favour of the central 
government, so that local governments, especially at county level, experience much more pressure under 
tighter fiscal constraints.  
75
 After China’s 1994 tax reform, a product tax was abolished and a circulating tax introduced that was 
composed of value added tax, consumption tax and business tax. In January 2012, a new tax reform 
started, changing business tax to value added tax. The revenue from business tax used to be the main 
fiscal resource available to local government. However, because of the cancellation of business tax local 
public finance has been dramatically affected.  
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10.1.2.2 The Low Degree of Participation of the Private Sector in the Elder Care 
Industry 
Since reform and opening-up in the 1980s, the private economy has achieved great 
things economically. The private economy’s contribution has been highly visible in that 
it has produced over half of China’s GDP since 2010. In 2013, the private sector 
invested 27 trillion RMB into urban infrastructure, with year-on-year growth of 22.8%, 
accounting for 62% of private sector investment in China (Sun, 2014). Thus, the private 
sector plays an important role in China’s economic development. Since 2000, China has 
started to explore different approaches in order to encourage private companies to 
provide and fund elder care services. The gradual process of deregulation introduced by 
the Chinese government creates several ways for the private sector to participate in the 
elder care industry, such as, sole proprietorship, joint venture, cooperation and joint 
operation. These various forms of financing are being introduced into the construction 
of nursing institutions, the provision of home-based care services, and the development 
of a consumption market for the aged. However, private nursing institutions only offer a 
small proportionof the total number of nursing institutions across China. By the end of 
2015, the number of nursing institutions in China was 104,899, offering 6,698,400 beds 
for elderly people, which means that there are, equivalently, 30 beds to every 1,000 
elderly people. Private nursing institutions account for 29.3% (13,677) of the total 
number of beds available (National Statistics Bureau, 2016).  
The introduction of private sector companies into elder care provision is understood as a 
useful approach to optimise the allocation of resources,to supplement the shortage of 
public funds. Empirically, however, private sector investment in the industry is 
motivated by short-term profit-seeking, in part due to the limits of their own financial 
situations. Establishing a nursing institution requires lots of initial funding for land, 
fixed assets, relevant equipment, and service staff. Due to the nature of the private 
sector, unlike the public sector, it is difficult for companies in the private sector to get a 
bank loan. Besides, as there is a long return period, profit rates are generally not high. 
Research from Chinese Ageing Scientific Research Centre (2015) shows that only 
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19.4% of the private nursing institutions in China are run profitably, 32.5% run at a loss, 
and 48.1% break even. This makes fund accumulation relatively weak which results in a 
lack of available internal capital. Additionally, in the actual implementation stage, local 
governments often do not strictly enforce their own financing policies in the allocation 
of funds. They might, for example, set various restricted conditions which do not 
guarantee a certain amount of subsidies on time, or policy regulations prove too 
complex and can hardly be implemented in apractical situation. These factors will affect 
the enthusiasm of private enterprise to become involved in the elder care business. All 
these reasons may lead to a low degree of participation by private enterprise in the elder 
care industry, and further influence the development, or the lack of development, of an 
elder care market. 
10.1.2.3 Imbalance of Provision and Demand for Elder Care 
From an economic perspective, the proportional relation of input and output can create 
an effective outcome, otherwise the economic system might generate inefficient or less 
than efficient results. Elderly peopleare viewed as terminal consumers, and only 
effective consumption can promote the production of elder care services. At present, 
however, the existing supply of services cannot meet the demand of elderly people, 
mainly due to high accommodation expenses which result in a large number of vacant 
beds in nursing institutions. 
From 2010 to 2016, the number of nursing institutions increased and the number of beds 
has nearly doubled. Yet, the average occupancy rate of beds in various types of nursing 
institutions in China has dropped from 76.8% to 51.2% during this time (see Table 8.1 
in Chapter 8). In fact, these low accommodation ratesare a common phenomenon across 
China. The reasons for this are attributable to three factors: first, due to the traditional 
culture of China, the majority of Chinese elderly people prefer to stay at home with 
their children, although they might experience an increased demand for LTC due to 
health reasons in their old age. In some cases, communities could deliver door-to-door 
services to elderly people, but elderly people are also reluctant to accept these kind of 
services, because they prefer their families (particularly their own children) to look after 
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them. Besides, most Chinese elderly people tend to believe that the environment in 
nursing institutions is not as comfortable as at home, and that the service staffs are not 
as careful and considerate as their children. Thus, it is difficult for them to accept either 
institutional or community care. Second, the expense ofinstitutional care is relatively 
high and is out of reach for most elderly people resulting in low accommodation rates in 
nursing institutions. If the phenomenon of low accommodation rates exists for a long 
time, it will have a negative effect on the sustainable development of nursing 
institutions, especially private agencies which are largely relying on their own capital 
funds and are seeking a return on their investment. If these private nursing institutions 
raise their service fees, this could exacerbate the exclusion of elderly people who are 
more sensitive to such costs. Thus, excess bed capacity due to high fees threatens to 
undermine the financial viability of private elder care, which cannot fully meet elderly 
people’s care demands. 
Thus, the government’s misunderstanding about the capacity of the elder care industry 
to provide an adequate service, the ignorance of a diversified range of demands for elder 
care, elderly people’s actual purchasing power, and the absence of any assessment 
system, altogether have caused structural imbalances of supply and demand, and lead to 
a waste of resources. 
 
10.2 RQ2: Can LTCI Work as a Social Insurance to Benefit the 
Chinese Elderly People on the Demand Side? How can China Learn 
from International Lessons in this Area? 
Due to fiscal pressures and an increasingly aged population, China cannot establish the 
same universal tax-based funding model for LTC as those found in Nordic countries to 
cover all elderly people. In China, before establishing a public LTCI plan (June 2016), 
elder care was regarded as social assistance supported by fiscal revenue, which is 
similar to the mean-tested safe-net scheme implemented in the US and the UK. Social 
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assistance only applied to those who are identified as ‘Three-Nos’ and 
‘Five-Guarantees’ elderly people, and other elderly people have to fund themselves 
(depending on pensions and other benefits, e.g., old-age allowances and service 
subsidies) to purchase elder care services (community care and institutional care). 
Currently, the basic pension scheme achieves nearly full coverage across China: the 
urban basic pension level increased more than 58 times from 1978 to 2016, so that the 
average urban basic pension was 31,500 RMB/annual by 2016 (Ministry of Human 
Resources and Social Security, 2016). The new rural pension level is much lower, but 
together with an agricultural subsidy it ensures elderly people’s basic living standards 
(Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Agriculture, 2016). However, the financial 
resources for elderly people are still not adequate for the majority of Chinese people to 
access decent elder care services in their old age. In recognition of the growing demands 
of the ageing population, therefore, a reform in funding for LTC has to be launched as 
soon as possible. Referring to the conduct of several Western countries, a new social 
insurance scheme – public LTCI – is being introduced in China.  
Since June 2016, the Chinese Government aims to increase elderly people’s demand for 
LTC by introducing LTCI as a form of social insurance by launching a pilot programme 
in 15 regions. Due to the limited amount of time since its inauguration, it is difficult to 
examine the implications of this latest reform. However, I can compare China to other 
countries as a public LTCI plan has already been established in some Western countries. 
For instance, Japan and Germany launched this plan in 2000 and 1995, respectively. 
The implementation of LTCI in those countries can provide both experiences and 
lessons for the Chinese Government to further improve public LTCI in China.  
From a political perspective, since reform and opening-up in the late 1970s, the Chinese 
government placed economic growth as a top priority for a long time, and focused more 
on efficiency than on equality. At present, total Chinese GDP ranks second place in the 
world, but GDP per capita and disposable income for individuals lag far behind other 
developed countries. Thus, since the beginning of the twenty-first century onwards, the 
Chinese Government has paid more attention to people’s livelihoods. One objective is 
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to increase the elderly’s retirement income, including enhancing their basic pension 
level, establishing a new rural pension scheme and public LTCI and issuing an old-age 
allowance, etc., in order to stimulate elderly people’s demand to purchase elder care 
services. Another aim is to expand elder care provision and other relevant facilities. 
Although the current situation may not seem to be positive (e.g., low accommodation 
rates in the nursing institutions leading to empty beds), overall, policy orientations have 
been chosen to develop the elder care industry in order to meet anticipated future 
demand.  
In terms of the implementation of the public LTCI programme in several Western 
countries, it has exhibited some differences compared with China’s public LTCI scheme. 
For instance, in Japan and Germany, public LTCI is a mandatory system covering the 
whole population (Japan: 40 years and older; Germany: working-age people) 
(Fernandez and Forder, 2012: 350-1). But at present, in China, only 15 cities have 
begun to establish a public LTCI scheme which varies significantly between different 
locations. According to the relevant policy of the public LTCI scheme in Qingdao (in 
Shandong Province) and Jingmen (in Hubei Province), the scheme only covers elderly 
people who also enroll in the Urban Basic Medical Insurance System (excluding rural 
residents). In Beijing, the policy-based LTCI scheme is implemented on a voluntary 
basis, and it seems that the participation rate is less than expected. Thus, it will take a 
long time to achieve full coverage of this type of scheme across China.  
In addition, the public LTCI in Germany is designed as a PAYG system and is the fifth 
pillar of the country’s social security system. Although it is an independent and 
self-governing system, it is still connected to the existing statutory health 
insurance-funded programme, so that there is an overall financial balance among LTCI 
providers (Rothgang and Igl, 2007). With most cases in China, people enrolling in the 
Basic Urban Medical Insurance Scheme are automatically covered by the LTCI scheme, 
which is too immature to be an independent social insurance programme so it has to rely 
for its financial resources on public medical insurance funds and government subsidies. 
Unlike a PAYG pension scheme, the public LTCI scheme shares the same financial 
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principles as public medical insurance. By 2016 the balance of public medical insurance 
funds was so huge (277.6 billion RMB), it was higher than all other social insurance 
schemes (basic pension, unemployment insurance, work-related injury insurance and 
maternity insurance) (Ministry of Finance, 2017). Thus, the Chinese central government 
should consider connecting a universal LTCI scheme to the basic medical insurance 
system, and the LTCI can also be managed inside the medical insurance system.  
Third, in Germany, public LTCI is financed by income-related contributions equally 
paid by both employer and employee. In Japan, the financial sources of public LTCI 
scheme are from general national and local taxation (accounting for 50%) and personal 
premiums. Thus, the finance of the LTCI in Japan is linked to the national responsibility 
for all citizens. Currently in China, contribution criteria are not unified in pilot cities for 
LTCI purposes, and most of these schemes are not earnings-related. Due to the heavy 
burden of social insurance contributions (‘Five Insurance and One Fund’), Chinese 
employers are not required to contribute to the public LTCI scheme. In addition, the 
contribution level is more diversified in Western countries, for instance, in Japan, 
contributions include a 10% co-payment that is reduced for low income people 
(Fernandez and Forder, 2012: 351). In Germany, contribution rates vary between 
different groups. For instance, pensioners are required to pay the full contribution by 
themselves; an extra 0.25% is required from childless individuals, because they are less 
likely to receive informal care from relatives. Contributions for the unemployed are paid 
by the Federal Employment Office. Children up to the age of 25 years, and spouses or 
life partners with monthly income below a certain level are co-insured (Zuchandke et al., 
2012: 220). While in China, the contribution policy for public LTCI schemes differs 
considerably in all pilot cities, and there is currently no national unified contribution 
criteria set for these LTCI schemes. Thus, in the future, the central and local 
government in China need to consider establishing reasonable contribution criteria.  
Fourth, in order to meet the growing expenditure on benefit levels and make the public 
LTCI system more sustainable, Germany has increased the contribution rate several 
times from 2008 to 2017: a new contribution rate (at 1.95% of salary) and levels of 
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payments were set in 2008, and changed in January 2017 to 2.55% (2.8% for people 
without children) (Backer, 2016). These rectifications imply that the Chinese 
government also needs to consider the sustainable implementation of their public LTCI 
programme. 
At present, in China, the construction of the elder care industry has resulted in an 
increase of the population of care recipients (see Table 8.1 in Chapter 8), and reduced 
the elderly’s reliance on social assistance (see Table 6.3 in Chapter 6). This trend is 
quite similar to most Western countries, where LTCI programmes relieve municipalities 
from having to increase expenses for social assistance programmes, and further separate 
social assistance from LTC risk coverage (Zuchandke et al., 2012: 217; Fernandez and 
Forder, 2012: 353). However, the launch of LTCI and its increasing expenditure has 
demonstrated that private LTCI cover has been severely crowded out, especially in 
Japan. While in Germany, private LTCI cover is also compulsory (benefits on 
expenditure are the same for all LTC programmes) (Zuchandke et al., 2012: 216), which 
can greatly relieve public expenditure pressures.  
Above all, public long-term insurance programmes in Germany and Japan are 
compulsory and demand-oriented, covering all insured recipients. The public LTCI in 
Germany is designed as PAYG system, and the use of funds is not entirely restricted by 
fiscal budgets. The contribution rate can also be adjusted according to prevailing 
economic conditions, which reflects the flexibility of the policy in place. However, we 
should also bear in mind that in the German LTCI system, the funds covering blue 
collar workers has run at a deficit for some time, and this counts as a deficit on the 
public accounts. Whether the Chinese government would be prepared to take on this 
risk is questionable. Above all, the LTCI scheme designed as social insurance can, to 
some extent, make use of available social sources and generate positive results for 
society as a whole compared to those only relying on tax revenues. Thus, given my 
research and the available data, I suggest that a public LTCI scheme should be the main 
form of social welfare for Chinese elderly people in the future.  
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10.3 RQ3: Does the Analytical Framework offered by PPP Funding 
Arrangements Help us Analyse Current Trends in Funding Elder 
Care/LTC in China? 
Currently, Public and Private Partnerships (PPPs) are regarded as the most effective 
funding approach to expand elder care provision, including diversifying the range of 
services categories, and improving the quality and the level of elder care services. In the 
four case studies (discussed in Chapter 7), the introduction of a market-based 
mechanism and private capital have a positive effect on the reform of public nursing 
institutions. Apart from the advantages of PPPs indicated previously, these forms of 
investment can also motivate private agencies to provide elder care services, and create 
job opportunities in the local areas. For instance, all cases have demonstrated that after 
reform, the scale of these public nursing institutions is extended as more beds and 
relevant facilities are built, accommodation rates improve greatly
76
, and more jobs are 
offered to the local population, especially attracting women in their mid-fifties to work 
as service staff (e.g., the Wuhan Social Welfare House, after a new building was 
completed, offered more than 1,000 new jobs), which promotes the development of 
elder care. However, there are some problems that we need to take into consideration:  
First, as we learn from the historical context of social policies on elder care services, for 
a quite long time, the elder care service has been regarded as a public service provided 
by the government. This idea is common even nowadays, because the majority of 
elderly people still prefer to go to public nursing institutions (Social Welfare Houses) 
rather than private ones. Throughout the process of market-based reform in public 
nursing institutions, however, PPP-oriented elder care services gradually lose their 
public features. My research demonstrates, from observing PPP cases, which are driven 
by maximum profits, PPP projects are becoming an essential vehicle for private 
companies to obtain a government subsidy and gain operating profits, even though the 
                                               
76
 We have to exclude the Wuhan Welfare House/Xiehe Elderly Apartment, because this PPP project was 
just completed and the possible accommodation rate is unknown at this stage.  
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slow withdrawal of government funding in elder care is aimed at creating a 
market-based industry. However, management is entirely in private hands. As the 
contract period for a PPP project is quite long (e.g., in some cases, the contract period is 
over 20 years), private companies hope to gain more profits from these projects and 
usually compete during the bidding stage. Thus, new pricing systems under PPP 
projects tend to set higher prices for elder care than the previous system, creating more 
financial burdens for elderly people entering private care who might only depend on a 
pension for their income. In this respect, the PPP funding model has played an active 
role in the elder care industry, mainly working on the supply side. The investment of 
PPPs, which acts as a mixed funding method, works to create job opportunities, to 
expand beneficiary coverage, etc., but it does not satisfy elderly people’s practical 
welfare demand for LTC. Those who really need LTC cannot afford the relatively high 
expenses the new hybrid nursing institutions. Thus, it cannot be denied that public 
interest and public benefits are diminishing, and without other supplementary welfare 
benefits, the issues surrounding adequate elder care services will be more severe in the 
future as the elderly population grows.  
Second, considering the operating costs and profits of nursing institutions, it seems that 
after PPP reforms, private companies have not enjoyed as much profit as they had 
expected. For instance, in Hanchuan’s case, although the nursing institution runs under 
a ‘Public Construction and Private Operation’ model, the high depreciation fee and 
rising operating costs reduce profits, and this might affect their future business. In the 
UK’s case, as public care homes shift to private ones, this is accompanied by a dramatic 
decline in government subsidy with fewer elderly people receiving state help with the 
costs of their elder care services. Recently, a private equity-owned care home – The 
Four Seasons – has been teetering on the brink of collapse, with loans of more than 500 
million pounds and annual interest payments of 50 million pounds (Sodha, 2017). While 
the UK government refuses to raise the fee payments it makes for means-tested social 
care, these private companies face enormous difficulties in maintaining their business. 
The option of raising private fees to cross-subsidise elderly clients who cannot afford to 
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pay more provides no solution. As Williams (as cited in Sodha, 2017) argues, care 
homes are more suited to low-risk, low-return and long-term financing, because there is 
a significant mismatch between the high return of private equity and the delivery of 
elder care services. So, it seems that, without government intervention (in particular, a 
lack of public funding), a sudden shift from public to private nursing institutions may 
create serious financial issues over the long run. 
To sum up, the above problems have demonstrated that various PPP funding models on 
elder care in China can produce effective results, such as an increase in the construction 
of elder care services and the improvement of service quality. However, the PPP model 
has not solved elderly people’s increasing demand for LTC. Therefore, blind investment 
in PPP projects is not appropriate, rather social policy should consider funding models 
which can stimulate elderly people’s purchasing power, in other words, establishing a 
funding model for elder care from the perspective of the demand side. Raising the 
consumption of the elderly would strengthen the freedom of personal choice, which is 
essential to the effective operation of any market.  
 
10.4 RQ4: What is the Investment Efficiency in the Elder Care 
Funding in China? Which Investment Orientation is more Efficient in 
terms of Extending Care the Elderly? 
Based on the previous section, due to the absence of a public LTC institution in China, 
both equity and efficiency are not guaranteed. The Chinese government tends to invest 
more on the construction of elder care, in particular, subsidising the construction and 
operation of elder care services, which indicates that the Chinese government is more 
likely to focus on the supply side of elder care provision. Thus, efficiency is given 
higher priority than equity. However, from the perspective of equity, the majority of 
elderly people (or elderly people’s children) cannot afford to pay for relatively high care 
service fees; and, from the perspective of efficiency, overly aggressive expansion leads 
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to lower occupancy rates, thereby undermining a viable market mechanism in elder 
care.  
In this thesis, I used quantitative methods to investigate the efficiency of public 
expenditure on elder care services. Seen from the results of DEA statistical analysis, I 
find that input redundancy and output deficiency co-exist in some regions of China (see 
Section 8.2.3 in Chapter 8), and the efficiency of public expenditure varies significantly 
in different regions. The efficiency of public expenditure on elder care services in 
eastern and central China is much better than in western regions. Consequently, the 
allocation of welfare resources in the development of the elder care industry is 
unbalanced.  
In addition, the results of calculating an elder care service index for urban and rural 
China demonstrated that there is a welfare gap between urban and rural elderly people. 
According to my calculations, comparing different investments across areas on the 
construction of elder care, an investment in elderly people is more likely to significantly 
improve the level of elder care services in one region. Thus, it statistically proves what I 
have illustrated in the first three sections of the conclusion, that investment on the 
demand side of elder care generates greater efficiency than investment in the supply 
side, suggesting that demand-oriented investment should be China’s policy priority for 
the future. 
 
10.5 RQ5: What Kinds of Elder Care Funding Seem to be Working 
Most Effectively at Present that might Serve to Direct Future Policy? 
Since the reform and opening-up policy in the late 1970s, sustained economic growth 
has created a certain fiscal foundation which can be used to establish another 
redistributive social policy to achieve the balance between equality and efficiency. A 
unified national-based public LTCI scheme as a social insurance scheme which operates 
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on a PAYG basis, can solve the financial issues concerning elder care services in China 
and provide a stable source of funds for LTC.  
As discussed previously, the policy orientation in financing LTC in China has shifted 
priority from offering social assistance to vulnerable elderly people to establishing 
social insurance (in particular in the form of public LTCI) that covers all elderly people 
enrolling in a public medical insurance scheme. The former is fully funded by fiscal 
revenues issued by the Department of Civil Affairs in local areas. This needs to be 
maintained to provide a minimum living standard to those who are in extreme economic 
difficulty. Meanwhile, subsidy levels should be adjusted according to local economic 
conditions. As for the public LTCI as social insurance, the Departments of Human 
Resources and Social Security in local areas should take on the responsibilities for 
benefit administration and management, while elder care provision is delivered with 
market-based approaches.  
My conclusions demonstrate that China needs to establish a unified public LTCI system 
for both urban and rural residents. The collection of financial resources can be allocated 
by pooling funds contributed by individuals, companies and local government. These 
contributions can be used to subsidise private elderly people’s daily care services, and 
some medical care services. In addition, social policy needs to allocate and distribute 
the social pooling of LTCI funds, to balance gaps in funding between different regions. 
Its administrative system can follow the German model, in other words, to incorporate 
the lessons learnt from public medical insurance management. 
 
10.6 Strengths and Limitations of this Research in Terms of 
Methodology 
As I review previous studies of funding models for elder care/LTC, there is an 
abundance of studies mainly focusing on the examination of LTC funding models, 
especially the public LTCI scheme. However, there is no study on the performance of 
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PPP funding models, nor one making use of quantitative methods to analysis the 
efficiency of elder care/LTC funding systems. Thus, the strength of this research in 
terms of methodology is based on the incorporation of case studies into the research 
design, and quantitative methods that analyse the efficiency of investments on elder care 
services. 
One of the strengths of this research is the selection of four cases to analyse PPP 
projects on elder care in and around Wuhan, and also the discussion of their funding 
structure based on the interpretation of semi-structured interviews, as well as local 
documentary sources. These four PPP elder care projects are all typical cases and 
belong to four categories of the PPP funding model. Through in-depth interviews, I 
investigate the details of PPP contracts, basic information of the nursing institutions, 
operational situations before and after PPP reform, and any achievement or potential 
problem, etc. Semi-structure interviews are conducted with the interviewees from the 
government (e.g., the Hubei Department of Civil Affairs) and nursing institutions. Thus, 
the use of primary data from semi-structured interviews is more likely to fit local 
research contexts and enrich the database.  
Another strength is establishing an elder care service index system by using a 
multiple-linear regression model to evaluate the efficiency of public financial input in 
the elder care industry. This is achieved by comparing efficiency differences concerning 
public expenditure on the construction of elder care services, and between elderly 
people in urban and rural areas of China. It also establishes input and output indicators 
that represent the efficiency of public expenditure on elder care services. By using the 
DEA method, the results of calculation demonstrate the efficiency in different regions 
of China, and thus suggest how one might adjust the results that are lower than 
expected.  
However, there are two limitations that need to be pointed out:  
One limitation of this research is the difficulty of accessing the initial materials 
collected via semi-structured interviews. Some interviewees, including government 
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officials and managers in private companies, might choose to say whatever they wish to 
say or even refuse to answer questions. For instance, when I asked some questions 
related to the details of PPP contracts or annual financial statements, they rejected these 
questions with an excuse of privacy. In two instances, I asked the same question to two 
interviewees but the answers were somehow different. For example, when I investigated 
the project company of Wuhan Welfare House/Xiehe Elderly Apartment, the answer 
concerning registered capital differs from the official document released by the 
government. But I did not ask for the original contract, and finally I chose to trust the 
project company and use the data they offered. 
Another inevitable limitation is the reliability and accuracy of collective secondary data. 
In this thesis, all data for the statistical analysis in Chapter 8 is from the national 
statistical database (published by the National Statistical Bureau, the Ministry of Civil 
Affairs or other departments). All these data are collected from sample surveys 
conducted in local areas. In fact, local governments usually pay local officials to report 
the most optimistic and positive results if they do not wish further investigations and 
inspections from the central government. Indeed, reporting average performance is 
usually a good idea, as today’s social research tends to regard official statistical data as 
revealed truth and this trust may not be merited.  
 
10.7 Suggestions for Future Study 
First of all, this research attempts to predict the potential demand for LTC and provision 
expense in the future, and proposes the need to establish public LTCI to promote the 
development of the elder care industry. However, at present, only 15 cities have 
launched a pilot LTCI scheme since June 2016 (most of them have been implemented 
since 2017), so there is currently no useful data or studies available to evaluate the 
effectiveness of these LTCI schemes. So, further research is needed to investigate the 
performance of public LTCI schemes in several cities, perhaps interviewing 
policymakers in relevant administrative departments, for example, the Department of 
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Human Resources and Social Security. I will also investigate any advantages and 
problems within these public LTCI schemes, and compare the different performances of 
public LTCI schemes in these cities. 
Besides, due to the complex situation of the LTCI scheme in different regions of China, 
some factors, such as, the total population of disabled elderly people (including severely, 
moderately and mildly disabled), varied fees under the different types of LTCI schemes, 
and relations with the public medical insurance scheme, make it difficult to evaluate the 
efficiency of the public LTCI scheme as a single entity or to define an appropriate 
contribution rate of LTCI. So, further research might first need to quantify the relevant 
variables and analyse the operational efficiency of the public LTCI scheme, before 
proceeding to identify a way to calculate a reasonable contribution rate.  
In addition, due to the unavailable access to the relevant data of general private 
investment on elder care services, this research uses public expenditure to analyse the 
efficiency of fund allocation in the elder care industry, to compare and analyse the 
development of elder care services in both urban and rural China, or different regions of 
China. Further research should consider possible ways of obtaining the relevant 
statistics related to private investment, and identify how to quantify these statistics so as 
to analyse the impact of private investment on the development of elder care. 
Moreover, due to the limited length of the thesis, I only offer a review on the extensive 
literature related to different financing models for LTC in developed countries, but there 
is no detailed comparison and analysis of the LTCI models or problems of elder care 
provision and finance. In fact, the experiences and lessons of the developed countries is 
worthy of more extensive consideration, especially countries with a social insurance 
model, such as Germany, Japan, Netherlands, and Korea, etc. So, further research can 
be conducted to compare the financing system of LTC in developed countries, fully 
considering the issues related to institutional levels as well as to the different aspects of 
cultures, values, political systems and economic situations that might affect the 
construction of an elder care funding system. All these experiences will be useful 
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sources for the Chinese Government to consider in order to create a suitable funding 
model for elder care services.  
Finally, in China today, there large numbers of the population who have already retired, 
or are approaching retirement, who will never be covered by any LTCI scheme and 
whose children cannot afford (or are too distant) to meet their parents’ needs for elder 
care. This study has not addressed the impact of this transition, which poses its own 
difficulties. Therefore, further study is required to review existing LTCI plans, to 
investigate this group of elderly people and to analyse how public LTCI insurance 
might impact their demands for elder care. 
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Appendix 1: Application of Data Envelopment Analysis  
 
 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is proposed by the operational researcher Charnes 
(1978), and its basic principle is to evaluate, using a non-parametric method, economic 
system production frontier effectiveness. This method can be applied to evaluate the 
performance of multiple objective decision-making units for multiple inputs and 
multipleoutputs, and the application process is shown in the following Figure 1: 
 
Figure 1 Application Process of DEA Method 
 
In this research, we use BCC model (Banker, Charnes and Cooper, 1984) from the DEA 
method. The main advantage of the BCC model is to takes into consideration the 
variable return to scale in calculating efficiency, in other words, the scale of production 
varies in the long run in three interrelated performances: constant returns to scale, 
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decreasing returns to scale and increasing returns to scale. In BCC model, it is assumed 
that there are ‘n’ comparable decision making units, and each decision unit has ‘m’ 
types of inputs(X), which represents the production resources consumption of the 
decision unit, and there are also ‘s’ types of output, which means the economic benefits 
of production after putting in production factors. So the construction of the BCC model 
is shown as below: 
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Where s-、s+ are the input slack and output variables, j  is the weight coefficient of 
the input and output indices,   is the Non-Archimedes infinite small amount,   is 
the DEA efficiency value of evaluated decision-making unit. 
There are three types of model benefits under the BCC model: 
 When 1  and 0
 ss , the decision-making unit is DEA effective, and 
the output Y is optimal on the basis of input X in the economic system which 
consist of ‘n’ number decision making units.  
 When 1 but 0
s or 0
s , it means the decision-making unit is DEA 
effective, which can also be explained by over-investment or insufficient-output. 
 When 1 , the DMU is DEA invalid. 
 
